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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis is a cross-jurisdictional, multidisciplinary study of the use of 
potentially deceptive conduct in negotiation by lawyers and the regulation of such 
deceptive conduct through the legal ethics codes.   
Negotiation is considered a vital skill for every legal practitioner.  Negotiation is 
also a fairly unregulated dispute resolution process yet ubiquitous in practice.  One of the 
alleged acceptable tactics in negotiation is the use of some deception in certain forms.  
Potentially deceptive tactics such as bluffing, puffing, exaggerating the value of a deal, 
and certain settlement offers are considered a natural and acceptable part of the 
bargaining dance under acceptable negotiation theory.  This is especially true in business. 
Legal negotiators, however, work under very strict ethical codes of conduct which 
prohibit deception, misrepresentation, lying and fraud in any capacity.  A lawyer is not 
supposed to lie – ever.  This is due to the legal professional’s multi-faceted duties of 
loyalty to the client, the court, the justice system, and the public interest.  However, over 
the last few decades, legal professionals have incurred a negative perception of being 
liars and manipulators who themselves run afoul of the law and do not serve their clients’ 
best interests. 
While legal ethics codes are meant to curtail the deceptive behaviours of legal 
professionals, it is not entirely clear whether such attempts are successful or ever can be 
successful in light of acceptable negotiation practices which include some forms of 
deception. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani  9-Aug-10   xi
This thesis focuses on four main research questions related to deception in legal 
negotiation.  First, the thesis addresses whether lawyers engage in deception in 
negotiation.  Second, the thesis discusses whether legal ethics codes address this issue by 
conducting a comparative study of the legal ethics codes of four common-law 
jurisdictions.  Third, the thesis presents an original analysis of the legal ethics violations 
cases of one common-law jurisdiction.  Finally, the thesis recommends a tripartite set of 
strategic, integrated policy reform proposals aimed at addressing the issues related to 
lawyer deception in negotiation. 
Analysing the issue in a multidisciplinary capacity is essential to a better 
understanding of the role of ethics in the legal profession and the effect of regulating 
certain practices in negotiation.  Through this understanding, the various stakeholders in 
the legal system are better able to assess the extent to which the legal profession can 
successfully support lawyers in their duties to their clients, the courts, and the public 
interest whilst also maintaining a successful, ethically-focused practice. 
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CHAPTER 1 –  
ITRODUCTIO AD RATIOALE 
 
 
‘We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, 
but a habit.’  
 
        ~ Aristotle
1
 
 
This chapter provides an introduction and rationale for undertaking this 
research project and the investigation into a specific set of research questions.  A 
background to the study is followed by a discussion of the significance of this study as 
well as the study’s contribution to knowledge.  The chapter concludes with an 
overview of the research methodology, a statement of the problem, research 
questions, hypotheses (where applicable), and organisation of the thesis. 
1.1 ITRODUCTIO 
Negotiation is long considered an essential skill of a legal professional,
2
 if not 
the essential skill of an effective legal professional.
3
  While negotiation, or bargaining 
                                                 
1
 Thinkexist.com, Aristotle quotes (2009) <http://thinkexist.com/quotes/aristotle/2.html> at 9 August 
2010.  
2
 John Carvan, Understanding the Australian Legal System 74 (5
th
 ed, 2005).  (‘The term lawyer 
collectively describes members of the legal profession – barristers and solicitors.’). Similarly, the term 
legal professional as used in thesis refers to barristers and solicitors.  The terms lawyer, attorney, and 
legal professional are used interchangeably to mean a qualified member of the bar of the legal 
profession in a particular jurisdiction.  See also Rex R Perschbacher, ‘Regulating Lawyers’ 
Negotiations’ (1985) 27 Arizona Law Review 75, 75-76, n2 (‘Negotiation is one of the most important 
activities of the practicing lawyer.  It is the dominant method of resolving civil and criminal disputes 
and is also important in a non-litigation or transaction context such as in setting contract terms.’); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Legal Negotiation:  A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory’ (1983) 4 
American Bar Foundation Research Journal 905, 911 (‘….legal negotiators put together the millions 
of daily transactions that keep social, economic, and legal structures functioning…’) 
3
 William M Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond, and Lee S Schulman, 
Educating Lawyers:  Preparation for the Profession of Law (2007) 111 (stating that in the late1970s, 
the American Bar Association specifically required the teaching of negotiation in law schools after a 
report on lawyer competency).  See also American Law Institute - American Bar Association, 
Enhancing the Competence of Lawyers: The Report of the Houston Conference XI-XII (1981); Mark 
Osler, The Role of 2egotiation in Criminal Law Teaching (2006) 
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as it is often called, is something most people engage in on a daily basis, there is now 
particular attention being paid to how legal professionals negotiate because of the 
special rules and constraints to which lawyers are subject.  One of these factors is the 
extent to which legal ethics codes impact a lawyer’s use of potentially deceptive 
tactics in negotiations.  In addition, these constraints vary across legal jurisdictions 
and even countries.  While research in the area of legal negotiation behaviour is 
limited, research into the bargaining ethics of legal professionals is even more scant.  
This thesis contributes knowledge to this important and emerging area of interest 
amongst practitioners, academia, lawmakers and society at large.
4
  
1.2 BACKGROUD TO THE STUDY 
This thesis is about the study of the relationship between lawyers, the practice 
of negotiation in the context of the legal system, the ethics by which lawyers must 
perform their duties within the legal system and within society and the extent to which 
lawyers are permitted to use, or use regardless of permission, certain acceptable 
negotiation strategies, namely deception.  Prior to discussing the background to the 
study, it is recognised that many lawyers may not practice in a strictly adversarial 
legal setting where the issues of deception in negotiation are likely more relevant.  For 
example, many lawyers are engaged in non-litigious and non- adversarial work such 
as preparation of documents, where adversarial negotiation tactics such as deception 
might not exist.     
                                                                                                                                            
<http://lsi.typepad.com/lsi/2006/12/the_role_of_neg.html> at 9 August 2010 (‘Over 90% of criminal 
cases plead out in most jurisdictions, so negotiation is a key skill for criminal practitioners.’). 
4
 Robert J Condlin, ‘Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice 
Instruction’ (1981) 40 Maryland Law Review 223 (discussing ‘the major unstudied variable in the 
justice of the legal system – the patterned behaviour of individual lawyers.’). 
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In understanding the importance of the study and its contribution to 
knowledge, attention to and recognition of several concepts is necessary. 
First, negotiation,
5
 by and large, may be construed as a social good in that the 
act of bargaining is part of the fabric of society.  Society has always used negotiation 
as the primary means of social currency to achieve personal or business objectives.
 6
  
It is ubiquitous.  Many consider negotiation to be a social process, the regulation of 
which could be detrimental to social functioning.
7
  Negotiation, as a dispute resolution 
process, has undergone an evolution from being a fairly unstructured and loose 
interaction to being a more sophisticated, structurally defined process with its own 
rules, both technical and ethical and, in some cases, varied by profession.
8
  While the 
classical distributive bargaining
9
 technique is still used in such areas as personal 
injury cases and contract negotiations, an integrative bargaining model, sometimes 
                                                 
5
 Please refer to Section 1.7 (Definition of Key Terms) for a definition of ‘negotiation’ as used in this 
thesis. 
6
 See, eg, Richard T Ritenbaugh, 2egotiations, Deceptive (2009) 
<http://bibletools.org/index.cfm/fuseaction/Topical.show/RTD/CGG/ID/3716/Negotiations-
Deceptive.htm> at 9 August 2010 (discussing Biblical verses Numbers 22:7-14 which entails the 
biblical story of a labour negotiation between Balaam, Balak, and the princes as well as the deceptions 
used to obtain personal or material gain).  The reason for the alleged deception is the desire to have the 
best of both worlds.  That core reason does not appear to have changed though, I argue, the means of 
achieving such desires is important.  See also Robert Benjamin, Swindlers, Dealmakers, and 
Mediators: A Brief History of Ethics in 2egotiation (2004)  
<http://www.mediate.com/articles/benjamin16.cfm#> at 9 August 2010 (‘There have been third parties 
involved in brokering business deals, treaties, and conflicts since the beginning of time but only in 
recent years have we begun to formalize and professionalize that role.’)  
7
 James A Barnes, A Pack of Lies: Towards a Sociology of Lying (1996) 3 (discussing Arendt (1968) 
and Barwise and Perry (1983) and the views of lying as central to human creativity, conversation, and 
freedom).  See also Avnita Lakhani, ‘The Truth About Lying as a Negotiation Tactic:  Where Business, 
Law, and Ethics Collide…or Do They?’ (2007)  9 ADR Bulletin 6. 
8
 By this I mean that the rules for acceptable bargaining in business may be different than rules for 
bargaining in the legal system. See, eg, Benjamin, above n 6 (describing negotiation as ‘the heart of 
mediation’ and providing historical examples of negotiations and the tensions created by its historical 
past through Biblical times).  
9
 Please refer to Section 1.7 (Definition of Key Terms) for a definition of key terms used in this thesis. 
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called principled negotiation,
10
 has gained in popularity through the publication of 
negotiation books such as Getting to Yes
11
 and Getting Past 2o.
12
  
Second, lawyers negotiate constantly and on a daily basis; however, many 
lawyers negotiate within a very specific context, namely the adversarial legal system 
which appears to support litigation as the core means of dispute resolution.  By this I 
mean that the adversarial system, historically, is based on the notion of every person 
having their day in court where the rules of litigation apply as opposed to rules of 
mediation, negotiation, or other dispute resolution process.  ‘Adversarial’ means and 
implies adversaries or competitors who are automatically on opposite sides with 
opposing views.  It is about winners and losers, about claiming as much value out of 
the bargaining pie as one can for the benefit of one’s client.  It is about client loyalty 
above all else.  As such, an adversarial system might naturally embrace a distributive 
bargaining model.  Once again, it is acknowledged that some lawyers may engage in 
transactional or non court-related legal work that does not consist of adversarial 
bargaining.  In such cases, these lawyers may adopt other negotiation styles.  
However, nearly all lawyers generally have special ‘rules’ and ‘ethical codes’ that 
appear to prevent them from using certain distributive bargaining strategies, such as 
an acceptable level of deception, that are naturally acceptable to all other non-legal 
negotiators/bargainers. 
Finally, ethics and the extent to which negotiations should be ethical is 
becoming an ever-increasing area of critical analysis and concern. With the evolution 
                                                 
10
 Principled negotiation is the term used by Fisher and Ury to describe interest-based negotiations.  It 
consists of four main principles:  1) separate people from the problem; 2) focus on interests, not 
positions; 3) invent options for mutual gain; and 4) insist on objective criteria. 
11
 Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: 2egotiating Agreement Without Giving In (1981). 
12
 William Ury, Getting Past 2o: 2egotiating Your Way from Confrontation to Cooperation (1993).  
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of business and law in an era of globalisation, both law and business are instantly 
international services and subject to the cross-cultural, cross-disciplinary, and cross-
jurisdictional forces that collide with ethics.  These ethics include societal ethics (the 
ethical norms of a society, community, or culture under which lawyers operate), 
bargaining or negotiation ethics (the personal ethics paradigm of negotiators) and 
legal ethics (the ethics codes imposed on lawyers).  Ethics is often concerned with 
expectations of truth and fairness so that the use of deception or deceptive negotiation 
tactics, such as lying, would seem to violate the rules of ethical negotiation.  Further, a 
legal negotiator who uses deception could be considered unethical and in violation of 
the legal ethics code.  Yet when looking at acceptable negotiation theory and 
principles, certain deceptive practices are considered permissible and expected. 
The study aims to look at certain deceptive practices used by legal 
professionals, how and why ethics codes attempt to regulate such conduct, and 
whether the ethical controls imposed on the use of certain allegedly deceptive 
negotiation tactics by legal professionals may or may not be successful. 
1.3 SIGIFICACE OF THE STUDY 
This study is significant in four important ways.  First, the seemingly troubling 
and increasing negative perception of legal professionals by clients, legal 
commissions, disciplinary tribunals and courts, is frequently attributed to lawyers 
being perceived as deceptive and unethical.
13
  While the overall number of lawyers 
                                                 
13
 See, eg, Gary A Hengstler, ‘Vox Populi:  The Public Perception of Lawyers:  ABA Poll’ (1993) 79 
American Bar Association Journal 60; American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Public 
Perception of Lawyers:  Consumer Research Findings (2002) 
<http://www.abanet.org/litigation/lawyers/publicperceptions.pdf> at 9 August 2010; Daniel Dasey, 
Judges lose public’s confidence (4 May 2003) The Sun Herald 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/05/03/1051876898909.html> at 9 August 2010; Margaret 
Simons, Lawyers 2ot Moral Judges:  Clayton Utz Chief, The Sunday Age (Melbourne), 4 August 2002, 
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may be ‘honest’, the negative perception created by a few lawyers in a self-regulated 
profession may be enough to engender concern and a review of legal ethics codes.  
Second, law increasingly plays a role on the international stage yet the 
jurisdictional standards of proper ethics with respect to negotiation are inconsistent.  
One country’s legal ethics codes may condone certain levels of acceptable deception 
while another country’s ethics patently forbid any form of deceit or misrepresentation 
during negotiations.  At the same time, a lawyer’s clients may play by their own, 
perhaps contradictory, ethics with respect to bargaining.  Understanding such tensions 
is critical in order for lawyers to navigate the bargaining minefield. 
Third, understanding the tensions between law, ethics, and negotiation will 
benefit policy makers so as to ensure that future policy affecting legal professionals 
and their duties to the client, the courts, and the pursuit of justice takes into account 
the impact of rules and ethical codes which constrain a lawyer’s ability to serve the 
public interest.  Furthermore, policy decisions which attempt to control certain 
behaviours of legal professionals can account for reasonable societal expectations of 
the duties carried out by legal professionals. 
Finally, this study is significant in reviewing the existing theoretical 
framework for negotiation and introducing a potentially new theoretical framework 
for the negotiation process.  By doing so, this study fills a gap in the existing 
knowledge with respect to fully understanding the implications of imposing ethical 
controls on the negotiation behaviour of legal professionals. 
                                                                                                                                            
3.  Full article is available at <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/08/03/1028157860572.html> at 
9 August 2010. 
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1.4 COTRIBUTIO TO KOWLEDGE 
This thesis provides considerable contribution to knowledge in various areas 
including the cross-disciplinary areas of negotiation theory, legal ethics, negotiation 
ethics, and negotiation practice and legal education.  The most significant 
contribution, as discussed below, is to the area of public policy and law reform. 
First, as discussed further in Chapter 7, this thesis presents a comprehensive, 
integrated set of policy reform proposals aimed at addressing the complex issues 
represented by the research questions outlined in Chapter 1, section 1.6.  These policy 
reform proposals target legal regulation, ethical standard setting, and institutional 
design, three components of sustainable, measurable change.   
A second contribution of this thesis to public policy and law reform is a more 
thorough and comprehensive knowledge base from which to inform policy making 
decisions that might affect legal professionals, especially in the area of negotiations 
and legal ethics.  This knowledge base is primarily in the form of the literature review 
which takes an interdisciplinary approach to investigating and analysing current 
research on negotiation, ethics, legal decision-making and notions of how legal 
professionals conduct their negotiation practices.  
A third significant contribution of this thesis to public policy and law reform is 
an integrated framework for analysing and addressing a research problem which, even 
today, is a source of debate without action or resolution.  While most scholarly 
attempts to address the issue of deception in legal negotiation have included isolated 
suggestions and proposed solutions, this thesis strives to take a more 
multidisciplinary, cross-jurisdictional view of the issues and proposes an integrated 
framework for addressing the research question.  This integrated framework can be 
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replicated across jurisdictions and implemented with minimal effort and maximum 
benefits.    
Finally, this thesis addresses the challenges of implementing proposed 
behavioural changes by introducing and discussing some viable methods of executing 
the policy reform proposals that will allow policy makers and other key stakeholders 
to benchmark, test, and measure the successful development of policy in the target 
areas. 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the research 
methodology used in this thesis.  The research methodology used in this study is 
broad, varied, multidisciplinary, and cross-jurisdictional.  This methodology is used to 
ensure reliability and validity of the results with respect to the research questions. 
A particular study may have a specific research perspective.
14
  In the context 
of this study, the research perspective is limited to a positivist inquiry approach in the 
areas of law, legal negotiation, and legal ethics from the perspective of common-law 
jurisdictions.  A positivist inquiry, most commonly used and respected within legal 
academia, means that the research entails a review and analysis of law and related 
legal document such as statutes, codes of conduct, tribunal decisions, judicial 
opinions, law journal articles, law review articles, and case law decision in law and 
ethics.  Further, a review of literature in related areas such as negotiation, psychology, 
behavioural modification, business, and economics is undertaken, where necessary 
and applicable.   
                                                 
14
 See generally Raymond L Calabrese, The Elements of an Effective Dissertation & Thesis:  A Step-by-
Step Guide to Getting it Right the First Time (2006). 
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The research design of this thesis is primarily a theoretically based, 
qualitative study, one which is common to the field of law.  A key aspect of this 
design is to not only describe but to analyse certain key variables of the research 
question in attempting to explain the cause of a phenomenon.
15
  For example, if the 
use of deceptive negotiation practices is prohibited in the legal profession then why 
are there so few cases of ethical violations by legal professionals who use such 
practices, almost daily?   
The central aspects of the research design consisted of the following  main 
tasks:  1) a catalogue and analysis of various tactics used by legal professionals when 
employing a strategy of deception in negotiation; 2) an analysis of legal ethics codes 
in various common-law countries, primarily Australia and United States with some 
analysis of Canadian and Hong Kong legal ethics codes; 3) an analysis of legal ethics 
cases decided in Queensland, Australia;  4) a set of strategic policy reform proposals 
designed to address the issues raised by the study; and 5) an analysis of methods used 
to successfully implement policy changes as related to the policy reform proposals 
recommended herein. 
Data collection involved the process of defining and collecting information 
from which to conduct detailed analysis, present the findings, and interpret the 
implication of the research findings on future policy reform.  Overall, I performed the 
following data collection and data analysis tasks:   
 review and analyse existing literature to find what types of tactics and 
behaviours legal professionals might associate with a strategy of 
deception in negotiation; 
                                                 
15
 See, eg, John W Cresswell, Research Design: qualitative and quantitative approaches (1994); Bruce 
W Tuckman, Conducting Educational Research (3
rd
 ed, 1988). 
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 review and analyse literature to understand the difference between 
various models of ethics, especially legal ethics versus philosophical 
ethics versus bargaining ethics, if any; 
 review and analyse legal ethics codes to understand the kinds of 
deceptive behaviours the legal ethics codes is attempt to regulate or 
control in various jurisdictions; 
 review and analyse negotiation literature to determine to what extent 
deceptive behaviour is allowed or not allowed and the impact of 
bargaining ethics on such; and  
 review and analyse measures of ‘success’ of negotiation such as 
efficiency, agreement, and good outcome in order to determine if 
regulating deceptive behaviours via the legal ethics code could be 
considered ‘successful’ both in terms of successful negotiation and as 
determined against negotiation theory and principles.  
1.6 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
This section discusses the research problem that is the focus of this thesis 
including a statement of the problem, research questions, limitations and 
delimitations.  
1.6.1 Statement of the Problem 
In the context of a thesis, Clark, Guba, and Smith state that a problem 
‘establishes the existence of two or more juxtaposed factors, which, by their 
interaction, produce: (1) an enigmatic or perplexing issue, (2) yield an undesirable 
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consequence, or (3) results in a conflict which renders the choice from among 
available alternatives moot.’
16
 
Prevailing negotiation literature contends that certain kinds of deception are 
permissible, and even expected, as part of the bargaining process, while other 
deceptive tactics are considered unethical or sometimes illegal.
17
  Juxtaposed to that, 
the legal ethics codes for certain countries, though not all, allow for a certain amount 
of deception when lawyers negotiate on behalf of their clients.  Sometimes the bounds 
of the legal ethics codes conflict with societal norms of what is expected of lawyers 
and the standard of behaviour expected in the negotiation process.  In addition, over 
the last decade or so, there has been a significant decline in the public’s trust and 
perception of the justice system with the primary issue being the lack of integrity and 
honesty of lawyers.
18
  Finally, there have been recent attempts to not only impose 
greater candour within the bargaining process but to call for amendments to legal 
ethics codes to fully restrict a lawyer’s attempts to use deceptive tactics in any 
context.
19
  So far, there has not been an adequate assessment of this problem to 
propose a viable, practical solution. Therefore, a more thorough analysis of prevailing 
ideas and knowledge using a multidisciplinary approach is necessary.  
                                                 
16
 David L Clark, Egon G Guba, Gerald R Smith, Functions and Definitions of Functions of a Research 
Proposal (1977) 6. <http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/jrichardson/dis290/clark.pdf> at 9 August 2010.  See 
also Fred N Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (1973) 16-17 (‘A problem, then, is an 
interrogative sentence or statement that asks: What relation exists between two or more variables?’). 
17
 See Chapter 2 (Review of Literature) for more information on this topic.  By ‘illegal’ I am referring 
to certain deceptive behaviour that may be considered fraudulent and is therefore generally considered 
to be illegal as well as in violation of professional ethics codes. 
18
 See, eg, Hengstler, above n 13; American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Public Perception of 
Lawyers:  Consumer Research Findings, above n 13; Dasey, above n 13; Simons, above n 13. 
19
 See, eg, Eleanor Holmes Norton, ‘Bargaining and the Ethics of Process’ in Carrie Menkel-Meadow 
and Michael Wheeler (eds) What’s Fair:  Ethics for 2egotiators (2004) 270-298; John  Ladd, ‘The 
Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics: An Intellectual and Moral Confusion’ in Geoffrey C Hazard Jr 
and Deborah L Rhode,  The Legal Profession: Responsibility and Regulation (2
nd
 ed 1988) 105;  Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, ‘Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment:  A Proposal for a 
Golden Rule of Candour’ (1990) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 761 
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1.6.2 Research Questions 
As discussed before, negotiation, a critical function of lawyers, intersects 
both law and ethics and provides fertile ground for research.  The ways in which 
lawyers conduct negotiations or behave as negotiators may have an impact on how 
clients or key stakeholders perceive the legal profession’s ability to administer justice.   
With an understanding of this context, the focus of this study is an attempt to 
answer the following research questions: 
(a) What are some potentially deceptive negotiation tactics as commonly 
used by lawyers as negotiators? 
(b) How do legal ethics rules attempt to control the potentially deceptive 
negotiation tactics as might be used by legal professionals? 
(c) Are attempts by legal ethics rules to regulate the use of potentially 
deceptive negotiation tactics by legal professionals successful? 
(d) How can the prevailing approach be reformed to improve the ways in 
which the profession might more successfully regulate the use and 
impact of potentially deceptive negotiation tactics by legal 
professionals? 
Prior to discussing the research hypotheses, this study acknowledges that there may be 
other specific jurisdictional statutory controls on negotiation behaviour which are 
considered out of scope for the purposes of this thesis and this study.  Some of these 
include, for example, the requirement of ‘good faith’ in negotiation in such areas as 
retail lease disputes and franchising disputes, the evolution of the negotiation pledge 
in Victoria, Australia, and the use of collaborative negotiation models which 
contractually require candour and transparency.  While such legislation is important to 
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the evolution of attempts to control negotiation behaviour, the focus of this study is on 
the legal ethics codes to which every practicing lawyer is subject within their 
practicing jurisdiction.    
1.6.3 Research Hypotheses (where applicable) 
As the research design of this study is a qualitative research methodology, 
detailed research hypotheses are not applicable.   
However, given that one aspect of this study consists of a detailed analysis of 
a common-law jurisdiction’s ethics cases, research hypotheses in this context may be 
useful.  The following are research hypotheses relate specifically to the qualitative 
study of ethics violation cases
20
 in Queensland, Australia: 
1. Where deception is used by a lawyer in a negotiation context, the 
lawyer will be punished for unethical conduct, cited either as 
unprofessional conduct or practice or professional misconduct, in 
violation of professional ethics codes. 
2. Lawyers who practice in a jurisdiction where certain deceptive 
practices in negotiation are allowed will not be punished under the 
professional code of ethics for engaging in such conduct. 
3. Lawyers who practice in a jurisdiction where deception in negotiation 
is not allowed will be punished for the use of deception in negotiation 
under the professional code of ethics. 
4. Deception in negotiation is deemed not acceptable unless specifically 
indicated or outlined in a jurisdiction’s professional code of ethics. 
                                                 
20
 See Chapter 5, Section 5.10 (Queensland Ethics Violation Cases) for more information on this topic. 
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It is expected that a post-doctoral study would include and benefit from a 
quantitative study using measurable hypotheses with a target audience of legal 
professionals. 
1.6.4 Limitations 
Limitations are potential weaknesses in the design or methodology of the 
study that potentially restricts the study’s scope.
21
 
There are three possible limitations of this study design.  First, the 
geographic scope is limited to select common-law countries, namely Australia, United 
States, Hong Kong, and Canada.  In addition, there may appear to be a greater reliance 
on US sources on the primary topic relative to sources from other common-law 
countries.  This may be because of the breadth of literature and perspectives available 
in the US regarding the topic of legal ethics rules to control negotiation behaviour as 
well as debate surrounding some of the controversial provisions of the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  This is meant to provide a 
perspective and basis for discussing the topics herein and not intended to convey that 
these perspectives or issues necessarily exist in other common-law countries studied 
in this thesis.  However, the issue of whether legal ethics codes are effective in 
controlling lawyer behaviour, especially in negotiation, is ripe for all common-law 
countries because these professional ethics codes serve as the basis for the self-
regulation of the profession in common-law countries.  In addition, the duties, task, 
and obligations of lawyers in common-law countries are similar to the extent that 
recommendations based on an understanding of one common-law country’s legal 
ethics rules, such as those of the United States or Canada, for example, might be 
                                                 
21
 Enrique J Murillo, Jr, Murillo method: A guide (2005) <http://coe.csusb.edu/Murillo/method3.htm> 
at 9 August 2010; Calabrese, above n 14, 12. 
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useful for other common law such as Australia and Hong Kong.  In the end, the 
perceived reliance on sources from one country serves to only to educate and benefit 
others rather than to indicate or imply the dominance of one country’s views on the 
topic over another.  
Second, the absence of comparing a civil law country to the common law 
jurisdictions in this thesis or to a system that is culturally unique means that the 
results and recommendations may vary where such distinctions exist.  On the other 
hand, this limitation is appropriate because civil law and common law systems are 
different.  This potential limitation does not restrict the value of the findings of this 
study since Australia, United States, and a particular province in Canada have taken 
different approaches with respect to the use of ethical codes of conduct to control 
deceptive negotiation practices by legal professionals.  Therefore, there is great 
benefit in a comparative study and such analysis will further provide a foundation for 
future studies across more legally and culturally diverse systems and jurisdictions. 
Third, the regulatory scope of the study is limited to looking at ethical codes 
of conduct for legal professionals as well as cases dealing with the violation of 
professional ethics codes.  Professional ethics codes are the primary source of 
guidance for how lawyers ought to behave in practice.  These professional ethics 
codes provide the legal profession’s regulatory controls for lawyers such that lawyers 
who violate these ethics rules are subject to professional sanctions.   
A final potential limitation of this study is the analysis of the ethics violation 
cases of a single common-law jurisdiction, Queensland, as opposed to conducting an 
analysis across legal jurisdictions.  The purpose of using a single common-law 
jurisdiction is two-fold.  First, the ethics violation cases in Queensland are readily 
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available through a public register.  Second, analysing the ethics violation cases of a 
single jurisdiction helps to establish the framework and guidelines for conducting 
future post-doctoral studies.  Therefore, this potential limitation does not deter from 
the value of this thesis in contributing to knowledge of the research problem, research 
questions, subsequent findings and policy reform proposals.   
1.6.5 Delimitations 
Delimitations are the self-imposed boundaries used to delimit the scope of 
the study.
22
 
The focus and scope of the study is based on an evolving delimitation 
process.  After a preliminary review of many statutes, regulations, codes, and cases 
which attempt to control the negotiation practices of legal professionals, it became 
clear that the most direct and explicit source of regulating lawyer conduct in practice 
on a national basis is the legal ethics codes.  In addition, the legal ethics codes define 
and regulate how lawyers ought to behave in their various functions, such as 
advocates, mediators, and judges.  This is not to say that there are no other statutory 
attempts to control negotiation behaviour.  As stated above, it is acknowledged that 
there may be other specific jurisdictional statutory controls on negotiation behaviour, 
such as good faith requirements, negotiation pledges, or contractually binding 
collaborative lawyering agreements that mandate honesty.  However, the legal ethics 
codes bind every practicing lawyer in their profession, and sometimes personal, 
capacity.  Therefore, I concluded that a more focused study involving key variables 
would achieve the objectives of this thesis in terms of answering a set of specific 
research questions and making a viable contribution to knowledge.   
                                                 
22
 University of South Dakota, 12 Components:  Evaluating qualitative design (2005) 
<http://www.usd.edu/ahed/analysis.cfm> at 9 August 2010; Calabrese, above n 14, 13. 
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The literature review, analysis, and published articles related to this thesis 
revealed that one of the more persistent issues in the field is the seemingly perpetual, 
yet scientifically unproven, notion that lawyers are deceptive and that deceptive 
practices by lawyers in negotiations are the norm.  A related issue involves conflicting 
views on whether to condone the use of deceptive tactics by lawyers engaged in 
negotiation, with some contending that there should be a rule or code of conduct that 
imposes greater candour or truth in negotiations.  This position appears to be contrary 
to acceptable negotiation principles, theories, and practice.  The negotiation process 
and the ethics of legal professionals are under greater scrutiny with the increased use 
of legal negotiation.  Therefore, defining the scope of this study to the intersection of 
law, ethics and negotiation, specifically as it pertains to attempts by the legal ethics 
codes to regulate the use of deceptive tactics by legal professionals, provides a 
significant contribution to knowledge.    
Furthermore, because the common-law jurisdictions of Australia, United 
States, and Canada appear to have taken different approaches in their professional 
ethics codes in terms of regulating deceptive conduct of legal professionals, a 
comparative analysis is insightful and provides the basis for further empirical studies.  
While the study attempts to conduct a cross-jurisdictional and multidisciplinary 
analysis, it does not attempt to discuss in detail the cross-cultural implications or 
multicultural aspects of the research questions though some attention is warranted 
where it may provide insight or explanation.  A full and thorough analysis of the 
specialised topic of cross-cultural negotiations is not within the scope of this study, 
though insights gained in this study may be applied cross-culturally. 
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1.6.6 Assumptions 
Kennedy states that ‘[i]n research, assumptions are equivalent to axioms in 
geometry – self-evident truths, the sine qua non of research.  In research, well-
constructed assumptions add to the study’s legitimacy.’
23
  Assumptions may take the 
form of propositions to guide the inquiry in the form, for example, ‘if we assume x, 
then it follows that y.’
24
  The following assumptions were made during this study: 
1. Where the prevailing societal ethics was in line with the legal ethics of 
the jurisdiction and did not condone the use of deception in negotiation, 
there should be less tolerance for the use of deceptive tactics among 
legal professionals. 
2. Legal professional ethics codes regulate the deceptive practices of legal 
professionals and punish accordingly. 
3. Deception and the use of deceptive practices are generally considered 
common practice in some legal negotiations. 
4. The profession of lawyers (the professional body) recognise that 
negotiation is a specific skill used by lawyers. 
5. Regulatory bodies do not condone the use of deception in negotiation 
unless specifically indicated, the presumption being that the use of 
deception by all lawyers, in any capacity, is not acceptable. 
6. If we assume that the legal ethics codes bar the use of deceptive 
behaviour among legal negotiators, then it follows that violation of 
these codes should result in significant numbers of ethics violation 
                                                 
23
 Calabrese, above n 14, 14. 
24
 Robert Yin, Case study research: Design and methods (3
rd
 ed, 2003); Calabrese, above n 14, 14. 
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cases against lawyers in a self-regulated profession with severe 
consequences. 
7. If we assume that the legal ethics codes do not bar the use of deceptive 
behaviour among legal negotiators, then it follows that violation of 
these codes should not result in significant numbers of ethics violation 
cases against lawyers in a self-regulated profession with severe 
consequences. 
8. Where the law imposes controls on negotiation behaviour in 
contravention of acceptable negotiation theory and principles, such 
controls would undermine the goal of ‘successful’ negotiations. 
1.7 DEFIITIO OF KEY TERMS 
This section lists and defines the key terms that are central to this study and 
used throughout this thesis.  Unless otherwise indicated in the body of the thesis, the 
terms listed in this section will have the corresponding meaning.  The key terms used 
in this thesis are as follows, in alphabetical order: 
1. Bargaining – defined as ‘the competitive, win-lose situations such as 
haggling over price that happens at a yard sale, flea market, or used car 
lot.’
25
 
2. Cross-jurisdiction – defined as taking into account the views of 
different geographic boundaries with the authority to exercise power or 
administer justice.
26
  For example, in this thesis, the legal jurisdictions 
taken into account are Australia, United States, Canada, and Hong 
Kong. 
                                                 
25
 Roy Lewicki, David M Sanders, and Bruce Barry, 2egotiation (5
th
 ed, 2006) 3.  
26
 Sara Hawker (ed), Colour Oxford Dictionary, Thesaurus, and Wordpower Guide (2002) 340. 
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3. Deception – defined as ‘the business of persuasion aided by the art of 
selective display’ put into effect by two primary behaviours:  ‘hiding 
the real and showing the false.’
27
 It involves convincing another to 
believe something which is either not true or not completely true.      
4. Ethics – includes ‘the various theories and schools of ethics that 
attempt to describe the kind of moral action, conduct, motive or 
character that a society ought to embody, how society ought to 
behave.’
28
  Negotiation scholars define ethics as ‘broadly applied social 
standards for what is right or wrong in a particular situation, or a 
process for setting those standards.’
29
  
5. Lawyer – defined as a person admitted to the legal profession under the 
appropriate laws of a legal jurisdiction.
30
  In the context of this thesis, 
the term lawyer encompasses both barristers (specialist advocates) and 
solicitors. 
6. Legal Ethics – may be defined as ‘[u]sages and customs among 
members of the legal profession, involving their moral and professional 
duties towards one another, towards clients, and toward the courts.’
31
  
                                                 
27
 John W Cooley, ‘Defining the Ethical Limits of Deception in Mediation’ (2004) 4 Pepperdine 
Dispute Resolution Law Journal 263; See also David Nyberg, The Varnished Truth:  Truth Telling and 
Deceiving in Ordinary Life (1992) 66-67. 
28
 Black’s Law Dictionary (6
th
 ed, 1990) 553; See also Lewicki et al, above n 25, 236; See also David A 
J Richards, ‘Moral Theory, the Developmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism’ 
(1981-1982) 31 Journal of Legal Education 359, 373 (describing ethics as a form of critical reasoning 
used to develop universalist principles that apply to oneself and others);  Gary Tobias Lowenthal, ‘The 
Bar’s Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers’ (1988-1989) 2 Georgetown Journal of Legal 
Ethics 411, 413 (describing ethics broadly as desired conduct that is morally binding). 
29
 Lewicki et al, above n 25, 236.  
30
 See, eg, Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 5 (describing various definitions of ‘lawyer’ under the 
Act); Hawker, above n 26, 352. 
31
 Black’s Law Dictionary, above n 28, 894.  See also Mirko Bagaric and Penny Dimopoulos, ‘Legal 
Ethics is (Just) Normal Ethics:  Towards a Coherent System of Legal Ethics’ (2003) QUT Law and 
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Legal ethics are the standards of what is right and wrong by legal 
professionals who operate within the legal system.  These standards are 
generally documented and prescribed in each jurisdiction’s legal ethics 
rules and/or codes of professional conduct.  In addition, these standards 
may be implicit by conduct as well as explicit by prescription. 
7. Legal 2egotiation – defined as situations that occur when parties try to 
find a solution to a complex problem within the rules, codes of 
conducts, and limitations of the legal justice system.  Generally legal 
negotiation involves lawyers representing client interests, which are 
generally opposing interests.
32
  In the context of this thesis, legal 
negotiation includes both distributive (common) and integrative 
situations. 
8. Legal Practitioner – defined as a lawyer who holds a current practicing 
certificate or license in the relevant jurisdiction.  In the context of this 
thesis, the term legal practitioner includes both barristers (specialist 
advocates) and solicitors.  In addition, the terms legal practitioner and 
lawyer are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
9. Legal Regulation – defined as the rules of law that are intended to 
control behaviour and are considered part of the state’s ‘normative 
arsenal’ in regulating the conduct of members of society, re-enforcing 
ethical standards for the good and providing disincentives for poor 
                                                                                                                                            
Justice Journal 21; Gerald Wetlaufer, ‘The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations’ (1990) 75 Iowa Law 
Review 1219, 1235-1236.  
32
 Russel Korobkin, ‘A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation’ (2000) 88 Georgetown Law Journal 
1789, 1809, n 24 (describing ‘legal negotiation’ as one ‘where the negotiator often is an agent [lawyer] 
for a principal [client] who is not present at the bargaining table’). 
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conduct.  In the context of the legal profession, legal regulation 
includes professional codes of conduct (ethics codes), court rules, and 
laws regulating the legal profession such as the Legal Profession Act 
1987 in Australia.     
10. Lie – defined as a false statement made with the intent to deceive, an 
intentional untruth.
33
  In the context of the legal system, a lie may be 
defined as ‘a statement made with the intent to deceive which purports 
to state the existence, in unequivocal terms, of facts and law contrary to 
the declarant’s express knowledge.’
34
   
11. Morals (Morality) – defined as ‘individual and personal beliefs about 
what is right and wrong.’
35
  Morals are ‘cognizable and enforceable 
only by the conscience or by the... [moral sense] of right conduct, as 
distinguished from positive law.’
36
 
12. Multidisciplinary (Interdisciplinary) – defined as taking an approach of 
problem solving by drawing from multiple branches of learning 
(disciplines) for the purposes of defining, analysing, and proposing 
solutions.  For example, in this thesis the disciplines of law, ethics, 
business, psychology, and economics are used to define, understand, 
analyse, and propose solutions around the research questions.  
                                                 
33
 The Random House Dictionary of English Language (2
nd
 ed, 1987) 1109; The Oxford English 
Dictionary (2
nd
 ed, 1989) 899; Cf Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1223 (defining lying to include ‘all means by 
which one might attempt to create in some audience a belief at variance with one’s own.’); Sisela Bok, 
Lying: Moral Choices in Public and Private Life (1978) 14 (defining a lie as ‘any intentionally 
deceptive message which is stated.’). 
34
 Thomas F Guernsey, ‘Truthfulness in Negotiation’ (1982-1983) 17 University of Richmond Law 
Review 99, 105.  
35
 Lewicki et al, above n 25, 236. 
36
 Black’s Law Dictionary, above n 28, 1008 (‘Moral’, part 2). 
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13. 2egotiation – defined as both integrative (non zero-sum) and 
distributive (zero-sum) bargaining.  Some scholars use the terms ‘win-
win’, ‘win-lose’, or ‘principled negotiation’.  In this thesis, the term 
negotiation includes all these variations.
37
   
14. 2on-zero-sum Bargaining (also known as integrative or mutual gains 
scenario) – defined as ‘when parties’ goals are linked so that one 
person’s goal achievement helps others to achieve their goals… [such 
that there is a]…positive correlation between the goal attainments of 
both parties.’
38
 
15. Occupation – defined as ‘an activity in which one engages; the work in 
which one is regularly employed; the principal business of one’s life; 
vocation’.
39
 
16. Profession – defined as ‘a disciplined group of individuals who adhere 
to high ethical standards and uphold themselves to, and are accepted 
by, the public as possessing special knowledge and skills in a widely 
recognised, organised body of learning derived from education and 
training at a high level, and who are prepared to exercise this 
knowledge and these skills in the interest of others.  Inherent in this 
definition is the concept that the responsibility for the welfare, health 
and safety of the community shall take precedence over other 
                                                 
37
 Lewicki et al, above n 25, 3 (‘win-win situations such as those that occur when parties are trying to 
find a mutually acceptable solution to a complex conflict.’); Russell Korobkin (ed), 2egotiation Theory 
and Strategy (2002) 1 (‘an interactive communication process by which two or more parties who lack 
identical interests attempt to find a way to coordinate their behaviour or allocate scarce resources in a 
way that will make them better off than they could be if they were to act alone.’). 
38
 Lewicki et al, above n 25, 11. 
39
 Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, Occupation <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/occupation> at 9 August 2010; Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, Vocation 
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vocation> at 9 August 2010. 
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considerations.’
40
  A trade or occupation is transformed into a 
profession through the ‘the development of formal qualifications based 
upon education and examinations, the emergence of regulatory bodies 
with powers to admit and discipline members, and some degree of 
monopoly rights.’
41
   
17. Professional Code of Ethics – defined as ‘the formal statement of 
standards which the professional consults to guide his or her behaviour.  
It represents a statement of the roles that professionals ought to assume 
in specific situations.  To that extent, a code is a formalized statement 
of role morality, a unitary professional ‘conscience’.’
42
  Professional 
ethics can also be defined as ‘the moral principles that regulate the 
behaviour of lawyers in a role.’
43
 
18. Strategy – defined by business scholars as ‘the pattern or plan that 
integrates an organization’s major targets, policies, and action 
sequences into a cohesive whole.’
44
  As applied to negotiations, a 
strategy is ‘the overall plan to accomplish one’s goals in a negotiation 
                                                 
40
 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Definition of a profession  
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/277772> at 9 August 2010.   
41
 Alan Bullock and Stephen Trombley, The 2ew Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (1999) 689; 
Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc v. Scivantage, 525 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Baer, D.J.) 
(stressing that ‘[a] profession is not a business.  It is distinguished by....a duty to subordinate financial 
reward to social responsibility...to conduct themselves as members of a learned discipline, and 
honorable occupation.’); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Definition of a 
profession, above n 40 (citing Dr John Southwick, ‘Australian Council of Professions’ view’, in Can 
the professions survive under a national competition policy? Proceedings of a joint conference on 
competition law and the professions, Perth, April 1997); Professions Australia, ‘Definition of a 
profession’ (2009) <http://www.professions.com.au/defineprofession.html> at 9 August 2010. 
42
 Reed E Loder, ‘Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct: Saltwater for Thirst’ (1987-88) 1 Georgia 
Journal of Legal Ethics 311, 318. 
43
 Robert Condlin, ‘The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education’ (1983) The Good Lawyer 317. 
44
 Lewicki et al, above n 25, 105 (citing Henry Mintzberg and James Brian Quinn, The Strategy 
Process: Concepts, Context, Cases (1991)). 
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and the action sequences that will lead to the accomplishment of those 
goals.’
45
 
19. Tactic – defined as ‘short term, adaptive moves designed to enact or 
pursue broad (or higher-level) strategies, which in turn provide 
stability, continuity, and direction for tactical behaviours.’
46
  Tactics 
are subordinate to strategy and are considered structured manoeuvres 
driven by strategic considerations.  
20. Zero-sum Bargaining (also known as distributive) – defined as ‘where 
the goals of two or more people are interconnected so that only one can 
achieve the goal…a competitive situation…in which individuals are so 
linked together that there is a negative correlation between their goal 
attainments.’
47
 
1.8 ORGAISATIO OF THESIS 
This thesis is divided into eight primary chapters, organised as follows.  The 
reader may refer to the Table of Contents in order to access specific chapters directly. 
o Chapter 1 (Introduction and Rationale) sets  the foundation of the 
thesis by introducing the primary topic of the study, the background to 
the study, the significance of the study, contribution to knowledge, the 
research questions, an overview of the research methodology, a 
definition of key terms, and the organisation of the thesis. 
o Chapter 2 (Review of Literature) reviews the state of existing literature 
in the primary cross-disciplinary areas of the thesis and those which 
                                                 
45
 Lewicki et al, above n 25, 105. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Lewicki et al, above n 25, 11. 
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surround the research questions.  Chapter 2 reviews and analyses 
primary research in the areas of ethics, legal ethics, negotiation, and 
deception.  After a critical analysis of existing literature, Chapter 2 
attempts to place the importance of this qualitative research project in 
the context of existing knowledge to highlight the contribution to 
knowledge of this thesis. 
o Chapter 3 (Alleged Deceptive Behaviours of Lawyers) provides a 
detailed analysis and discussion of the research findings related to the 
first research question, namely whether lawyers use potentially 
deceptive behaviours in negotiation, to whom these behaviours are 
directed and the justifications used by lawyers to condone such 
behaviour.  The purpose of this chapter is to establish that lawyers tend 
to use certain potentially deceptive behaviours in negotiation and 
attempt to justify these behaviours in a variety of ways, including the 
argument that such conduct is not prohibited under the legal ethics 
code of the prevailing jurisdiction.  
o Chapter 4 (Efforts by Professional Ethics Codes to Regulate Deceptive 
Behaviours in 2egotiation) addresses the second research question, 
namely whether professional ethics codes attempt to regulate 
potentially deceptive negotiation behaviour and to what extent the 
professional ethics codes consistently do so.  The purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss the findings of a qualitative study of five common-
law legal ethics codes.  The study consists of a detailed analysis of 
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whether these legal ethics codes discuss negotiation and attempt to 
regulate deceptive or misleading conduct in negotiation. 
o Chapter 5 (The Success of Professional Ethical Codes in Controlling 
Lawyers’ Deceptive Behaviour) focuses on the third research question, 
namely whether professional ethics codes appear to be successful in 
controlling the potentially deceptive behaviours of lawyers in 
negotiations.  In addressing the third research question, I undertook a 
unique comparative analysis of ethics violation cases in Queensland 
over a ten-year period.  Chapter 5 presents the results of this qualitative 
study of the ethics violation cases where the alleged violation consisted 
of misleading or deceptive conduct on the part of the lawyer with a 
focus on any cases where the violation occurred in a negotiation.  The 
results of the qualitative analysis are interpreted and discussed in light 
of the overall purpose of this thesis and the research questions 
established in Chapter 1. 
o Chapter 6 (The Foundation for Change) provides a summary of key 
insights from Chapters 3, 4, and 5 in order to establish a foundation for 
the policy reform proposals presented in Chapter 7.  Chapter 6 also 
includes the findings of several studies of the legal profession that 
focus on the extent to which consumers and the profession expect 
honesty and integrity in the conduct of legal professionals.  These 
studies further reinforce the primary objective of Chapter 6, namely to 
establish the imperative for law and policy reforms and a call to action 
in addressing the issues highlighted by the research questions.   
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o Chapter 7 (Implications for Law Reform) discusses a tripartite response 
to the issues presented and addressed in the previous chapters.  This 
chapter consists of a set of integrated policy reform proposals in the 
areas of legal regulation, ethical standard setting and institutional 
design with a discussion of key benefits.  In addition, this chapter 
presents a summary of key theories and techniques for encouraging 
behavioural change followed by a discussion about the goals and 
benefits that can be achieved by implementing the specific policy 
reform proposals.   
o Chapter 8 (Thesis Summary and Conclusions) provides a summary of 
the thesis and concluding remarks including suggestions for further 
research, implications of the findings to practice and the relationship of 
the results to existing theory. 
o Appendices include a variety of resources including a listing of figures 
and tables, a listing of cases, and the detailed results of the analysis of 
the Queensland ethics violation cases discussed in Chapter 5. 
o Bibliography includes the resources consulted in the production of this 
thesis.  
1.9 CHAPTER COCLUSIO 
 A fundamental question facing legal professionals today is how to maintain 
the integrity of the profession.  This includes a financially viable legal practice as well 
as confidence in the public about the legal system.  This issue arises as a result of the 
negative perceptions of lawyers as liars and manipulators even as lawyers are subject 
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to very strict ethical codes of conduct with regards to the use of deception in legal 
practice, including negotiations.   
 Negotiation is the one central task that lawyers engage in throughout the 
course of their daily practice.  As such, how lawyers negotiate has a direct impact on 
how clients are served and how those same clients perceive the legal profession.  In 
part, how lawyers should behave in practice is established through guidelines in the 
professional ethics codes.  In general, these professional ethics codes prohibit 
deceptive conduct.  However, lawyers as negotiators work in a world where it appears 
that some forms of deception are not only acceptable but expected.  In such an 
environment, questions arise as to whether lawyers do actually engage in deceptive 
conduct in violation of professional ethics codes, whether professional ethics codes 
effectively curtail such behaviours and whether such attempts are successful or 
undermine the success of negotiations.  If it is determined or perceived that the 
professional ethics codes do not effectively curtail the use deception in negotiation, 
the question arises as to what can be done to effectively address this ongoing issue.   
 The purpose of this chapter has been to set the foundation, rationale, and 
research questions to guide an enquiry into this complex issue through addressing four 
primary research questions.  Chapter 2 is a review of literature followed by an 
examination of the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that underlie the study of 
these research questions. 
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CHAPTER 2 –  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
‘Curiosity begins as an act of tearing to pieces or analysis.’ 
 
 ~ Samuel Alexander
48 
 
This chapter provides a review of the literature designed to assimilate, 
summarise, and synthesise the existing published scholarly research in the areas of 
law, ethics, and negotiation which serve as the primary focus of this study.  After 
introductory remarks, this chapter discusses competing perspectives, theoretical 
frameworks in the areas relevant to the study, and a conceptual framework for the 
proposed research questions.  The chapter then provides a synthesis of the literature 
review, a critical analysis of existing published scholarly research, and a discussion of 
strengths, weaknesses, and gaps within the literature.  Finally, this chapter highlights 
the importance of this study in addressing some of the gaps in the existing body of 
research.  
2.1 ITRODUCTIO 
This literature review establishes the foundation which informs the need to 
address each of the research questions outlined in Chapter 1.  First, this literature 
review describes and discusses the existing research into the cross-disciplinary areas 
affecting this study, namely legal negotiation, negotiation practices, and legal ethics.  
Second, this literature review serves to identify the gaps that will be addressed by this 
study.  Finally, this literature review provides a basis for the policy reform proposals 
                                                 
48 Brainyquote.com, Analysis Quotes (2009) 
<http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/analysis_2.html> at 9 August 2010.  
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outlined in Chapter 7 for addressing the issue of deception in legal negotiation.  As 
Einstein once noted, one cannot expect to achieve different results by doing the same 
thing over and over again.49  It is in this spirit of a fresh, multidisciplinary perspective 
that the literature review aims to establish the need for this study and for 
implementing an integrated set of policy reforms.   
The criteria used for this literature review include:  (1) empirical studies or 
significant recent research and analysis conducted on the thesis topics; (2) studies or 
significant research and analysis related to legal negotiations or general negotiations 
that might have a bearing on the research question(s); (3) studies or significant 
research and analysis related to societal ethics, legal ethics and negotiation ethics as 
well as the use of deception in negotiation; and (4) studies or significant research and 
analysis related to implementing behavioural changes, policy development and policy 
implementation.   
The literature review focuses on a review of scholarly publications relevant to 
the problem statement and research questions as outlined in Chapter 1.  A review of 
literature outside the bounds of the research questions was also conducted in order to 
get a balanced and cross-disciplinary view of the research problem, subsequent 
analysis, and recommended policy reforms.  For example, ethics is primarily related 
to philosophy and, therefore, research into the philosophical context of ethics was 
                                                 
49 Brainyquote.com, Albert Einstein Quotes (2009) 
<http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/a/alberteins133991.html> at 9 August 2010 (‘Insanity:  
doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.’). 
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done to better understand similarities and differences with bargaining50 ethics and 
legal ethics. 
2.2 COMPETIG PERSPECTIVES 
The purpose of this section is to briefly discuss some of the competing 
perspectives in the field as they relate to key topics relevant to this thesis.  A 
discussion of competing perspectives is designed to acknowledge the different 
perspectives across disciplines related to the problem statement and research 
questions outlined in Chapter 1. 
The purpose of discussing competing perspectives in these areas is to ensure 
that the reader is aware that such competing perspectives impact the ability to answer 
the research questions and set the foundation for recommending the policy reform 
proposals in Chapter 7.  An understanding and clear definition of the competing 
perspectives will also help contribute to knowledge. 
2.2.1 Lies Versus Deception:  Competing Definitions  
One of the most obvious areas of some disagreement is whether lies are the 
same as deception or only a form of deception and whether one can be condoned 
while the other is not.  This section considers these competing definitions in light of 
its impact on the legal profession.         
As defined in Chapter 1, a lie is a false statement made with the intent to 
deceive, an intentional untruth.51  Some scholars distinguish between two categories 
of lies and their distinct applications as presented below in Table 2.1. 
                                                 
50 Norton, above n 19, 282 (defining ‘bargaining’ as ‘a self regulated process by which parties with 
different goals engage in strategic dealings until they agree upon an outcome, or until one or more of 
them decides that agreement cannot be reached.’).  
51 The Random House Dictionary of English Language, above n 33, 1109;  The Oxford English 
Dictionary, above n 33, 899; Cf Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1223 (defining lying to include ‘all means by 
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Table 2.1:  Two Categories of Lies 
Pure ‘white’ lies / lies to save face
52
 Distributive lies
53
 
• fairly harmless 
• meant to just ‘grease the wheels of 
discourse’ – move things along 
• focus is still on achieving a mutually 
acceptable agreement 
• lie is not intended to gain an advantage 
over the other party or to disadvantage 
the other party  
 
• primary purpose is to gain an advantage 
over the other person 
• there is intentional lying to secure the 
advantage 
• includes lies about the nature, history, 
and value of the subject of negotiations, 
false promises, false threats, and false 
predictions as to the value of the subject 
of negotiations and lies about our 
clients’ opinion or expectations 
 
 
Unlike pure ‘white’ lies, if distributive lies are believed and effective, the ‘liar 
becomes richer in the degree to which the victim becomes poorer.’54  Distributive lies 
are inherently part of distributive bargaining because the assumption is that each party 
is trying to claim the maximum value out of a fixed pie.  Distributing bargaining 
involves a win-lose mentality, where lying is central to gain maximum advantage. 
Deception, on the other hand, can be defined as ‘the business of persuasion 
aided by the art of selective display’ put into effect by two primary behaviours:  
‘hiding the real and showing the false.’55  It is an intentional distortion of the truth so 
as to mislead others in order to gain advantage for the practitioner such that deception, 
rather than something being false, is at the essence of the lie.56 
                                                                                                                                            
which one might attempt to create in some audience a belief at variance with one’s own.’);  Bok, above 
n 33, 14 (‘any intentionally deceptive message which is stated.’). 
52 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1225-1226.  See also J Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley, Cheating and 
Deception (1991) 48-52. 
53 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1224-1227.  
54 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1227. 
55 Cooley, above n 27, 263; Nyberg, above n 27, 66-67. 
56 See, eg, Joseph W Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (2004) 1; Francis Mechner, Using 
Behavioural Contingency Analysis to Classify the Various Forms of Deception (2009) 1-68 < 
http://mechnerfoundation.org/newsite/downloads.html> at 9 August 2010; Bell and Whaley, above n 
52, 48-52.  
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Deception may be of two varieties, concealing the truth or exhibiting false 
information, both of which are described below in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2:  Two Varieties of Deception 
Concealing the Truth Exhibiting False Information 
• includes the ability to dissimulate 
or gloss over; 
• Withhold information 
 
• accomplished by simulation 
• Involves three techniques: 1) mimicry; 2) 
fabricate; and 3) attract. 57 
 
Dissimulate = ‘concealing the truth, 
like inconvenient or secret 
information either by camouflage, 
disguising appearance, or dazzle.’58 
 
Example: in negotiation, concealing 
one’s true bottom line from the 
opposing party 
 
Example:  in military tactics, 
soldiers colour their faces and wear 
clothing to resemble the jungle or 
desert or other surroundings to 
conceal themselves from the enemy 
(camouflage) 
 
Example:  disguising oneself as 
someone else so that you are not 
recognised or mistaken for another 
person (disguise appearance) 
 
In simulation, the primary goal is to convey 
false information by copying an existing 
model (mimicry), making up new 
information and presenting it as true 
(fabricate), or offering an alternative model 
(attract).59 
 
Example: in negotiation, this may involve 
making a verbal settlement offer that is 
accepted but the actual written settlement 
agreement is a different offer that conceals 
something that was not verbally agreed to. 
 
Example:  A used car salesman uses a bait 
and switch tactic to ‘attract’ the buyer to a 
tempting feature in order to conceal a fault 
such as bad tires (attract). 
 
Example:  A landlord of a commercial 
building telling a tenant that unless the tenant 
pays a higher yearly rent, the landlord will 
sell to another purchaser who wants the 
space knowing there is no other purchaser 
(fabricate). 
 
 
Lerman argues that regardless of the definition of either, both lies and 
deception are ‘morally identical’ in that the consequences are the same.60  In the 
                                                 
57 See, eg, Scott Gerwehr and Russell W Glenn, The Art of Darkness:  Deception and Urban 
Operations (2000) 16-18; Mechner, above n 56, 1-6.   
58 Gerhwer and Glenn, above n 57, 16-18. 
59 Caddell, above n 56, 1; Gerhwer and Glenn, above n 57, 16-18. 
60 Lisa G Lerman, ‘Lying to Clients’ (1990) 138 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 659, 663. 
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context of the legal system, some scholars argue that lies and deception mean 
different things to lawyers.  For example, Guernsey offers that a lawyer’s definition of 
lying may be described as ‘a statement made with the intent to deceive which purports 
to state the existence, in unequivocal terms, of facts and law contrary to the 
declarant’s express knowledge.’61  By comparison, noted ethicist Sisela Bok defines a 
‘lie’ as ‘any intentionally deceptive message which is stated.’62  Among other things, 
Guernsey dismisses noted ethicist Sisela Bok’s definition of a ‘lie’ as being too broad 
in that it would ‘preclude negotiation since inherent in all negotiations is some 
element of an attempt to mislead the other side.’63  
From the above discussion, it appears that the deception is imbedded in the lie.  
Deception can be considered a negotiation strategy and telling a lie is a tactic that may 
be used to achieve the goal of deceiving the other party by expressly stating an 
untruth.  While there is some common ground amongst the competing views on the 
definition of deception or lies, there are strong competing views on whether deception 
is an inherent negotiation strategy. 
2.2.2 Deception as a egotiation Strategy 
Whether deception is or should be an acceptable negotiation strategy attracts 
considerable attention in both negotiation and legal literature.  Negotiation literature 
seems to generally accept and allow that at least some forms of deception are an 
inherent part of the bargaining dance.64  In fact, some scholars argue that without 
                                                 
61 Guernsey, above n 34, 105;  James J White, ‘Machiavelli and the Bar:  Ethical Limits on Lying in 
Negotiation’ (1980) American Bar Foundation Research Journal 926 (stating unequivocally that 
deception is part of every negotiation) 
62 Bok, above n 33, 13. 
63 Guernsey, above n 34, 105 n34. 
64 See, eg, Lewicki et al, above n 25, 3; White, above n 60; Guernsey, above n 34, 105 n.34 (stating that 
‘…inherent in all negotiations is some element of an attempt to mislead the other side.’).  This view has 
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deception, there would be no true negotiation.65  The view here is that the minor 
deception that occurs in negotiation is expected by the parties and even has some 
merit.66  For example, Strudler argues that the truth can actually get in the way of a 
good deal.67  He further contends that some forms of deception, especially non-
disclosure of a negotiator’s reservation price, serve as a ‘a signalling and symbolic 
device that even strangers, people who neither know nor trust one another, can use to 
work their way to a reasonable and mutually advantageous agreement in an otherwise 
risky environment.’68  
In contrast, those who argue against the use of deception in negotiation, 
particularly by lawyers, discuss the various harms caused by deceiving the various 
stakeholders of the legal justice system.  For example, Rubin69 holds a universalist 
view that a lawyer’s societal obligations require honesty and good faith towards 
opponents, even in negotiations.  Similarly, Norton argues that truth (i.e., absence of 
deception) is vital to negotiations, partly because it underlies the choices that parties 
make in negotiation and to ensure the validity and integrity of the agreement reached 
during negotiations.70   
 
                                                                                                                                            
been echoed in the various professional ethics codes and cases across international jurisdictions 
including Australia and United States. 
65 See, eg, White, above n 60, 926; Guernsey, above n 34, 105 n.34 
66 Selene Mize, ‘Is deception in negotiating unprofessional?’ (2005) The 3ew Zealand Law Journal 246 
(‘Nevertheless, it is clear that deception sometimes contributes to a better deal.). 
67 Alan Strudler, ‘On the Ethics of Deception in Negotiation’ (1995) 5(4) Business Ethics Quarterly 
805; Mize, above n 66, 246 (‘Nevertheless, it is clear that deception sometimes contributes to a better 
deal.’). 
68 Strudler, above n 67, 805.  
69 Alvin B Rubin, ‘A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiations’ (1975) 35 Louisiana Law Review 
577 
70 Norton, above n 19, 273-274.  See also Geoge Sharswood, Professional Ethics (1844) 168-169 
quoted in Maryland State Bar Ass’n v Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 548-49, 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974) 
(‘…[f]rom the very commencement of a lawyer’s career, let him cultivate, above all things, truth, 
simplicity and candour; they are the cardinal virtues of a lawyer.’). 
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2.2.2.1 Harms Caused By Deception 
The use of deception is negotiation is said to cause a variety of harms, harms 
resulting either from the improper motives of the negotiator or the harmful 
consequences of unethical conduct at negotiations, such as an unconscionable 
agreement which takes unfair advantage of a negotiating party.  As Lerman points out, 
the cost-benefit analysis ‘…to elevate possible or actual consequences of a deception 
is fraught with difficulties because of the indeterminacy of events and the subjectivity 
of attempting to predict harmful consequences.’71 
Lerman and many noted ethicists and legal scholars appear to agree that the 
use of deception in negotiation, particularly by lawyers, creates sufficient harm on 
multiple levels as to be considered unacceptable.  The harms potentially caused by 
deception appear to fall into four main categories.   
First, deception can cause reputational harm to the individual lawyer and the 
legal profession.  Lerman argues that even the widespread use of small deceptions can 
affect the professional integrity of the lawyer as well as the reputation of the bar.72  
The accepted and unpunished use of smaller deceptions can lead the lawyer to 
conclude that such conduct is acceptable in all settings, thus affecting the lawyer’s 
internal standard of integrity by increasing the likelihood that the lawyer will engage 
in such conduct again.73 
                                                 
71 Lerman, above n 60, 679.  Lerman, in particular, refers to the harms caused by ‘self-interested lawyer 
deception’ of clients in her study, which is discussed below. 
72 Lerman, above n 60, 679.  See also Kang Lee et al, ‘Taiwan and Mainland Chinese and Canadian 
Children’s Categorization and Evaluation of Lie- and Truth-Telling:  A Modesty Effect’ (2001) 19 
British Journal of Developmental Psychology 527 (‘...[lie-telling] creates an internal conflict on the 
part of the lie-teller and cognitive dissonance in the lie-teller’s belief system, which can be hazardous 
to the lie-teller’s psychological well-being.’). 
73 Lerman, above n 60, 680 (quoting ethicist Sisela Bok as this being a ‘slippery slope’).  See also 
Lerman, above n 60, n 81 (quoting Bok (1977) as stating that “‘[a]fter the first lies…others can come 
more easily.  Psychological barriers wear down; lies seem more necessary, less reprehensible; the 
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Second, deception may harm the lawyer’s performance in their professional 
duties and in their dealings with clients.  If left unchecked, such deception can lead to 
neglect, error, substandard performance, and lack of expertise necessary to assist 
clients.74  Where a lawyer deceives a client, the lawyer may ‘dehumanize him or her, 
treating the client as an annoyance…a way of asserting superiority in the relationship 
with the client.’75  This can also affect the way lawyers relate to other lawyers by 
creating a culture of unnecessary competition between senior and junior lawyers 
where ‘the cost of deceiving one person is the exploitation of another.’76   
 Third, deception may harm the negotiation process itself.   If deception is 
used in negotiation, it can ‘cause a negotiation to falter and the bridge, being built by 
the negotiator to bring them together, to collapse.’77  In addition, deception in the 
negotiation process limits each party’s freedom of choice by affecting the party’s 
ability to make informed choices based on all available information.78  In turn, this 
can harm the relationship of the parties to the negotiation as deception tends to 
‘trigger, exacerbate or cause to exceed the expected effects of the heuristics and biases 
that already exist at the bargaining table.’79  Ultimately, if freedom to make informed 
choices is compromised between the parties, this may result in an imbalance of the 
                                                                                                                                            
ability to make moral distinctions can coarsen; the liar’s perception of his chances of being caught may 
warp.’). 
74 Lerman, above n 60, 682 n 86. 
75 Lerman, above n 60, 683. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Cheryl Rivers (2004) What are they thinking?  Considerations underlying negotiators’ ethical 
decisions 3 (Paper presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting Academy of International Business 
Conference in Stockholm, Sweden). 
78 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 527. 
79 See generally Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie, ‘Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table’ 
(2004) 87 Marquette Law Review 795 (discussing the various heuristics and biases that operate at the 
bargaining table).  Deception would seem to make such heuristics and biases even more prevalent. 
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distribution of power between the negotiating parties.80  This leads to ‘altering [the] 
choices [of the negotiating parties] at different levels’81 and may ultimately affect the 
degree to which the resulting agreement is successful in resolving the dispute.  
Finally, deception in negotiation may create economic harm.  A successful 
negotiation depends, in part, on trust among the parties.  The use of deception in 
negotiation can undermine this trust or create barriers to building trust.82  The parties 
to a negotiation may incur ‘losses sustained as a result of deception’83 or deception 
may cause economic harm due to ‘benefits missed as a result of deception’84 because 
the negotiation may be seen as means to an economic end rather than as a process to 
make informed choices and create mutually beneficial agreements. 
While the actual and perceived harms caused by using deception in negotiation 
would deter lawyers and parties from engaging in such conduct, deception continues 
to be a key aspect of negotiations.  It is even believed to contain benefits.  The next 
section provides a discussion of some perceived benefits of deception in negotiation. 
2.2.2.2 Perceived Benefits of Deception in Negotiation 
Many legal scholars, such as Strudler, Raiffa, White, and Mize, argue that 
deception in the context of negotiation can have benefits, especially if one takes the 
                                                 
80 Sisela Bok, ‘Truthfulness, Deceit and Trust’ in Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Michael Wheeler (eds) 
What’s Fair:  Ethics for 3egotiators (2004) 80. 
81 Bok, above n 80, 80 (‘Deception can make a situation falsely uncertain as well as falsely certain.  It 
can affect the objectives seen, the alternatives believed possible, the estimates made of risks and 
benefits.’). 
82 Strudler, above n 67, 813.  See also Bok, above n 80, 79 (describing deceit as violence in that it is 
a‘deliberate assault on human beings.  Both can coerce people into acting against their will.  But deceit 
controls more subtly for it works on belief as well as action.’). 
83 Strudler, above n 67, 813. 
84 Strudler, above n 67, 815.   Strudler discusses these impacts and ultimately concludes that with 
respect to deception of reservation prices, deception is a necessary and natural part of the process, such 
that we have to ‘haggle’ for a deal. 
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view that deception is an inherent part of negotiations, regardless of whether lawyers 
are involved.   
First, Strudler argues against the notion that deception may cause an erosion of 
trust.  He states that, in fact, deception occurs because there is a lack of trust to begin 
with.85  He uses the example of selling one’s car to a potential buyer and disclosing 
one’s reservation price.  In this scenario, Strudler argues that ‘…neither of us expects 
the other to tell the truth about [our reservation] price’86 and that doing so, especially 
after the deal is concluded, ‘will only be a source of resentment later.’87   
Second, deception may also be such a predictable part of the process of 
negotiation that it can be a ‘mutually advantageous tool’ for both parties that might 
enhance trust rather than erode it.88  Because both parties expect some form of 
deception as part of the negotiation process, they have already included built-in 
transaction costs to account for any time expended in bypassing any deception.  
Strudler argues that because everything people do has costs, one must go beyond just 
stating that deception incurs costs and is wasteful to actually finding ways to ‘measure 
these costs against costs of alternative actions, and to take into account the advantages 
that flow from the action.’89  For example, in the case of deceptive reservation prices, 
Strudler states that ‘…the advantages we enjoy as a result of a successfully completed 
                                                 
85 Strudler, above n 67, 812; See also White, above n 60, 926; Guernsey, above n 34, 105 n. 34. 
86 Strudler, above n 67, 812. 
87 Strudler, above n 67, 812 (citing Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of 3egotiation: How to Resolve 
Conflicts and Get the Best Out of Bargaining (1982) ( (referring to Raiffa’s advice that people should 
not tell the other party their reservation price even after a successful negotiation). 
88 Strudler, above n 67, 813; Mize, above n 66, 246 (‘Nevertheless, it is clear that deception sometimes 
contributes to a better deal.’).  
89 Ibid.   
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negotiation may more than outweigh the disadvantages of the costs of deceptive 
negotiation.’90   
Finally, deception may, in some cultures and circumstances, be used as an 
effective indirect communication process to see how one might react to offers, 
counter-offers, and reservation prices.91  In summary, both opponents and proponents 
of deception in negotiation seem to agree that such conduct may impact the success of 
a negotiation. 
2.2.3 Definition of ‘Success’ in egotiation 
A negotiation may be considered ‘successful’ for many reasons.  For example, 
a negotiation may be successful simply because it is less costly and more economical 
than pursuing litigation, thus being more cost-efficient.  It is for this reason that the 
legal system, at least with respect to civil disputes, is sometimes referred to as a 
landscape of ‘the vanishing trial’92 as many more cases are settled via judge-assisted 
                                                 
90 Note:  This is certainly a question well suited for an empirical study.  See also Kang Lee et al’s study 
on lie- and truth-telling discussed in later sections on perceptions of lie-telling in a cross-cultural study 
involving Canadian, Chinese, and Taiwanese children. 
91 Strudler, above n 67, 817 (discussing how deception can ‘form part of an indirect process of 
communication, a process that is advantageous because it is less risky than more direct 
communication.’).  Strudler gives the example of a situation in Spain where a taxi driver was posturing 
(using deception) to potentially get a higher rate for his services and to indicate he was willing to 
bargain but Strudler did not understand this as a cultural aspect of commencing a negotiation with the 
driver. 
92 Mark Galanter, ‘The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts’ (2004) 1(3) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 459, 462-463 (showing through an 
extensive study that the number of trials and the trial rates have been declining over four decades, 
particularly in the United States federal courts).  Cf  David Spencer, ‘The Vanishing Trial 
Phenomenon’ (2005) 43(8) Law Society Journal 58 (‘In other words, the court’s data show that there is 
no conclusive evidence that trials in the court are vanishing.’); John Lande, ‘Shifting the Focus from 
the Myth of ‘The Vanishing Trial’ to Complex Conflict Management Systems, Or I Learned Almost 
Everything I Need to Know about Conflict Resolution from Marc Galanter’ (2005) 6 Cardozo Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 191 (arguing that ‘the vanishing trial’ is a myth and discussing the importance 
and role of trials in conflict resolution). 
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settlement conferences, party-to-party mediation, or lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation 
rather than trial.93   
As discussed above, these negotiations seem to invite a certain amount of 
acceptable deception.  However, regardless of the possibility that ‘estimates of costs 
and benefits of any action can be endlessly varied through successful deception’,94 
proponents of using some deception in negotiation would argue that, in the final 
analysis, the advantages of a successfully completed negotiation in which each party 
is satisfied of the outcome may outweigh the disadvantages of some deception as part 
of the bargaining process.95  Under this view, a negotiation is considered successful 
because an agreement is reached, regardless of how ethically it was achieved or 
perceived by the parties to the negotiation.   
A negotiation may also be considered ‘successful’ because it produces a ‘good 
outcome’.96  Bordone, who also argues for having negotiation recognized as an 
independent dispute resolution process,97 describes a good outcome in negotiation as 
an agreement having the following characteristics:   
                                                 
93   It should be noted that settlement conferences and mediation have negotiation as the foundation 
from which to bargain for concessions, cross-offers and the like. 
94 Bok, above n 80, 80. 
95 Strudler, above n 67, 813 (specifically discussing deception of reservation prices); White, above n 
60, 929 (arguing that deception is inherently part of negotiation and attempts to regulate it are futile). 
96 Robert C Bordone, ‘Fitting the Ethics to the Forum:  A Proposal for Process-Enabling Ethical Codes’ 
(2005) 21 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 1, 16 (According to Bordone, a ‘good outcome’ in 
litigation may be ‘defined by measuring whether justice was achieved, a right was vindicated, or 
appropriate reparations were made… whether the resolution of a matter is ‘successful’ can often be 
boiled down to a binary question of whether a particular litigant won or lost.’  The definition of a ‘good 
outcome’ in negotiation is different.) 
97 Note:  Negotiation could be considered a separate process as well as part of another dispute 
resolution process, such as mediation.  While Bordone recognises that negotiation is generally 
understood to be part of mediation, he also argues for negotiation to be recognised as a separate process 
as well because it is largely unregulated as practiced by lawyers or it is regulated by legal ethics codes 
based on a litigation/adversarial philosophy.  See also Norton, above n 19, 270-272 (‘....a lawyer who 
would tell the whole truth in court might tell a half-truth if the same matter were being resolved in the 
privacy of negotiations.’). 
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‘a) is better than our best alternative to a negotiated agreement 
(BATNA); b) meets our interests very well, the interests of the 
other side acceptably, and the interests of any third parties who 
may be affected by the agreement at least tolerably enough to be 
durable; c) is the most efficient and value-creating of many 
possible sets of deal terms; d) is based on a norm of fairness or 
some objective standard, criterion, or principle that is external to 
the parties themselves; e) identifies commitments that are 
specific, realistic, and operational for both sides; f) is premised 
on clear and efficient communication; and g) improves or at 
least does not harm the relationship between the parties where 
‘relationship’ is defined as the ability of the parties to ‘manage 
their differences well.’98   
 
Against this standard, it would appear that any kind of deception during 
negotiation, regardless of whether it is expected or acceptable, would only undermine 
a foundation necessary to create a good outcome, primarily because such deception 
would impact a level of trust99 necessary to achieve all the elements of Bordone’s 
‘good outcome’ test.  
A third way in which a negotiation may be deemed a ‘success’ is due to its 
efficiency in resolving the issues between the parties.  This type of efficiency is 
different from a negotiation being cost effective in that, for example, an efficient 
negotiation may be costly but the issues are dealt with in a timely manner with 
mutually beneficial outcomes.  Peters argues ‘…efficiency is and ought to be a goal of 
negotiations.’100  Peters refers to the traditional micro-economic sense of efficiency 
where the goal is the most optimal solution to an issue between the parties.101  Where 
                                                 
98 Bordone, above n 96, 16-18; See also Roger Fisher, ‘A Code of Negotiation Practices for Lawyers’ 
(1985) 1 3egotiation Journal 105, 107-108. 
99 See, eg, Norton, above n 19, 273-275 (discussing the impact of standards of honesty in negotiation); 
David Lax and James K Sebenius, ‘Three Ethical Issues in Negotiation’ in Carrie Menkel-Meadow and 
Michael Wheeler (eds) What’s Fair:  Ethics for 3egotiators (2004) 5-7. 
100 Geoffrey M Peters, ‘The Use of Lies in Negotiation’ (1987) 48 Ohio State Law Journal 1, 22. 
101 Peters, above n 100, 23 (discussing the scenario where two people are fighting over an orange where 
one person wants the orange to bake a cake and the other person wants to drink the juice.  Peters states 
that the most efficient and optimal solution is not to divide the orange into half but to give one person 
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a negotiation is considered a ‘zero-sum game’,102 Peters states that distinguishing 
between lies and deception is not necessary or important with regards to efficiency 
because the effect is the same.103  For example, in a used-car sales negotiation, both 
parties have a maximum price or position.  The buyer’s goal is to pay as little as 
possible while the seller’s goal is to get as much as possible for the used car.  The 
primary concern is getting a deal within the bargaining range such that if a deal is 
reached, the negotiation is efficient and successful.104  In a zero-sum bargaining 
situation, Peters argues that all settlements are efficient and that a ‘failure to reach a 
settlement is inefficient where there is a bargaining range.’105  This view appears to be 
based on the notion that parties to the negotiation will have an overlapping bargaining 
range (e.g., a range between $5,000 (buyer’s limit) and $6,000 (seller’s limit)) where 
settlement is possible simply due to the range of alternatives as defined by the 
bargaining range.  As such, the parties will either reach agreement along some point 
on the bargaining range or, if they find out each other’s price limit, simply find 
another way to reach agreement.106  Therefore, even if deception is part of the 
negotiation, a successful negotiation is one in which parties who have a bargaining 
range, whether overlapping or not, reach a settlement.  
                                                                                                                                            
the entire peel and the other person the juice of the orange, leaving both parties satisfied of their 
interests.)   
102 See Section 1.7 (Definition of Key Terms) for the definition of ‘zero-sum’ bargaining as used in this 
thesis. 
103 Peters, above n 100, 29-30. 
104 Peters, above n 100, 26-30 (describing a zero-sum negotiation for a used car between two parties 
and the impact of distinguishing between lies and other forms of deception).  In Peters’ efficiency view, 
he appears to focus on the immediate goal (agreement) in favour of more long-term issues of the use of 
deception (trust, relationships, etc) presumably because many times such zero-sum negotiations are 
single or one-time negotiations with price as the primary focus.  Cf Peters, above n 100, 29-30 (citing 
the American Law Institute’s view that ‘'Hard bargaining between experienced adversaries of relatively 
equal power ought not to be discouraged.’ Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176 comment f 
(1981)). 
105 Peters, above n 100, 29-30. 
106 Peters, above n 100, 29-31. 
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Under this view, and specifically in regards to zero-sum negotiations, it 
appears that deception is simply an expected variable invited by the competitive 
nature of zero-sum bargaining that does not necessarily affect the efficiency of the 
final outcome.107  In fact, Shelling seems to argue that there are social benefits to 
deception and that without some form of deception, there would be no settlement in 
zero-sum negotiations.108   
With respect to non-zero-sum negotiation,109 Peters, along with others, seem to 
concur that tactics such as all forms of deception ‘interfere... with reaching efficient 
results, and we deplore the inefficiency they introduce.’110  The reason deception 
leads to inefficiency in non-zero-sum negotiations is because such negotiations 
involve more than just a distribution of resources.  Intangible components such as 
personal relationships, on-going business relationships, non-monetary concessions, 
and future commitments are valued and important aspects of these types of 
negotiations.  Deception, if detected during or after the negotiation, tends to erode the 
trust necessary to ensure that the respective parties fulfil their mutual obligations 
under an agreement.  If the agreement is built on unstable foundations, it will not last 
and the negotiation will have potentially been considered a failure. 
In summary, the success of a negotiation may hinge on whether deception 
played a role and the extent to which such deception was perceived as harming or 
benefiting the final outcome of the negotiation.  This perception also depends on the 
lawyers’ and parties’ view of certain theoretical perspectives about the nature of law, 
                                                 
107 Peters, above n 100, 30. 
108 Peters, above n 100, 30  (citing Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1963) 22, 67 quoted by 
H Laurence Ross, Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims Adjustment (1980) 
159-60, n 17-19)  
109 See Chapter 1, Section 1.7 (Definition of Key Terms) for the definition of ‘non zero-sum’ 
bargaining as used in this thesis. 
110 Peters, above n 100, 32.  
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negotiation, ethics, and deceptive behaviour.  The next section explores the theoretical 
framework underlying some of the key areas of this thesis relative to the research 
questions.   
2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the theoretical constructs of various 
disciplines relevant to the research questions of this thesis.  As defined by Strauss and 
Corbin, a theory ‘incorporates a set of well-developed concepts related through 
statements of relationship, which together constitute an integrated framework that can 
be used to explain or predict phenomena.’111  In general, the theoretical framework is 
composed of ‘the long-standing theoretical traditions, theoretical principles, and 
relationships between the principles and traditions.’112  By understanding the 
theoretical framework, one can see the cross-disciplinary nature of the issues posed by 
the research questions as well as identify potential solutions, where applicable. 
2.3.1 Theories of Law 
Law is central to the regulation of behaviour, whether of society or of legal 
professionals.  An understanding of the major theories of law is important as the key 
areas of the research questions (rules, ethics, and negotiation) intersect the two major 
theories of law, namely legal positivism and natural law. 
Carvan identifies at least two major theories of law which directly affect the 
creation, application, evolution, and interpretation of rules and codes of conduct 
affecting legal professionals and the legal system.  One theory, legal positivism, is the 
                                                 
111 Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin, Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and 
techniques (1990).  
112 Günter Krumme, Phases, stages and steps in geographic investigation (2000) 
<http://faculty.washington.edu/krumme/guides/researchguide.html> at 9 August 2010; Calabrese, 
above n 14, 25.  
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more dominant theory in use today within the adversarial system. 113  Legal positivism 
appears to reject the natural law theory and thus generally sees little value of ‘any 
religious or humane basis for laws.’114  According to legal positivists, ‘a law is a law 
because it is a law’ and its validity depends on some clearly defined reason rather than 
on any moral values.115  Under legal positivism, the test for whether a law is valid is 
‘whether the law benefits the greater good of the people’, a primarily utilitarian 
perspective.116  For traditional legal positivists, such as John Austin, laws must derive 
from ‘positive’ sources such as the commanding sovereign who creates laws and then 
imposes a sanction for violating such laws.117   
Modern legal positivists, such as Hart, see the legal system as consisting of 
primary and secondary rules.  Primary rules include rules ‘that impose an obligation… 
[that may be] by social pressure supported by physical sanctions’ and those that are 
necessary for a functioning society.118  Secondary rules appear to be demonstrative of 
                                                 
113 See generally, Carvan, above n 2, 5 (‘This seeking out of the truth by examination, cross-
examination, and re-examination is the foundation of the adversary system.  In this country [Australia], 
we mostly use the adversary system in legal proceedings.  Other countries use different procedures to 
resolve conflict or to find the truth.’)  This is ironic because many would argue that it is the adversarial 
model which not only perpetuates deception but does so in a way that also keeps many, including the 
stakeholders of the system, from finding the truth.  See also Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) (Bentham is considered one of the first utilitarian 
philosophers to see a conceptual difference between law and morality).  
114 Carvan, above n 2, 4; See also Jonathan Crowe, Legal Theory (2009) 31-32 (‘…legal positivists 
claim that morality plays no necessary role in determining legal validity….the question of what the law 
is can be logically separated from the question of what the law ought to be…often called the separation 
thesis.’ (emphasis in the original) 
115 See, eg, Tony Honoré, ‘The Dependence of Morality on Law’ (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1, 1-17 (arguing that ‘law will sometimes make morally binding what was not binding apart 
from its being so required’);  See also Tony Honoré, The 3ecessary Connection Between Law and 
Morality (2008) , 2 (discussing the connection between positivism and morality); Crowe, above n 114,  
30 (‘… whether a law is valid necessarily depends on certain socially recognised facts and events, such 
as whether it has been issued in the appropriate form by a recognised legal authority.’). 
116 Carvan, above n 2, 4; Crowe, above n 114, 30.  
117 Carvan, above n 2, 4; Crowe, above n 114, 30-31 (discussing the distinction between exclusive 
positivism, as argued by Joseph Raz and inclusive legal positivism); See also Jospeh Raz, The 
Authority of Law (1979) 45-52. 
118 Carvan, above n 2, 5 (discussing Hart and listing prohibition of murder and theft as examples of 
primary rules.).  See also H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed, 1994) 250-254. 
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an ‘advanced legal system’ because secondary rules complement and support primary 
rules by ‘provid [ing] a system of change in the rules that govern that society as it 
develops’ as well as a viable system of resolving disputes.  Common law countries, 
such as the United States and Australia, may be considered advanced legal systems by 
this definition since judicial decisions, for example, provide a mechanism to resolve 
disputes as well as a means of changing and evolving law as the country develops. 
Legal positivism appears to be primarily a system of rules and codes of 
conduct created by humankind that punishes those who violate them rather than a 
system of law derived from higher principles or with the intent of rewarding and 
encouraging good behaviours.  This is not to say that legal positivism does not 
encourage good behaviour; however it attempts to or hopes to encourage good 
behaviour through a system of punishing those who engage in behaviour that is 
deemed unacceptable or violating established laws and codes of conduct as defined by 
society or those in positions of political power. 
In contrast to legal positivism, the natural law theory recognizes the existence 
of ‘a natural or divine reason for the existence of laws.’119  Natural law can be defined 
as:  1) universally applicable; 2) unchangeable; and 3) superior law to human-made 
laws.120  The primary difference between legal positivists and natural law theorists is 
that legal positivists would require persons to obey a law simply because it is 
considered law and explicitly codified as such.  In contrast, natural law theorists 
believe that a law is valid when it is based on natural law principles and ‘reflects the 
principles by which we should live.’121  Natural law theorists argue that traditional 
                                                 
119 Carvan, above n 2, 4.   
120 Ibid.  
121 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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sources of law should be supplemented by an additional moral test.  According to 
natural law theorists, legal validity is determined by a two-pronged test:  1) a source 
based test that looks at explicit, codified rules; and 2) a moral component that looks at 
the moral purpose of the law.122  Natural law generally reflects and takes into account 
moral values to a greater degree than legal positivism.  For example, natural law 
might state that it is immoral to kill someone and oppose the death penalty.  However, 
legal postivism in many countries allows the judicial system (state) to condemn a man 
to death and to carry out the death penalty as a matter of law.  This creates a tension 
between natural law theorists and legal positivists about how society ought to live and 
how law can be codified to benefit citizens.  
In the context of this thesis, understanding the distinction between these two 
theories of law is paramount if one is to gain insight into the complex issues of the 
nature of deception in negotiation by legal professionals.  Lawyers are meant to 
uphold the codified law in the positivist sense such that by the professional ethics 
codes, lawyers are generally forbidden to lie in the course of their professional duties.  
These duties may also apply to their private dealings to the extent that they impact the 
nature of the legal profession.  At the same time, lawyers daily interact with and serve 
the public, whose views on acceptable deception in negotiation cross the boundaries 
between codified law and natural law principles.  The question arises as to whether 
negotiations conducted by lawyers should be subject to strict positivist laws or 
whether lawyers ought to be able to use some forms of deception because such 
deception is natural to society’s expectations of bargaining behaviour.  A related 
enquiry is the extent to which either positivist rules (laws and ethics codes) or natural 
                                                 
122 Crowe, above n 114, 10, 30 (discussing the validity of law according to legal positivists and natural 
law theorists). 
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principles (values, morals) provide the most successful means of dealing with the 
issues posed by the research questions.  
An understanding of the tension between these two theories of law is also 
important because ethics is a function of natural law and what is deemed ethical or 
considered an ethical course of action (i.e., what one ought to do in a given situation) 
sometimes clashes with what is considered a legal or non-legal course of action in the 
life of a legal practitioner, particularly in the case of negotiation, a process that 
intersects both law and ethics.  To the extent that there is a marked difference between 
negotiation behaviour that is legally acceptable versus that which is ethically 
permissible, the legal practitioner will likely face an ethical dilemma, 123 especially if 
his/her own personal ethics is also at odds with the jurisdiction’s legal ethics and the 
prevailing bargaining ethics. 
2.3.2 Theories of Ethics 
As previously discussed, ethics plays an important role in establishing and 
measuring acceptable behaviour.  The purpose of this section is to present some 
divergent views on general societal ethics as well as legal ethics.  This section also 
discusses the distinction between ethics and morals.  In the context of this thesis, 
understanding these divergent yet co-existing views will help explain why the issue of 
deception in negotiation is complex and the impact of various influences on 
negotiation behaviour.  
 
 
                                                 
123 See Chapter 1, Section 1.7 (Definition of Key Terms) for a definition of ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ as 
used in this thesis.  In the context of this thesis, an ethical dilemma is one where the legal practitioner is 
unsure of proper course of action in terms of what is right or wrong, either by social standards or one’s 
own moral (individual) standards of right and wrong. 
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2.3.2.1 Introduction 
At the start, ethics needs to be distinguished from morals and from legal 
ethics, though they are sometimes used interchangeably.   
Ethics includes the various theories and schools of thought that attempt to 
describe the kind of moral action, conduct, motive or character that a society ought to 
embody and how society ought to behave.124  In addition, ethics is considered by 
some as even more stringent than custom, defined as the need to conform to the 
behavioural patterns of a community, whether personal or professional.125  For 
example, in the context of this study, where ethics states that lawyers must be honest 
and maintain candour in their professional capacity, the custom of negotiation in 
personal injury cases may tacitly require that personal injury lawyers use some forms 
of deception.126  
Legal ethics is a special subset of ethics and may be defined as ‘[u]sages and 
customs among members of the legal profession, involving their moral and 
professional duties towards one another, towards clients, and toward the courts.’127  
In contrast to ethics or legal ethics, morals or morality is ‘the law of 
conscience’.128  Morals are generally considered a personal standard of what is right 
or wrong, perhaps based on an aggregate view of the ethical rules and principles.  
                                                 
124 Black’s Law Dictionary, above n 28, 553; See also Lewicki et al, above n 25, 236; Bobette Wolski, 
Legal Skills: A Practical Guide for Students (2006) 23. 
125 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1236. 
126 See, eg, Rob Davis , ‘Negotiating Personal Injury Cases:  A Survey of the Attitudes and Beliefs of 
Personal Injury Lawyers’ (1994) 68 Australian Law Journal 734. 
127 Black’s Law Dictionary, above n 28, 894.  See also Bagaric and Dimopolous, above n 43, 3;  
Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1235-1236; Wolski, above n 124,  23 (referring to this as rules which 
‘encompass the ethical standards of the profession – that is, these are the standards for determining 
what is right or wrong in a particular situation.’). 
128 Black’s Law Dictionary, above n 28, 1008 (‘Moral law’).  See also Wolski, above n 124,  23 
(defining morals as ‘individual and personal beliefs about what is right and wrong’ (citing Roy J 
Lewicki, Bruce Barry, David M Saunders and John W Minton, Essentials of 3egotiation (2003) 236). 
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More importantly, morals are ‘cognizable and enforceable only by the conscience or 
by the... [moral sense] of right conduct, as distinguished from positive law.’129  
Morality is sometimes a ‘product of communal life’ resulting in a personal sense of 
what is right and wrong as developed during the socialization process, such as through 
the family, community life, and the environment in which one lives.130  The result is a 
personal conscience as a by-product of ‘the ideals we aspire to, the beliefs to which 
we attach particular significance, the essence of our desire…signpost giving meaning 
to our lives.’131 
Morality, unlike law, is concerned with fairness and choice such that being 
legally right is not the same thing as being morally right.132  Morals do not require 
strict or logical proof and are based simply on a sense, a belief, or even a conviction 
of what is right or wrong.133  Morals may have a randomness that the law tries to 
‘correct’ by imposing a societal standard of what constitutes appropriate and 
acceptable conduct so as to maintain some sense of civil order.  Of course, each one 
of these – business customs, legal ethics, and personal morals – can be opposing 
forces during a negotiation. 
2.3.2.2 Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Morality Distinguished 
In addition to differences in definition between ethics, legal ethics and 
morality, some argue that ethics is more stringent than law, law less stringent than 
ethics.134  Whereas law must deal with such external factors as problems of 
ascertaining the facts of the past events, motives of the person charged, possibility of 
                                                 
129 Black’s Law Dictionary, above n 28, 1008 (‘Moral’, part 2). 
130 Hugh Mackay, Right & Wrong (2004) 26.  
131 Mackay, above n 130, 18. 
132 Mackay, above n 130, 37. 
133 Note: Whether morals can be proved and thus have an underlying logical proof is debatable. 
134 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1235. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 53 -  9-Aug-10 
error, data conflicts, and the transaction costs of trying to do justice, ethics sometimes 
transcends such limitations.  The legal process must overlook or allow for certain 
deceits that either have little or no effect on the outcome of the case or are difficult or 
impossible to prove.135  For this reason, it appears that legal ethics is especially 
formulated to work within the ‘limitations’ of the law, thus the perception that the 
legal professionals’ code of ethics is not really ‘ethics’.136  For example, law and legal 
ethics is concerned with deception as it relates to what might be ‘material facts’137 
whereas societal ethics or personal morals does not make this distinction.  
In brief, the differences between legal ethics, societal ethics, and morality, 
whether actual or perceived, could potentially create conflicts of perception with 
regards to the use of deceptive tactics in negotiation.  Ethics, in particular, creates a 
layer of complexity when dealing with attempts to regulate deceptive behaviour, 
especially where such ethical norms collide with the ‘legal ethics’ of the legal 
profession. 
2.3.2.3 Overview of Dominant Theories of Ethics 
There are four predominant ethical philosophies from a society’s view of how 
one ought to behave.138  First is end-result ethics, which argues that one should pursue 
a course of action that gets the greatest return on investment.139  End-result ethics is 
                                                 
135 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1235. 
136 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1235-1236. 
137 See, eg, Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 F.Supp. 30, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on other grounds, 
485 F. 2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973) (defining ‘material facts’ as those ‘which, if known to the client, might 
well have caused him, acting as a reasonable man, to alter his proposed course of conduct.’)  See also 
Lerman, above n 60, 686 (referring to this as the ‘materiality standard’). 
138 Note:  These could be debated.  See, eg, Gordon Graham, Eight Theories of Ethics (2004) 126-161 
(discussing utilitarianism in light of at least eight theories of ethics, from Immanuel Kant’s categorical 
imperative (lying is not appropriate under any circumstances) to act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism, 
existentialism, hedonism, and consequentialism.  In addition, a distinction is made between ethical 
philosophies as understood in general by society and noted philosophers (‘societal ethics’) and ethical 
models as proposed by negotiators (‘bargaining ethics’).  
139 Lewicki et al, above n 25, 236-237. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 54 -  9-Aug-10 
based on determining the rightness of an action by considering the consequences of 
the action.  As such, end-result ethics can be regarded as utilitarianism, which is also a 
consequentialist doctrine.140  End-result ethics, therefore, judges the consequences of 
the action, rather than the will or intention of the actor behind the action (Kantianism 
or duty ethics) or the authenticity or good faith with which the action is performed 
(Existentialism).141  In the context of this thesis, legal positivism is generally 
utilitarianism or end-result ethics in action.   
A second philosophy, duty ethics, states that the best course of action is one 
based on the duty to obey or uphold certain rules and principles, such as the law.142  
This means that one’s actions should be guided by primary moral principles, or 
‘oughts’ and that the ultimate good is ‘a life of virtue (acting on principles) rather than 
pleasure.’143  In the context of this thesis, legal professionals are considered duty 
bound to obey the legal ethics codes of their jurisdiction, even in negotiations. 
A third ethical philosophy is social contract ethics, in which the best course of 
action is  one in line with established customs, norms, values, and strategy of an 
organization or community,144 such as codes of ethics, body corporate laws, and 
business industry customs and usage.  
A fourth approach is personalistic ethics.  Under this approach, the right 
course of action is based on one’s personal conscience or convictions.145  As such, 
personalistic ethics is most closely tied with morals. 
                                                 
140 Graham, above n 138, 139.  
141 Graham, above n 138, 137-138; Lewicki et al, above n 25, 241. 
142 Lewicki et al, above n 25, 236-237.  Immanuel Kant is considered the founder of this philosophy, 
sometimes referred to as ‘duty for duty’s sake’. 
143 Lewicki et al, above n 25, 239.  
144 Lewicki et al, above n 25, 236-237. 
145 Ibid. 
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In summary, the dominant theories of ethics discussed above influence how 
society believes it ought to behave.  The next section discusses theories of how the 
legal profession, through professional ethics codes, believes lawyers ought to behave 
and the ethics of eliciting such behaviours or punishing behaviour that violates these 
rules. 
2.3.3 Theories of Legal Ethics 
Ethics146 is a fundamental guiding force of the legal profession.  The legal 
ethics147 rules shape not only the lawyer’s behaviour but define the profession and its 
values.  Therefore, the selection and enforcement of a particular legal ethics model is 
likely to drive corresponding behaviour.   
Legal ethics can be understood as possibly consisting of two types of codes 
and two types of morality.  Once again, this is the intersection between legal 
positivism and natural law principles.  The two types of codes include disciplinary 
codes and aspirational codes.  Disciplinary codes are written rules identifying ‘a 
lowest common denominator of conduct below which offenders are punished’.148    
Disciplinary codes are technically rules made by the law societies or law associations.  
They generally identify the lowest common denominator of conduct by which lawyers 
should abide and conduct which is unacceptable.  In most cases, disciplinary codes are 
reactive and punitive, not preventative and remedial.  The rules could also be 
                                                 
146 See Chapter 1, Section 1.7 (Definition of Key Terms) for a definition of ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ as 
used in this thesis.  See also Richards, above n 28, 373; Lowenthal, above n 28, 413.  
147 Note:  Legal ethics here incorporates a broad definition to include not just the legal ethics rules but 
also to mean ‘leading our lives as lawyers, making decisions about our clients, our opponents, 
ourselves and our families, searching to be ‘good lawyers’ as well as ‘good people’’ (citing Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow,  ‘Portia Redux:  Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics’ in Stephen 
Parker and Charles Sampford (eds) Legal Ethics and Legal Practice:  Contemporary Issues (1995) 55.  
148 Charles Samford with Christine Parker, ‘Legal Regulation, Ethical Standard Setting, and 
Institutional Design’ in Stephen Parker and Charles Sampford (eds) Legal Ethics and Legal Practice:  
Contemporary Issues (1995) 14;  Ruth Fleet Thurman, ‘Chipping Away at Lawyer Veracity:  The 
ABA’s Turn Toward Situation Ethics in Negotiations’ (1990) Journal of Dispute Resolution 103. 
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considered self-interested as they are created and enforced by the professional 
associations, not by an external and disinterested group.  So long as a legal 
professional does not violate the ‘rule’, s/he is free to do as s/he wishes. 
Aspirational codes, on the other hand, are ‘the highest standards to which all 
should strive’.  Aspirational codes go beyond providing guidance on sanctions for 
unacceptable behaviour and also prescribe higher and preferred standards of conduct 
expected of lawyers, conduct that is rooted in core values or a higher calling and 
mission.  In the context of this thesis, the type of ethics code used will determine the 
extent to which behaviour can be specifically monitored, regulated, and enforced. 
Two primary types of morality underpin or intersect the disciplinary and 
aspirational codes of ethics discussed above.  The two types of morality are positive 
morality and critical morality.  Positive morality is what many consider to be the 
appropriate standard of conduct for lawyers.  It is rooted in the legal positivism149 
argument that drives most legal systems, especially common law systems.  Positive 
morality, or ‘the moral customs actually practiced by a given society’ are codified in 
the disciplinary codes of the legal profession.  According to Sampford, positive 
morality of legal ethics today seems to reinforce the ideas of the ‘moral majority’ in 
law and thus ‘denies the validity of claims that the way things are [might] not 
necessarily [be] the way they ought to be.’150  This denial of other, more appropriate 
standards of behaviour by lawyers is a principal criticism of this approach.  Rhode, for 
                                                 
149 Formulated by John Austin (1790-1859), legal positivism argues that ‘the existence and content of 
law depends on social facts and not on its merits.  The positivist thesis does not say that law's merits are 
unintelligible, unimportant, or peripheral to the philosophy of law. It says that they do not determine 
whether laws or legal systems exist.  According to positivism, law is a matter of what has been posited 
(ordered, decided, practiced, tolerated, etc.); as we might say in a more modern idiom, positivism is the 
view that law is a social construction.’ (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Legal Positivism 
(2003) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/> at 9 August 2010.  
150 Samford and Parker, above n 148, 16.  
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example, criticises the bar and the profession for failing to see its own problems and 
taking steps to correct the current problems plaguing the profession. 151  This is 
caused, in part, by strict adherence to standards of behaviour as codified in the 
disciplinary codes, which might be out of step with the evolution of the profession and 
its role in society.   
Critical morality, on the other hand, is a model where ‘individuals can debate, 
discuss, and criticize majority views, internalizing their own values and acting on 
them…allowing lawyers to question the way things are and to develop their ideas of 
how things ought to be.’152  Values are central to the discussion of critical morality. 
The values important to critical morality are those which the individual finds 
compelling, not the values imposed by rules or a ‘moral majority’ with a legalistic 
view.153  In this sense, one talks about legal ethics in the true context of ethics, not 
law.  At the same time, critical morality does not attempt to completely undermine 
prevailing legal ethics principles.  According to Sampford, critical morality can be 
applied to even the prevailing positive morality with an eye to applying a shared 
morality that lawyers can use to guide their actions.154  In the context of this thesis, a 
particular provision of the legal ethics code may be driven by positive morality, such 
as the rules on client confidences.  The provisions are usually designated by ‘must’ or 
‘shall’ statements that appear to denote a required mandate.  A lawyer would not be 
able to question, or be critical of, these provisions and must act in accordance with the 
provision (positive morality).  However, another provision of the legal ethics code 
                                                 
151 See, eg, Deborah L Rhode, In the Interests of Justice:  Reforming the Legal Profession (2000) 200-
208. 
152 Samford and Parker, above n 148, 16.  
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
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may allow the lawyer to use professional discretion in carrying out their duties.  These 
provisions are usually identified as ‘should’ or ‘may’ statements.  The lawyer may 
question the ethics code and act outside of it, where necessary (critical morality).  The 
ethical dilemmas and tensions arise when the provisions of the legal ethics codes 
conflict as to what a lawyer must do in a professional capacity that goes against what 
a lawyer believes is the right course of action based on personal ethics or the 
prevailing ethics of the community or society at large.  It is at these points where a 
lawyer who has developed critical morality may be able to better navigate ethical 
dilemmas and to make better judgments than one who feels strictly bound by the letter 
of the law under positive morality.     
These notions of codes and morality underpin models of legal ethics.  In 
addition to theories of social ethics,155 theories of legal ethics exist to explain the type 
of ethical decision-making lawyers might engage in during the course of practice.  As 
will be discussed further in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, the legal ethics codes define how 
lawyers ought to behave.  Legal ethics codes may differ from theories of social ethics 
and are generally constructed on a prevailing legal ethics theory.  The extent to which 
lawyers might use deception in negotiation may depend on the legal ethics theory 
being used by a given jurisdiction such that where there is explicit guidance on 
permissible tactics in negotiation, lawyers are expected to follow such guidance as 
opposed to a legal ethics code where no such guidance exists.   
In the context of this thesis,  understanding the express and implicit language 
of the legal ethics codes combined with an understanding of the major legal ethics 
theories is crucial to the analysis of the third research question, namely whether legal 
                                                 
155 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2 (Overview of Dominant Theories of Ethics) for a discussion on this 
topic. 
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ethics codes can and do successfully guide the negotiation behaviour of lawyers.  The 
next section discusses the four major legal ethics theories beginning with the 
prevailing adversarial legal ethics model. 
The primary and prevailing legal ethics theory, described by Parker and Evans 
as the Adversarial Advocate model,156 is also referred to by many as the standard 
conception of lawyer ethics.157  Under the adversarial advocate approach to legal 
ethics, the lawyer’s role is governed by the adversarial legal process which requires 
that the lawyer’s primary duty is to zealous advocacy on behalf of his/her client 
within the bounds of the law.158  This approach is characterised by ensuring client 
autonomy, partisanship, loyalty to the client, and non-accountability.159  Luban 
describes the standard conception of the lawyer’s role160 under the adversary model as 
consisting of: 1) ‘a role obligation (the “principle of partisanship”) that identifies 
professionalism with extreme partisan zeal on behalf of the client’ and 2) ‘the 
“principle of nonaccountability”, which insists that the lawyer bears no moral 
responsibility for the client’s goals or the means used to attain them.’161   
The role obligation is based on the theory of role morality, as opposed to 
universal morality or even general social morality.  Role morality under Luban’s 
‘principle of partisanship’ means that while there may be universal moral duties, 
                                                 
156 Christine Parker and Adrian Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics (2007) 14.  
157 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 14; David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988). 
158 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 21-23.  Parker and Evans call this approach ‘adversarial advocate’ 
or ‘the traditional conception’.  A similar term, ‘standard conception’, is used by David Luban in 
referring to Gerald Postema’s article in New York University Law Review.  See Luban, above n 157;  
Thurman, above n 148, 103.  
159 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 21-23; Luban, above n 157.  
160 Gerald J Postema, ‘Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics’ (1980) 3ew York University Law 
Review 55, 73. 
161 Luban, above n 157.;  Thurman, above n 148,  103; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Ethics in Alternative 
Dispute Resolution:  New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ 
Responsibilities’ (1997) 38 South Texas Law Review 407, 429 (discussing the values of zeal, client 
loyalty, partisanship, and non-accountability that currently dominate the model rules of practice.  
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special duties go with various social roles or stations in life which may allow 
individuals in these particular social roles ‘to do things that seem immoral’ but are 
necessary in that role in society.162  In some ways, the conduct occurring under role 
morality is said to be excused because of the special role even though social ethics or 
general morality might vehemently condemn such conduct.  With regards to lawyers 
lying in negotiation, the principle of partisanship could explain how the use of 
deception in negotiation is not only allowed but also seen as expected and ethical.  
Partisanship naturally invites an intense competition against any person or interest not 
aligned with those of the client or the lawyer’s pursuit of zealous advocacy on behalf 
of his or her client.  Competition under the guise of zealous advocacy might cause 
certain behaviours to be more pronounced than others, such as those common to 
distributive bargaining, including bluffing, puffing, deception, and intense focus on 
winning.  Under the adversarial ethics model, lawyers might not even recognise 
certain deceptive behaviour in daily negotiations as unethical.  On the contrary, as 
White163 in his seminal US article, Lerman164 in her US anecdotal study, and 
Wetlaufer165 in his informal US study clearly demonstrate, lawyers appear to routinely 
justify deceptive behaviour as permissible and within the bounds of legal ethics codes.  
In addition, deceptive behaviour is not seen as deception at all but simply a part of a 
lawyer’s role as zealous advocates for their clients or as adopting a defensive posture 
because of the actions of opposing counsel.  Perhaps the adversarial approach to legal 
                                                 
162 Luban, above n 157.   Luban refers to general morality as ‘common morality’, a morality common 
to all people.   
163 White, above n 60, 929. 
164 Lerman, above n 60, 659. 
165 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1219. 
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ethics is best summarised by the comments of a chief executive partner of Clayton 
Utz, a leading law firm in Australia: 
‘Moral judgments have no place in the advice a lawyer gives 
to a client, according to the chief executive partner of 
Clayton Utz…He said:  ‘The clients are entitled obviously to 
avail themselves of the full protection of the law and the 
lawyers are there to advance their clients’ interest subject to 
the constraints of their professional duties and, in particular, 
their duties to the courts. But if they operate within those 
constraints then they are acting appropriately.  He said a 
lawyer might advise on the ‘appropriateness’ of different 
strategies, but it was wrong for a lawyer to make moral 
judgments. ‘We don’t take a moral stance and it’s not up to 
us, as advocates for a client, to take a moral stance.  
Ultimately that comes to a decision by the client, not the 
lawyer.’166 
  
A second legal ethics approach is described by Parker and Evans as the 
responsible lawyer model.167  Under this model, the lawyer’s duty as officer of the 
court and responsibility to pursue justice and maintain the integrity of the legal system 
overrides his duty to the client though the lawyer still advocates for his/her clients’ 
interests.168  Unlike the adversarial model which seems to be client-centred, the 
responsible lawyer ethic is public interest-centred without fully compromising client 
interests.   The responsible lawyer sees his/her role and the ‘practice of law as a 
“public profession” in which lawyers have a mediating function, between the client 
and the law.’169  While responsible lawyers might put the duties to the legal system 
first, they, like adversarial advocates, do not consider personal morals relevant to their 
roles.  Like the adversarial advocate, the responsible lawyer will look to the ethics 
                                                 
166 Simons, above n 13.  
167 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 24-27.  
168 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 24. 
169 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 26 (citing Robert Gordon, ‘Corporate Law Practice as a Public 
Calling’ (1990) 49 Maryland Law Review 255). 
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inherent in their role as officer of the court and in the law and attempt to ‘pursue 
justice according to the law, no more and no less’.170  However, unlike the adversarial 
advocate, the responsible lawyer’s primary focus is not the client’s interests but the 
public interest and how the client can achieve his/her goals without violating the 
public interest and compromising the integrity of the legal system.  In essence, the 
responsible lawyer puts the profession first rather than the client, a position advocated 
by many legal scholars.171  In a best case scenario, the responsible lawyer acts as a ‘go 
between’ to help the individual and the state achieve a more harmonious balance in 
terms of the goals each strives to achieve in the legal system.172  They accomplish this 
by ‘creatively combin[ing] technical skill, a sense of social and legal responsibility 
and the vigorous pursuit of clients’ interests’.173  In the context of this thesis, 
presumably a lawyer acting under the ‘responsible lawyer’ model would not use 
deception given his/her strict adherence to the integrity of the profession and 
maintaining the public trust, something which would be compromised through the use 
of deception.  The question arises as to what might happen when the duties to the 
profession collide with the interests of justice or the lawyer’s own moral code.   
A more extreme version of the responsible lawyer model might be what 
D’Amato and Eberle call the socialist model of legal ethics.174  The socialist model 
invokes the power of the state above client interests.  Under the socialist model, the 
                                                 
170 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 26. 
171 Michael Davis, ‘Professionalism Means Putting Your Profession First’ (1988-1989) 2 Georgetown 
Journal of Legal Ethics 342. 
172 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 25. 
173 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 26. 
174 Anthony D’Amato and Edward J Eberle, ‘Three Models of Legal Ethics’ (1983) 27 Saint Louis 
University Law Journal 762, 770-772. 
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lawyer’s duty as an agent of the state supersedes his or her duty to client.175  While the 
lawyer does consider the client’s interests worthy, these goals are only worthy to the 
extent that they are consistent with the state’s goals.  Clients are expected to conform 
to the law and lawyers are expected to assist clients to rehabilitate themselves from 
deviations to the contrary.  In the socialist system of legal ethics, ‘there is no division 
of duty between the judge, prosecutor, and defence counsel’.176 
A third legal ethics approach described by Parker and Evans is the moral 
activist model, a term originally coined by Luban.177  Moral activism is in stark 
contrast to both the adversarial advocate and responsible lawyer approaches.  Moral 
activism combines mainstream consequentialist theory and a deontological theory of 
ethics as applied to legal practice.178  Consequentialist theory is based on the notion 
that all actions have consequences.  A deontological theory of ethics means that there 
is a moral obligation to carry out some acts regardless of how they might impact 
human happiness or serve the common good.179  As described by Luban, the moral 
activist understands that he/she cannot hide behind the cloak of the lawyer’s 
traditional role-morality principles of partisanship and non-accountability.  Luban 
describes moral activism as follows: 
Moral activism…involves law reform – explicitly putting 
one’s phronesis, one’s savvy, to work for the common weal 
                                                 
175 D’Amato and Eberle, above n 174, 770.  This model is most prevalent in socialist countries such as 
China and Russia, where the interests of the state appear to supersede all other interests. 
176 D’Amato and Eberle, above n 174, 770 (citing Monroe H Freedman, Lawyers’ Ethics in an 
Adversary System (1975) 2. 
177 See generally Luban, above n 157, xxii (discussing the morally activist lawyer and moral activism 
approach to legal ethics). 
178 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 23, 28; See also Luban, above n 157, xxii (discussing the morally 
activist lawyer and moral activism approach to legal ethics).  Moral activism may also be referred to as 
‘public interest’ lawyering. 
179 D’Amato and Eberle, above n 174, 772-773 (discussing deontological ethics and its leading founder, 
Immanuel Kant).    
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– and client counselling.180  The morally activist lawyer 
shares and aims to share with her client responsibility for the 
ends she is promoting in her representation; she also cares 
more about the means used than the bare fact that they are 
legal.  As a result, the moral activist will challenge her client 
if the representation seems to her morally unworthy; she may 
cajole or negotiate with the client to change the ends or 
means; she may find herself compelled to initiate action that 
the client will view as betrayal; and she will not fear to quit.  
She will have none of the principle of nonaccountability, and 
she sees severe limitations on what partisanship permits.181 
 
Lawyers operating under a moral activist ethic see themselves as active 
players of the ‘opportunity in the law’182 such that they ‘feel responsible for doing 
justice even if that involves changing or challenging the law and, from time to time, 
its practitioners.’183  This is particularly the case where moral activists feel the client’s 
cause is just and such activism is warranted.184  The advantages of the moral activist 
approach include the possibility that lawyers are engaged in work for social good such 
as in legal aid or pro bono work as well as working with poor clients.  This approach 
also allows the lawyer to play an active role in their client’s representation rather than 
being just a ‘hired hand’.  The disadvantages consist of situations where lawyers may 
subordinate the interests of their clients to larger causes or to deny representation to 
people and causes which do not reform the law or causes that the lawyer deems 
                                                 
180 See generally Luban, above n 157, 173. 
181 Luban, above n 157, xxii. 
182 Luban, above n 157, xxii (discussing a term coined by Louis Brandeis who argued that the 
‘opportunity in the law’ consisted in acting as a ‘people’s lawyer’ who ‘would self-consciously 
promote unrepresented interests, both public and private, with the same devotion and intelligence that 
corporation lawyers offer their clients.’ Ibid at xxiii.); See also Louis D Brandeis, ‘The Opportunity in 
the Law’ (1905) 39 American Law Review 555, 559.  
183 Luban, above n 157, xxii. 
184 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 29. 
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unworthy.  In that vein, moral activism may work against the traditional approach of 
allowing each client ‘their day in court’, metaphorically speaking.185 
A fourth legal ethics approach described by Parker and Evans is the ethics of 
care model, or relational lawyering approach.186  Under this approach, personal and 
relational ethics take precedence over rights-oriented approaches and social, 
professional, or political gains.187  The ethics of care approach argues for the 
following: 
Whereas the ethics of justice is founded on the idea that 
everyone should be treated equally, the ethics of care 
requires that no one should be hurt.  Whereas the ethic of 
justice assumes that one can resolve moral dilemmas by 
abstract and universalistic moral reasoning, the ethic of care 
requires due attention to context and the specific 
circumstances of each moral dilemma.188 
 
This approach appears to argue for a feminine-oriented ethics approach with 
the assumption that the current standard conception ethics model is more male-
oriented.  The ethics of care model is primarily based on the works of Carol Gilligan 
who believed that the current rights-oriented moral reasoning approach was developed 
primarily from the male point of view rather than the more female-oriented care-based 
ethics views.189  While controversial, the ethics of care approach has been adopted as 
an alternative approach to legal practice ethics primarily because of its contextual 
style as well as the attempt to incorporate the ‘moral, emotional, and relational 
                                                 
185 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 30-31; Luban, above n 157, 174. 
186 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 23, 31. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Caroline Maughan and Julian Webb, Lawyering Skills and the Legal Process (1995) 36. 
189 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 23, 31 (citing Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women’s Development (1982)). 
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dimensions of a problem into the legal solution.’190  The controversial nature of this 
approach lies in its strength as well as its weakness; a contextual style of ethics which 
allows for situation-based solutions but creates difficulty in limiting the possibility of 
developing a model of legal ethics that can be replicated and consistently used in the 
context of legal ethics issues.  This contextual approach can be likened to what some 
scholars call situation ethics,191 described as an ethic which holds that ‘both moral and 
legal rules are only relatively obliging and valid.  Their claim upon us depends 
extrinsically upon variable circumstances’.192 
The ethics of care has influenced legal practice in several ways:  1) by 
encouraging lawyers to use a more holistic approach to resolving clients’ problems; 2) 
by encouraging a more participatory approach to lawyering through greater dialogue 
between lawyer and client as well as more in-depth dialogue beyond the ordinary 
‘legal issue’ that the client is facing; and 3) by allowing lawyers and clients to see 
each other as ordinary people with relationships worthy of preserving and thus 
encouraging more non-adversarial approaches to resolving disputes.193   
While the ethics of care approach may seem beneficial, justifying the 
incorporation of a personal ethic into the legal ethics dilemma would seem 
problematic because personal ethics vary so greatly and because there might be a 
                                                 
190 Thomas L Shaffer, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer:  Law for the Innocent (1981);  Thomas L 
Shaffer and Robert F Cochran, Lawyers, Clients and Moral Responsibility (1994); Parker and Evans, 
above n 156,  32. 
191 William H Simon, The Practice of Justice:  A Theory of Lawyer Ethics (1998) 138; Thurman, above 
n 148, 103. 
192 Joseph Fletcher, ‘Situation Ethics, Law and Watergate’ (1975-1976) 6 Cumberland Law Review 35, 
36.  See also Simon, above n 191, 138 (discussing the nature of contextual judgement of lawyers and 
proposing a lawyer ethic that is more contextual in nature and based on the justice-serving goals of the 
legal system rather than the current rules-based approach or personal morality).  Note that while Parker 
and Evans would include personal morality as a guide post in the ethics of care model, it appears that 
Simon would argue for going beyond personal morals to focus on the overarching intentions of the 
justice system. 
193 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 33-34. 
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danger of losing the overarching societal values that appear to be embodied into a 
legal justice system.  However, this is the embodiment of the ethics of care – a greater 
concern for the client’s deep-seated interests, the network of relationships in which 
the client is engaged, and a greater interest in personal change (of the client) rather 
than social change.194 
In addition to the primary legal ethics models discussed above, there have 
been other suggestions for adopting alternative legal ethics models, including the 
deontological model based on Immanuel Kant’s theories as proposed by D’Amato and 
Eberle195 as well as a contextual ethics model based on situation ethics as proposed by 
W D Ross.196  Finally, William H Simon has proposed a lawyer ethics model based on 
contextualism as well as a lawyer disciplinary model based on the torts compensation 
system.197  To date these have not had significant impact on the current legal ethics 
models used and thus are not discussed in detail here.   
In conclusion, while there appears to be some general consensus that the 
adversarial ethics model is the most predominant model in use today, the other legal 
ethics models may also be used in various degrees by various lawyers.  To some 
extent, this is expected of a self-regulated profession where legal jurisdictions are 
allowed to adopt certain jurisdiction-specific ethics codes and where lawyers often act 
as agents for clients.  At the same time, the use of multiple and potentially conflicting 
                                                 
194 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 35-36. 
195 D’Amato and Eberle, above n 174, 772-773 
196 See generally D’Amato and Eberle, above n 174, 772-774.  See also W D Ross, The Right and the 
Good (1930) (arguing for ‘right’ action rather than ‘good’ action such that ‘[a]n act is not right because 
it, being one thing, produces good results different from itself; it is right because it is itself the 
production of a certain state of affairs.  Such production is right in itself, apart from any 
consequence.’); W D Ross, The Foundations of Ethics (1939). 
197 Simon, above n 191.  Simon’s contextualist approach to legal ethics theory is treated briefly Chapter 
7. 
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legal ethics model of a given jurisdiction is highly problematic for a profession as a 
whole.   
In the context of this thesis and the use of deception in negotiation, it means 
that there is greater potential for variability in lawyer conduct198 depending on the 
legal ethics theory used such that some lawyers may justify deceptive conduct and get 
away with it while others may be unduly punished for acting in a similar manner.  The 
potential inconsistency in behaviour and enforcement under variable ethics codes is 
likely to only add to the public’s ambivalence towards the legal profession.199  Given 
these concerns, care must be taken in adopting a specific model because ‘ethics is 
precarious if it is dependent on a contingent outcome of an entirely selfish 
consequentialist calculus’.200  This is even more so when lawyers negotiate and are 
part of a negotiation process that has its own history and theories of bargaining ethics.       
2.3.4 Theories of egotiation and egotiation Process 
The preceding section focused on the various theories of legal ethics and how 
they may influence a lawyer’s behaviour in the course of practice.  The focus of this 
section is on the theories of negotiation and the negotiation process.201  As the central 
focus of this thesis is on the use of deception in negotiation, it is important to 
understand the underlying tenets of the negotiation process and how negotiation 
theory and principles affect a lawyer’s ability to negotiate while still adhering to the 
legal ethics codes of the profession.  This section discusses four primary negotiation 
                                                 
198 See Chapter 7, Section 7.7 (Implementing the Proposed Policy Reform Proposals) for a discussion 
on the impact of variability of conduct on the lawyer and the profession. 
199 See Chapter 6, Section 6.5 (Consumer Studies of the Legal Profession are the Sting in the Tail) for a 
discussion of consumer studies and public perceptions of lawyers and the legal profession. 
200 Stephen Parker and Charles Sampford (eds) Legal Ethics and Legal Practice:  Contemporary Issues 
(1995) 55; See also C A J Coady and Charles J G Sampford (eds), Business, Ethics, and the Law (1993) 
6. 
201 See Chapter 1, Section 1.7 (Definition of Key Terms) for a definition of ‘negotiation’ as used in this 
thesis. 
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theories starting with the communitarian bargaining theory.  This is followed by a 
section on theories of negotiation ethics so as to distinguish between ethics used in the 
legal context as compared with ethics proposed for the negotiation process. 
A legal bargaining theory, called the ‘communitarian bargaining theory’ 
emerged in the late 1970s202 with the meta argument203 as a central mechanism.  The 
communitarian bargaining theory has been described as perhaps ‘the most important 
development in the legal bargaining literature in the last twenty years.’204 
Communitarian bargaining theory is relevant to this thesis because it helps 
establish the distinction between negotiation for the purpose of a social good (non-
legal) and negotiation for the purpose of resolving an individual’s claim to something 
(legal).  Scholars such as Professor Condlin describe the communitarian approach to 
legal bargaining as grounded on ‘methodological claims about the importance of 
tradition and social context for moral and political reasoning, ontological or 
metaphysical claims about the social nature of the self and normative claims about the 
value of community.’205  Further, a communitarian approach is ‘characterized 
principally by a commitment to resolving disputes from the perspective of what is 
                                                 
202 Robert J Condlin, Bargaining with a Hugger:  The Weaknesses and Limitations of a Communitarian 
Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, Or Why Can’t All Just Get Along (March 25, 2006) 1, n 3.  
bpress Legal Series.  Working Paper 1194.  <http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1194>  at 9 August 
2010 (crediting the work of Gerald R. Williams with the introduction of the communitarian theory of 
bargaining in legal literature with the publication of his book Legal Negotiation and Settlement.  See 
generally Gerald R Williams, Legal 3egotiation and Settlement (1983).  Based on survey research 
conducted in the late 1970s, Williams argued that ‘the most effective [legal] negotiators are 
characterized by positive social traits and attitudes and by the use of more open, cooperative and 
friendly negotiating strategies.’ (See eg, Gerald R Williams et al., ‘Effectiveness in Legal Negotiation’ 
in Gordon Bermant et al. (eds) Psychology and the Law (1976) 113.    
203 Robert J Condlin, ‘Every Day and in Every Way, We are All Becoming Meta and Meta: Or How 
Communitarian Bargaining Theory Conquered the World (of Bargaining Theory)’ (2008) 23 Ohio 
State Journal on Dispute Resolution 2.  
204 Condlin, above n 203, 2, n 9 (citing Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why Hasn’t the World Gotten to Yes?  
An Appreciation and Some Reflections (2006) 22 3egotiation Journal 485, 485-487 (stating that 
communitarian bargaining has ‘revolutionized how negotiation is taught in law schools’).  
205 Condlin, above n 202, 1, n 3.  See also Communitarianism  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism> at 9 August 2010. 
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good for the social group, on the basis of consensus norms, rather than from the 
perspective of what is good for the individual negotiator, on the basis of a rights 
claim.’206   
Clients and lawyers using this approach allegedly ‘share information about 
themselves and their situations candidly and honestly, construct agreements from the 
perspective of their common interests and resolve differences according to objectively 
derived and jointly agreed upon substantive standards.’207 This communitarian 
approach results in a bargaining model where self-interest, a central motive of 
traditional bargaining methods is ‘not naked, force is not brutish, entitlement claims 
are not legalistic and everyone acts in the spirit and to the limits, of their social 
potential.’208   
A central mechanism of communitarian bargaining theory is the meta 
argument.  According to Condlin, the meta argument ‘goes beyond the frame of 
reference of another person to a conversation to trump that person’s views with those 
of a higher order...and attempts to resolve disagreement from a ‘higher’ vantage point, 
one that takes more relevant data and ideas into account.’209  In other words, instead 
of focusing on an individual’s specific point of view, the meta argument looks at the 
bigger picture and attempts to dispose of opposing contentions by interjecting a 
different perspective, more information, or other higher view to resolve the 
disagreement.  This aspect of communitarian bargaining is especially relevant to the 
                                                 
206 Condlin, above n 202, 1, n 3. 
207 Condlin, above n 202, 1-2 
208 Condlin, above n 202, 3.  Condlin actually disputes these purported benefits of communitarian 
bargaining as being too idealistic and not grounded in reality, as ‘more mythic than data-based’ and 
‘appealing to those who have little direct experience with bargaining practice itself’ or those who do 
have practice but have failed and so ‘now want to change the ground rules so they will do better in the 
future’. (Ibid at 4). 
209 Condlin, above n 203, 1. 
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focus of this thesis because the meta argument would presumably preclude the use of 
deception in negotiation as it would not be conducive to the goal of resolving 
disagreement and achieving agreement.  
Proponents of communitarian bargaining seem to consider it a more civilized 
approach to bargaining as compared with adversarial bargaining, which is sometimes 
described as ‘representing a refusal to bargain, a process of presenting “an 
unbreachable defensive position” which an opponent cannot dislodge or defeat…by 
any means of persuasion based on the merits.’210  Murray describes adversarial 
bargainers as those who ‘coerce’, ‘deceive’, and ‘manipulate’211 opponents, have total 
disregard for the costs or concerns of others and ignore concerns of ‘fairness, wisdom, 
durability, and efficiency’.212 
Conversely, opponents consider the communitarian approach to bargaining as 
not grounded in reality and based on ‘myth’ rather than the real-life aspects of 
bargaining.  Opponents to communitarian bargaining believe the adversarial 
bargaining approach represents the way legal bargaining actually takes place and 
argue that, in the end, both lawyers and their clients are better off pursuing individual 
rather than communal goals and are likely to do better at the bargaining table if ‘they 
are secretive as well as open, argumentative as well as accommodating, suspicious as 
well as trusting, stubborn as well as flexible, and combative as well as cordial’,213 thus 
dismissing a solely communitarian bargaining approach as ‘self-defeating’ in the 
context of legal bargaining. 
                                                 
210 Condlin, above n 203, 10 (citing John S Murray, ‘Understanding Competing Theories of 
Negotiation’ (1986) 2 3egotiation Journal 179, 183. 
211 Murray, above n 210, 183. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Condlin, above n 202, 6.  
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Over the last two decades, three other theoretical frameworks have emerged as 
being dominant with respect to the theory of negotiation and, and more specifically, 
the legal negotiation process. 214  These key developments are important to 
understanding how traditional negotiation as practiced by non-lawyers has evolved 
into negotiation as practiced by lawyers and the ethics that might guide the lawyer’s 
conduct in negotiations depending on the relevant theory of negotiation, including 
whether the use of deception is permissible. 
First, in 1984, Menkel-Meadow proposed that all negotiations can be 
classified according to two categories:  ‘problem-solving’ or ‘adversarial’.215  
Adversarial negotiation, considered a traditional model of negotiations, has also been 
called zero-sum bargaining, distributing bargaining, and value claiming.216  In the 
context of this thesis, a lawyer who operates under an adversarial advocate model of 
legal ethics would presumably use adversarial negotiation practices as the norm since 
the ethics align with practice.   
As defined by Menkel-Meadow, the problem-solving model is based on 
‘finding solutions to the parties’ set of underlying interests’217 rather than focusing 
solely on strategies and tactics. The problem-solving approach to negotiations has 
been classified as a win-win, integrative bargaining or value creating model whose 
focus is on finding the underlying needs and interests of the parties in order to come 
to a solution that is mutually beneficial without unnecessary compromise.  Menkel-
                                                 
214 Korobkin, above n 37, 1 (defining negotiation as ‘an interactive communication process by which 
two or more parties who lack identical interests attempt to find a way to coordinate their behaviour or 
allocate scarce resources in a way that will make them better off than they could be if they were to act 
alone.’)  
215 Korobkin, above n 37, 17-21; See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Toward Another View of Legal 
Negotiation:  The Structure of Problem-Solving’ (1984) 31 University of California Los Angeles Law 
Review 754, 765-772, 780, 800-805. 
216 See, eg, Menkel-Meadow, above n 215, 764-794 (discussing the adversarial model). 
217 Menkel-Meadow, above n 215, 794; See also Fisher and Ury, above n 11. 
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Meadows argues that because lawyers bargain ‘in the shadow of the law’, legal 
negotiators tend to operate from the ‘adversarial’ negotiations paradigm with a focus 
on maximizing victory,218even if this might mean crossing ethical boundaries. 
Second, in 1993, Mnookin proposed that negotiation is really about how 
parties overcome obstacles in order to reach mutually advantageous solutions.219  
Therefore, the essence of negotiations is the factors that impede the ability of 
negotiating parties to reach agreement on a solution.  Mnookin identified at least three 
categories of barriers:  strategic, cognitive, and the principle/agent problem.220  
Presumably, resolution to each of these types of barriers is not only the goal of 
negotiations but a mark of whether a negotiation may be considered ‘successful’.221  
Finally, in 2000, Korobkin introduced a fourth primary theoretical perspective 
of negotiation.  Korobkin argued for a positive theory of negotiations, one in which all 
negotiations can be understood in terms of ‘zone definition’ and ‘surplus 
allocation’.222  According to Korobkin, a key aspect of any negotiation is determining 
the ‘bargaining zone’, defined as ‘the space below a buyer’s reservation price but 
above the seller’s reservation price’.223  Within the bargaining zone, a party’s 
reservation price is ‘the most…[a party]…will pay to obtain a valuable item through 
negotiation or the least that…[a party]…will accept to give up a valuable item’.224  
According to Korobkin, all negotiations entail defining the range of the bargaining 
                                                 
218 Menkel-Meadow, above n 215, 765-772, 780, 800-805.  See also Korobkin, above n 37, 18. 
219 Korobkin, above n 37, 26-29; See also Robert H Mnookin, ‘Why Negotiations Fail:  An Exploration 
of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict’ (1993) 8 Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution 235, 235-
245. 
220 Korobkin, above n 37, 26-29; See also Mnookin, above n 219, 235-245. 
221 See Section 2.2.4 (Definition of ‘Success’ in Negotiation) for an in-depth discussion. 
222 Korobkin, above n 37, 21-25; See also Korobkin, above n 32, 1791-1792, 1799-1812, 1816-1831. 
223 Korobkin, above n 37, 41- 42. 
224 Ibid.  A reservation price is also known as the reservation point. 
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zone (‘zone definition’), determining the ‘cooperative surplus’,225 and then allocating 
that surplus amongst the bargaining parties.  An important aspect of this theory is 
Korobkin’s recognition of the economic aspect of negotiations (zone definition) 
entwined with the more social aspects (surplus allocation), where issues of procedural 
fairness, and perceptions of ethics come into play.226  
The preceding section described four main theoretical perspectives on 
negotiation and the negotiation process.  In the context of this thesis, the theoretical 
perspectives of the negotiation process provide a foundation to realising that 
negotiation appears to be a distinct process composed of certain expectations, 
behaviours, steps, and strategies.  Furthermore, these theories of the negotiation 
process impact the kinds of ethics a lawyer might use during negotiation and the 
resulting behaviours because just as theories of law intersect with theories of legal 
ethics, so do theories of negotiation intersect with theories of negotiation ethics.  This 
will be important in light of the policy reform proposals discussed in Chapter 7. 
2.3.5 Theories of egotiation Ethics 
In contrast or perhaps complementary to the generally accepted legal ethics 
theories discussed in section 2.3.3, Shell, a notable dispute resolution scholar, argues 
for three slightly different schools of ethics as they pertain specifically to bargaining 
(negotiations) and its effects on deceptive practices within negotiations.227  In the 
context of this thesis, it is important to note that in the absence of guidelines to the 
                                                 
225 Korobkin, above n 37,  41- 42 (defining ‘cooperative surplus’ as ‘…the breadth of the bargaining 
zone – that is, the distance between the two parties’ reservation prices…or ‘joint value’ that the parties 
can create by reaching agreement’). 
226 Korobkin, above n 37, 22, 24-25. 
227 G Richard Shell, ‘Bargaining with the Devil Without Losing Your Soul’ in Carrie Menkel-Meadow 
and Michael Wheeler (eds) What’s Fair:  Ethics for 3egotiators (2004) 65-69. 
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contrary, lawyers may use one or more of these models to guide negotiation behaviour 
regardless of whether any might violate the legal ethics rules.   
According to Shell, the first negotiation ethic is the ‘poker’ school of 
bargaining, which holds that negotiations are like a poker game and, as such, must be 
played by the rules of the game.  In this bargaining ethics scenario, lying is simply 
like a poker chip, bluffing is allowed (even expected) but ‘hiding cards or reneging on 
one's bets is not allowed.’228  The ‘poker’ school of bargaining closely relates to the 
‘end-results’ social ethics model discussed in section 2.3.2.3 above.  The ‘poker 
game’ analogy is also most commonly used by the adversarial advocate theory of 
legal ethics. 
The second negotiation ethics model is the idealist school, which argues that 
bargaining is an inherent part of life.  The ethics used in one’s personal life should be 
the same ethics used in negotiations.229  It follows that if, in your personal life, you do 
not condone lying, then you should not lie in your professional negotiations.  The 
idealist school of bargaining ethics does not exclude lying, especially in certain 
circumstances such as protecting someone’s feelings.  Because this model more 
closely integrates religion and philosophy, it appears to be a combination of the social 
contract and personalistic social ethics models discussed in section 2.3.2.3 above.  
Finally, the third bargaining ethics school is the pragmatist approach.  This 
approach argues for acting based on what is practical, realistic, or sensible given the 
circumstances.  In regards to lying, the pragmatist recognizes that deception is part of 
                                                 
228 Cindi Fazzi, ‘Book Review:  What’s Fair:  Ethics for 3egotiators, edited by Carrie Menkel-
Meadows and Michael Wheeler’ (2005) 60-JUL Dispute Resolution Journal 89, 89. 
229 Shell, above n 227, 65-69. 
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negotiations but would rather not use it given the long-term costs of using such a 
tactic, such as relational, reputation or transaction costs.230 
While Shell’s three bargaining ethics models assume deception as part of the 
negotiation process, bargaining ethicist Norton believes fully understanding the 
bargaining process is essential to having the proper ethics in which to engage in 
bargaining.  In effect, Norton discounts the existence of deception in negotiation and 
argues that truthfulness and fairness are vital to negotiations231 and set the baseline for 
reaching durable agreements by imposing a minimal, though not always aspirational 
standard of bargaining ethics.  Norton contends that ‘ethical clarity is taxed in a 
process in which both truthfulness and deception have standing.’232  While Shell 
believes Shell’s three bargaining ethics models are sufficient to describe negotiation 
ethics, Norton argues that there are four aspirational bargaining ethics models.  These 
models are discussed briefly below. 
According to Norton, the first aspirational bargaining ethics model is 
universalism, whose most ardent supporter may be considered to be Judge Alvin 
Rubin.233  Universalism may also correlate to Shell’s idealist model of bargaining 
ethics discussed above.  Universalism proposes to push negotiation ethics towards 
universal ethical norms with greater priority on societal interests over considerations 
of self-interest234 as the ‘center of gravity in negotiations’.235  Universalism rejects 
‘special’ rules that may apply to an individual because of his or her special role or 
cultural process.  Universalists such as Judge Rubin argue that because lawyers serve 
                                                 
230 Ibid. 
231 Norton, above n 19, 271. 
232 Norton, above n 19, 274. 
233 See, eg, Rubin, above n 69, 577; See also Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1219. 
234 Norton, above n 19, 274.  
235 Ibid.  
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society and not just their clients in the ‘just determination of disputes’, lawyers have 
an affirmative duty of candour, including voluntary disclosure during negotiations.236  
Judge Rubin places a higher value on honesty as a positive value and one which 
implies ‘not only telling [the] literal truth but also disclosing the whole truth.’237 
Universalist bargaining ethics, however, appears to sharply contradict the 
central paradigms of negotiation, especially those of legal negotiation.  First, a 
universalist ethic presupposes and would ask lawyers to interject societal interests into 
a process that is generally ‘intrinsically individualistic’ given the adversarial nature of 
the legal system.238  Second, a universalist bargaining ethic does not appear to give 
sufficient weight to both the partisan nature of the adversarial system or the partisan 
interests inherent in real negotiations, especially those involving lawyers.239  While 
truth and fairness could be said to transcend partisan/individualistic concerns, the 
reality of most negotiations appears to be such that a universalist duty of candour 
would be problematic given that ‘available evidence confirms the notion that 
truthfulness is a particular source of ethical tension in negotiations.’240  Nevertheless, 
aspirational notions of truthfulness and fairness are favoured by many and may still be 
achieved. 
 A second aspirational bargaining ethics model, in sharp contrast to 
universalism is the traditionalist view, which coexists with the classic bargaining 
process of offers and counteroffers.  Traditionalism could be correlated to Shell’s 
poker school of bargaining ethics and Parker and Evans’ adversarial advocate legal 
                                                 
236 Norton, above n 19, 276. (discussing Rubin’s universalist views). 
237 Rubin, above n 69, 582, 589-591. 
238 Norton, above n 19, 277.  
239 Ibid.  
240 Norton, above n 19, 274.  
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ethics model discussed earlier.  Traditionalism is based on zero-sum self-interest.241  
Zero-sum bargaining is also referred to as distributive bargaining, win-lose, or lose-
win.242  
Traditionalism is ‘the dominant ideology of the legal profession.’243  As such, 
traditionalists draw from the ethics of the adversary system.  This is most commonly 
expressed ‘in the oppositional stance assumed by lawyers with clients against others 
with adverse interests and is justified by intense loyalty in order to adequately 
represent a client.’244  Traditionalists, such as James White,245 appear to specifically 
reject universalism and place partisan, individualistic, and self-interest concerns well 
above societal interest.  In fact, traditionalists would push bargaining ethics to the 
outer limits to the point where a lawyer might ‘use a lower standard than he would if 
he were acting for himself, and lower too, than any standard his client himself would 
be willing to act on, lower, in fact, than anyone on his own.’246  As Curtis explains, 
the traditionalist lawyer’s primary concern is loyalty to the client and this higher 
responsibility, one that is the foundation of zealous representation of the client as well 
as the traditional foundation of the adversarial system, ‘allows the lawyer to lie for the 
client when he could not justify lying for himself.’247  Without this chief asset of the 
profession, in other words, the ‘freedom from the strict bonds of veracity’,248 lawyers 
                                                 
241 Norton, above n 19, 277.  
242 See, eg, Fisher and Ury, above n 11 (discussing the distinctions on various ways to conduct 
distributive bargaining). 
243 Norton, above n 19, 277.  
244 Ibid.  
245 See, eg, White, above n 60, 929. 
246 Charles P Curtis, ‘The Ethics of Advocacy’ (1951) 4 Stanford Law Review 3, 3-23. 
247 Norton, above n 19, 277.  Note that in some jurisdictions and perhaps in some cultures, explicit or 
implicit rules specifically allow such deception on behalf from the client, including duties of 
confidentiality and non-disclosure of certain information as part of attorney-client privilege;  Curtis, 
above n 246, 9 (‘ … one of the functions of a lawyer is to lie for his client … He is required to make 
statements as well as arguments which he does not believe in.’) 
248 Curtis, above n 246, 9. 
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who espouse to this traditionalist view would argue that they are not able to 
effectively serve their clients who are, in effect, members of society.  A traditionalist 
view of bargaining ethics is intricately woven into the fabric of the traditional 
bargaining ethics of the adversary system and would potentially require a massive 
overhaul to impose an alternative bargaining ethic. 
A third aspirational bargaining ethics model is the relativist ethic.  The 
relativist ethic may provide a means of departure from a strictly universalist or 
traditional bargaining ethic because instead of applying strict rules across all 
negotiations (universalist ethic) or adopting the majority view of bargaining 
(traditional ethic), the relativist ethic argues for bargaining rules relative to the 
situation or context within which bargaining occurs.   
For example, Norton argues that the difference between litigation and non-
litigation means of resolving disputes may provide an avenue for a specialist ethic, a 
bargaining ethic that is relative to the process used (e.g., whether it required 
courtroom advocacy, a judge, or simply a non-legal neutral).249  While a relativist 
bargaining ethic would seek to maintain the benefits of both universalism and 
traditionalism, it does not appear clear whether such divisions would create more 
confusion or provide ethical clarity.  It would seem that a relativist ethic would leave 
ethics more diluted and less cohesive so as to increase the chances of deception, albeit 
in perhaps more subtle ways. 
Pragmatist ethics is a final aspirational bargaining ethic, one which Shell also 
supports and recognises.250  Pragmatism eschews the theoretical underpinnings of 
universalism and traditionalism.  This model advocates for bargaining experience as 
                                                 
249 Norton, above n 19, 279.  
250 Shell, above n 227, 65-69. 
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the primary basis for a bargaining ethic.251  It is ‘the range of acceptable agreements 
for experienced negotiators in the field in question.’252  A pragmatist would use a 
different bargaining ethic depending on the skill and sophistication of each opponent 
as well as the circumstances surrounding the negotiation.   
Context, as in the negotiation context, is a determinative factor in deciding 
which ethic is appropriate.  Pragmatism does not automatically defer to the societal 
ethical norms (universalism) or adopt a classic adversarial stance (traditionalism) or 
even conform to a bargaining ethic relative to a person’s position or cultural process 
(relativism).  Pragmatism appears to favour using the bargaining experience, which 
may include widespread ethical practices or not, as the basis for determining which 
ethical standard is appropriate.253  As such, pragmatism may correlate to the 
responsible lawyer legal ethics model discussed earlier as both seek to make the best 
decisions without compromising personal or professional integrity and reputation.   
While functional and perhaps even common practice among lawyers, pragmatism as a 
bargaining ethic raises several concerns. 
First, pragmatism assumes that what is common practice is an appropriate 
ethical standard.  The appropriateness of the ethical standard would likely be 
measured at a higher level than just one given situation or step in the negotiation.  The 
standard may be the prevailing society’s ethical standard, likely higher than that of a 
given negotiation context.  Second, pragmatism has ‘serious methodological 
problems.’254  In essence, as Norton questions, without data or some means of 
                                                 
251 Norton, above n 19, 279. 
252 Lowenthal, above n 28, 411.  
253 Norton, above n 19, 279. 
254 Norton, above n 19, 280. 
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identifying and evaluating practices, how does one assess the extent to which a 
deviation from the truthfulness and fairness baseline is unethical?255    
In brief, these various bargaining ethics models play a part in any negotiation.  
The bargaining ethics of the legal negotiator may conflict with the society’s ethical 
norms, the client’s ethics or even the ethics of a mediator, if one is employed to assist 
in the negotiations.  Knowledge and sensitivity to such conflicts may increase the 
chances that a lawyer can properly manage potentially deceptive practices, especially 
in negotiation.  However, even sensitivity to the ethics in the context of a negotiation 
may not be sufficient if certain theories of deception and decision-making hold true 
during the negotiation.  These theories of deception and decision-making theories, 
which may affect the extent to which deception is used in negotiation, are discussed in 
the next two sections. 
2.3.6 Theories of Deception and Lies in Practice 
As discussed in the preceding sections, the prevailing legal ethics codes as 
well as the prevailing negotiation theory in the legal jurisdiction may heavily 
influence whether deception in negotiation is permissible.  In addition, a lawyer’s own 
view of the nature and impact of deception may affect the decision to use deception in 
negotiation, whether personally or professionally.  The purpose of this section is to 
provide a theoretical perspective on deception and lies in practice so as to better 
inform the results of the research questions as discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 6 and to 
provide a foundation for understanding the policy reform recommendations presented 
in Chapter 7.  
                                                 
255 Ibid.  Note that this problem would likely occur under any of the models simply because 
‘truthfulness’ and ‘fairness’ are not expressly identified criteria of measuring or evaluating negotiation 
‘success’ or outcome.   
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Whether deception is a necessary evil appears to depend ‘on the eye of the 
beholder’.  Theoretically, there appear to be two distinct views on deception.  The 
deontological view of lying states that lying is intrinsically wrong, always has a 
negative value, regardless of reason, and should be prohibited.256  As discussed 
earlier, deontologists consider lying to be inherently wrong because of the following 
primary reasons:  1) lying ‘violates contractual commitments between two 
interlocutors who assume by default that the other person always tells the truth’; 2) 
lying ‘limits the lie-recipient’s freedom of choice and leads the person to make an 
uninformed decision’; and 3) lying ‘creates an internal conflict on the part of the lie-
teller and cognitive dissonance in the lie-teller’s belief system, which can be 
hazardous to the lie-teller’s psychological well-being’.257 
In sharp contrast, proponents of the social-conventional view of lying argue 
that lying has inconstant values and may be considered right or wrong depending on 
social and cultural conventions.258  In some socio-cultural conventions, lying may be 
considered positive and sanctioned while in others, lying is prohibited and has a 
negative value.259  In addition, social-culturalists discount the deontological 
perspective of lying as wrong, suggesting instead that the deontological view reflects 
only the Western, individualist view and does not take into account cultures (e.g. 
Asian),260 where ‘concerns for individual rights to information, freedom of choice, 
                                                 
256 This is the view of someone like Emmanuel Kant.  See also Bok, above n 33, 26; J Krupfer, ‘The 
moral presumption against lying’ (1982) 36 Review of Metaphysics 103–126. 
257 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 527. 
258 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 526-527 (citing E Ochs Keenan, ‘On the universality of conversational 
implicatures’ (1976) 5 Language in Society 67-80).  
259 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 526-527 (citing Harry C Triandis, Individualism and collectivism 
(1995).  Triandis’ work on cross-cultural differences with respect to a variety of factors is well-
respected and well-referenced in the field. 
260 Note:  The use of ‘Western’ and ‘Asian’ terms is not meant to stereotype countries or people.  These 
terms, as used here, indicate a common view that some countries are more concerned about 
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and mental health are not necessarily critical factors for deciding the moral 
implications of lying’.261  In non-Western cultures, Lee et al’s research suggests that 
‘concerns for collectivity, and sometime divine forces are important determinants of 
whether lying is right or wrong.’262   
2.3.7 Decision-Making Theories Affecting Legal egotiation 
The legal system’s foundation is a system of rules263 by which scholars, 
legislators, judges, and regulators attempt to balance the need to discourage 
undesirable behaviours while encouraging other more favourable behaviours.  In so 
doing, law and economics scholars have referred to certain decision-making theories 
to better understand human behaviour and how decisions are made in the context of 
legal negotiation.  While these theories many not be widely used, they do offer 
insights that are useful in answering the research questions at hand.  For example, one 
of the key skills of a lawyer is risk management, both for the client and the lawyer.  
Given both the perceived benefits and harms caused by deception in negotiation,264 it 
could be argued that the decision to be deceptive is a risky decision.   
One way in which these decision-making theories are useful is in 
understanding how a lawyer might evaluate the risk involved in using deception in 
                                                                                                                                            
individualistic views and priorities (‘western’) versus group or collectivist views (‘asian’) regarding the 
use of lying or deception and the factors that influence whether it is right or wrong.  For the lawyer 
acting as negotiator, the key question is whether it is permissible for a lawyer, as an officer of the court 
and representative of the legal system, to lie, regardless of whether in a negotiation or otherwise.  Lying 
in negotiation seems permissible precisely because it is such an acceptable part of traditional 
negotiations. 
261 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 527. 
262 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 527; See also K Lee and H Ross, ‘The concept of lying in adolescents 
and young adults’ (1997) 43 Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 255-270; E E Sweetser, ‘The definition of lie; 
An examination of the folk models underlying a semantic prototype’ in D Holland (ed) Cultural models 
in language and thought (1987) 43-66 (Sweetset’s research pointed to lying as a social-cognitive 
construct influenced by social conventions).   
263 Note: By ‘rules’, I mean legislation, legal principles derived from case law, codes of conduct, court 
rules and any similar prescriptions, which deem to regulate conduct and punish for violation thereof. 
264 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2 (Deception as a Negotiation Strategy) for a detailed discussion of 
harms and perceived benefits of using deception as a negotiation strategy). 
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negotiation.  In addition, by understanding how lawyers and clients make decisions 
when confronted with risky behaviour, educators and policy makers can better guide 
behaviour or develop policies that take into account certain behavioural expectations, 
resulting in greater success in developing, implementing, and measuring policy 
outcomes.  The purpose of this section is to discuss these key decision-making 
theories with an eye towards how these theories may affect the implementation of the 
policy reform proposals outlined in Chapter 7. 
One of the chief decision-making theories long used by law and economic 
scholars is ‘rational choice theory’ or ‘expected utility theory’.265  Rational choice 
theory is based on a series of logical axioms and argues that ‘people make outcome 
maximizing decisions’.266  In other words, people will make those decisions which 
maximize their own self-interests.  This theory is consistent with basic human nature 
that tends to focus on self-interests.  However, rational choice theory began to fall into 
disfavour as legal scholars recognised that there was ‘too much credible experimental 
evidence that individuals frequently acted in ways that are incompatible with the 
assumptions’267 proposed by rational choice theory.  In other words, individuals do 
not always make rational choices.  Out of a critical analysis of the rational choice 
theory and a greater understanding of human decision-making, a new theory, called 
                                                 
265 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’ 
(1979) 47(2) Econometica 263-291; See also Chris Guthrie, ‘Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the 
Law’ (2003) 97 3orthwestern University Law Review 1115, 1115-1119; Thomas S Ulen, ‘Firmly 
Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law’ (1977) Wisconsin Law Review 433, 436  (‘The single 
most important contribution that law and economics has made to the law is the use of a cogent theory 
of human decision-making [rational choice theory] to examine how people are likely to respond to 
legal rules.’) 
266 Guthrie, above n 265, 1115.  
267 Russell B Korobkin and Thomas S Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics’ (2000) 88 California Law Review 1051, 1055.  
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‘prospect theory’, emerged in the wake of evidence from the fields of behavioural law 
and economics as well as law and psychology. 
In 1979, cognitive psychologist and Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman and 
cognitive psychologist Amos Tversky developed prospect theory through an empirical 
study involving students and university faculty in response to several hypothetical 
choice questions.268  There are four primary components of prospect theory, which 
argues that people do, in certain circumstances, make risky or uncertain decisions.269  
These four primary components, discussed in detail below, include: 1) the framing of 
ordinary gains and losses; 2) the framing of low-probability gains and losses; 3) the 
perception of loss aversion; and 4) overvaluing the sense of certainty.   
The proposition of prospect theory counters rational choice theory and the 
assumption that people generally assume a position of ‘either risk neutrality or risk 
aversion in the face of both gains and losses.’270  In other words, rational choice 
theory says people never make risky choices or risky decisions, whether faced with a 
probability of achieving gains or incurring losses.  This seems to be based on an 
objective (rational) assessment of their expected loss in comparison to their perceived 
total wealth at the time of making the decision.  In contrast, prospect theory holds that 
people will make risky or uncertain decisions regarding gains or losses in one of four 
particular ways, as discussed below.  Decisions under prospect theory tend to be 
                                                 
268 See generally, Kahneman and Tversky, above n 265, 264-268; See also Avnita Lakhani, ‘The Fog 
Has Not Lifted – Section 198J of the NSW Legal Profession Act in Light of Acceptable Negotiation 
Theory and Principles’ (2006) 18.1 Bond Law Review 61 (discussing how prospect theory applies to 
lawyer behaviour during certain types of negotiations in light of section 198J of the NSW Legal 
Profession Act). 
269 Guthrie, above n 265,  1115; See also Jeffrey J Rachlinski, ‘Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of 
Litigation’ (1996) 70(1) Southern California Law Review 113, 121 (‘Expected utility theory predicts 
that people make either risk-averse or risk-neutral choices depending upon the magnitude of the stakes 
relative to their total wealth.  In contrast, prospect theory predicts that people make either risk-averse or 
risk-seeking choices depending upon the characterization of the decision as a loss or as a gain.’).   
270 Guthrie, above n 265, 1118.  
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guided by a non-rational, subjective assessment based on one’s perception of the 
magnitude of expected or imagined gain or loss.  The next four paragraphs discuss 
each of the four primary components of prospect theory in detail. 
The first component of prospect theory deals with ordinary gains and losses.  
Under the framing of ordinary gains and losses component, when choosing between 
options that present the probability of a gain relative to a specific reference point, 
prospect theory says that the person will make a risk-averse choice.  Conversely, if 
choosing between options that present the probability of incurring a loss, prospect 
theory holds that the person will make a risk-seeking choice.271  Guthrie cites the 
example of winning a prize or paying a fine.  Under this first component, ‘people will 
generally choose a definite $1,000 prize over a 50% chance at receiving a $2,000 
prize’ (gain options).272  Conversely, where there are loss options relative to a 
particular reference point, decision-makers will generally risk a 50% chance of 
incurring a $2,000 fine rather than pay a definite fine of $1,000.273   With regards to 
the use of deception in negotiation, one might expect that if a person has a 100% 
chance of successfully deceiving the opposing party in a negotiation to their benefit as 
compared with a 50% chance of being discovered and punished for using deception, 
the individual will make the choice to deceive the opposing party because they stand 
to gain from that conduct relative to their perception of loss.  Conversely, they will 
                                                 
271 Guthrie, above n 265, 1118 (discussing the first component of prospect theory, the framing of 
ordinary gains and losses). 
272 Guthrie, above n 265, 1118. 
273 Ibid. 
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choose not to use deception in negotiation if they believe the deception will result in a 
greater loss than the perceived gain.274 
The second component of prospect theory concerns a decision-maker’s 
behaviour when faced with low-probability gains and losses.  In this circumstance, 
prospect theory holds that a person’s risk preferences are reversed relative to the first 
component of ordinary gains and losses.  In other words, ‘[i]ndividuals tend to make 
risk seeking choices when selecting between options that appear to be low-probability 
gains and risk-averse choices when selecting between options that appear to be low-
probability losses.’275  Using the same example above, people will take the gamble of 
a 50% chance at winning $1,000 over a definite $50 prize; however the same person 
will tend to prefer paying a definite $50 fine rather than risk a 5% chance of paying a 
$1,000 fine (still $50 yet a risk-averse choice).276 
The third component of prospect theory, loss aversion, states that a prospective 
loss has greater weight on the mind of the decision-maker as a compared to a 
prospective gain of the same value.277  Therefore, the prospective loss of $1,000 will 
be more aggravating and weigh more heavily on a person’s mind than a prospective 
gain of $1,000.  
Finally, the fourth component of prospect theory states that people overvalue a 
sense of certainty.278  In other words, decision-makers ‘overweigh outcomes that are 
                                                 
274 See, eg, White, above n 60, 927 (‘if the low probability of punishment means that many lawyers will 
violate the standard [concerning truthfulness in negotiation], the standard becomes even more difficult 
for the honest lawyer to follow, for by doing so he may be forfeiting a significant advantage for his 
client to others who do not follow the rules’; Scott S Dahl, ‘Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in 
Negotiations’ (1989) 8 Review of Litigation 173. 
275 Guthrie, above n 265, 1118 (discussing the second component of prospect theory, the framing of 
low-probability gains and losses). 
276 Guthrie, above n 265, 1118.  
277 Kahneman and Tversky, above n 265, 263-291; Guthrie, above n 265, 1118.  
278 Kahneman and Tversky, above n 265, 265; Guthrie, above n 265, 1118. 
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considered certain relative to outcomes which are merely probable.’279  Using another 
example, while most people would ‘prefer a definite prize of a one-week tour of 
England over a 50% chance of winning a three-week tour of England’, these same 
individuals would prefer a 5% chance of a three-week tour of England over a 10% 
chance at a week-long tour.280 
Two key aspects drive the conclusions of prospect theory.  These same aspects 
could be construed as limitations to its value; nevertheless, prospect theory is arguably 
‘applicable to every area of law’.281   
The first key aspect that drives prospect theory is the use of a reference point 
as a critical factor in decision-making.282  Kahneman and Tversky observed that 
reference points are important not only in decision-making but also in forming 
impressions and making judgments.  Reference points for a given person may be 
single or multiple given the circumstances.283  For example, if litigants compare a 
settlement offer relative to a best-case scenario at trial, their decision may be different 
than comparing the same options to a worst-case scenario in terms of gains or losses 
and the ultimate decision to settle.  Reference points are crucial to understanding 
whether a person will likely make a risk-seeking or risk-averse decision.  Reference 
points may also determine the way in which an offer or counteroffer is framed in the 
mind of the offeree so as to potentially determine their decision-making preferences. 
                                                 
279 Kahneman and Tversky, above n 265, 265; Guthrie, above n 265, 1119.  
280 Ibid. 
281 Guthrie, above n 265, 1120 (‘prospect theory sheds light on the way people behave in each legal 
area and the way legal doctrine evolved.’)  See also Guthrie, above n 265, 1163 (‘…[prospect theory] 
represents a valuable refinement to the maximization assumption and should inform law teaching, legal 
scholarship, and policymaking.’). 
282 Guthrie, above n 265, 1159. 
283 Guthrie, above n 265, 1160. 
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In the context of this thesis and as applied to the use of deception in 
negotiation, a lawyer’s reference point, whether perceived in terms of a gain or loss, 
might have a significant impact.  For example, during discussions with a client, the 
lawyer may have the authority to settle for $50,000 with the perception that he might 
get at least $65,000 at trial.  Presumably, the amount of $50,000 becomes the 
reference point.  During settlement discussions, if the lawyer gets an offer from the 
opposing party of $45,000, he may perceive this in terms of a loss relative to the 
client’s expectation of $50,000.  In addition, the lawyer may to use deception or a 
form of strategic posturing to try and settle for a value closer to $65,000 and might 
even reject an acceptable offer of $50,000 as approved by the client.    
A second key aspect that drives prospect theory is that it describes how 
individuals, in general, make risky decisions.284  It does not take into account 
differences across individuals, groups, or across cultures.  Questions still remain about 
whether prospect theory can apply to group decision-making due to insufficient 
experimental studies.285  Therefore, prospect theory analysis may be used to determine 
or measure individual decision-making and how various perceptions of gain or loss 
may drive the need to use deception in negotiation.   
Despite certain perceived limitations, law and economic scholars have 
leveraged prospect theory to develop two related litigation theories to explain how 
litigants may potentially make decisions in two key scenarios.  These scenarios 
involve ordinary litigation and low-probability or frivolous litigation. 
                                                 
284 Guthrie, above n 265, 1160-1161. 
285 Guthrie, above n 265, 1161-1162. 
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The ‘Framing Theory’286 of decision-making states that in ‘ordinary’ 
litigation, plaintiffs and defendants will make different decisions depending on how 
they perceive the litigation options.287  In general and consistent with prospect theory, 
the framing theory predicts that plaintiffs are more likely to prefer settlement over a 
trial (risk-averse) while defendants would likely prefer trial (risk-seeking).288 
In contrast, the ‘frivolous framing theory’ applies to frivolous or low 
probability litigation, where ‘the plaintiff typically chooses between a relatively small 
settlement amount and a low likelihood of obtaining a much larger amount at trial’ 
while ‘defendants must choose either to pay some small settlement or face a low 
likelihood of having to pay a much larger amount at trial.’289   
In essence, plaintiffs are faced with low probability gain options and 
defendants are faced with low-probability loss options.  The frivolous framing theory, 
consistent with the second component of prospect theory, states that in this situation, 
plaintiffs will likely prefer trial (risk-seeking) while defendants will prefer to settle 
(risk-averse).290 
In addition to prospect theory’s application to potential litigation behaviour,291 
scholars such as Guthrie, Rachlinski and Painter believe that prospect theory may also 
help in understanding lawyers’ behaviours with regards to professional responsibility, 
for example, as defined under the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 
                                                 
286 Rachlinski, above n 269, 113. Rachlinski is often credited with developing this theory.   
287 Note:  This likely refers to the litigant’s reference point and may also refer to how a given litigation 
situation is framed by the lawyer. 
288 Rachlinski, above n 269, 118. 
289 Guthrie, above n 265, 1124-1125. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Note: Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Painter discuss prospect theory as applied to litigation behaviour.  
Given that litigation behaviour involves significant negotiation, these same principles can apply to 
negotiations behaviour.  
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Professional Conduct (MRPC).292  The MRPC, in addition to providing guidelines for 
how lawyers should behave in practice, also prohibits lawyers from engaging in 
certain conduct that is deemed unethical.293   
In the context of this thesis, prospect theory may be sued to better analyse and 
predict the effectiveness of legal ethics codes.  The rational choice theory predicts that 
lawyers will only violate ethical rules if the expected benefits outweigh the costs.  
However, prospect theory predicts that lawyers will act unethically depending on how 
well each lawyer believes the case is progressing such that if things are ‘going well 
(gains), risky ethical violations will seem unattractive’ whereas these same violations 
are more attractive if the case or transaction is progressing poorly.294 
Painter used two cases295 to illustrate that prospect theory may account for the 
lawyers’ behaviour in the two cases and ‘generally may explain why, sometimes, the 
worse things get, the more likely a lawyer is to compound his own and his client’s 
troubles with violations of ethical rules, violations of law or both.’296   
In conclusion, while these three primary theories of decision-making may 
require further experiential evidence in negotiation, they go some ways to helping 
explain how participants in the legal system behave whether engaged in true civil 
litigation or in other dispute resolution processes such as negotiation and mediation.  
Of particular relevance to this thesis is the possible application of these theories in the 
                                                 
292 Guthrie, above n 265, 1139 (citing the American Bar Association Center for Professional 
Responsibility, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2003).  
293 American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_toc.html> at 9 August 2010.  I reference MRPC but 
this applies to codes of conduct for lawyers in other jurisdictions such as the Legal Profession Act 
(2007) Qld in Australia. 
294 Guthrie, above n 265, 1139-1140 (citing Richard W Painter, ‘Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and 
the Psychology of Concealment’ (2000) 84 Minnesota Law Review 1399). 
295 Painter, above n 294, 1399.  These cases are not discussed here in detail.  
296 Painter, above n 294, 1422. 
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context of deceptive practices in legal negotiations where lawyers play a prominent 
role and where professional responsibility collides with potential ethical misconduct 
and its ramifications.  Perhaps better understanding and application of these theories 
can assist in minimizing or even eliminating the extent to which the use of deception 
is perceived as beneficial. 
2.3.8 Theories of Lawyer-Client Relationships and Legal egotiation 
The degree to which legal practitioners may use deception during negotiations 
is also influenced by the model of lawyer-client relationship under which the legal 
practitioner, consciously or unconsciously, practices.  While legal practice continues 
to evolve, there are two widely discussed theories of lawyer-client relationships. 297  In 
the context of this thesis, a particular model of lawyer-client relationship may 
influence the degree to which a lawyer uses a particular bargaining ethic and the 
extent to which deception in negotiation is deemed acceptable.  
The first lawyer-client relationship model is the traditional model.  The 
traditional model of lawyer-client relationship is based on the adversarial system’s 
view of zealous advocacy and intense client loyalty.  This model presumes that 
lawyers are ‘motivated by altruism’ and do not allow ‘conflicting interests to interfere 
with his or her devoted service to the client’.298  Those who subscribe to this view 
believe it ‘unthinkable that lawyers lie to their clients’ with a seemingly unwavering 
view that ‘[t]he question of whether a lawyer may lie to a client is simply absent.’299  
Even if these same lawyers use deception, the traditional model attempts to ‘justify 
                                                 
297 See, eg, L Ray Patterson, ‘An Inquiry into the Nature of Legal Ethics: The Relevance and Role of 
the Client’ (1987) 1 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 43, 44 n 7; Charles Fried, ‘The Lawyer as 
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation’ (1976) 85 Yale Law Journal 1060, 
1060; Freedman, above n 176, 9.  
298 Lerman, above n 60, 666.  
299 Lerman, above n 60, 667. 
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deception as necessary in order for lawyers to fulfil their duties to their clients’, with 
the duties to the client being paramount over duties to the court or the public.300  
According to Lerman, the traditional model ‘might be viewed as smokescreen that 
obscures the pecuniary interests of lawyers…lawyers solely devoted to client 
interests…[in an effort] to reassure clients that their lawyers are not exploiting 
them.’301  Within the traditional model, the duty of zealous representation of clients 
takes precedence over duties to court, the justice system, and public interest.  
Opponents of this view argue that it is precisely this imbalance between seemingly 
competing duties that results in lawyers being criticized as ‘paternalistic’, 
‘manipulative’, or ‘exploitive’ of their clients302 to the point of detracting clients from 
receiving the benefits of the legal system to which they are entitled.   
The second lawyer-client relationship model is the revisionist model.  In an 
effort to address the concerns raised by the traditional lawyer-client relationship 
model, such as the fear that such intense loyalty to clients under the traditional model 
‘leads to too much deception of tribunals’,303 revisionists have ‘reconceptualized 
lawyer-client relationships based on moral analysis and an empirical examination of 
what actually takes place in interactions between lawyers and clients.’304  The 
revisionist model is based on principles of client autonomy and a client-centred 
practice.  Proponents of this model argue that ‘the lawyer owes a greater duty to the 
court than the conception of exclusive loyalty to the client would allow.’   
                                                 
300 Lerman, above n 60, 667. 
301 Lerman, above n 60, 673. 
302 Lerman, above n 60, 669.  This view of lawyers is common as expressed by the perception of 
continued resentment of lawyers by the public in a variety of formats. 
303 Lerman, above n 60, 668 (referring to Judge Marvin Frankel’s criticism of the traditional model). 
304 Lerman, above n 60, 668. 
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Under the revisionist model, the client has a larger voice in the decisions that 
affect the outcome of their legal representation.  Revisionists urge lawyers to ‘contract 
more explicitly about the terms of their employment with their clients, disclose more 
information to their clients’ and perhaps even adopt an ‘informed consent’ doctrine 
similar to that used in medical malpractice.305  The concern for revisionists appears to 
be in ensuring that lawyers act in accordance with preserving the public interest and 
confidence in the legal system.   
In the context of this thesis, it would seem that if a client is directly involved 
in his or her case, there is a lesser chance of deception being used, whether in 
negotiations or otherwise.  However, scholars such as Lerman seem to doubt that this 
model will address ‘the fundamental and pervasive conflict of interest [that] exists 
between the lawyer and client – the lawyer’s profit motivation’.306  If the ‘engine that 
drives the machine is profit’,307 and that profit comes from the client whose interests 
the lawyer is meant to serve, then it would seem that this would automatically lead to 
the lawyer having a greater loyalty to the client’s interests at some expense to his duty 
of loyalty to the court or the public interest.  This is also further complicated by the 
fact that ‘the traditional model of lawyer-client relationships, upon which the 
regulatory codes are based, fails to acknowledge anything but a unity of interest 
between lawyer and client.’308  This perceived unity of interest seemingly binds the 
lawyer to the client to the extent that the lawyer may be forced to act in ways that are 
contrary to the legal ethics codes of conduct and to the detriment of the lawyer if 
those behaviours are deemed to be unethical.  
                                                 
305 Lerman, above n 60, 669. 
306 Lerman, above n 60, 671. 
307 Lerman, above n 60, 672. 
308 Lerman, above n 60, 675. 
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In summary, both the traditional and revisionist model of lawyer-client 
relationships appear to co-exist today.  Each might affect the degree to which lawyers 
feel the need to use deception in negotiations. 
To date, this chapter of the thesis has presented a theoretical framework that 
establishes the underlying foundation necessary to answer the research questions 
identified in Chapter 1.  This underlying foundation consists of a discussion on the 
various theories of law, ethics, negotiation, deception, and lawyer-client relationships 
which may impact the use of deception as a negotiation strategy.  The next section 
establishes the conceptual framework for the study undertaken in this thesis. 
2.4 COCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A conceptual framework is derived from the ideas, constructs, and facts 
surrounding the study.309  A conceptual framework may be defined as ‘the 
relationship among the factors, constructs, or key variables in the enquiry.... [that 
allows] you to identify a model of what you believe is happening.’310  
The conceptual framework developed here is based on the exploration of the 
relationship between the key variables underlying the research questions defined in 
Chapter 1.  These key variables include legal negotiation, legal ethics, lawyers, 
generally accepted negotiation processes, and bargaining ethics.  I postulate the 
following with regard to the relationship between these key variables:  1) lawyers are 
trained to believe that the legal ethics codes of the profession guide their professional 
lives; 2) lawyers recognise that negotiation is a key, every-day skill necessary for 
                                                 
309 Calabrese, above n 14, 24.  
310 Calabrese, above n 14, 24 (citing Günter Krumme, Economic geography: Toward a conceptual 
framework (2002) <http://faculty.washington.edu/krumme/guides/researchguide.html> at 9 August 
2010; Matthew B Miles and A Michael Huberman, Qualitative data analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook (2nd ed, 1994). 
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being successful and effective;  3) the negotiation process, in general, is based on 
centuries-old conventions consisting of pre-defined bargaining ethics and rules, most 
of which condone some form of deception; 4) when lawyers negotiate, they do so 
using generally accepted negotiation conventions because the professional ethics 
codes, charged with providing guidelines on lawyer conduct in practice, are silent or 
ambiguous on the behaviour of lawyers as negotiators and on the legal negotiation 
process in general. 
Therefore, the likelihood of lawyers being deceptive in negotiations is greater 
than it would be if both the legal ethics codes and, to some degree, legal education 
were explicit in their recommendations, condemnations, or expectations of how 
lawyers should or must act in their role as negotiators within the legal profession.  
While there is a relatively consistent link between negotiation behaviour and 
negotiation ethics in the business arena, the legal arena is virtually and consistently 
silent regarding the nature and application of professional ethics codes to negotiation 
behaviour.  In light of this gap in regulation, lawyers, consistent with being 
practitioners in the business of law, appear to utilise conventional negotiation tactics 
such as deception.  In so doing, lawyers are likely in violation of the professional 
ethics codes to which they are subject as members of the profession of law. 
2.5 SYTHESIS OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this section is to present the current state of knowledge in 
some key topics as determined by the problem statement and research questions.  The 
synthesis of the literature review attempts to identify patterns, themes, common 
findings and arguments, and gaps in an effort to identify where the research supports 
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or does not support existing theories or raise questions as they relate to this thesis and 
the research questions. 
In the context of this thesis, this critical analysis of the literature focuses 
primarily on empirical research that may have been conducted in each area.  
Empirical research, in the context of this review, means a formal study311 conducted 
on a given topic or issue relevant to this thesis, the results of which are published in a 
scholarly journal. Scholarly publications which do not consist of discussion on 
empirical research findings are also considered in a given area to the extent that they 
support the focus of this thesis. 
The discussion of the current state of knowledge in the focus areas of this 
thesis begins with an introduction to the nature of conducting research on negotiation 
practice.  The introduction is followed by a synthesis of the current research on topics 
such as deception, legal negotiation, legal ethics, lawyers’ bargaining behaviour, and 
lawyers’ bargaining ethics.  Next, this section provides a critical analysis of existing 
research, identifying strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in the literature as well as how 
this thesis attempts to address any identified gaps in existing knowledge.  
2.5.1 Introduction 
Research into negotiation is at once fascinating and difficult for several 
reasons.  Negotiation is ubiquitous and surpasses the realm of legal negotiations into 
each person’s daily lives.  In some ways, we are always negotiating.  Negotiation 
takes on deeper significance when it enters into such realms as family, commercial or 
legal transactions because of the seriousness of the transaction and its potential 
                                                 
311 Note: A formal study consists of following empirical research protocols such as identifying 
hypotheses, research methodology, sample participants, data collection, data analysis, and results and 
conclusions.  See, eg, Barry Gower, Scientific method: An historical and philosophical introduction 
(1997); Cresswell, above n 15. 
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implications both on the economic aspects of the negotiation as well as the impact on 
the relationship between the parties.  However, determining what actually happens in 
negotiations is difficult because of the very nature of the negotiation process and its 
characteristics.   
First, negotiation is a private process and it is the tension between these 
private and public realms of negotiation, especially for lawyers, that is both the reason 
for its success as a dispute resolution process and its current scrutiny. The scrutiny 
comes from concerns that negotiation as a private process may collide with a legal 
practitioner’s other imposed duties of candour and ethical conduct.312  Many argue 
that privacy is ‘an essential component of good negotiating.’313  Advantages of the 
privacy of negotiations include the ability to test ideas or aspects of an agreement 
before they are fully accepted, exploring alternatives or testing alternatives, allowing 
parties to change their negotiating positions without fear of recrimination, and 
enabling parties to ‘use, even create, their own subtle communication 
process…without losing face’.314 
Second, because of the privacy of negotiation, public knowledge depends on 
what negotiators are willing to tell the public.  This information may not be entirely 
reliable because of problems of faulty memories, self-serving biases, the ‘apparent 
need to show superiority to the other side and frequently to one’s own teammates’, 
and other incentives and posturing that tend to cloud the objective reality of a given 
                                                 
312 See, eg, Benjamin, above n 6 (describing negotiation has historically being seen as ‘a sign of 
weakness, preferred by the faint of heart’, ‘a con game’, and carrying ‘a taint of being immoral and 
sinful’.) 
313 David Matz, ‘How Much Do We Know About Real Negotiations?’ in Peter Carnevale and Carsten 
K W de Dreu (eds), Methods of 3egotiation Research (2006) 24.   
314 Matz, above n 313, 24. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 99 -  9-Aug-10 
negotiation, especially if it is ongoing.315  In addition, the subtlety of communications 
inherent in negotiations, such as body language, tone of voice, energy levels, context, 
and environment are all factors which are not readily subject to objective analysis in 
order to study negotiation behaviours.316  Thus, most ‘scholars and journalists have no 
direct access to what occurs in negotiation, important documents may be misleading 
or missing, an eye witness participants/reporters have numerous incentives to distort 
their reports…and inconsistencies in such reports are frequent.’317   
From an academic standpoint, scholars such as Hollander-Blumoff argue that 
there are institutional and methodological obstacles to research in legal negotiation in 
particular.318  These obstacles are due in part to the nature of law and traditional legal 
research, which typically involves a review of legal opinions, statutes, and articles 
written by law professors, resulting in law review articles which generally ‘offer [] the 
author’s theoretical vision of a legal issue…’.319  Empirical research may ‘lack the 
force of law’ such that it may seem safer to rely on controlling authority such as 
statutes and cases which have greater weight and force than empirical research. 
Institutional obstacles into research pertaining to the legal negotiation process 
or behaviours include the following:  1)  there is a fundamental difference in how 
lawyers are trained in their profession from how they might view social science 
research and, for example, how social scientists are trained; 2) legal academia often 
lacks proper training in empirical research in order to carry out valid empirical 
analysis; 3)  empirical research is generally not the basis of legal training nor is it 
                                                 
315 Matz, above n 313, 25. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Matz, above n 313, 26. 
318 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, ‘Legal Research on Negotiation’ in Peter Carnevale and Carsten K W 
de Dreu (eds), Methods of 3egotiation Research (2006) 307, 312-313 (defining ‘empirical’ as 
‘involving a systematic collection and analysis of data using social science methodology.’).   
319 Hollander-Blumoff, above n 318, 307.  
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highly valued within legal academia;320 and 4)  because legal academics do not 
consider themselves students of social behaviour, there is a basic mistrust in relying 
on empirical data much less in understanding and evaluating how to use empirical 
research in the course of their occupation.321  These institutional obstacles appear to 
be changing as more legal academics start to recognise the value of sound, practical 
empirical research as complementing and informing traditional theoretically-based 
legal research. 
From the standpoint of methodological obstacles, the study of legal 
negotiation poses some interesting challenges.322  For example, confidentiality and 
attorney-client privilege may prevent full disclosure by practitioners who are asked to 
discuss their negotiation behaviours, even with a guarantee of confidentiality by 
researchers.  In addition, there are issues of selection bias, which may affect the 
degree to which a random and unbiased sample is used in a study that yields objective 
and reliable data.  Finally, there are issues of internal and external validity affected by 
a legal practitioner’s self-interest in participating in a study as well as the 
methodology used for data collection and analysis.  For example, strictly anecdotal 
data from a non-random group of study participants may not be considered 
statistically significant in terms of proving validity and generalisability so as to render 
the results worth of adding value.323 
                                                 
320 Hollander-Blumoff, above n 318, 313-314  (discussing Epstein & King (2002)’s reporting findings 
based on review of legal empirical research and finding that many of the legal articles that discussed 
‘empirical’ studies violated many of the methodological principles of social science research including 
validity, replicability, reliability, and measurement).  
321 Hollander-Blumoff, above n 318, 313-314.  
322 Hollander-Blumoff, above n 318, 314-318.  
323 See, eg, Korobkin, above n 37, 327.  (‘The greatest shortcoming of empirical observation is that it is 
difficult to generalize the findings of an empirical study to novel situations.’). 
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A final obstacle to legal negotiation research worth noting is the perception 
that negotiation and thus research into legal negotiation does not receive the serious 
attention within legal academia so as to attract sufficient funding for necessary and 
valuable research.324  For many of the reasons previously discussed, including the 
unresolved nature of the legal negotiation process as perhaps a distinct dispute 
resolution process, legal negotiation may not be considered an area ripe for research, 
further analysis, and funding simply because of its complex intersection with law, 
ethics, and other disciplines.  
Despite these arguable challenges, there have been attempts at both theoretical 
and empirical research in the areas of legal negotiation, ethics, and deception that I 
consider relevant to this thesis.  This current state of knowledge and research is 
discussed briefly below in groups of key topic areas.  For example, to understand 
whether lawyers engage in deceptive behaviour and whether this behaviour is 
considered unethical or impacts negotiations, it is important to review and understand 
research related to deception and lying.  To determine whether the legal ethics codes 
are effective in regulating potentially deceptive behaviours in negotiation, an 
understanding of research on legal ethics as well as how lawyers behave during 
negotiations is crucial.  The next sections will summarise the literature relevant to 
answering the research questions.  The review of literature is followed by a critical 
analysis of the research, its findings, and its relationship to the research questions 
presented in this thesis.   
                                                 
324 See, eg, Matz, above n 313, 24-31 (discussing some of the reasons why research into negotiation is 
hard and therefore may determine the extent to which legal academia may fund such research).  Note: I 
do not necessarily agree that valid and empirically based research cannot be done in the area of legal 
negotiation; however, legal negotiators do have ethical constraints which may prevent the ability to get 
relevant, quantifiable, and generalisable empirical data.  This means particular attention must be paid to 
using appropriate, reliable research methods. 
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2.5.2 Research About Deception/Lying 
Deception in negotiation may be common because of two primary factors:  1) 
asymmetrical325 information that is generally a common feature of negotiations; and 
2) the difficulty that most people face in detecting deception which makes it easier to 
mislead others.326  For example, research has found that very few untrained people 
can detect lies.327  In addition, people are generally overconfident in their ability to 
deter lies328 which may result in even greater misunderstandings about the extent of 
deception that occurs in negotiations.  
To aid in better understanding and detecting deception, social science as well 
as negotiation researchers have developed taxonomies about lies and certain 
deceptions.  DePaulo et al’s taxonomy of lies is classified according to content, 
motivation, magnitude and referent (i.e. whether the lie is about the liar, objects, 
another party or event).329  Lewicki and Stark identified eighteen (18) ethically 
questionable negotiation tactics, categorised them into five ‘appropriateness’ 
categories and then analysed how subjects within their study would rate these 
                                                 
325 Hawker, above n 26, 35 (defining ‘asymmetrical’ as ‘lacking symmetry’; synonymous with uneven, 
unbalanced, and irregular). In the context of negotiation, information may be considered asymmetrical 
because of how much accurate information is exchanged, or how it is interpreted by the lawyer or 
mediator or other key stakeholder and how this information is perceived or received by the other.  In 
the case where the negotiation is facilitated by a third party, such as a lawyer or a mediator, the chance 
of asymmetrical information is greater because there is little direct communication.  Even if there is 
direct communication between the negotiating parties, heuristics and biases might impact the facts. 
326 Maurice E Schweitzer and Rachel Croson, ‘Curtailing Deception: The Impact of Direct Questions 
on Lies and Omissions’ (1999) 10(3) The International Journal of Conflict Management 225, 226.  
327 See, eg, P J DePaulo, ‘Research on deception in marketing communications: Its relevance to the 
study of nonverbal behaviour’ (1988) 12 Journal of 3onverbal Behavior 253-273; P Ekman and W V 
Freisen, ‘Detecting deception from body or face’ (1974) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
288-298; P J DePaulo and B M DePaulo, ‘Can deception by sales persons and customers be detected 
through non-verbal behavioral cues?’ (1989) 19 Journal of Applied Psychology 1552-1577; P Ekman 
and M O’Sullivan, ‘Who can catch a liar?’ (1991) 246 American Psychologist 913-920.  
328 See, eg, Ekman and O’Sullivan, above 327, 913-920. 
329 See B M DePaulo, D Kashy, S E Kirkendol, M M Wyer, and J A Epstein, ‘Lying in everyday life’ 
(1996) 70 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 975-995.  
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tactics.330  Certain forms of lies and deception were part of this list.  In addition, 
Rivers331 leveraged the work of Lewicki and Robinson et al332 to create a new 
inventory of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics (EANTs) called the HAATTIN 
(How Appropriate Are These Tactics In Negotiation) inventory based on a review of 
business ethics literature including deceptive communication literature333 and 
workplace deviance literature.334  This inventory categorizes 24 items (tactics) under 
eight (8) types of EANTs.335  These eight types are:  ‘1) withholding information from 
the other party; 2) making promises that are not sincere; 3) threatening the other party; 
4) using or saying untruthful information but not as a threat or as a promise; 5) using 
positive feelings toward the other party; 6) using negative emotions/feelings toward 
the other party; 7) intentionally unsettling or wearing the other party down but not by 
threats or by lying; and 8) diverting attention of the other party away from the current 
negotiations’.336  Types 1 and 4, in particular, concern lies of omission and lies of 
commission, respectively, when reviewing the specific behaviours under these 
types.337  In addition to the taxonomies presented above, there are several studies on 
deception worth noting as they help to explain the extent to which lawyers may use 
                                                 
330See Roy J Lewicki and Neil Stark, ‘What is ethically appropriate in negotiations: an empirical 
examination of bargaining tactics’ (1995) 9(1) Social Justice Research 69-95.   
331 See generally Rivers, above n 77.   This study was to rate the appropriateness of each of the 
HAATTIN inventory of ethically ambiguous tactics by a total of 135 Australian business contacts of 
the researcher.  The research is continuing. 
332 R J Robinson, R J Lewicki, and E M Donahue, ‘Extending and testing a five factor model of ethical 
and unethical bargaining tactics: Introducing the SINS scale’ (2000) 21(6) Journal of Organizational 
Behavior 649-664 (developed a typology of EANTs called the SINS (Self-reported Inappropriate 
Negotiation Strategies) scale.  The SINS scale consisted of 16 items sorted into 5 types of tactics.  The 
five types of tactics were:  1) traditional competitive bargaining; 2) attacking an opponent’s network; 3) 
false promises; 4) misrepresentation/lying; and 5) inappropriate information gathering.) 
333 Rivers, above n 77, 11 (citing S A McCornack, ‘Information manipulation theory' (1992) 59(March) 
Communication Monographs 1-16.   
334 Rivers, above n 77, 11 (citing S L Robinson and R J Bennett, ‘A typology of deviant workplace 
behaviors: A multidimensional scaling study’ (1995) 38(2) Academy of Management Journal 555-572; 
E D Scott and K A Jehn, ‘Ranking rank behaviors’ (1999) 38(3) Business and Society 296-325.  
335 Rivers, above n 77, 11. 
336 Ibid.  
337 Ibid.  
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deception in practice, how to manage deceptive behaviour, and whether deception can 
effectively be regulated. 
In 1999, Schweitzer and Croson published the findings of their research on 
curtailing deception.338  Their research involved determining whether direct questions 
would assist in curtailing lies of commission and lies of omission.  Their research has 
some relevance in this study because of the variables tested and results obtained 
regarding the intersection of ethics and deception.  Schweitzer and Croson conducted 
two studies, which are discussed briefly below. 
Study 1 involved a self-reported questionnaire where subjects were asked to 
assume the role of the seller of a used car, one that has a transmission problem that 
needs work but does not require immediate attention.  Study 1 consisted of eighty (80) 
graduate students recruited from different universities in southern United States.339  
Participants were asked to complete one of four versions of a self-reported 
questionnaire.  A total of twenty (20) subjects completed each of the four versions of 
the questionnaire.340  Subjects were asked how likely they were to reveal the 
transmission problem to a friend and to a stranger who asks or does not ask about the 
mechanical condition of the car.341   
Schweitzer and Croson made three primary assumptions along with four 
hypotheses in this first study.  Their assumptions are worth noting here because they 
expected that ‘subjects who are asked a direct question to be less likely to use 
deception than subjects who are not asked direct questions.’342  Their assumptions 
                                                 
338 See generally Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 225-228. 
339 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 230.  
340 Ibid.  
341 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 228. 
342 Ibid. 
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were:  1) people can choose to either lie by omission, lie by commission, or reveal the 
truth; 2) most people would rather lie by omission than lie by commission given prior 
work in this area that showed that most people would judge lies by commission more 
harshly and seriously than omissions;343 and 3) direct questions force people to 
articulate a response and chose between telling a lie by commission and revealing the 
truth.344 
Along with the three assumptions above, Schweitzer and Croson made four 
hypotheses, one of which considered the role of ethics and whether ethics education 
has an impact in curtailing deception.345  Specifically, Schweitzer and Croson’s third 
hypothesis was that ‘subjects who have taken a course in ethics will be less likely to 
use deception than those who have not taken a course in ethics.’346  The results 
regarding this hypothesis may be particularly relevant in determining whether the 
legal profession’s ethics codes, in particular its prohibition against deceptive or 
misleading practices, combined with a professional ethics courses in law school have 
any bearing at all on reducing the seemingly ubiquitous practice of deception in 
negotiations. 
As to the results of Study 1, the average respondent’s age was 26.6 years old 
and 65% of the respondents were male.347  There were no significant differences in 
the results along gender lines.348  Across all treatment conditions and all responses, 
                                                 
343 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 228 (citing M Spranca, E Minsk, and J Baron, ‘Omission and 
commission in judgment and choice’ (1991) 27 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 76-105.  
344 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 228. 
345 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 229 (discussing the possible role of ethics and ethical 
education in curtailing the use deception)   
346 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 229; See also R F Duska, ‘What’s the point of a business 
ethics course’ (1991) 1 Business Ethics Quarterly 333-354; T Jones, ‘Can business ethics be taught: 
Empirical evidence’ (1989) 8 Business and Professional Ethics Journal 73-93.  
347 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 229.  
348 Ibid.  
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only 6 respondents (7.5%) said they would tell a prospective buyer about the 
transmission problem regardless of being asked or not and regardless of whether the 
person was a stranger or friend.349  This appeared to show that a substantial majority 
of respondents might mislead a prospective buyer in certain circumstances350 and the 
motivation appeared to be based on self-interest (i.e. a financial gain). 
Schweitzer and Croson found that, on average, respondents were ‘most likely 
to reveal the mechanical problem to friends who asked, next most likely to reveal to 
friends who did not ask, third most likely to reveal to strangers who asked, and least 
likely to reveal to strangers who did not ask.’351  The finding that friendship mattered 
appears consistent with studies that contextual factors such as relationships affect a 
negotiator’s propensity to lie352 and that ‘friends are held more responsible than 
strangers’353 because of greater consequences to friends such as harming the 
relationship, disturbing the social network, and incurring feelings of guilt or remorse 
even if the lie is not detected or found out.354   
Schweitzer and Croson also found that there were no ‘differences between the 
responses of the 42 (52.5%) subjects who had taken an ethics course and those of the 
38 (47.5%) subjects who had not taken an ethics course.’355  While those who had 
taken an ethics course were less likely to lie, the difference was not statistically 
significant to conclude that ethics education will necessarily curtail deceptive conduct 
                                                 
349 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 229.  
350 Ibid.  This is consistent with the natural inclination of human nature to protect one’s self-interest and 
achieve the greatest gain.  
351 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 231. 
352 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 227 (citing the works of R A Maier and P J Lavrakas, ‘Lying 
behavior and the evaluation of lies’ (1976) 42 Perceptual and Motor Skills 575-581; J Haidt and J 
Baron, ‘Social roles and the moral judgment of acts and omissions’ (1996) 26 European Journal of 
Social Psychology 201-218). 
353 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 229. 
354 Ibid. 
355 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 231. 
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in negotiation.356  This finding is important when reviewing the policy reform 
proposals in Chapter 7. 
Schweitzer and Croson’s Study 2 did not involve self-reported questionnaires 
but consisted of a face-to-face negotiation experiment involving the sale of a used 
computer with a faulty hard drive.   
A total of 148 student-participants were recruited for this study.  Participants 
were recruited from two different schools of business in the United States.  One 
hundred (100) subjects were recruited from a large eastern university and 48 subjects 
were recruited from a large southern university in the United States.357  To minimize 
certain biases or preconditioned responses, the subjects were recruited during their 
first week of starting university and before participants could form strong 
relationships or reputations or have significant education in negotiation.358  
Participants were randomly paired and assigned to the role of either buyer or seller 
and given twenty minutes to prepare for the negotiation. 
In Schweitzer and Croson’s second study, the seller knows about the problem 
with the computer and also knows that the buyer is unaware of the faulty hard drive 
issue.359  Schweitzer and Croson used three ‘treatment conditions’ (strong, moderate, 
and weak) which were intended to influence the number of questions used by the 
buyer-subjects when enquiring into the sale of the computer.  Finally, because of the 
face-to-face aspect of the simulated negotiations, Schweitzer and Croson were able to 
                                                 
356 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 231.  It would be interesting to determine whether this is 
consistent with the greater impact of community ethics or even pragmatism over rules and principles.  
See also Mark Victor Hansen, Cracking the Millionaire Code:  Your Key to Enlightened Wealth (2005) 
272 (Mr Hansen is speaking with the father of a very bright and industrious six year-old and states:  
‘Mr Tighe, every kid’s born honest, ethical, and moral.  They have to be taught to be crooked and go 
side ways.  I don’t think we have to worry about Tommy.  Kids all pay back with interest.’) 
357 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 236. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 234. 
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observe whether seller-subjects would lie about the information (lies of commission), 
conceal the information (lies by omission), or reveal the information to the 
prospective buyer-subjects.360  Negotiations were audio-taped and coders analysed the 
audio recordings and measured the impact of direct questions on deceptive 
behaviour.361 
  During the second study, Schweitzer and Croson had three primary 
hypotheses:  1) seller-subjects are more likely to reveal a material problem when 
asked a direct question than when not asked;362 2) seller-subjects are less likely to lie 
by omission when asked a direct question about a material problem;363 and 3) seller-
subjects are more likely to lie by commission when asked a direct question.364  In 
other words, Schweitzer and Croson ‘expect[ed] deception to be more prevalent when 
buyers do not ask a direct question.’365  If a buyer asks direct questions, the seller will 
either reveal the problem (i.e., tell the truth) or lie about the information (lie by 
commission).  If the buyer does not ask direct questions about the problem, the seller 
will either reveal the problem or conceal the information (lies by commission).366 
In Study 2, of the 148 subjects recruited to participate, all the participants 
completed the exercise.  The average age of the participants was 25.3 years old with 
2.9 years of full-time work experience.367  Males accounted for 66.9% of the 
participants.368 
                                                 
360 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 234. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 235. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 236. 
365 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 235. 
366 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 236 figure 6. 
367 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 238.  
368 Ibid.  
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In analysing the results of Study 2, Schweitzer and Croson did not find any 
statistically significant differences between the two university populations across the 
measures and outcomes.369  Their findings confirmed all three of their hypotheses, 
namely:  1) ‘sellers were significantly more likely to reveal the problem when buyers 
asked them about the reliability of the computer’370 then when buyers did not ask; 2) 
‘sellers were more likely to lie by omission when not asked a direct question’;371 and 
3) ‘sellers were more likely to lie by commission when they were asked a direct 
question’372 than when they were not so asked.  Schweitzer and Croson found that 
none of the sellers revealed the problem on their own and even ‘volunteered lies of 
commission’.373  This aspect of the results is interesting in the sense that sellers were 
in a typical bargaining scenario where they had more information and could gain a 
greater financial advantage at the expense of the buyer by actively using deception 
even when not necessary.  This was compounded by the voluntary lies of commission 
where self-interest and financial incentives encouraged a competitive nature on the 
part of the seller that lead to greater lying. 
While Schweitzer and Croson’s study involved mainly business students, 
Lerman’s study is relevant to the issue of deception in the legal profession.  In the late 
1980s, Lerman conducted an informal study of legal professionals in the United States 
to ‘probe the fabric of daily law practice to identify common types of deception.’374  
Lerman’s informal study consisted of identifying whether lawyers deceived clients 
and the ways in which such deception occurred.  The subject-participants in Lerman’s 
                                                 
369 Ibid.  
370 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 241. 
371 Ibid (meaning that the seller either avoided the topic or said nothing).  
372 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 241.  
373 Ibid.   
374 Lerman, above n 60, 703-704. 
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study consisted of twenty (20) lawyers in the United States who engaged in civil 
practice at various levels, including small firms, large firms, local practice and 
national practice.  The subjects were not randomly chosen and were part of Lerman’s 
personal network.  In addition, while the sample size was not statistically significant, 
the lawyers represented a ‘diverse spectrum of educational backgrounds, including 
national, regional, and local law schools’375 and none of the lawyers had ever been 
professionally disciplined at the time of their participation in the informal study.376  
Lerman used an in-person interview method whenever possible.  In some cases, where 
in-person interviews were not practical, Lerman conducted phone interviews.377  Each 
lawyer was asked to ‘talk [] about specific instances in which she [or he] had deceived 
a client or had seen another lawyer do so’.378  Each lawyer was also asked ‘whether 
the lawyer thought the conduct was justifiable and why’.379  Lerman reported the 
stories in narrative form so as to keep the results more real and close to actual law 
practice. 
The results from Lerman’s interviews suggested that lawyers ‘most frequently 
deceive their clients for economic reasons’.380  Lerman described the economic 
benefits as being either direct (‘as when a lawyer’s intention in deceiving was to 
obtain income’) or indirect (‘intended to protect or promote the lawyer’s professional 
reputation or that of the lawyer’s firm’).381  Lerman also concluded that the primary 
reasons why lawyers deceived clients,  which she termed as ‘self-interested 
                                                 
375 Lerman, above n 60, 704.  
376 Ibid.  
377 Ibid. 
378 Ibid. 
379 Ibid. 
380 Lerman, above n 60, 705. 
381 Ibid. 
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deception’, fell into six broad categories:  1)  billing;382 2) bringing in business; 3) 
covering up mistakes; 4) impressing clients; 5) convenience and control of work and 
time; and 6) impressing the boss.383  In analysing the anecdotal data, Lerman 
identified some patterns with regards to the lawyers’ reported deceptive conduct. 
First, lawyers reported ‘pervasive deception’ in the area of client billing, 
which in some cases involved large amounts of money.384  Second, there were 
‘numerous examples of deception’ concerning the extent of the lawyers’ own degree 
of expertise in a given area or the expertise of the firm.385  Third, the most reported 
deception was about mistakes made in the course of representing clients, efforts to 
correct the mistake and whether to charge the client for the time and effort to correct 
mistakes.386  Finally, the findings showed ‘countless deceptions’ by lawyers designed 
to manage the work load and time, for the lawyers’ convenience, and to create 
particular impressions on clients and partners alike.387  Lerman concluded that 
‘[l]awyers deceive their clients more than is generally acknowledged by the ethics 
codes or by the bar.’388  Citing the American Bar Association 1985 statistics on 
lawyer misconduct for deception,389 Lerman argues that it shows ‘how few lawyers 
are disciplined by the existing regulatory system.’390  
                                                 
382 See Susan Saab Fortney, ‘Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm 
Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements’ (2000) 69 University of Missouri-Kansas City 
Law Review 239 (concurring with Lerman’s findings with regards the impact of billable hours). 
383 Lerman, above n 60, 705-706. 
384 Lerman, above n 60, 665. 
385 Ibid. 
386 Ibid. 
387 Ibid. 
388 Lerman, above n 60, 663-664. 
389 Lerman, above n 60, 702 (citing the American Bar Association disciplinary action statistics of 1985 
in which ‘the offense of general misrepresentation accounted for five percent of all disbarments (22 
cases), six percent of all suspensions (38 cases), and four percent of all public reprimands (13 cases).’ 
390 Lerman, above n 60, 703. 
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While there may be numerous views and research into deception and lying, 
Lee et al’s 2001 empirical study 391 on lying is worth discussing because of its 
potential implications for understanding the use of deception from a cross-cultural 
standpoint.392  The focus of the study was a comparative analysis on children and lie- 
or truth-telling in Taiwan, mainland China, and Canada.  However, Lee et al’s 2002 
study is worth noting and important for three main reasons.   
First, while the study did not involve adults, legal practitioners or students, the 
results may shed some light on how legal practitioners from differing legal 
jurisdictions develop their initial ethical framework and how they may view and 
contend with perceptions of lying in their potentially differing socio-cultural legal 
jurisdictions, either before entering legal education or during the course of practice.  
Second, this study is important in understanding how legal education and the legal 
profession can better educate incoming law students and practitioners with regards to 
professional ethics codes and managing ethical dilemmas.  This second aspect is also 
relevant to the policy reform proposals discussed in Chapter 7.  Finally, this study 
may also shed light on how the social ethics of a culturally diverse legal jurisdiction 
might affect the legal ethics imposed on practitioners of that jurisdiction. 
Lee et al undertook their study of children’s moral judgment of lie- and truth-
telling due to two main reasons.  First, they felt that nearly all current research, except 
for one,393 was restricted to using Western children as subjects and thus likely the 
result of perspectives based on Western principles.  Because of this, it was ‘unclear 
                                                 
391 See generally Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 525-542. 
392 Note: the legal profession could be considered a ‘culture’ and, therefore, this study provides some 
insight on the influences and pressures of conforming to the legal culture’s expectations. 
393 Kang Lee et al, ‘Chinese and Canadian children’s evaluations of lying and truth-telling’ (1997) 64 
Child Development 924-934.  The 2001 study was a follow on to this 1997 study. 
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whether the findings with Western children can be generalized to children of other 
cultural backgrounds who may be raised in different moral-ethical traditions’.394  
Second, Lee et al wished to address the ‘important philosophical debate between two 
opposing views…about the moral values of lying’,395 namely the deontological view 
and the social-conventional views discussed earlier in this chapter.  
Lee et al’s 2001 study extended  the findings of Lee et al’s 1997 study in 
which Canadian and mainland Chinese children were asked to evaluate verbal 
statements made in the context of children’s stories where the child character 
performed either a pro-social or anti-social deed.396  Lee et al’s 1997 study found that 
there were no cultural differences in the children’s evaluation of a lie or truth told in 
an anti-social deed situation.397  In other words, both Canadian and mainland Chinese 
children were able to distinguish consistently between whether the child character told 
a lie or the truth in an anti-social deed.398  However, in a pro-social deed situation (i.e. 
where the child acts in a socially positive way), Lee et al’s 1997 study found that 
‘Chinese children rated truth-telling less positively and lie-telling more positively than 
Canadian children [and] this difference increased with age.’399  Lee et al’s 1997 study 
suggested that the cultural differences in the findings may be due to the Chinese 
culture’s emphasis on self-effacement and modesty such that ‘[a]s they become 
increasingly acculturated the emphasis on modesty leads Chinese children to believe 
that lying for self-effacement has high moral values, whereas truth-telling about good 
                                                 
394 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 526-527.  
395 Ibid. 
396 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 527 (a pro-social deed is one that would be considered favourably by 
society and an anti-social deed is not seen favourably by society, citing Kang Lee et al (1997), above n 
393). 
397 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 527. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Ibid. 
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deeds may be undesirable.’400  This was different from the Canadian children’s views 
where it appears that truth-telling about good deeds has just as much high moral value 
as truth-telling about bad deeds. 
To account for several perceived limitations401 of the Lee et al’s 1997 study as 
well as to extend and confirm the research findings, Lee and his colleagues, during the 
2001 study, used the same method as used in Lee et al’s 1997 study with two 
modifications.  These modifications included increasing the sample size to take into 
account Taiwanese children and asking the children ‘to categorize a particular truthful 
and untruthful statement as either a lie or the truth’.402 
The subjects of the 2001 study were children from Taiwan, mainland China 
and Canadian, aged  7, 9, and 11 years old.  A total of 233 children participated with 
the following distribution between countries:  1) 90 male and female Taiwanese 
children; 2) 60 male and female mainland Chinese children; and 3) 83 white male and 
female Canadian children.403  Canadian children were intended to represent a Western 
sample with ideas of rights and individualism.  While both Taiwanese and mainland 
Chinese children represent the Eastern values and are collectivist societies, Lee and 
his colleagues considered that collectivist values from Taiwan come directly, and 
without interruption, from Confucianism whereas mainland China’s collectivist values 
are a blend of Confucianism and communism.404   
Lee et al’s 2001’s study focused on whether these collectivist values would 
make a difference in the study’s results with regards to the moral value of truth-telling 
                                                 
400 Ibid (discussing Lee et al (1997), above n 393). 
401 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 528 (discussing the limitations of the Lee et al (1997) study). 
402 Ibid. 
403 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 529.  
404 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 536.  
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and lie-telling.  In addition, both Taiwan and mainland China have different political 
and economic policies405 despite their close geographic proximity, with Taiwan 
having ‘increased infusion of Western cultural values and practices…into [their] 
everyday lives.’406  Finally, there is a difference in the political-moral education 
program in mainland China versus in Taiwan.  In mainland China, ‘honesty and 
modesty are among the major Five Virtues that are strongly emphasized in the school 
curriculum…promoted explicitly as early as kindergarten….and are used by teachers 
as central criteria to assess children’s school comportment.’407  In Taiwan, ‘honesty 
has always been promoted…and children are taught explicitly not to lie from Grade 1 
if not earlier…’408  However, ‘modesty has not been emphasized explicitly in the 
moral education curriculum…and teaching modesty is no longer a requirement.’409 
  Children involved in the 2001 study heard ‘two sets of four brief stories’.  
Each story set consisted of two stories where a child character did a good deed (‘a 
deed valued by adults in all cultures involved’).410  The other set of two stories 
consisted of a child who did a bad deed (‘a deed viewed negatively in all cultures 
involved’).411  The stories were a combination of social stories (ones which affect 
                                                 
405 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 536 (describing Mainland China as ‘a centralized one-party political 
system (referred to as ‘proletarian dictatorship by the governing Communist Party) and a socialist 
market economy’ and Taiwan as ‘a multi-party democracy…[and a] capitalist free-market system 
influenced by Western models…’) 
406 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 536 (citing K S Yang and H Y Chiu (eds) Taiwanese society in 
transition (1987)).   
407 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 536 (citing Lee et al (1997), above n 393, 924-934; R Price, ‘Moral-
political education and modernisation’ in R Hayhoe (ed) Education and modernization: the Chinese 
experience (1992) 211-238.  
408 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 537.   
409 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 537 (citing the National Publishing House 1977 and 1997 guidelines as 
indicating that the Taiwan Ministry of Education revised its guidelines with regards to teaching 
modesty but did not revise the guidelines with regards to teaching honesty.); See also National 
Publishing House: Taiwan, Guidelines for moral and health education (1977); National Publishing 
House: Taiwan, Guidelines for moral and health education (1997). 
410 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 528-529.  
411 Ibid. 
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another child) and physical stories (ones that only involve physical objects).412  The 
researchers read the story to the subject-participants and asked the children whether 
they ‘thought that the statement made by the child story character was a lie or not a lie 
(the categorization question) and whether they thought the story character’s statement 
was good or bad (the moral evaluation question).’413 
With regards to expected results, Lee and his colleagues expected to see the 
following results:  1) that ‘Chinese children would not label untruthful statements 
made in pro-social deed situation as a lie’;414  2) that ‘Taiwanese and Mainland 
Chinese children were predicted to rate truth-telling in pro-social deed situations less 
positively, and lie-telling in the same situations less negatively, than Canadian 
children’;415 and 3) that all children ‘would rate lie-telling negatively and truth-telling 
positively in anti-social deed situations.’416 
The results of the 2001 study confirmed the majority of the findings from Lee 
et al’s 1997 study.  In the 2001study, Lee and his colleagues found that all children 
(Taiwanese, mainland Chinese, and Canadian) ‘shared the same basic categorization 
of lie- and truth-telling’ as related to the categorisation question.417  In other words, 
when asked to categorise a particular statement as a lie or not a lie, all the child-
participants were able to correctly and consistently distinguish between statements 
that were considered a lie or a truth regardless of whether the statement was made in a 
pro-social or anti-social deed situation.   
                                                 
412 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 528-529. 
413 Ibid.Note:  The results of the moral evaluation question is relevant to this thesis in assessing how 
ethics codes are viewed and the impact of morals and values in curtailing certain socially undesirable 
behaviours such as deception. 
414 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 529. 
415 Ibid. 
416 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 529. 
417 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 536. 
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With regards to the moral evaluation question, the findings of the 2001 study 
also confirmed the ‘modesty effect’ that was found in the Lee et al’s 1997 study in 
which Chinese children increasingly (as age increased) gave less positive ratings to a 
story character ‘who does something good and tells a teacher about it’.418  This 
modesty effect appears to exist even in Taiwanese children since, as the age increased, 
‘Taiwanese children also rated less positively truth-telling about one’s own good deed 
while giving more positive rating to lying about a good deed.’419 
Lee and his colleagues questioned the children regarding a justification for 
their responses to the moral evaluation question and found that ‘Chinese children’s 
[Mainland China and Taiwan] justification for giving less negative and more positive 
ratings to lying in pro-social situations and the reverse to truth-telling in similar 
situations tended to be modesty-related, consistent with Lee et al’s study in 1997.’420  
This led Lee and his colleagues to conclude that perhaps the deontological view of the 
constant and intrinsic positive value placed on truth-telling and the negative value 
placed on lie-telling was incomplete given the similarity in results between Mainland 
Chinese and Taiwanese children.   
Lee et al’s 2001 study suggests that ‘like many other cultural values and 
practices, modesty-related values and behaviours may be modelled and taught 
implicitly by teachers, parents and other socializing agents.’421  This implicit teaching 
of certain values and behaviours is particularly relevant to the legal profession since 
the legal ethics codes may, in many cases, be more strict than society’s views of what 
is moral and ethical or vice versa.  At least with regards to deception, society may 
                                                 
418 Ibid. 
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420 Ibid. 
421 Lee et al (2001), above n 72, 537. 
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condone what the legal profession appears to categorically prohibit, thus resulting in a 
conflict for the ethically-minded legal professional.  Furthermore, Lee et al’s 1997 
and 2001 study sheds insight into the notion that values such as truth-telling and lie-
telling may be learned and reinforced through various influences and that such 
conduct may be modified through alternate influences.  These findings add value to 
the policy reform proposals outlined in Chapter 7.  
In summary, this section has presented the results of research into deception, 
the extent to which practitioners engage in deception and the ways in which deception 
is perceived as acceptable or unacceptable behaviour.  In the context of this thesis, 
this research is important in establishing that the perception of deception as 
permissible behaviour can be managed early in a child’s development and as the 
individual undergoes moral development as explained by Kohlberg later in this 
chapter.  Furthermore, as Lee et al’s study found, designating truth-telling as a high, 
pro-social value can have an impact on whether a person will use deception.  As such, 
this research adds important insights in light of the policy reform proposals presented 
in Chapter 7.   
In addition to research on deception, the next section discusses some relevant 
research and analysis with regards to behaviour in legal negotiation.  
2.5.3 Research About Legal egotiation 
In the context of this thesis, legal negotiation, as separate from negotiation, is 
the process of negotiation as conducted by legal professionals and as constrained by 
the rules, codes of conduct, court rules, and ethics codes of the legal system. 
In 1983, Williams undertook one of the most extensive studies of legal 
negotiation.  William’s study is considered to be one of the first large-scale studies of 
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legal negotiation conducted by an academic on the negotiation practices and 
behaviours of lawyers.422  The objective of Williams’ study was to explore the 
negotiating patterns of practicing attorneys within the context of the legal system. 
Williams used multiple methods to conduct his research.  First, he used a 
survey questionnaire.  The survey questionnaire was sent to approximately 2,000 
attorneys practicing in Denver, Colorado and Phoenix, Arizona in the United 
States.423 The purpose of the questionnaire was to elicit the attorneys’ views on a list 
of adjectives that make up a highly effective or not highly effective negotiator.  A 
second method was a one-hour tape-recorded interview with forty-five (45) attorneys 
in Denver, Colorado in the United States.424  A third method involved video-taped 
recordings of experienced negotiators conducting negotiations.425  A total of seven 
cases were analysed across a range of matters including personal injury, breach of 
contract, divorce, criminal law, landlord-tenant, and business transactions.  Finally, 
Williams used an original technique in which he asked both plaintiff and defence 
attorneys in a case to keep oral, tape-recorded accounts of their actions as they moved 
step-by-step through their cases.426  The results of this fourth method included self 
tape-recorded accounts of more than fifty (50) pairs of attorneys in Denver, Colorado 
and over one-hundred (100) in Phoenix, Arizona.427   
Williams posed several research questions, including:   ‘1) What are the 
characteristics of effective negotiators?; 2) Are there identifiable patterns to their 
negotiating behaviours?; 3) What strategies do lawyers most commonly use?; 4) What 
                                                 
422 See generally Williams, above n 202. 
423 Williams, above n 202, 15-16. 
424 Ibid. 
425 Williams, above n 202, 15-16. 
426 Williams, above n 202, 17. 
427 Ibid. 
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combination of traits are found in the most effective (and most ineffective) 
negotiators?; and 5) What are their strong points and what are their weak points?’428 
Several results of Williams’ study are relevant for the purposes of this 
thesis.429  First, Williams found that a majority of subject-participants exhibited one of 
two primary negotiating patterns:  cooperative (65%) or competitive (24%).430  
Approximately 11% of participants did not fall within these two dominant patterns.  
Second, Williams concluded that ‘the higher proportion of cooperative attorneys 
(65%) who were rated effective (38%) does suggest that it is more difficult to be an 
effective (6%) competitive (24%) negotiator than an effective cooperative one.’431  In 
essence, the results appear to indicate that lawyers who use cooperative styles of 
negotiation appear to be more effective than those who adopt more competitive 
negotiation behaviours even though both cooperative and competitive negotiation 
styles are effective.  Perhaps the most relevant and surprising result for the purposes 
of this thesis is the lawyers’ assessment of where ‘acting ethically’ ranks in the list of 
characteristics of effective or non-effective negotiating styles.  Williams noted the 
following when he listed and compared the motivational objectives between 
cooperative and competitive negotiators. 
Table 2.3:  Top Three Motivational Objectives of egotiators
432 
Effective/Cooperative Effective/Competitive 
• Conducting self ethically • Maximizing settlement for client 
• Maximizing settlement for client • Obtaining profitable fee for self 
• Getting fair settlement • Outdoing or outmanoeuvring the 
opponent 
 
                                                 
428 Ibid. 
429 See generally Williams, above n 202, 18-27 (discussing the results of the study). 
430 Williams, above n 202, 18. 
431 Williams, above n 202, 19. 
432 Williams, above n 202, 20 (listing the Cluster One results). 
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Williams points out that ‘it is surprising to find the predominant concern is 
with ethical conduct [and] [t]his theme recurs among cooperative negotiators at all 
levels of effectiveness.’433  Further, Williams found that the effective/cooperative 
attorneys ‘feel constrained in their conduct by a standard of fairness and ethical 
dealing.’434  While being ‘ethical’ and ‘honest’ is ranked on the lists of both 
competitive and cooperative negotiators, it is ranked higher for cooperative 
negotiators (at 3 and 1 respectively) than for competitive negotiators (at 15 and 11 
respectively).435 This suggests that being ethical and honest is not as highly valued or 
expected for competitive, effective negotiators and thus deception may be a natural 
part of this negotiating style.  Williams concludes that the results show ‘the 
unbridgeable gap in perceptions and attitude between competitive and cooperative 
attorneys.’436   
What is interesting is that regardless of whether all attorneys are expected to 
conduct themselves under the prescribed ethics codes, to never lie, and to presumably 
cooperate with opposing counsel and the courts, there are still distinct differences in 
what motivates attorneys during negotiations on behalf of their clients.  It seems 
attorneys are implicitly learning their negotiating behaviours outside the explicit rules 
and codes of conduct that are meant to govern their profession. 
2.5.4 Research About Legal Ethics 
The purpose of this section is to present and discuss research related to legal 
ethics.  Prior to discussing research in the area of legal ethics, this section presents a 
                                                 
433 Williams, above n 202, 20. 
434 Williams, above n 202, 20-21 (further pointing out that while they want to know their clients’ needs 
and to try and meet these needs without resorting to litigation, cooperative negotiators are also 
concerned about maintaining a good personal relationship with opposing counsel).  
435 Williams, above n 202, 26-27. 
436 Williams, above n 202, 25. 
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brief discussion on Kohlberg’s levels of moral development.  This information is 
important because, as discussed earlier, each individual who enters law school does so 
with a pre-disposed idea of what is right and wrong.  Kohlberg’s levels of personal 
moral can aid in understanding the challenges faced by lawyers in adhering to legal 
ethics codes, the extent to which lawyers may understand and adhere to the demands 
of the legal ethics codes in the practice of law as well as the extent to which legal 
education can assist in or detract from further developing a future legal practitioner’s 
stage of moral development.  In the context of this thesis, this could mean the ability 
to distinguish between using deception in negotiation and making alternative, 
ethically viable choices of negotiation behaviour. 
The first step towards resolving the tension between the view of a strictly 
autonomous moral agent and the professional ethics obligations is to understand 
Kohlberg’s levels of moral development and how they can be applied to better 
understand the impact of legal ethics codes and how it can influence the future of 
legal education (especially legal ethics education that is meant to manage attorney 
behaviour).437  Understanding Kohlberg’s levels of moral development is also 
important in successfully implementing the ethical standard setting policy reform 
proposals in Chapter 7.  The second important precursor is to realise that, in some 
instances, if not all, law and morality do intersect438 and lawyers, as professionals of 
the legal system, need to be able to manage those issues which fall at the crossroads of 
law and morality. 
                                                 
437 See generally Richards, above n 28, 365-371 (proving a historical perspective of moral development 
and moral psychology’s key developers and discussing Kohlberg’s work in detail and its relevance to 
legal education). 
438 See generally Honoré (2008), above n 115. See also Honoré, above n 115, 1. 
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Kohlberg’s work developed from and followed the basic methodology and 
research established by Piaget, a noted child development scholar.  Kohlberg used 
extensive samples of data, including cross-cultural samples and statistical analyses of 
data to test Piaget’s findings.439  Instead of the two-stage moral development process 
(‘ethics of authority’ and ‘autonomous personal conscience’) that Piaget developed,440 
Kohlberg postulated six stages of moral development, with each person moving 
through the stages systematically and sequentially before achieving higher levels of 
moral development.441  The three major levels and six stages of moral development 
are highlighted below in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4:  Kohlberg’s Levels and Stages of Moral Development
442
 
Level / Stage 
 
Applied to Example  
Level I – Premoral /  
Pre-Conventional (children) 
Stage 1 – Punishment and obedience orientation 
 
(How can I avoid punishment?) 
Obey rules to avoid punishment 
Stage 2 – Naive instrumental hedonism 
 
(What’s in it for me?) 
Conform to and obey rules to obtain 
rewards, have favours returned, etc. 
Level II – Morality of Conventional Role Conformity /  
Conventional (adolescents and adults) 
Stage 3 – Good-boy morality of maintaining good 
relations, approval by others 
 
(Social norms; good-boy/good-girl attitude) 
Conform to and obey rules to avoid 
disapproval or being disliked by others 
Stage 4 – Authority maintaining morality 
(legalism) 
 
(Law and order morality) 
Conform to and obey rules to avoid 
censure by legitimate authorities and 
resulting guilt that may be experienced 
Level III – Morality of self-accepted moral principles / Post-Conventional 
 
Stage 5 – Morality of contract of individual rights Value of human life example – Life is 
                                                 
439 Richards, above n 28, 366-367. 
440 Jean Piaget, The Moral Development of the Child (1962) 174, 228. 
441 Richards, above n 28, 367. 
442 Adapted from Richards, above n 28, 367-368;  See also Lawrence Kohlberg, ‘Moral Development’ 
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968) 489-494; Lawrence Kohlberg, ‘A 
Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education’ (1972) The Humanist 15;  
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Level / Stage 
 
Applied to Example  
and of democratically accepted law 
 
(Social contract orientation) 
valued both in its relation to 
community welfare and as a universal 
human right 
Stage 6 – Morality of individual principles of 
conscience 
 
(Universal ethical principles / Principled 
conscience) 
Value of human life example – Life is 
valued as sacred and as representing a 
universal human value of respect for 
the individual. 
 
  As seen in the table above, legalism and lawyers would tend to fall under 
Stage 4 of Kohlberg’s model.  Stage 5 consists of only 25% of those studied by 
Kohlberg while he reserves Stage 6 for only 5-10% of individuals who could be 
considered cultural heroes because they ‘achieve the integrity of autonomous ethical 
individuation from their societies at the expense of their lives (Socrates, Christ, 
Gandhi, Martin Luther King)’.443 
An important point by Kohlberg is that as individuals progress to higher stages 
of moral development, they tend to act more ethically when faced with temptation.444  
People at higher stages also tend to be more honest under temptation and resist 
outrageous and unjust orders.445  Of special significance is the finding from 
Kohlberg’s more recent studies that ‘conclude that stage 5 is not achieved until age 
23, and stage 6 until age 30’,446 both of which are in the range of prime ages of 
professional education, such as law school or medical school.  This is specifically 
relevant to incoming law students in their first year of law school who tend to fall 
within the 23-30 year age range.  Kohlberg’s findings in relation to Stages 4, 5, and 6 
                                                 
443 Kohlberg, above n 442, 15. 
444 Lawrence Kohlberg and E Turiel, ‘Moral Development and Moral Education’ in G Lesser (ed) 
Psychology and Educational Practice (1971) 456-461. 
445 Kohlberg and Turiel, above n 444, 456-461. 
446 Richards, above n 28,  369 (citing Lawrence Kohlberg, ‘Continuation in Childhood and Adult Moral 
Development Revisited’ in Lawrence Kohlberg and E Turiel (eds), Moralization, the Cognitive 
Developmental Approach (1973) Chapter 45). 
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indicate that there is great opportunity to either cause moral development regression 
or moral development progression depending on how law students are taught the 
nature of legal ethics and moral reasoning. Given this background, a review of 
research in the area of legal ethics yields important insights that will be more fully 
integrated into the policy reform proposals discussed in Chapter 7. 
To date, there are relatively few empirical studies on legal ethics; however, the 
research discussed below provides important insights in furthering the objectives of 
this thesis.  A review of literature in this area (includes professional ethics) yielded 
four primary and relatively reliable sources of research in this area, each of which is 
introduced and discussed below.   
The first important study in this area is Lamb’s late-1990’s study.  Lamb 
leveraged Lerman’s 1990 anecdotal research in the United States447 to conduct similar 
research in Australia.  Debra Lamb, with the support of the Australian Research 
Council and the Queensland Law Society, undertook a study to better understand the 
types of ethical dilemmas faced by Australian lawyers.448  The qualitative study 
consisted of approximately seventeen (17) interviews with barristers and solicitors 
across Australia who practiced in different areas of law.  The sole objective of this 
study was to obtain realistic examples of the types of ethical issues lawyers face.449  
There was no focus on obtaining a representative sample or to analyse results 
quantitatively or statistically.  The research method consisted of a pre-interview letter 
that asked respondents to consider at least two specific examples of the types of 
ethical dilemmas they faced.  Prior to the interview, lawyers received a letter that 
                                                 
447 Lerman, above n 60, 659. 
448 Debra Lamb, ‘Ethical Dilemmas:  What Australian Lawyers Say About Them’ in Stephen Parker 
and Charles Sampford, Legal Ethics and Legal Practice:  Contemporary Issues (1995) 217-234. 
449 Lamb, above n 448, 218. 
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asked them to identify two problems they considered ‘troubling’.  The term 
‘troubling’ was defined in the letter as follows: 
‘By trouble, I mean trouble your conscience, make you 
concerned that something unethical is being asked of you, or 
make you personally worried about the consequences of what 
you are being asked to do.’450 
 
Lamb’s study resulted in more than 80 case studies reflecting the various types 
of ethical dilemmas faced by Australian lawyers.  Lamb placed these findings into six 
main categories of problems:  1) conflicts of interest; 2) dealings with clients; 3) 
problems in litigation; 4) relationships with other practitioners; 5) problems within a 
firm; and 6) conflict with a lawyer’s own morals.  The category dealing with conflicts 
with the lawyer’s own morals seems to show a clear conflict between what the legal 
ethics of lawyers compels them to do versus what the lawyer as a non-professional 
member of society would do.  For example, while some lawyers appeared to conform 
to the traditional notion that the lawyer’s personal morals are irrelevant and all moral 
dilemmas are the client’s issues, these same lawyers were conflicted about following a 
client’s potentially immoral instructions or determining how best to act in volatile 
cultural situations where their legal jurisdiction’s legal ethics conflicted with those of 
the visiting legal jurisdiction.451  As Lamb found, legal ethics issues are a constant 
facet of a lawyer’s professional terrain and there is ‘clearly a need for further and for 
greater attention to be directed to educating lawyers about the types of problems they 
are likely to face, and to suggest solutions’452 which do not present a conflict between 
the professional and non-professional dimensions of lawyers. 
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451 Lamb, above n 448, 233-234. 
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© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 127 -  9-Aug-10 
A second important study in the area of legal ethics is Moliterno’s 1994-1995 
comparative study of graduate preparedness.  Professor Moliterno of the William and 
Mary Law School in the United States undertook a comparative study of law school 
graduates and their perceived ability and readiness to handle professional ethics issues 
in practice after completion of their law school education.453  This study is valuable 
and relevant in providing an assessment of whether professional ethics courses as they 
are currently taught, especially at major law schools in the United States, have a 
positive impact on a law graduate’s perceived ability to handle ethical issues in 
practice. 
As explained by Moliterno, the purpose of the study was ‘to determine 
whether a relationship exists between the professional skills and professional ethics 
curriculum at a law school and the school’s graduates’ satisfaction with their 
profession or their perceptions of preparedness for various types of legal practice.’454  
To this end, four law schools, each a state-supported school with records and 
traditions of excellence,455 agreed to participate in an extensive survey.  Moliterno’s 
William and Mary Law School was one of the four schools as one of Moliterno’s 
informal goals was to assess the unique curriculum structure of his own law school as 
compared with other law schools.456 
The study methodology consisted of sending out a total of one thousand 
surveys distributed evenly across the four participating schools (i.e., 250 surveys at 
                                                 
453 See generally, James E Moliterno, ‘Professional Preparedness:  A Comparative Study of Law 
Graduates’ Perceived Readiness for Professional Ethics Issues’ (1995) 58-AUT Law and 
Contemporary Problems 259. 
454 Moliterno, above n 453, 260. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Moliterno, above n 453, 261 (care was taken to ensure there was no bias in terms of finding out the 
name of the school by respondents or those conducting the survey and an arbitrary reply address was 
used to prevent disclosure). 
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each of the four participating schools).  The surveys participants were graduates of 
each school who were randomly selected from the mailing lists provided by the 
school.457  Graduates had been in practice between two to five years.458  Of the 1,000 
surveys sent out, 404 surveys were completed and returned, resulting in a response 
rate of 42.3 percent.459 
The general legal curricula at all four schools was similar; however the 
professional skills and professional ethics curricula was unique for Moliterno’s 
William and Mary Law School.460  While the other three schools required that 
students complete a professional ethics course, most notably as an upper-level elective 
and not as a core first-year course, William and Mary Law School’s professional 
ethics and professionals skills course is a required two-year programme designed 
around ‘long-term, comprehensive, simulated client service’461 where the 
professional/legal ethics aspects are interwoven into daily experiential learning of 
what it means to be a lawyer and not just think like one.  This notable difference had 
an impact on the results of the study. 
The results of Moliterno’s study yielded two key insights, especially with 
respect to legal ethics education.  First, while all four schools were asked to rank the 
importance of knowledge of substantive law against other items such as legal and 
professional ethics analysis and legal communications through research and writing, 
William and Mary graduates ranked knowledge of substantive law below the top three 
skills versus the other schools which ranked knowledge of substantive law at or near 
                                                 
457 Moliterno, above n 453, 261. 
458 Ibid. 
459 Moliterno, above n 453, 262. 
460 Moliterno, above n 453, 262-263. 
461 Moliterno, above n 453, 264 and 264-270 (discussing William and Mary’s approach to professional 
skills and professional ethics education). This is discussed and treated further in Chapter 7. 
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the top three.462  Second, the mean preparation scores in the area of professional ethics 
were 3.61 for the three traditional professional ethics curricula schools and 4.05 for 
William and Mary graduates.463  This is a statistically significant difference that 
appears to point to the conclusion that William and Mary graduates of the intense, 
two-year experimental professional ethics curricula appear to have greater confidence 
in their ability to handle the key skills necessary for practice, including the ability to 
navigate professional and legal ethics issues that may arise.464    
A third important study in the area of legal ethics is Macfarlane and 
Manwaring’s 2005-2006 study in Canada.  Macfarlane and Manwaring conducted a 
study of the ethics of legal practice in Canada using focus groups and a skills audit.  
One of the central drivers of Macfarlane and Manwaring’s study appears to be the 
finding that, in Ontario, Canada in particular, there is significant ‘concern over 
professionalism and ethics in the practice of law’ because professional ethics remains 
an ‘orphan’ of legal education,465 relegated to the status of being tangentially 
discussed in substantive law courses or part of non-core or optional courses taken by a 
minority of students.466  In developing the skills audit, Macfarlane and Manwaring 
                                                 
462 Moliterno, above n 453,  273-274 (discussing the relationship between these results and its 
consistency with the theory that knowledge of substantive law is the least important according to 90 
percent of hiring partners who expect communication skills, analytical skills, and sensitivity to 
professional ethics issues as primary skills that new lawyers need to bring to practice).  See also Lon L 
Fuller, ‘On Teaching Law’ (1950) 3 Stanford Law Review 35, 36 (‘There are certain propositions about 
legal education upon which, I believe, a consensus exists.  There is, for example, an almost universal 
agreement that our primary object is not to impart information.   Whatever it is we want the student to 
get, it is something more durable, more versatile and muscular, than a mere knowledge of rules of 
law.’); Erwin N Griswold, ‘Law Schools and Human Relations’ (1955) Washington University Law 
Quarterly 217, 229-30 (‘It is no longer possible for a student to know all the law.  Nor is it necessary or 
desirable.’); Bryant G Garth and Joanne Martin, ‘Law Schools and the Construction of Competence’ 
(1993) 43 Journal of Legal Education 469, 490. 
463 Moliterno, above n 453, 271. 
464 Moliterno, above n 453, 274-275. 
465 Julie Macfarlane and John Manwaring, ‘Reconciling Professional Legal Education with the 
Evolving (Trial-less) Reality of Legal Practice’ (2006) Journal of Dispute Resolution 253, 256-257. 
466 Macfarlane and Manwaring, above n 465, 256. 
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asked a series of key questions about what skills are required of 21st century lawyers 
and how legal education could support the development of those skills.467  The skills 
audit undertaken by Macfarlane and Manwaring was based on focus groups and 
Delphi panels to solicit direct input from Ontario legal practitioners in the cities of 
Toronto, Windsor, Ottawa and Thunder Bay.468    
The focus groups and Delphi panels resulted in a taxonomy consisting of six 
major skills categories: 1) client relationships; 2) managing a client file (dispute 
resolution); 3) managing a client file (transactions and applications); 4) legal research 
and writing; 5) practice management; and 6) ethical issues and professionalism.469  As 
indicated by the taxonomy, ethics and professionalism is a central concern for 
practicing lawyers yet this appears to gets marginal focus in Canadian legal 
education.470  The input from Canadian practitioners was used to help address the 
issue of the lack of adequate competence in professional ethics as well as the growing 
gap between the skills gained through formal legal education versus the skills that 
practicing lawyers of the 21st century require given what they actually do in legal 
practice.471  In the context of this thesis, Macfarlane and Manwaring’s study highights 
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and seems to be consistent and common in many common law jurisdictions. See also American Bar 
Association: Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Report of The Task Force on Law 
Schools and the Profession: 3arrowing the Gap (the McCrate Report) (July 1992) 
<http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html> at 9 August 2010 (United 
States perspective); General Council of the Bar and the Council of the Law Society, London, A Time 
for Change:  Report of the Committee on the Future of the Legal Profession (the Marre Report) (1988) 
(United Kingdom perspective); Richard Wu, ‘Reform of Professional Legal Education at the University 
of Hong Kong’ (2004) 14(2) Legal Education Review 153 (Hong Kong perspective). 
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the importance of ensuring that both legal education, in general, and legal ethics, in 
particular, evolves with changes in legal practice.  This study has merit when 
analysing the legal ethics codes in Chapter 4, the legal ethics violation cases in 
Chapter 5, and discussing the policy reform proposals outlined in Chapter 7.     
Finally, a fourth important study in the area of legal ethics is Wilkinson, 
Walker, and Mercer’s research initiative.  Wilkinson, Walker, and Mercer along with 
the University of Western Ontario commenced a research initiative in Canada in 
1999-2000 to examine ‘the effectiveness of codes of ethics in maintaining standards 
of behaviour within the legal profession in Ontario.’472  The aim of the study was to 
determine to what extent Ontario lawyers used the jurisdiction’s legal ethics codes for 
guidance on specific ethical issues, the extent to which the legal ethics codes 
addressed or hindered their final decision on what action to undertake regarding the 
specific ethical dilemma, and whether, despite the existence of legal ethics codes, 
lawyer still relied primarily on independent ethical decision-making.473 
The researchers interviewed approximately 180 lawyers in Ontario, Canada in 
four independent centres with the representative sample designed ‘to mirror the 
proportion of practitioners practising in private firms of various sizes in Ontario’.474  
A total of 150 private practitioners and 30 corporate counsels were approached to be 
part of this study.  Each lawyer was interviewed for approximately thirty to forty-five 
minutes and was asked to discuss certain ethical problems they faced, the extent to 
                                                 
472 Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker and Peter Mercer, ‘Do Codes of Ethics Actually Shape 
Legal Practice?’ (2000) 45 McGill Law Journal 645, 645.  The Ontario, Canada legal profession is 
guided by the Law Society of Upper Canada Rules of Professional Conduct.  See also The Law Society 
of Upper Canada (Ontario), Rules of Professional Conduct (June 2009) 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/rpc.pdf> at 9 August 2010. 
473 Wilkinson, Walker, and Mercer, above n 472, 645-653 (discussing the nature of ethical codes as 
related to this study). 
474 Wilkinson, Walker, and Mercer, above n 472, 653-654. 
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which they used legal ethics codes for guidance, whether the ethics codes were 
helpful, and whether they referred to another source of guidance to finally resolve the 
ethical dilemma.475  Approximately 86% of lawyers interviewed gave consent for 
their interview details to be part of the final analysis using a chi-square statistical 
testing methodology.476 
 In short, the findings showed that only 16% (14/154 respondents) even 
mentioned the Handbook (Ontario, Canada’s legal ethics guide).477  In addition, only 
11 out of the 14 respondents indicated that the Handbook was helpful in determining 
their ethical obligations in resolving the issue.  Further, out of the 11 respondents, 
three respondents (3) indicated that the Handbook was not effective in resolving the 
ethical issues that came up in the course of their practice.  As a result, the study 
concluded that only 5% (8/154 respondents) ‘found the Handbook to be useful in 
resolving a specific ethical issue.’478  The remainder of respondents either did not 
mention the Handbook as a source of guidance, negatively mentioned the Handbook 
as helping to resolve their specific ethical dilemma, exercised independent judgment 
in resolving the ethical dilemma, or solicited the advice of senior attorneys for 
assistance in resolve the specific ethical issue.479  
The findings of the Ontario, Canada study seem to indicate that there is room 
for improvement of the legal ethics codes in Ontario in terms of providing better, 
effective assistance to lawyers when they face ethical dilemmas in practice.  The same 
                                                 
475 Wilkinson, Walker, and Mercer, above n 472, 653-655. 
476 Wilkinson, Walker, and Mercer, above n 472, 654 
477 See generally, Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook (2nd ed 1998). This 
study referred to the Law Society of Upper Canada’s Professional Conduct Handbook which contains 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
478 Wilkinson, Walker, and Mercer, above n 472, 655-656. 
479 Wilkinson, Walker, and Mercer, above n 472, 656-679 (discussing the results in detail and providing 
edited transcripts of lawyer interviews and ethical issues faced).   
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could be said of the legal ethics of other jurisdictions as discussed further in Chapter 
4.  The findings also demonstrate that the majority of lawyers do not actually refer to 
the legal ethics codes for helpful guidance,480 implying that modifying legal ethics 
codes or imposing new rules on ethical conduct alone is not likely to influence lawyer 
behaviour.  This appears to be due, in part, to a pre-disposed moral perspective of 
lawyers as they enter the profession and the perceived self-interested nature of most 
people, including lawyers.481 
For the purposes of this thesis, the Ontario, Canada study is important in 
providing a perspective into the legal regulation reforms proposed in Chapter 7.  At 
best, it confirms that legal regulation and ethics codes do play a role in shaping 
attorney behaviour in resolving ethical issues.  At worst, it sheds light that while legal 
ethics codes may play an explicit or implicit role in such dilemmas, they are certainly 
not the main driver in ensuring an integrity-based system of lawyer conduct.  The 
legal regulation reform proposals presented in Chapter 7 take these observations into 
account in specifically addressing the potentially deceptive behaviour of lawyers in 
negotiations. 
A final noteworthy analysis on the view of ethics, though not specifically legal 
ethics, is the annual Honesty and Ethics consumer poll conducted by The Gallup 
                                                 
480 Wilkinson, Walker, and Mercer, above n 472, 656-679 (discussing the result of the study in Ontario, 
Canada); Mize, above n 66,  245 (echoing a similar sentiment regarding New Zealand’s Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Barristers and Solicitors in addressing negotiation behaviour by lawyers in 
New Zealand, ‘[m]ore guidance needs to be given on acceptable negotiating behaviour’); Rhode, above 
n 151, 20-21 (discussing the state of the American Bar Association’s MPRC and arguing that ‘bar 
ethical codes are not an adequate source of guidance....end up reflecting too high a level of abstraction 
and too low a common denominator of conduct.’).  
481 See, eg, Loder, above n 42, 333 (‘the influence which any code may have on lawyer attitudes and 
conduct may be sorely limited, since moral disposition predates entry into the profession’); T H 
Morawetz, ‘Lawyers and Conscience’ (1989) 21 Connecticut Law Review 383 (‘codes...cannot 
transform the most callous and self-interested operators into lawyers of conscience.  At best, codes and 
training can activate pre-existing inclinations.’); F C Zacharias, ‘Specificity in Professional Ethics 
Codes:  Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics’ (1993) 69 3otre Dame Law Review 
223, 386. 
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Organisation in the United States.  Since 1976, The Gallup Organisation has 
conducted an annual poll asking a select group of random people in the United States 
to rate the relative honesty and ethics of various professions.  Interestingly enough, 
since 1976, medical doctors and judges have routinely outranked lawyers on the 
honesty and ethics rating, strongly suggesting that lawyers are not considered to be as 
honest or ethical as other professions.482  This view was further confirmed by the 2002 
ABA Section on Litigation public perception of lawyers study.483  These negative 
ratings appear to get worse the more someone is actively engaged in using a lawyer or 
legal services.  The Gallup polls as well as other professional and consumer studies 
related to the legal profession are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
In conclusion, the foregoing research in the area of legal ethics appears to 
demonstrate that while the legal ethics codes are intended to guide lawyer behaviour, 
they are not as effective as expected in curtailing unethical conduct.  Furthermore, 
while law firms and practitioners regard the ability to manage professional ethics 
dilemmas as a key skill for 21st century lawyers, law schools do not appear to 
effectively integrate the development of these core skills into mainstream legal 
education.  These insights are important in developing and implementing the 
integrated policy reform proposals discussed in Chapter 7.   
2.5.5 Research About Lawyers’ Bargaining Behaviour 
As discussed earlier, legal ethics as well as bargaining ethics models may 
influence a lawyer’s bargaining (negotiation) behaviour.  
                                                 
482 See generally The Gallup Poll, Honesty and Ethics Survey – Trend Analysis:  1976 – 2008.  This is 
on file with the author.  A copy is included in the Appendices.  See also American Bar Association 
Section of Litigation, Public Perception of Lawyers:  Consumer Research Findings, above n 13. 
483 See, eg, Hengstler, above n 13, 60; American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Public 
Perception of Lawyers:  Consumer Research Findings, above n 13. 
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The purpose of this section is to highlight and discuss research related to 
lawyers’ bargaining behaviour.  Recent studies into lawyers’ negotiation behaviour 
have generally been based on case studies involving law students given the issues 
related to research into lawyer’s behaviours in negotiation discussed earlier in this 
chapter.484  However, the first study discussed below does involve personal injury 
lawyers. 
In 1994, Davis conducted a survey of professional injury solicitors in 
Queensland, Australia.485  The purpose of the survey was to determine the attitudes 
and beliefs of Queensland personal injury solicitors relevant to negotiating behaviours 
with the goal of interpreting the results in the context of prevailing psychological 
research in games and decision theory.486  The research method involved a survey 
questionnaire which was sent out to 148 solicitors in Queensland specialising in 
personal injury litigation.487  Each survey questionnaire contained sixteen (16) 
statements specific to personal injury litigation and negotiation.488  Respondents were 
asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each of the sixteen 
(16) statements.  To eliminate bias and ensure confidentiality, surveys were sent 
unmarked with a reply-paid envelope and the results were tabulated by an external 
tabulator.489  
                                                 
484 See Chapter 2, section 2.5.1 (Introduction) for a detailed discussion on this topic. 
485 Note:  It is noted that the negotiation practices of personal injury lawyers today, at the time of this 
thesis, may be different from those discussed in this 1994 study.  However, the study provides valuable 
insight into the negotiation practices of a distinct subset of lawyers.  See, eg, Legal Services 
Commissioner v Mullins [2006] LPT 012, a recent Queensland jurisdiction legal ethics case discussed 
more fully in Chapter 5 which involves a personal injury barrister whose negotiation behaviour appears 
to reinforce the findings of Davis’ 1994 study. 
486 See generally Davis, above n 126. 
487 Davis, above n 126, 735. 
488 Ibid. 
489 Ibid. 
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Of the 148 surveys sent, 105 respondents replied for an overall response rate 
of 71%.  Out of the 105 completed surveys, 58 respondent-lawyers represented 
mainly plaintiffs while 41 respondent-lawyers primarily acted for defendants.  Among 
the various attitudes and beliefs about negotiation by personal injury lawyers, Davis 
found that ‘most plaintiffs are highly motivated towards settlement early in the action, 
and again shortly prior to trial.’490  Conversely, defendants ‘start [ ] low and build [ ] 
with increasing proximity to trial.’491  The findings from this survey also support the 
research on prospect theory which argues that plaintiffs tend to be risk- averse in a 
potential gains scenario and defendants tend to be risk-takers in the same situation.492   
In the context of this thesis, the survey asked respondents to assess statements 
related to the role of exaggeration and misrepresentation which, as has been 
established above, are both considered to be acceptable deception tactics in 
negotiation.  Davis found that twenty-four percent (24%) of both plaintiff and 
defendant lawyers used exaggeration and considered it ‘normal’ when indicating that 
‘an offer was “the last offer”’.493  This represents nearly 50% of all respondents.  
Davis also found that nearly thirty-six percent (36%) of plaintiff lawyers and thirty-
nine percent (39%) of defendant lawyers felt that ‘it was often necessary to 
misrepresent the strengths of your position to get a good negotiated result.’494   
Statistically, these results, on their own, are not necessarily conclusive to 
assert that plaintiff or defendant lawyers are prone to exaggeration or 
misrepresentation to the extent of being actionably deceptive; however, it is arguably 
                                                 
490 Davis, above n 126, 748. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Davis, above n 126, 748.  See also Kahneman and Tversky, above n 265, 263-291.  
493 Davis, above n 126, 746. 
494 Ibid. 
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significant that so many of them feel the need to use these tactics or that such tactics 
are ‘common’ in order to represent their clients in the context of personal injury 
negotiations.495 As Davis points out, ‘many assert that there is a difference between 
exaggeration, misrepresentation, and deception’496 in such negotiations, leading one to 
preliminarily conclude that although most lawyers or clients might see exaggeration 
(puffing) and misrepresentation as deceptive, the lawyers in this study consider it 
acceptable within the distributive bargaining context of personal injury negotiations, 
where a win-lose mentality is the primary modus operandi and one party seeks to 
‘maximise the pay-out’ while the other party seeks to minimise it.497         
A second study on legal negotiation occurred approximately two years later.   
Rachlinski’s 1996 experiment attempted to demonstrate the framing theory of 
ordinary litigation as it might apply to lawyers and the legal profession.  Rachlinski’s 
study involved a copyright problem given to law students.  In this study, half of the 
students played defendants and the other half played plaintiffs.498  In the hypothetical 
copyright problem, plaintiff-subjects could either accept a $200,000 settlement offer 
by the defendant or face a 50% chance of winning $400,000 at trial (and a 50% 
chance of winning nothing).499  Defendant-subjects could either pay a $200,000 
settlement to the plaintiff or face a 50% chance of losing $400,000 at trial (and a 50% 
of losing nothing).500  In this scenario, the rational choice theory predicts that both 
plaintiffs and defendants would be either indifferent to both options (risk-neutral) or 
                                                 
495 See eg,  Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins (2006) (legal ethics case discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4) 
496 Davis, above n 126, 747. 
497 Davis, above n 126, 734. 
498 Rachlinski, above n 269, 113. 
499 Ibid.  
500 Ibid. 
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would prefer settlement (risk-averse).501  However, Rachlinki found that, consistent 
with the framing theory, 77% of plaintiff subjects preferred settlement (risk-averse) 
while 69% of defendant-subjects preferred trial (risk-seeking).502 
A third study on legal negotiation behaviour worth noting is Guthrie’s study 
involving the frivolous framing theory.  In 2003, Guthrie conducted a similar study to 
demonstrate the frivolous framing theory of litigation behaviour.503  Frivolous 
litigation is litigation without merit on the basis of law or fact that unnecessarily 
consumes the valuable resources of the legal system.504  Guthrie’s scenario involved a 
sample litigation problem given to law students.  Half of the students played 
defendants and the other half played plaintiffs.505  Plaintiffs were given the option to 
either accept a $50 settlement payment or face a 1% chance of winning a $5,000 
judgment at trial.506  Similarly, defendants could either pay a certain $50 settlement to 
the plaintiff or face a 1% chance at having to pay a $5,000 judgment at trial.507  Once 
again, the economic theory of suit and settlement (rational choice theory) predicts that 
                                                 
501 Guthrie, above n 265, 1121-1122.  See also Chapter 2, section 2.3.7 (Decision-Making Theories 
Affecting Legal Negotiation) for more information on these various decision-making theories.  
502 Rachlinski, above n 269, 128-129.  
503  See Chapter 2, section 2.3.7 (Decision-Making Theories Affecting Legal Negotiation) for more 
information on these various decision-making theories. 
504 Guthrie, above n 265, 1115; See also John Lande, ‘Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business 
Lawyers' and Executives' Opinions’ (1998) 3 Harvard 3egotiation Law Review 1, 26 (1998) (reporting 
that 53 percent of inside counsel and 14 percent of outside counsel in his survey believe that more than 
half of the cases filed against businesses are frivolous); Robert G Bone, ‘Modeling Frivolous Suits’ 
(1997) 145 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 519, 520 (‘[T]here is widespread belief that 
frivolous litigation is out of control. Many people cite frivolous suits as the cause of the litigation 
system's most serious ills-huge case backlogs, long delays and high trial costs.’); Valerie P Hans and 
William S Lofquist, ‘Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the 
Litigation Explosion Debate’ (1992) 26 Law and Society Review 85,95 (1992) (reporting survey results 
showing that 83 percent of jurors in cases involving business defendants either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly 
agree’ that there are far too many frivolous lawsuits) 
505 Chris Guthrie ‘Framing Frivolous Litigation:  A Psychological Theory’ (2000) 67 University of 
Chicago Law Review 163, 188-189. 
506 Guthrie, above n 505, 188-189. 
507 Guthrie, above n 265, 1124  (discussing the frivolous framing theory informal study) 
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both the plaintiffs and defendants would be either indifferent (risk-neutral) or prefer 
settlement (risk-averse).508 
The results of this study indicated that, contrary to the economic theory of suit 
and settlement yet consistent with the frivolous framing theory, 62% of plaintiff-
subjects preferred a trial (a risk-seeking option).509  In addition, 84% of the defendant-
subjects preferred settlement (a risk-averse option) where both parties are faced with 
low-probability gains or losses.510 
In summary, each of these studies on how lawyers might behave in litigation 
and negotiation is important to the issues discussed in this thesis.  For example, both 
the framing theory of ordinary litigation and the frivolous framing theory of litigation 
behaviour can be used to potentially predict the possibility of lawyers using deception 
in negotiation based on the lawyer’s perception of whether using deception in 
negotiation is a risk-seeking or risk-averse option at a given point in the negotiation.  
Furthermore, the foregoing research can be used to effectively define and implement 
the policy reform proposals discussed in Chapter 7.    
2.5.6 Research About Lawyers’ Bargaining Behaviour and Ethics 
Empirical research concerning a lawyer’s potentially unethical behaviour in 
negotiation is generally focused on law review articles and views from legal scholars 
and ethicists on whether lawyers fulfil their ethical obligations or how they should 
fulfil those obligations.  However, this area is becoming more critical given a global 
                                                 
508 Guthrie, above n 265, 1124.  
509 Guthrie, above n 505, 188-189.; See also Chris Guthrie et al, ‘Inside the Judicial Mind’ (2001) 86 
Cornell Law Review 777 (discussing the results of an informal study of federal judges and magistrates 
in settling a simple copyright dispute in light of the prospect theory).   
510 Guthrie, above n 505, 188-189. 
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economy, cross-national legal jurisdictions, and the changing role of the legal 
profession in this global world. 
The relatively few comments on this topic have focused less on lawyers’ 
potentially unethical behaviour than on the potential impact of using ethically 
ambiguous tactics in a negotiation.  They are worth noting here to the extent that the 
impact may be more or less consistent in a legal negotiation setting.  In addition, the 
research provides insight into the factors which may influence the lawyer’s decision 
to use deception in negotiation or engage in other conduct that may violate the legal 
ethics code of a given jurisdiction. 
In 1991, Lewicki et al found that ‘where there is a likelihood of a future long-
term relationship with the other party, negotiators are less likely to endorse marginally 
ethical tactics.’ 511  Later, in 1999, Lewicki et al went on to identify five contextual 
factors which play a role in a model of ethical decision making, including:  ‘1) 
relationship with the other party; 2) the relative power of the negotiators; 3) whether 
or not the negotiator is acting as an agent;512 4) the group and the organisational 
norms; and 5) the cultural norms’.513 
There have also been some consistent findings in negotiation literature with 
regards to the differences in men and women on the topic of using ethically 
ambiguous negotiation tactics (EANTs), such as deception.  Generally it appears that 
women are less accepting of EANTs than men and older people disapprove of EANTs 
                                                 
511 Roy J Lewicki and G Spencer (1991) Ethical relativism and negotiating tactics: Factors affecting 
their perceived ethicality (Paper presented at the Academy of Management, Miami, Florida). 
512 See, eg, Norman Bowie and R Edward Freeman, Ethics and Agency Theory (1992) (noting that 
‘when people act as an agent they may be more willing to violate personal ethical standards.’). 
513 See generally Roy J Lewicki, David M Saunders, and John W Minton, 3egotiation (3rd ed, 1999).  
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relative to younger people.514  Banas and McLean-Parks conducted a study of MBA 
students and found that ‘negotiators classified as ideologically ‘absolutist’ (would 
assume the best outcome can be achieved by following universalist principles) were 
less accepting of EANTs than those who were classified as ideologically ‘subjectivist’ 
(negotiators who base decisions on personal values and perspectives)’.515  Finally, 
Rivers stated that determining the use of appropriate negotiation tactics in an 
international business environment is critical since a negotiator using a tactic that 
might be considered unethical by the other party results in ‘the perpetrator…[feeling] 
distraught, personal stress or even guilt, and the receiver…likely to be angry, 
embarrassed and most victims…likely to seek retaliation and revenge’.516 
Aquino studied the impact of an ethical climate on the use of deception during 
negotiation is especially salient.517  Aquino hypothesised the following:  1) that if 
there was an ethical organisational climate, negotiators would use less deception; 2) 
that if there was an ethical organisational climate, negotiators would be better 
perceived as honest; and 3) that those negotiators perceived as honest due to the 
ethical climate would also achieve a less personally favourable outcome than those 
not in a similar situation.518  Aquino studied the effects of face-to-face negotiations in 
which participants were required to come to a negotiated agreement between supplier 
                                                 
514 See, eg, R J Volkema, ‘Ethicality in negotiations: An analysis of perceptual similarities and 
differences between Brazil and the United States’ (1999) 45(1) Journal of Business Research 59-67; R 
J Volkema, ‘Demographic, cultural, and economic predictors of perceived ethicality of negotiation 
behavior: A nine-country analysis’ (2004) 57 Journal of Business Research 69-78; Robinson, Lewicki, 
and Donohue, above n 332, 649-664. 
515 Rivers, above n 77, 5 (citing J T Banas and J McLean-Parks, ‘Lambs among lions? The impact of 
ethical ideology on negotiation behaviours and outcomes’ (2002) 7(2) International 3egotiation 235-
262). 
516 Rivers, above n 77, 4 (citing Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton, above n 513). 
517 See generally Karl Aquino, ‘The effects of ethical and the availability of alternatives on the use of 
deception during negotiation’ (1998) 9(3) The International Journal of Conflict Management 195-217. 
518 See generally Aquino, above n 517, 195-217; See also Sue Fitzmaurice, The Mediator and Ethics: 
Searching for the Wisdom of Solomon 
<http://www.windeaters.co.nz/publications/ethics/mediation%20ethics.pdf> at 9 August 2010. 
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and buyer.  Aquino found the following: 1) that a knowledge of one’s ethical 
organisational climate decreased the use of deception; 2) those negotiators who 
behaved honestly were perceived as honest by the other party and those behaving 
dishonestly were so perceived by the other negotiator; and 3) that the honest 
negotiator’s negotiated agreement price with the supplier ($25.80) was more than that 
achieved by the dishonest negotiator ($23.75),519 with the latter presumably having 
achieved the better deal.  Aquino’s study appears to demonstrate that ‘when ethical 
standards are highly salient, negotiators were significantly less likely to use deception, 
even when there were strong individual incentives to act otherwise.’520 
A final relevant study in this area involved law students and consisted of 
demonstrating the applicability of prospect and framing theory discussed above on a 
legal professional’s ethical conduct.  As previously indicated, legal scholars have 
argued that prospect theory is highly relevant to the legal profession in multiple 
areas.521  In an effort to test the effect of framing theory on an issue of professional 
responsibility, Rachlinski gave subject-participants (law students) a hypothetical 
products liability litigation problem.522  Student-participants assumed the role of 
counsel for the defence for a pharmaceutical company.  In the hypothetical, subject-
participants were informed of the following additional facts:  1) the plaintiffs were 
parents of a child injured by a product manufactured by the defendant-company; 2) 
the plaintiffs had already offered to settle the case for $3 million; 3) unknown to the 
plaintiffs, the defence had discovered and withheld during discovery certain relevant 
                                                 
519 See generally Aquino, above n 517, 195-217; Fitzmaurice, above n 518, 2-3 (discussing Aquino’s 
study).  
520 Rivers, above n 77, 6 (citing Aquino, above n 517).  
521 See, eg, Rachlinski, above n 269, 113; Guthrie, above n 265, 1115. 
522 See Rachlinski, above n 269, 113. 
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documents which would prove incriminating to the defendant-company.523  Subject-
defence counsel also learned that, if they agreed to settle the case without disclosing 
the documents to the plaintiffs, they might be sanctioned as having acted unethically 
under the jurisdiction’s professional ethics code.524  
Rachlinski assigned two distinct scenarios to the subject-participants (acting as 
counsel for the defendant).  One-half of the subject-participants were assigned to a 
‘gains’ scenario in which they were told that their client, the pharmaceutical company, 
had expected to pay $5 million to settle the case and so thought that the case was 
‘going well’ given the plaintiffs only wanted $3 million to settle the case.525  The 
other half of the subject-participants were assigned to a ‘loss’ scenario where the 
client thought that the case was ‘going poorly’ because they only expected to pay $1 
million to settle whereas the plaintiffs were asking for $3 million in settlement.526  
Rachlinski then asked the student-participants in both groups to advise whether they 
would accept the plaintiff’s settlement offer given this information.  
Rachlinski found that the results were consistent with the framing theory even 
though both groups faced the same option to settle the case.  Rachlinski found that 
only 12.5% of those assigned to the ‘gains scenario’ would engage in an ethically 
risky prospect of settling prior to disclosing the incriminating documents.527  In 
contrast, approximately 45% of those in the loss scenario indicated they would settle 
without disclosing the documents which were incriminating to their client, 
presumably because they felt their client would be even less satisfied with the 
                                                 
523 Ibid. 
524 Ibid. 
525 Ibid. 
526 Ibid. 
527 Ibid. 
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progress of the case than they already were.528  Consistent with prospect theory, 
Rachlinski found that those facing actual or perceived losses were more likely ‘to 
adopt a risk-seeking, and ethically dicey, litigation strategy’.529 
2.5.7 Research About Lawyers’ Bargaining Behaviour and Deception 
While the research discussed in Chapter 3 indicates that lawyers engage in 
deceptive behaviour in negotiations, there is little quantitative empirical research into 
lawyers’ deceptive behaviour in bargaining that statistically supports the qualitative 
findings of such behaviour.  However, it is widely acknowledged that there are 
‘routine occurrences of deception in negotiation’530 yet there is also ‘little agreement 
among experts on the extent to which deception is appropriate.’531 
For example, some suggest that deception is an integral part of the negotiation 
process532 while others seem to categorically dismiss deception as necessary, even in 
negotiation and particularly where lawyers are concerned.533  Others have targeted 
certain types of deception as acceptable while outright lies are unacceptable.  For 
example, Wokutch and Carson argue that while deception in negotiation may be 
normal, it is worse to lie about an issue ‘which the other parties have a right to know 
                                                 
528 See Rachlinski, above n 269, 113.  This also appears to demonstrate that the way the scenario is 
initially framed triggers the subjects to be anchored to that perspective and impacts the way they make 
a decision.  Again, a person’s heuristics and biases come into play and affect their perceptions and 
judgments in every negotiation setting.  The use of deception would seem to only heighten such biases 
and judgments. 
529 Guthrie, above n 265, 1142 (discussing Rachlinki’s study results).  
530 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 226.  
531 Ibid. 
532 See, eg, Albert Carr, ‘Is business bluffing ethical?’ 46(1) Harvard Business Review 143-153; White, 
above n 60,  929; Lax and Sebenius, above n 99, 491-498; R E Wokutch and T L Carson, ‘The 
ethicality and profitability of bluffing in business’ in Roy J Lewicki, John A Litterer, David M 
Saunders and John W Minton (eds) 3egotiation (1993) 499-504. 
533 See, eg, White, above n 60, 926; Carr, above n 532, 143-153.  Cf Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1219; Reed 
Elizabeth Loder, ‘Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator’ (1994) 8 Georgetown Journal of 
Legal Ethics 45; Rubin, above n 69, 577. 
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than one about which they have no right to know’.534  Of course the dilemma here 
seems obvious in that there is no clear agreement on who determines the parties’ right 
to know something and how one determines what is necessary to know versus 
something that might appear irrelevant.  Bluffing in negotiation is rated as acceptable 
to some535 yet frowned upon by others.536   
One deceptive practice, lying about one’s reservation price, appears to be an 
acceptable tactic by most scholars.  Anton argued that while lying about one’s 
reservation price is acceptable, fabricating material facts is unethical.  Lewicki and 
Stark indicated a similar notion and said that lies about material facts are 
‘inappropriate’537 and later asserted that while lies about reservation prices are still 
acceptable, lies about material facts are ‘unacceptable’.538  Once again, there are likely 
several issues in determining what may be considered a material fact or whether 
something that is not considered a material fact at one point is later a very relevant 
fact as negotiations draw to a close. 
In summary, this section has provided a review of literature into existing 
research and commentary regarding legal negotiation, the use of deception in 
negotiation, and the impact of ethics in negotiation.  The next section continues with a 
critical analysis and evaluation of the literature review.  
                                                 
534 Wokutch and Carson, above n 532, 502. 
535 See, eg, Carr, above n 532, 143-153.  It is important to note that Carr speaks about bluffing in the 
business context and since the publication of this article, even business demands greater ethics in this 
area.  As well, the question is whether his permissive view of bluffing in business can or should apply 
to lawyers and the legal profession.  
536 See, eg, J Gregory Dees and Peter C Crampton, ‘Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier:  Toward 
a Theory of Morality in Practice’ (1991) 1(2) Business Ethics Quarterly 1; Roger Fisher, William Ury 
and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: 3egotiating Agreement Without Giving In (2nd ed 1991); Lewicki and 
Stark above n 330, 69-95; R J Lewicki and R J Robinson, ‘Ethical and unethical bargaining tactics: an 
empirical study’ (1998) 17 Journal of Business Ethics 665-682. 
537 Lewicki and Stark above n 330,  69-95; Strudler, above n 67.  
538 See, eg, Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton, above n 513; Lewicki and Robinson, above n 536, 665-
682. 
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2.6 CRITICAL AALYSIS OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this section is to provide a critical evaluation of the findings of 
the literature review, including strengths and weaknesses of existing research and 
potential gaps in the research.  In addition, this section describes how this thesis and 
the results of a detailed enquiry into the research questions attempts to close some of 
these gaps and thus provide an original and valuable contribution to the field. 
2.6.1 Summary of Findings 
In the early 1980s, one law professor referred to ‘the major unstudied variable 
in the justice of the legal system – the patterned behaviour of individual lawyers.’539  
In attempting to address the research questions, the issue of the patterned behaviours 
of legal professionals with regard to alleged deceptive conduct in negotiation is still a 
major unstudied variable.  The literature review in this chapter demonstrates several 
key findings related to the research problem and research questions outlined in 
Chapter 1.  First, there is a plethora of literature on negotiation both as a process and 
in terms of negotiation strategies and tactics.  In addition, while there is ever-
increasing literature on legal negotiation, guidance on the ethics of legal negotiation 
still appears to be in its infant stages.  As such, legal practitioners, when looking for 
guidance on appropriate negotiation behaviour and ethics, are more likely to be 
influenced by the pervasive and growing body of work on general negotiation in 
business and the customary negotiation practices of a given jurisdiction than by 
explicit guidelines on ethical negotiation behaviour as provided by legal professional 
associations.   
                                                 
539 Condlin, above n 4, 227 n 10. 
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Second, there is insufficient attention to the types of tactics considered 
appropriate or not appropriate in legal negotiation.  Law and legal scholars seem to 
have adopted the views of business scholars in regards to negotiation tactics, perhaps 
as a result of the lack of more credible information about how lawyers ought to 
conduct negotiations in their professional capacity.  This seems to be reflected in 
current literature.  Existing literature, which discusses negotiation strategies and 
tactics used by lawyers as well as some ‘ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics’ 
would benefit from a more clearly defined structure that would make it user friendly 
to legal practitioners in particular.  By this I mean that negotiation courses in a faculty 
of law could implement, for example, a comparative analysis of the strategies and 
tactics lawyers can use in negotiations and addressing the ethical implications of 
lawyers violating the legal ethics code.  This is especially important because, as 
discussed earlier, lawyers are considered public servants and therefore have a higher 
ethical obligation than business persons with regards to acceptable conduct, such as 
the use of deception in negotiation.   
Third, while there is discussion on the ethics of negotiation for lawyers, this 
appears to be fairly recent.  Much of the debate regarding negotiation ethics for 
lawyers is centred on legal ethics rules, their applicability and their effectiveness.  
Bargaining ethics models have been proposed though it is not clear that one model has 
been adopted by legal practitioners to the exclusion of others since it is similarly 
unresolved whether negotiation even needs a separate code of ethics.  As the review 
and analysis of various legal ethics codes in Chapter 4  appear to indicate,540 the 
treatment and focus of negotiation as a distinct function central to the lawyer’s day-to-
                                                 
540 See Chapter 4 (Efforts by Professional Ethics Codes to Regulate Deceptive Behaviours in 
Negotiation) for more information. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 148 -  9-Aug-10 
day  practice is not consistently addressed in the same vein as, for example, the role of 
the lawyer as a judge or third-party neutral (mediator).    
A fourth observation from the literature review is central to the question of the 
use of deception in negotiation by lawyers.  The legal system, at least in the United 
States, appears to still embrace White’s view that it is necessary for a lawyers to 
deceive in negotiation if they are to properly do their job and be successful.541  As 
discussed further in Chapter 4, White’s argument regarding acceptable deception in 
negotiation is reflected, for example, in the language of Rule 4.1 of the American Bar 
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct as well as the formal opinion of the 
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility.542  Even in the midst of opinions to the contrary,543 the legal system, at 
least in the United States, appears to cling to this empirically unsupported proposition, 
dismissing the possibility that a negotiation can be successful without use of 
deception.544 
Finally, the literature review appears to demonstrate that while there are books 
and articles written about negotiation for lawyers, it is still arguable whether 
                                                 
541 White, above n 60, 928 (misleading other side is the essence of negotiation and is all part of the 
game); See also American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, ‘Formal Opinion 06-439:  Lawyer’s Obligation of Truthfulness When Representing a 
Client in Negotiation: Application to Caucused Mediation’ 4-6 (April 12, 2006) (reaffirming the use of 
certain kinds of deception in negotiation). 
542 See generally Formal Opinion 06-439, above n 541, 4-6. 
543 See, eg, Fisher, Ury, and Patton, above n 536 (advocating for principled-negotiation instead of 
adversarial negotiation approach).    
544 See also Formal Opinion 06-439, above n 541, 4-6 (discussing certain cases where intentional 
misrepresentation would be considered unethical).  Despite these discussions, the American Bar 
Association still condones certain levels of deception in negotiation.  It is important to note that most of 
the other common-law jurisdictions which were the focus of this study (except Canada) do not 
explicitly or implicitly address acceptable or unacceptable negotiation behaviour in their legal codes 
and therefore, I cannot comment on them specifically except that one could presume that either general 
business or customary negotiation practices are acceptable unless otherwise indicated.  See also Avnita 
Lakhani, ‘Deception as a Negotiation Tactic: A Study of the Views and Perceptions of Practitioners’ 
Update (October 2009).  This article is also published in the Spring 2010 issue of Rutgers Conflict 
Resolution Law Journal. 
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negotiation is a separate function of the legal professional.  It does not appear to be 
subject to the same level of scrutiny as mediation, arbitration or litigation with its own 
set of rules and ethics codes.  In general, law appears to see negotiation as a skill 
rather than as a separate activity or function of the lawyer deserving of unique 
mention.545  As such, articulated empirical research into legal negotiations is rare 
given the legal rules, codes of conduct and professional responsibility privileges 
which form a strong part of a lawyer’s professional practice and are expected to 
provide sufficient guidance. 
In terms of this thesis, the findings of this literature review revealed several 
strengths, weaknesses and gaps.  These are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
2.6.2 Strengths 
The literature review revealed four principle strengths of the current state of 
knowledge in the areas and disciplines which are the focus of this thesis.  First, there 
appears to be a resurgence of interest in the behaviours of legal professionals and 
ethics, especially in the area of negotiation ethics.  Perhaps driven by the continued 
negative perceptions and press concerning lawyers’ conduct, there has been a surge of 
discussion and debate about the need for fairness and truthfulness in negotiations and 
the need for more candour in negotiations.546  This resurgence demonstrates the 
timeliness of this thesis and the importance of having a comprehensive foundation 
upon which to address such complex issues as the use of deception in negotiation. 
                                                 
545 Note:  This is an arguable observation.  It is duly noted that the American Bar Association does 
discuss negotiation though not necessarily as a separate function.  Furthermore the ABA lists 
negotiation as a fundamental skill of a lawyer.    
546 See, eg, Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Michael Wheeler (eds), What’s Fair:  Ethics for 3egotiators 
(2004); Andrea Kupfer Schneider and Christopher Honeyman (eds), The 3egotiator’s Fieldbook:  The 
Desk Reference for the Experienced 3egotiator (2007) (containing chapters discussing ethics, fairness, 
and morality in negotiation).  
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 150 -  9-Aug-10 
A second strength of existing literature is that much of the recent literature and 
commentary acknowledges the changing aspects of the legal profession which, in 
turn, requires renewed assessment of how best to support the legal profession in 
adapting to  these changes.  The profession of law has traditionally been focused on 
public service ahead of personal and professional gains even as it is also recognised as 
one’s livelihood.547  However, the profession has increasingly become more like a 
business, with a focus on profits, efficiency, and serving customers.548  Globalisation 
has only made the legal profession more competitive, cross-national, and multi-
jurisdictional.  Furthermore, the increased evolution and integration of developing 
countries into the rule of law paradigm as well the increased use of technology in the 
courtroom means that the legal profession is poised to significantly evolve even 
further in the next few years.  This rapid evolution from a public service profession to 
a client-driven business and service-provider for profit has serious implications for 
how legal rules and ethics will ensure that the legal system stays viable and 
trustworthy in the eyes of its citizens and for the benefit of the public interest. 
A third strength of the literature review is increased acknowledgment and 
appreciation of the value of social sciences methodology and empirical research as 
integrated into law teaching.  The legal academic world is embracing empirical 
research (qualitative and quantitative) as adding value to the profession, academia, 
and the knowledge base from which to improve the practice of law.  The increased 
integration of social science research methodology as well as cross-disciplinary 
                                                 
547 See, eg, Davis, above n 171; Derek Bok, ‘Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: 
Markets and Mindwork’ (2002) 10 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 1; Brandeis, above 
n 182; Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1995). 
548 See, eg, Laurel S Terry, ‘The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession:  The Impact of Treating the 
Legal Profession as ‘Service Providers’’ (2009) (Penn State University ~ Dickinson School of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 01-2009) <http://ssrn.com/abstract =1304172> at 9 August 2010.  
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research from the fields of, for example, business, economics, psychology, and 
negotiation, demonstrates the importance of future legal research being multi-
disciplinary. 
Finally, the continued breadth, depth, and diversity of literature on negotiation 
demonstrate that it is a vital and important process, especially to legal professionals.  
However, it is still viewed primarily as a skill and not a separate function.  The 
profession would benefit more dialogue on the nature of legal negotiation, greater 
education of the bargaining ethics surrounding legal negotiation and the potential 
impact of deception in negotiations.  This is still a relatively unstudied area which 
affects public perceptions and public interest. 
In the context of this thesis, the strengths of the literature review provide a 
foundation from which to address each of the three principle research questions and 
establish the foundations for recommending the policy reform proposals in Chapter 7.  
At the same time, the weaknesses of the literature review limit the extent to which 
conclusions can be drawn.  Nevertheless, weaknesses in the literature review also 
provide an opportunity to address some of the gaps in the context of this thesis and to 
establish an analytical framework which may be used in future research across 
multiple jurisdictions. 
2.6.3 Weaknesses 
There are five major weaknesses of the existing literature in the context of this 
thesis.  Many of these are consistent with prior discussions on the issues of 
conducting research into legal negotiation as well as the institutional and 
methodological obstacles of empirical research into the area of negotiation area given 
the constraints of the legal system. 
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A principal limitation is the lack of empirical research on legal negotiation.  
Apart from Williams’ long-term study into legal negotiation,549 there is relatively little 
formal empirically-based research using a validated social sciences methodology that 
looks into the negotiation behaviours of legal professionals.  While there are 
experiments that attempt to predict how lawyers are likely to act in negotiations, these 
studies generally involve students in law or business.  Consequently, the results could 
be criticised for lack of generalisability to actual legal professional behaviour while 
social science researchers are likely to question its validity on the basis of research 
methods, sample size, data collection and data analysis. 
A second weakness of existing literature is a lack of sufficient research into 
what is ethically permissible in legal negotiation as different from business 
negotiation or other types of negotiations.  As discussed, negotiation as practiced by 
lawyers appears to be constrained by the rules and codes of conduct imposed on the 
profession of law, at least as indicated on the face of the applicable rules and codes of 
conduct. Given the view of negotiation as a skill rather than a function for the legal 
professional, the lack of a distinct body of research in this area may seem appropriate; 
however, this is arguable especially if negotiation is a critical daily skill for lawyers 
and the public perception of lawyers continues to be negative.  
A third weakness is that there is a less than comprehensive understanding 
about the nature of ethics, legal ethics, and bargaining ethics and how they affect a 
lawyer’s negotiation behaviour as well as the extent to which deception is allowed and 
acceptable in the context of the legal system.  Legal professionals have multiple and, 
at times, conflicting duties of loyalty which place them in ethical dilemmas.  These 
                                                 
549 See generally Williams, above n 202.  Even this study is arguably not sound from a methodological 
perspective since self-reported behaviour is subject to researcher and subject bias. 
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same duties combined with the universal practice of negotiation in so many contexts 
(formal and informal) are a basis of scholarly and professional debates on the merits 
of imposing candour in negotiations versus acknowledging the fact that deception in 
negotiation cannot be regulated and the costs of imposing candour are too great at best 
and unknown at worst. 
A fourth potential weakness, though this may simply be an inevitable and 
normal function of separate legal jurisdictions, consists of apparent inconsistencies 
between legal jurisdictions in how the legal ethics codes treat negotiation and the use 
of deception in negotiation. For example, while arguably the United States has taken a 
more comprehensive look at the extent to which a certain level of deception is 
allowed in legal negotiations, Australia does not appear to allow this distinction in its 
ethics code.550  Presumably any level of deception in Australia is an ethics violation.    
In addition, while the United States does not have a separate code of ethics for 
lawyers as negotiators, a Canadian province does see negotiation as a separate 
function of the legal professional subject to a separate code of ethics.551   
Finally, a fifth potential weakness is the subjective nature in which many 
ethics violations cases are determined where there does not appear to be a clear 
understanding in the law/negotiations/ethics arena for proper decision-making on 
ethical issues such as deception in negotiation.  Though some scholars have proposed 
an ethical decision making model, this has not been formally adopted by the legal 
profession or recognised by a majority of negotiators.552  As a result, courts and 
                                                 
550 Note:  This is further discussed in Chapter 4.  
551 Note:  This is further discussed in Chapter 4. 
552 See, eg, Loder, above n 533, 45 (discussing a moral problem-solving approach to be used during 
negotiations which would obviate the need to use deception); Norton, above n 19, 270-298 (presenting 
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disciplinary tribunals appear to make subjective assessments about the gravity of 
conduct violations and the punishment imposed in relation to the offending 
conduct.553  From a practical standpoint and even with the existence of ethics advisory 
opinions, a lack of such guidelines might leave a lawyer stranded when it comes to 
making ethical decisions. 
2.6.4 Gaps in the Literature Review/Research 
The gaps in the literature with regards to the research questions and the focus 
of this thesis can best be summarised as follows. 
First, while legal ethics codes are a constant in a lawyer’s professional life, 
there appears to be a lack of comprehensive understanding of the ethics governing the 
lawyer as a professional and the ethics of the clients he/she is meant to serve.  In 
essence, there is a gap in the legal ethics codes of specific rules or guidelines that 
assist the lawyer in choosing between appropriate courses of action when faced with 
certain dilemmas. This may be in the form of a decision tree or an ethical decision-
making framework.   As a result, a lawyer faces innumerable ethical decisions in 
serving his/her client.  These ethical dilemmas are further complicated by the 
sometimes conflicting duties to the client, the courts, and the legal system.  The result 
is ambivalence about lawyers and the legal profession.554  This includes the 
continuing negative perception of lawyers, continuous issues with unethical conduct 
of lawyers and the pressures on the profession resulting from a demanding and taxing 
                                                                                                                                            
a functionalism model of bargaining ethics as a means of making more ethical decisions during 
negotiations).   
553 See Chapter 5 (The Success of Professional Ethics Codes in Controlling Lawyers’ Deceptive 
Behaviour) for more discussion on this topic based on a qualitative study of ethics violation cases in the 
Queensland legal jurisdiction. 
554 See Chapter 6, Section 6.5 (Consumer Studies of the Legal Profession are the Sting in the Tail) for a 
detailed discussion of this topic). 
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operating structure.555  At the same time that the profession argues for lawyers to be 
‘better communicators’,556 there appears to be a significant lack of practical guidance 
on how to do so whilst avoiding the ethical dilemmas that present themselves in the 
real world, especially in negotiations.557 
A second gap in the literature appears to be that there is virtually no 
comprehensive discussion or analysis on the application of legal ethics to certain 
negotiation tactics from a cross-jurisdictional standpoint.  This may be due to the fact 
that the profession recognises separate legal jurisdictions and their respective codes of 
conduct.  However, this view can be problematic.  If lawyers are part of a 
‘profession’, it would seem that a consistent application of a consistent code of ethics 
of the profession would go some way to increasing consistent lawyer conduct in a 
positive way.   
Current debate on the ethics codes and its application are on a single-country 
basis with the United States possibly leading the way in terms of volume, consistent 
analysis, and intensity of examining legal ethics.  For example, there are numerous 
articles extolling the virtues of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) in 
                                                 
555 See, eg, American Bar Association, Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System (1998) 
<http://www.abanet.org/media/perception/perceptions.pdf> at 9 August 2010 (study and a 
comprehensive nationwide survey on the U.S. justice  
system among the general population consisting of a sample of approximately one thousand 
respondents age eighteen and older); American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Public 
Perception of Lawyers:  Consumer Research Findings, above n 13 (finding, for example, that 
consumers are still ambivalent about lawyers and lack public confidence in them due to such factors as 
poor handling of basic client relationships and absence of attention to communication including 
significant misunderstanding and mistrust of fees). 
556 American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Public Perception of Lawyers:  Consumer 
Research Findings – Forward, above n 13 (Robert A Clifford, Section Chair stating that ‘[t]he image of 
lawyers is not just a matter of professional or personal pride. It affects the public’s belief in our justice 
system, and ultimately, their faith in our democracy.’).   
557 See, eg, Norton, above n 19, 291 (stating that the ‘ethics of bargaining…must be reconciled with the 
ethics of the real world.’). 
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the United States and an equal, or perhaps greater, amount of criticism regarding some 
of its provisions, especially those which attempt to regulate deceptive conduct.558   
In Australia, there appears to be less debate about ethics codes, perhaps due to 
the smaller size of the country and lesser number of lawyers.559  At the same time, 
Australia faces similar issues with regards to the public’s negative perception of the 
legal system and its lawyers.560  A cross-jurisdictional analysis of ethics codes, such 
as the analysis undertaken in Chapter 4 of this thesis, along with a discussion of 
similarities and differences, would aid the profession in determining the optimal and 
most ethically consistent set of standards to which the profession can realistically 
adhere whilst serving a demanding global society.   
As it stands today, lawyers appear to be caught in the contradiction between 
bargaining’s ‘practical norms’, which ‘provide rule[s] for maximizing long range 
client and lawyer returns’561 and ‘ethical norms’, which ‘provide rules for 
representing clients competently and diligently’562 without resorting to ‘meta norms’ 
to ‘sort out the contradictions or rank the order commands’563 so as to provide a 
means for making appropriate decisions on how to act.  These apparent contradictions 
                                                 
558 Note: This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
559 Note:  In Australia, there is currently a debate on nationalising the Australian legal profession.  Cf 
Roger Wilkins AO, ‘National regulation of the legal profession: An agenda for reform’ (2009) 3SW 
Law Society Journal; Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) 3ational Legal Profession Reform (2009) < 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Consultationsreformsandreviews_CouncilofAustralianG
overnments(COAG)NationalLegalProfessionReform> at 9 August 2010 (providing information on the 
history of the national legal profession reforms in Australia and various task force papers).  
560 See, eg, Chris Merritt, ‘We need to change our culture, says Victorian DPP’, The Australian 
(Sydney), 31 October 2008, 2; The Australian Law Reform Commission (1999) ‘Discussion Paper 62:  
Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, 5. Lawyers and practice standards’ 3 (hereinafter called 
‘Discussion Paper 62’); Lakhani, above n 268, 61 (discussing some of the issues facing lawyers in 
New South Wales in particular).  
561 Robert J Condlin, ‘Bargaining in the Dark:  The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute 
Bargaining Role’ (1992) 51 Maryland Law Review 1, 71-72, 75-82, 84-84. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid. 
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can be better aligned through an informed, objective, and cross-jurisdictional analysis 
of the legal ethics codes. 
A third gap in the literature is a lack of understanding of the various, and 
sometimes, conflicting duties and loyalties of the legal professional when engaged in 
negotiations.  As Lerman argued, and this is even more relevant today, the 
fundamental profit motivation of today’s law firms and legal practitioners in general 
is not necessarily reflected in the traditional model of lawyer-client relations upon 
which the regulatory codes are based.564  This profit motivation may likely conflict 
with a preferred ‘unity of interest’ between the lawyer’s motivation and the client’s 
objectives.  This conflict, then, may provide ample fuel for legal professionals to 
consider using deception in carrying out their duties.  From an economic standpoint, it 
must be duly recognised that the client pays for the services and it is not unreasonable 
to expect the lawyer to work on the client’s behalf or hold a duty of loyalty to the 
client at a premium relative to his/her duty to the courts, the justice system and the 
public interest should there be a conflict.  Perhaps it is precisely because of the 
economic implications, not to mention the livelihood of the legal professional, that a 
deeper and more comprehensive analysis of these duties might aid the profession and 
the public in reconciling the nature of professional ethics obligations and societal 
ethics obligations. 
A final gap in the literature worth noting relates to a better and clearer 
understanding of how to measure whether a negotiation is successful and whether the 
use or non-use of deception plays a significant role in the perception of a successful 
negotiation.  This issue is important for several reasons.  First, lawyers appear to 
                                                 
564 Lerman, above n 60, 671-675. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 158 -  9-Aug-10 
engage in successful negotiations every day as a regular part of their work and they 
appear to successfully conclude deals on a variety of levels, which are then 
acknowledged and enforced by the courts.  If deception by lawyers is as rampant and 
egregious as some would contend, then it would seem that there would be less 
demand for lawyer services, fewer deals being made, or negotiated agreements would 
frequently collapse.  The counterargument may be that a lawyer’s use of deception is 
rampant and egregious but clients are easily manipulated and the self-regulating 
profession does not, in fact, effectively regulate such conduct.  Even where the 
literature discusses the ‘success’ of a negotiation in terms of ‘efficiency’, ‘the good 
outcome’, the strategic use of lies, getting an agreement (any agreement) or even the 
absence of having used deception (and thus an ‘ethical’ negotiation), there is no 
consensus on objective criteria which would provide a sound basis for assessing all 
negotiations.  Whether it is necessary to subject a largely self-regulated process such 
as negotiations to such analysis is arguable.  However, some objective criteria may 
provide a foundation from which to test a hypothesis that the use of deception in 
negotiations, whether by lawyers or non-lawyers, is so negligible as to not be worth 
the worry and on-going debate over lawyers being unethical and deceptive in 
negotiations, at least at a level higher than normal as compared with judges, business 
people, or society in general.  One must at least be open to the possibility that we, as a 
society and a profession, are ‘making a mountain out of a molehill’ and that continued 
judgment against the profession, without some reasonable and objective research, 
only serves to denigrate the profession and those who would pursue the noble intent 
and goals of the profession. 
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In the context of this thesis, I attempt to address at least three of these gaps 
through the research questions outlined in Chapter 1.  First, in addressing the first 
research question of whether lawyers engage in deceptive conduct in negotiations, I 
review the existing literature and research to develop a catalogue of potentially 
deceptive behaviours by lawyers, especially in negotiation.  In addition, I examine the 
possible excuses or sources used by lawyers to justify deceptive conduct, especially in 
negotiations.565  The results are then used to focus on answering the second research 
question.  
The second research question is related to how the legal ethics codes, a key 
source of both acceptable and impermissible lawyer conduct, affect the use of 
deception in negotiation.  In order to answer the second research question, I take a 
deeper look at the relationship between societal ethics, bargaining ethics, and legal 
ethics to determine whether they might be incongruent and whether this may impact 
the legal professional’s use of deception in negotiation. This analysis involves a cross-
jurisdictional analysis of the legal ethics codes of a select group of common-law 
jurisdictions.566  The purpose of this study is to determine whether and how each 
jurisdiction’s legal ethics code regulates the use of deception in negotiations and 
whether they address negotiations at all.  The results of this analysis provide insight 
into answering the third research question. 
The third research question analyses whether the legal ethics code, which 
serve as the primary regulatory mechanism by which lawyers’ conduct is controlled, 
are successful in regulating deception in negotiation.  In order to address the third 
                                                 
565 See Chapter 3 (Alleged Deceptive Behaviours of Lawyers) for more information. 
566 See Chapter 4 (Efforts by Professional Ethics Codes to Regulate Deceptive Behaviours in 
Negotiation) for more information. 
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research question, I conduct an original analysis of the legal ethics violation cases in 
one particular common-law jurisdiction to see whether cases involving deception in 
negotiation are prosecuted and how they are decided under the jurisdiction’s legal 
ethics codes.567   
The combined findings and insights from each of the research questions leads 
to the conclusion that the profession would benefit from a set of strategic policy 
reforms to address the complex, multidimensional issue of deception in negotiation.  
These integrated policy reform proposals are the focus of the final research question 
and are outlined in Chapter 7.   
In summary, through the four research questions and the contribution they 
make to the field, this thesis provides a significant contribution to effective policy 
reforms as well as a more stable foundation and analytical framework for 
understanding this important yet understudied area of these interrelated disciplines of 
law, ethics, and negotiation.  
2.7 CHAPTER COCLUSIO 
This chapter provided a comprehensive discussion and analysis of existing 
literature in the central research areas of this thesis.  Commencing with a discussion of 
competing perspectives and existing theoretical frameworks impacting the relevant 
areas of research, this chapter established a conceptual framework for the proposed 
research questions.  Next, a synthesis of the literature review was followed by a 
critical analysis of existing published scholarly research in light of the proposed 
research questions.  This included a discussion of the major findings, strengths, 
weaknesses and potential gaps in the existing literature.  Finally, this chapter 
                                                 
567 See Chapter 5 (The Success of Professional Ethics Codes in Controlling Lawyers’ Deceptive 
Behaviour) for more information. 
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concluded with a discussion of how this thesis addresses some of these gaps and 
provides a valuable, original contribution to the existing body of research whilst 
recommending an integrated set of strategic policy reform proposals to address the 
issues highlighted by the literature review and analysis of the research questions. 
The next chapter begins to look more closely at the first research question, 
namely whether lawyers use deception in negotiation and the justifications for such 
behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 3 –  
ALLEGED DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOURS OF LAWYERS 
 
 
‘I do not see why we should not come out roundly and say that one of 
the functions of a lawyer is to lie for his client....’ 
 
      ~ Charles P Curtis
568
 
 
This chapter discusses the results of the research findings related to the first 
research questions, namely whether lawyers engage in alleged deceptive behaviour, 
especially in negotiation.  First, this chapter presents the results of qualitative research 
on the ways in which some lawyers appear to deceive clients.  This chapter also 
identifies how lawyers might attempt to justify potential deceptive behaviours.  This 
chapter concludes with a brief discussion of insights gained from the results and 
analysis of this first research question, insights which form the basis of recommending 
the policy reform proposals outlined in Chapter 7. 
3.1 ITRODUCTIO 
Chapter 1 established the research questions and hypotheses.  The research 
questions are aimed at addressing the following issues:  1) the types of potentially 
deceptive behaviours that lawyers might use; 2) attempts by professional ethics codes 
to control such behaviour in negotiations; and 3) whether attempts to control 
deceptive behaviour in negotiations through professional ethics codes are successful.  
                                                 
568
 Curtis, above n 246, 3. See also Alan M Dershowitz, The Best Defense (1982) (stating that “lying, 
distortion and other forms of intellectual dishonesty are endemic among judges...the courtroom oath – 
‘to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’ – is applicable only to witnesses.  Defense 
attorneys, prosecutors and judges don’t take this oath.  They couldn’t!” Dershowitz was also highly 
critical of some prosecutors in Manhattan, stating that “prepared to close their eyes to perjury; to distort 
the truth; and to engage in cover-ups - all in the name of defending society from the obviously guilty.”).   
One of the central and ongoing issues of the legal profession which is now really a turning point for the 
profession is whether times have changed or whether they should change with respect to this perception 
and consistent view of lawyers and how to go about affecting that change. 
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The results of addressing these issues leads towards the recommendation for a 
strategic set of policy reforms as outlined in Chapter 7.     
The first research question addresses the types of deceptive behaviours that 
lawyers might engage in as alleged by scholars, the public, and other lawyers.  As 
discussed previously, legal professionals, even today, are perceived negatively among 
the public it is meant to serve.
569
  As a quick summary, a 2002 survey in the United 
States found that only 19% of Americans surveyed were “very” or “extremely 
confident” about US lawyers and the US legal profession, the second lowest rating 
behind the media in US consumer confidence.
570
  A 2003 study in Australia
571
 as well 
as the Australian Law Reform Commission’s review of the profession indicates a 
similar lack of confidence with the Australian legal system.
572
    
Interestingly enough, in addressing the first research questions, the results of 
the qualitative research appears to demonstrate a consistency with the 2002 American 
Bar Association study mentioned above with respect to US lawyers and the legal 
profession.  As discussed in various sections of Chapter 2, research into actual 
negotiation behaviour of legal professionals is marred by process, methodological and 
institutional obstacles, not the least of which is the attorney-client privilege, duties of 
loyalty and time pressures which accompany the practice of law.  There are very few 
valid, statistically significant, and therefore trustworthy studies regarding the 
                                                 
569
 See Chapter 6, Section 6.5 (Studies of the Legal Profession Recommend Change) for more 
discussion on this topic.  See also W William Hodes, ‘Truthfulness and Honesty Among American 
Lawyers: Perception, Reality, and the Professional Reform Initiative’ (2002) 53 South Carolina Law 
Review 527, 528-530 (citing various US sources that confirm the declining public trust in lawyers and 
the legal profession). 
570
 American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Public Perception of Lawyers:  Consumer 
Research Findings, above n 13, 6. 
571
 Dasey, above n 13 (“The judiciary attracted confidence from just 15per cent of people, less than vets 
(43per cent), teachers (34per cent), scientists (27per cent) and local shopkeepers (20per cent).”) 
572
 Discussion Paper 62, above n 560, 3.  
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potentially deceptive or manipulative practices of legal professionals. This is true for 
the United States as well as Australia as discussed in this thesis.  However, anecdotal 
data is available which sheds some light on whether lawyers engage in deceptive 
behaviours, especially in negotiations.  The following sections describe and discuss 
the results of these anecdotal studies as reported mainly by scholars in the United 
States and Australia.  The most important point to take away from these studies is that 
lawyers do appear to engage in deceptive conduct in practice, including in negotiation, 
such that the topic of deception in negotiation is still ripe for research.  These results 
are adapted from the findings and analyses of Lerman (1990),
573
 Wetlaufer (1990),
574
 
Krivis (2002),
575
 Pengilley (1993) and Davis (1994),
576
 legal scholars and 
practitioners who have undertaken the most detailed look at lawyers’ potentially 
deceptive behaviour.  Prior to discussing these studies, it is important to note that the 
findings of the studies are reflective of the attitudes and behaviours of lawyers within 
the study’s jurisdictional context and is not meant to be reflective of all lawyers across 
all jurisdictions.  However, it is also important to note that in the context of the 
common-law system that is the focus of this thesis, the tasks of non-transactional 
lawyers is similar and these findings may be extrapolated as applying across common-
law jurisdictions and ripe for further research.  The next section focuses on how 
lawyers might deceive clients, either intentionally or unintentionally.  
                                                 
573
 See Lerman, above n 60, 659. 
574
 See Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1219. 
575
 See Jeffrey Krivis, The Truth About Deception in Mediation (2002) 
<http://www.firstmediation.com/truthmed_p.htm> at 9 August 2010.  This article was also published in 
the 2002 edition of Alternatives, a newsletter by CPR. 
576
 See Warren Pengilley, ‘“But You Can’t Do That Anymore” – The Effect of Section 52 on Common 
Negotiating Techniques’ (1993) 1 Trade Practices Law Journal 113-129. 
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3.2 LAWYERS DECEIVIG CLIETS 
One of the major areas where lawyers tend to engage in potentially deceptive 
conduct is with and on behalf of their clients.  To some degree this is not surprising as 
the majority of legal ethics codes discussed in this thesis, while expressly prohibiting 
deception and misleading conduct with other practitioners and third parties, do not 
contain explicit rules on such behaviour with clients or in the context of negotiation.   
One of the most detailed analyses of how lawyers might be deceptive is 
Lerman’s anecdotal study in the United States.  Lerman conducted a small, anecdotal 
study on ways in which lawyers reported lying to clients or other lawyers.
577
  Of 
special mention is that these findings are reports from US lawyers directly, who 
readily admit that they engage in such conduct as a normal and acceptable part of 
legal practice.  The results of Lerman’s study are presented in the table below, 
followed by a discussion of key insights. 
Table 3.1:  Lawyer Deceiving Clients (Lerman 1990)
578
 
 
Note:  The following is a summary chart of the findings of Lerman’s 1990 small and 
informal anecdotal study on ways in which US lawyers say they deceive clients. 
Categories and behaviours are as described by Lerman to ensure accuracy and clarity.  
 
Category / Sub-category Deceptive Behaviour 
1.  Billing 
Doing non-essential work 
– running the meter (then 
billing for it) 
 Perform unnecessary work then billing client for it; 
 Inflate or cut the amount of work depending on 
client’s resources; 
 “…most common [type of deception], by far, is 
‘make work’ that the client pays for but didn’t lead 
very directly to the result.”; 
 Lawyer’s discretion on how to approach work means 
the same work can cost very different amounts; 
 Lawyer’s pecuniary interests are affected by 
                                                 
577
 Lerman, above n 60, 703-705. 
578
 Adapted from Lerman’s 1990 anecdotal study.  See Lerman, above n 60, 659.  Note: Lerman 
indicated that many of these findings are from law firms and that the law firm environment tends to 
encourage such deception. 
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Category / Sub-category Deceptive Behaviour 
settlement advice to clients, especially in contingent 
fee cases; 
 “…more likely that a lawyer would attempt to 
deceive a client into continued litigation, including 
trial, by inflating the client’s chances of success.” 
Padding bills and double 
billing 
 inflating or padding bills of wealthy clients… 
“deception, to the tune of tens of thousands”; 
 “…I generally bill as much as I can to the richest 
client [and under bill] clients who can’t afford 
standard rates…” 
 bill for more hours than actually worked;
579
 
 billing to clients for the same work; 
 fabricating hours worked;
580
 
 removing monies from trust account and then 
fabricating the record to conceal from client; 
 double-billing in order to meet minimum billable 
hours; 
 knowing answer to client’s question but not telling 
client, doing unnecessary research and then billing 
the client for it…. “a pure case of lying, cheating, and 
stealing…”; 
 under billing clients who are ‘friends’ 
 
Meeting minimum firm 
hours requirement 
 billing hours not actually worked to meet firm 
minimum requirements; 
 ‘fudge’ hours worked to meet minimum when there 
is not enough work to meet the minimum hours 
standard 
Premium billing / 
itemization 
 ‘premium billing’ (especially in law firms) certain 
clients – “adding substantial sums to the bill based on 
a subjective determination of the value of the 
work”
581
 
 using hours as a minimum and then premium billing 
to take advantage of ‘information imbalances’ 
 sending non-specific or non-itemized bills to 
discourage questions; 
 concealing the firm’s billing ‘multiplier’ on the bill 
but not informing client about it. 
 
                                                 
579
 Fortney, above n 382, 239 (discussing Lerman’s study and concurring with Lerman’s findings on 
this topic). 
580
 Ibid. 
581
 Lerman, above n 60, 714.  See also W William Hodes, ‘Conference on Legal Ethics: “What Needs 
Fixing?”: Cheating Clients with the Percentage-of-the-Gross Contingent Fee Scam’ (2002) 30 Hofstra 
Law Review 767, 767-773 (describing a deceptive billing practice used by some contingent fee 
lawyers). 
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Category / Sub-category Deceptive Behaviour 
Non-contemporaneous 
records 
 failing to keep accurate record of time worked – 
“…perhaps the most prevalent deceptive billing 
practice among the lawyers…” 
 “small amounts of time often get fudged”; 
 forgetting about actual time worked and charging 
more if lawyer feels client can afford it 
Charging clients for perks, 
leisure, and admin time 
 billing clients for time spent on non-legal activities 
and expenses not related to that client’s case; 
 billing clients for admin tasks necessary for effective 
case management (not clear if this is deceptive or 
not) 
Explaining the bill  when client challenges the bill, “the lawyer often 
buttresses one lie with another.” (many times due to 
minimum firm billing requirements); 
 “cloak the firm’s practices by offering client 
incomplete answers”; 
 “duplicitous interaction with the client” and 
manipulating an associate to deliver the information 
thus being dishonest with the associate as well 
 
2.  Bringing in Business 
Exaggeration of expertise  overstate experience or expertise of the firm or 
attorney (presumably to get the business) – consider 
this ‘puffing’ not lying; 
 billing clients (especially large clients) for ‘study 
time’ if new area of law or new for client; 
 “…engage in puffing by being intentionally vague 
about actual experience…” 
 deceive clients about extent of experience or access 
to influential people 
 failing to correct client’s incorrect impression about 
lawyer’s expertise or failing to offer complete 
information  
Business development  recommending clients need additional work when 
they might not – for own pecuniary interest 
 encouraging clients to file comments on proposed 
agency rules then billing client for them when may 
not be necessary or benefit the client 
3.  Covering Up Mistakes 
  failing to disclose mistakes for fear of losing client 
confidence; 
 concealing errors and not informing client; 
 procrastinating or doing mediocre work and still 
billing for it; not advising client; 
 failing to return phone calls quickly and making 
excuses for not calling client back; 
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Category / Sub-category Deceptive Behaviour 
 withholding documents from client so client would 
not see mediocre work; 
 the “more serious the error or oversight, the greater 
the incentive to conceal it”; 
 missing deadlines; sending documents to clients that 
contain errors of law or facts 
4.  Impressing Clients 
Who did the work  most common way in deceiving clients in this 
category is “precluding associates who did the work 
from signing documents sent to clients.” 
 Partners telling client they did the work when 
actually associate did the work; associate not given 
credit 
 Associate doing all the pre-trial work but partner 
doing trial and not telling client who did actual work 
so client can make informed decision 
Making work look easier 
or harder 
 Deceiving client about one’s availability or how long 
certain work will take; 
 Taking on more work than a lawyer can actually 
handle; 
 Making the work look harder than it is to impress 
client; 
 Inaccurately portraying negotiations so client gets 
impression that lawyer really “had to fight for it” to 
impress client 
 
Deception about what the 
law is / Value of case or 
lawyer’s fee 
 “…misstatements of the intent of the law is…one of 
the most prevalent and odious forms of deception in 
the legal business…”; (either lawyer lies to client 
about the law or client wants lawyer to misinterpret 
the law) 
 “lowballing” – “underestimating the value of the case 
so that the eventual settlement, compared to the 
original projection, looks favorable to the client.”
582
 
Strategic deception  withholding lawyers’ honest opinion of client to 
protect client;
583
 
 withhold information from client as part of strategy 
of courtroom presentation; 
 withhold information about certain tactics as part of 
lawyer’s discretion 
5.  Convenience and Control of Work Time 
When a client calls  using secretaries to convey ‘white lies’ to clients 
about availability of lawyer or whereabouts of 
                                                 
582
 Lerman, above n 60, 734. 
583
 See, eg, Menkel-Meadow, above n 19, 778-779 (discussing how lawyers might also deceive by 
silence and withholding information from the client). 
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Category / Sub-category Deceptive Behaviour 
lawyer; 
 lie about status of case or status of pending work; 
 failing to report to client on actions taken so as to 
retain greater control over case; 
 “lawyer uses deception to solve a problem even 
though there are truthful solutions to many of these 
problems.”
584
 
 
Progress reports on work  lying to client about status of certain tasks when 
client specifically asks even if not done to “keep the 
client satisfied” by having them think their work is 
being attended to; 
 Not reporting to clients certain aspects of their work 
– for example, “draw the line between substance and 
procedure”; 
Impact of workload on 
advice 
 Presenting a settlement offer to a client in a way to 
induce the client to take it because lawyer does not 
want to go to trial;
585
 
 Advising client to not file certain documents or 
comments because lawyer does not have time; not 
providing sufficient information so client can make 
informed decision 
6.  Impressing the Boss 
  Deceiving clients to make a good impression on the 
partner/boss – increase chances of promotion or 
avoid conflict; 
 Repeating misinformation; 
 Advising ‘yes’ to something a client wants to do 
instead of ‘no’ even when lawyer knows it is 
potentially illegal (especially in corporations where it 
is generally pro-business and lawyers are sometimes 
expected to go along); 
 Law firm and partner expectations that create an 
atmosphere where “nobody tells the truth” 
 Using deception to mediate a conflict between 
supervisor’s expectations and client’s interests 
 “the demands of a paying client came before the 
ethical demands of the profession” (re a pro bono 
case) 
 
                                                 
584
 Lerman, above n 60, 739 (Some lawyers in Lerman’s study indicated that sometimes these 
potentially harmful lies were the result of the pressure to stay on top of things and that clients have 
unrealistic expectations or don’t understand law practice.). 
585
 See, eg, Menkel-Meadow, above n 19, 777 (discussing these types of deceptions where lawyers 
might fail to disclose risks and benefits of lawsuits and encourage settlement despite the client’s best 
interest). 
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Table 3.1 identifies six major categories of deceptive behaviour as reported by 
US practicing lawyers.  Lerman’s study identifies the types of deceptive behaviours 
that lawyers engage in with clients.  Because lawyers tend to serve multiple clients at 
the same time and have to juggle duties to the client, the courts, opposing lawyers, 
and the public, lawyers could be said to engage in mini-negotiations of all the various 
tasks required to handle a client’s case.  In the course of zealous representation of the 
client, the lawyer-client relationship is, in itself, a negotiation of communicating and 
completing key tasks to resolve the dispute.  This is likely more prevalent and true 
where the lawyer-client relationship model is based on the revisionist model which 
argues for adherence to principles of client autonomy, client-centred practice and 
informed consent.
586
  Lawyer-client relationships under the revisionist model expose 
the lawyer to community expectations of such relationships interspersed, and 
sometimes in competition with, the legal profession’s expectations based on an 
adversarial model.  Such relationships would also involve greater interaction and 
communication with the client.  As a result, the lawyer may need to provide more 
explanations and justifications, which can create an environment conducive to certain 
types of deception because of a lawyer’s profit motivation, the economics underlying 
the lawyer-client relationship or  because clients do not always understand what 
lawyers do or why.
587
 
                                                 
586
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.8 (Theories of Lawyer-Client Relationships and Legal Negotiation) for a 
detailed discussion on theories of lawyer-client relationships. 
587
 See eg, Linda Haller, ‘Solicitors’ Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000:  A Statistical 
Analysis’ (2001) 13.1 Bond Law Review 1; Linda Haller, ‘Disciplinary Fines:  Deterrence or 
Retribution?’ (2002) 5 Legal Ethics 152; Leslie C Levin, ‘Building a Better Lawyer Discipline System:  
The Queensland Experience’ (2006) 9(2) Legal Ethics 187-210 (discussing that in many cases lawyers 
may lie or clients may complain simply because they don’t understand the nature of how lawyers must 
work within the legal system). 
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 Lerman’s study was targeted towards lawyer deception of clients and was 
based on anecdotal data in the form of stories used to describe situations where a 
lawyer might engage in deception of clients, especially within an economic context.  
Shaffer supports Lerman’s use of stories as adding value to the ethics discussion.
588
  
Lerman’s study is important when looking at future policy reforms as discussed in 
Chapter 7 because the study confirms that lawyers do engage in deception, that such 
behaviour has a negative impact on clients, and that the behaviour is, in part, the result 
of a possible gap in the legal ethics codes, the way lawyers are taught to practice 
through legal education, anddriven by the demands of the legal profession.   
Menkel-Meadow concurs with many of Lerman’s findings and supports 
Lerman’s study as raising important questions about the ability of legal ethics codes to 
prohibit lawyers from lying to their clients.
589
  However, Menkel-Meadow argues that 
Lerman’s study does not fully address a number of issues in the US related to lawyers 
lying outside the ‘market model of lawyering’.
590
  These situations involve those that 
occur in private practice but may not have a direct impact on the client,
591
 including, 
but are not limited to, misrepresentation of expertise or experience, failure to disclose 
mistakes made in the work product, and questionable arrests made by a district 
attorney who is seeking public office in order to gain publicity.
592
  Menkel-Meadows 
                                                 
588
 Thomas L Shaffer, ‘On Lying for Clients’ (1996) 71 -otre Dame Law Review 195, 196-197, 203-
204 (discussing Lerman’s study and the use of stories as an important part of understanding and 
discussing ethics). 
589
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 19, 761-762 (providing a brief summary of Lerman’s findings and 
recommendations). 
590
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 19, 763-764 (referring to Professor Lerman’s analysis as based on the 
recognition that law is a business while Menkel-Meadow discusses the topic from law as a profession 
outside of the market-based view). 
591
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 19, 775-777 (distinguishing lawyer lying scenarios in public or non-
market lawyering from those in fee-for-service lawyering). 
592
 Ibid.  Some of these are addressed in Lerman’s findings as related to its impact on clients. 
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recommends  a golden rule of candour for these types of scenarios
593
 as well as other 
types of lies that lawyers might use outside of a competitive market model of legal 
services.
594
   
Despite some criticisms, Lerman’s study provides a foundation from which to 
draw some conclusions, one being that more in-depth exploratory research would be 
beneficial in identifying additional situations where lawyers might engage in 
deception and confirming Lerman’s findings.
595
  These comments also support the 
view that US lawyers do appear to engage in deception and that such deception is 
likely exacerbated by a competitive and global market economy for legal services. 
While Lerman’s study was targeted towards lawyer deception of clients, these 
behaviours can be extrapolated to apply to similar deceptions that may occur between 
lawyers, meaning that just as a lawyer might deceive a client regarding the status of a 
case, billing, settlement negotiation offers and expertise, lawyers may deceive each 
other and their opponents along the same lines or be tempted to deceive the court in 
furtherance of their client’s case under the guise of zealous representation.  As such, 
Lerman’s findings have value in confirming that lawyers themselves acknowledge the 
use of various forms of potentially deceptive behaviours.   
3.3 LAWYERS JUSTIFYIG DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOUR 
In addition to Lerman’s informal research, Wetlaufer conducted an informal 
study of US lawyers’ behaviours and the justifications that some US lawyers give for 
engaging in deceptive conduct.  The following table contains results adapted and 
                                                 
593
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 19, 770-774 (‘Lawyers should reveal to their clients that which they 
would want revealed to them if they were clients.’). 
594
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 19, 775-779. See also Terry, above n 548 (discussing the impact of 
lawyers being seen as service providers rather than professionals).  
595
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 19, 778-779 (‘We need an exploratory study in this field, as Professor 
Lerman has done in the market context, before we can fully canvass the issues.’). 
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extracted from Wetlaufer’s findings of ways in which lawyers appear to excuse, 
justify, or explain deceptive behaviours in negotiations. 
Table 3.2:  Catalogue of Statements and Justifications for Deceptive Conduct by 
Lawyers (Wetlaufer 1990)
596
 
 
Note:  The following is a summary chart of the findings of Wetlaufer’s 1990 US 
informal study on ways in which lawyers justify that lying is permissible in 
negotiation.
597
  Categories and behaviours are as described by Wetlaufer to ensure 
accuracy and clarity. 
 
Category Sample Statements/Explanations 
“I didn’t lie”  "I didn't lie because I didn't engage in the requisite act 
or omission"; 
 "I didn't mean to do anything that can be described as 
lying"; “I did not have the requisite intent.” 
 "I didn't lie because what I said was, in some way, 
literally true"; 
 "I can't have lied because I was speaking on some 
subject about which there is no 'truth"'; and  
 “I didn't lie, I merely put matters in their best light."; 
“strategic speaking” that is part of art of “lawyering” 
“I lied, if you insist on 
calling it that, but it 
was…” 
 it was not ethically impermissible; 
 there is no general duty of disclosure; 
 everybody does it (i.e. lie about this type of matter) 
“I lied but it was legal.”  "I may have lied but it was ethically permissible 
because it was not legally forbidden." 
“I lied but it was on an 
ethically permissible 
subject.”
598
 
 lie about property that is subject matter of a 
transaction; 
 it was only about strength of a cause of action; 
 lie about those subjects about which their adversary 
could have or should have known the truth; 
 it was only an opinion; 
 it was ‘internal’ to the negotiations (e.g. Interests, 
authority, priorities, etc) not subject to disclosure; 
 it was about reservation price (i.e. acceptable 
deception) 
“I lied but it had little or  it was only a ‘white lie’;
599
 
                                                 
596
 See generally Wetlaufer, above n 31. 
597
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1235-1236 (making the distinction between law and ethics; arguing that 
simply because the rules of legal ethics may permit deception does not mean it is ethically permissible). 
598
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1243 (“It is in the nature of law that it will not, indeed cannot, undertake to 
prohibit all forms of bad conduct. In any event, the fact that some of these lies will not support a suit 
for civil remedies, standing alone, is no indication that we regard these lies as ethically permissible.”). 
599
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1243 (describing ‘white lie’ as those purpose is said to “only to smooth the 
seas, to grease the wheels of discourse and commerce, perhaps to create the illusion of relationship 
where none really exists, and, in these ways, to enhance the possibility of agreement.”). 
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Category Sample Statements/Explanations 
no effect.”  using “I can’t” instead of “I don’t want to” even when 
you can accept an offer and is within authorized limit 
 it was ‘puffing’ or ‘immaterial’;
600
 
 lie was not believed; 
 lie was believed but later discovered so not a lie; 
 lie had no effect on the outcome 
“I lied, but it was justified 
by the very nature of 
things [negotiations]…” 
 “lying is necessary and useful in negotiations” 
 “lying is within the rules of the game”
601
 
“I lied but it was justified 
by the nature of my 
relationship to the 
victim….” 
 lying is justified by the relationship of the parties to 
process (e.g., criminal pleads not guilty to invoke 
state’s need to prove conduct even though he knows 
he’s guilty; parties to negotiation claim they can lie as 
a matter of right because of rules of the game); 
 
 rules of litigation and partisan interests of client permit 
certain lies or deceptions 
 
“I lied, but it was justified 
by the special ethics of 
lawyering…” 
 lawyers’ special duties of loyalty and zealous 
representation mean it is “therefore ethically 
permissible, or even ethically mandatory, for lawyers 
to tell lies on behalf of their clients.”
602
 
 Lawyer’s duty to client means that a "lawyer is 
required to be disingenuous."
603
 
 Lawyer’s duty to preserve confidences of client means 
he may lie in certain circumstances (e.g. lie to protect 
certain secrets in negotiations) 
“The lie belongs to 
someone else” 
 Lie is client’s lie and not responsibility of lawyer even 
though lawyer told it;  “the principle of 
                                                 
600
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1243 (saying that speakers who invoke this excuse are referring to those 
which the law regards as permissible and not actionable (citing Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 4.2, commentary at 89-90  (Discussion Draft 1980) (Chicago: American Bar Association))  
601
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1248 (discussing why this particular justification is not warranted because 
the ‘rule of the game’ with regards to negotiation are within the definition of bona fide rules which 
warrant credibility or compliance). 
602
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1255 (“In this form, the lawyers' duty to their clients entails an affirmative 
obligation to perform all lawful acts without regard to ethics.”). 
603
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1256 (quoting Harry T Edwards and James J White, Problems, Readings, 
and Materials on the Lawyer as -egotiator (1977) 373-89, 378.).  See also Curtis, above n 246, 3-23 
(saying that “ ... one of the functions of a lawyer is to lie for his client.”); Arthur Applebaum, 
‘Professional Detachment: The Executioner of Paris’ (1995) 109 Harvard Law Review 458, 486 
(“Lawyers…as serial liars and thieves. He would observe that lawyers - good lawyers – repeatedly try 
to induce others to believe in the truth of propositions or in the validity of arguments that they 
themselves do not believe, and he would observe that lawyers - again, good lawyers - often devote their 
skills to advancing the unjust ends of rapacious clients”); Evan Whitton, ‘Immoral ethics in an immoral 
system’ (2006) 64 Living Ethics 8 <http://www.ethics.org.au/about-ethics/ethics-centre-articles/living-
ethics-newsletter/pdfs/issue-64-article-1.pdf> at 9 August 2010 (discussing several quotes aimed at 
showing “how the concept of adversary ethics is based on a fallacy”). 
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Category Sample Statements/Explanations 
nonaccountability according to which lawyers are not 
accountable for the things their clients have done”
604
 
 ‘soldier’s excuse’ – that lawyer lied but it is 
permissible by rules so his lie is attributable ‘to the 
profession’ or the state or jurisdiction
605
 
“I lied because my 
opponent acted badly” 
 lie is justified as self-defence because of bad acts of 
opponent; 
 lie is justified as means to offset the effects of 
opponents’ lies; 
 lie is justified as punishment or retaliation for the lies 
of another in order to teach him/her a lesson; 
 "my lie was justified because my adversary has 
forfeited his right to honest treatment."
606
 
 “but for my adversary’s error or incompetence, my lie 
would have caused no harm.” (i.e. I lied but it was my 
adversary’s error or incompetence which cause the 
harm, not my lie) 
‘I lied, but it was justified 
by good consequences” 
 “…lies are ethically permissible because they work to 
prevent a greater immorality.” (e.g., lying in 
negotiations with terrorists or lying in negotiations to 
ensure a more fair price, block a greater evil from 
occurring) 
 “lies are sometimes said to be justified by the good 
they may produce” (e.g., “"I need money for my 
child's operation and that's all the justification I need.") 
 
Wetlaufer’s informal study on ways in which lawyers in the US justify the use 
of deceptive behaviour in negotiation is important for two primary reasons.  First, the 
sample statements and justifications highlight the paradox that sometimes exists 
between ethics in the general philosophical sense (or social ethics),
607
 the rule-based 
ethics of the legal system as codified in the legal ethics codes, and the bargaining 
                                                 
604
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1263-1264. 
605
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1265 (asserting with regards to this excuse that “[t]he state has neither 
compelled nor expressly permitted them to lie. The most that the lawyers can say is that certain lies 
have not been prohibited.”). 
606
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1268 (The golden rule is "do unto others as you would have them do unto 
you;" it is not "do as you believe, or fear, they may be doing to you."). 
607
 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion on the various philosophical models of ethics.  See also 
Graham, above n 138. 
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ethics of the negotiating world.
608
  In reviewing the statements and justifications 
above, it seems clear that lawyers are willing to admit that under all general notions of 
what is right and wrong (meaning as compared with society’s general view), 
deception is clearly not appropriate while, at the same time, arguing that deception is 
permissible under the legal ethics codes.   
The rule-based ethics of the legal profession permits lying in some 
circumstances under the guise of zealous representation or due to the lawyer’s role in 
society.  Such statements and justifications clearly reinforce the standard conception 
of the lawyer’s role with its dual principles of non-accountability and partisanship that 
has been widely discussed and debated.
609
  In other words, while society in general 
may condemn deception,
610
 lawyers are constantly thrust into gray areas where 
societal notions of right and wrong collide with the legal system’s obligation to 
zealous representation of clients, delivering justice, and protecting the public interest 
using the various, sometimes conflicting and inconsistent, rules under which the legal 
system operates.
611
   
Many of the justifications for the use of deception point directly to the 
lawyer’s understanding or perception of acceptable conduct under these professional 
ethics rules of the legal system, even if the rules do not explicitly allow such conduct.  
The justifications lawyers use for using deception as they relate to the legal ethics 
rules include:  1) there was no intent to lie; 2) it was not ethically impermissible to lie; 
                                                 
608
 See Chapter 2 (Review of Literature) for a more detailed discussion on bargaining ethics. 
609
 See Chapter 2 for a more extensive discussion on the standard conception of lawyers.  See also 
Parker and Evans, above n 156, 14; Luban, above n 157. 
610
 This is debatable.  See, eg, Lakhani, above n 7 (discussing the various interpretations on the 
morality or legality of lying). 
611
 See, eg, Levin, above n 587, 196 (“Lawyers are unquestionably engaged in a business, but they are 
not the same as the businesses of car salesmen or shopkeepers.  Lawyers have competing ethical duties 
to the courts, to their clients and to the public. They are paid to make complex judgment calls every 
day.”) 
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3) it was ‘strategic speak’ or ‘lawyer talk’ and therefore acceptable; 4) there is no duty 
of disclosure; 5) it was only ‘puffing’; and 6) lying is permissible within the rules of 
the game.
612
 
Second, the statements and justifications in Wetlaufer’s findings highlight the 
extent to which acceptable forms of deception under conventional negotiation practice 
have crept into the lexicon and practice of lawyer negotiations.  On the one hand, 
legal ethics codes generally condemn any form of deception in any forum, including 
negotiations.
613
  On the other hand, negotiation theory and principles readily 
acknowledge, and sometimes expect, that deception is part of the negotiations 
‘dance’.
614
  In addition, most legal ethics codes are silent with respect to how lawyers 
should act when they negotiate or silent on the extent to which negotiation is a distinct 
role of lawyers.
615
  This silence has as much impact on lawyer behaviour as rules 
which explicitly tell lawyers what is acceptable or unacceptable in other areas of legal 
practice.  Therefore, if lawyers engage in the process of negotiation, it would seem 
that they must, by way of being immersed in the ‘culture of negotiation’ combined 
with the lack of explicit guidance in  the ethics codes, be forced to use certain forms 
of deception if they are to be successful in the zealous representation of their 
clients.
616
   
                                                 
612
 Wetlaufer, above n 31. 
613
 See Chapter 4 (Efforts by Professional Ethics Codes to Regulate Deceptive Behaviours in 
Negotiation) for more information on a comparative analysis of select common-law legal ethics codes. 
614
 Note: The term negotiations ‘dance’ is used synonomously with thinking of negotiations as a game 
or a process where certain conduct, such as deception is expected and accepted as normal.  See, eg, 
Wendi L Adair and Jeanne M Brett, ‘The Negotiation Dance: Time, Culture, and Behavioural 
Sequences in Negotiation’ (2005) 16(1) Organization Science 33-51 (discussing the negotiation 
‘dance’ across various cultures). 
615
 See Chapter 4 (Efforts by Professional Ethics Codes to Regulate Deceptive Behaviours in 
Negotiation) for more information on a comparative analysis of select common-law legal ethics codes. 
616
 See, eg, White, above n 60; But see Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1243 (arguing that all forms of deception 
are lying and should not be condoned). 
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Wetlaufer’s study points to numerous statements made by lawyers, which are 
used to justify the use of deception as acceptable under prevailing negotiation theory 
and principles. These statements include:  1) everybody does it; 2) it is not legally 
forbidden; 3) it was ‘internal’ to negotiations so it is acceptable; 4) lying is necessary 
and useful in negotiations; and 5) it is part of the rules of negotiation. 
The findings of Wetlaufer’s article seem to allude to the tensions between 
what is ethically permissible under the legal ethics codes, what is legally forbidden, 
and what is expected under generally accepted conventions of negotiation practice.  
Understanding these potentially conflicting sets of guidance on negotiation behaviour 
is critical to determining whether the rules of legal ethics can ever be successful in 
managing the deceptive behaviours of legal professionals in negotiation. 
3.4 DECEPTIO I EGOTIATIO AD PERSOAL IJURY 
A third source of research on the potentially deceptive behaviours of legal 
professionals in negotiations is Davis’ 1994 Australian survey of the beliefs and 
attitudes of personal injury solicitors in Queensland, Australia regarding negotiation 
behaviour.
617
  The table below shows some of these potentially deceptive behaviours 
followed by a discussion of key insights to consider from Davis’ study.  
Table 3.3:  Potentially Deceptive Behaviours of Personal Injury Lawyers in 
egotiation (Davis 1994)
618
 
 
Note:  The following is a summary chart of Davis’ view of the potentially deceptive 
behaviours or statements used by personal injury lawyers in Australia based on his 
1994 study. 
 
Deceptive Behaviour / Statement 
 Misrepresent the strength of your position – to get a good or better negotiated 
result; 
                                                 
617
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.5 (Research About Lawyers’ Bargaining Behaviour) for an in-depth 
discussion of Davis’ study. 
618
 Adapted from Davis, above n 126.   
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Deceptive Behaviour / Statement 
 
 Deliberately delay cases – to increase the financial pressure on plaintiffs so that 
they become more willing to settle; 
 
 Always exaggerate an offer, saying it’s your ‘final offer’ 
 
 
Davis’ findings are specific to personal injury solicitors in Queensland, 
Australia.  His findings on the extent to which personal injury lawyers feel they can 
use potentially deceptive negotiation behaviours seems consistent with adherence to 
acceptable forms of deception as understood or perceived through the legal ethics 
codes, customary negotiation practice, or negotiation theory and principles.
619
  Davis’ 
study found that less than 50% of the respondents actually agreed that such potentially 
deceptive behaviours were acceptable or necessary.  However, in the context of 
personal injury negotiations, a substantial number of both plaintiff and defendant 
lawyers seem to condone some form of deception to further their client’s interests, 
possibly in contravention of the rules of legal ethics in the prevailing jurisdiction.
620
 
One conclusion from Davis’ study could be that where duty ethics (e.g. law or  
legal rules) collide with community ethics (e.g. negotiation conventions) or even end-
result ethics (e.g. zealous representation of clients), lawyers seem to feel that the rules 
of legal ethics sometimes must bow to prevailing negotiation ethics which condone 
certain forms of deception.  For example, in Davis’ study, the prevailing rules forbid 
any form of deception in practice.  However, the results of Davis’ study indicate that 
                                                 
619
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2 (Deception as a Negotiation Strategy) for more information.  The 
findings in this study are also consistent with those of Lerman and Wetlaufer on the behaviour of 
lawyers in the United States. 
620
 See, eg, Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) and the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 (Qld) 
(‘Statement of general principle’) which basically do not condone deception in any form and do not 
have exceptions the use of deception in negotiation.  In this case, personal injury solicitors in this study 
are following customary negotiation practice because the ethics codes do not explicitly forbid the use 
of deception in negotiation. 
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personal injury solicitors in Queensland do engage in some form of deception as they 
find it necessary to do so in order to zealously and successfully represent their clients 
in personal injury matters.  This demonstrates a potential clash between expected 
conduct under the legal ethics codes for all solicitors (no deception allowed) and the 
type of negotiation behaviour expected of personal injury lawyers in the same 
jurisdiction (some deception allowed).   
As Davis point out in discussing the negotiation behaviour of personal injury 
lawyers in Queensland, Australia, ‘many assert that there is a difference between 
exaggeration, misrepresentation, and deception.’
621
  It appears that because personal 
injury lawyers in Queensland perceive a difference, they condone such practices even 
when the legal ethics rules of the Queensland jurisdiction make no such exceptions for 
possible deception in negotiation.
622
  This is an example of how overlapping and 
conflicting ethical standards can create an environment of acceptable yet unethical 
conduct within the legal profession, conduct which may go undetected and 
unpunished.    
While such conduct may not be punished or even be considered a minor 
offence, the behaviour does eventually impact lawyer-client and lawyer-lawyer 
relationships as well as the public’s perception of lawyers, the legal profession, and 
the way law is practiced.  As Menkel-Meadow argues, negotiation orientations can 
                                                 
621
 Davis, above n 126, 747 (This seems to imply that lawyers are either aware of the extent to which 
exaggeration and misrepresentation are permissible as part of negotiations or attempting to justify their 
actions whilst knowing they are not permissible.). 
622
 See, eg, Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) and the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 (Qld) 
(‘Statement of general principle’) which basically do not condone deception in any form and do not 
have exceptions the use of deception in negotiation. Cf Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), 
Rule 4.2, which actually appears to condone such behaviour as long as it is not to the degree of fraud. 
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affect negotiation results.
623
  In other words, one’s dominant negotiation style can 
impact the success or results of a negotiation as well as the perceptions about the 
negotiator.  For example, if a lawyer’s negotiation orientation is adversarial, the 
lawyer’s mindset is likely geared towards maximising individual gain at the expense 
of satisfying underlying needs.  In turn, this means that the lawyer’s behaviour is 
likely to be competitive, resulting in solutions which likely involve narrow 
compromises rather than creative solutions that address the problem holistically.
624
   
In sum, Davis’ study confirms the use of deception in personal injury 
negotiations among personal injury lawyers in Queensland, Australia.  In addition, 
this study highlights the need to address the extent to which an adversarial system 
implicitly encourages the use of deception in personal injury negotiations through a 
dominant negotiation orientation.  Another area of deception is negotiation is 
addressed under consumer protection laws such as the Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Cth) 
of Australia. 
3.5 ACTIOABLE DECEPTIO AD THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, 1974 (CTH) 
A fourth source information on the potentially deceptive behaviours of legal 
professionals in negotiations is Pengilley’s analysis of how s 52 of the Trade 
Practices Act, 1974 (Cth) (TPA)
625
 might affect eight (8) common negotiating 
                                                 
623
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 215, 759-760 (discussing ‘Orientation(RA)Mind-set(RA) Behavior(RA) 
Results’, a general model depicting the relationship between negotiation orientation (eg, adversarial) to 
negotiation results (e.g., narrow compromises)). 
624
 Ibid. 
625
 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 2 (stating the purpose as “to enhance the welfare of Australians 
through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for consumer protection.”).  See 
also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Professions and the Trade Practices Act 
(2010) 19-20 <http://www.accc.gov.a u/content/item.p html?itemld=926503&nodeld =71b6c165a 
bc78f1a60fOa 1643c9367&fn=Professions%20and%20the%20TPA.pdf> at 31 July 2010 (specifically 
reinforcing the obligation of the professions to refrain from deceptive and misleading conduct when 
dealing with clients).  This latter document is an updated document highlighting and reinforcing the 
application of the TPA on all professions in Australia, including the legal profession. 
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techniques of lawyers in Australia.  Pengilley’s perspective is about the potentially 
deceptive behaviour of legal professionals in Australia as viewed by the Trade 
Practices Act. 
The Trade Practices Act is akin to consumer protection legislation and is an 
important consideration in this chapter because it recognises some common legal 
negotiation behaviour, as found among Australian legal practitioners in this case, as 
potentially falling within the actionable categories of deception because the TPA’s 
view is that lawyers are engaged in the business of providing legal services to 
consumers and therefore are also subject to consumer protection laws.  
Table 3.4 shows a summary of certain negotiating techniques which may now 
be legally actionable under section 52 of the Trade Practices Act (Cth) followed by a 
discussion of key insights. 
Table 3.4:  Legally Actionable Deceptive Behaviour in egotiation under s 52 of 
Trade Practices Act (Pengilley 1993)
626
 
 
Note:  The following is a summary chart of the findings of Pengilley’s analysis of the 
impact of section 52 of the Trade Practices Act on eight common negotiating 
techniques.  The following chart indicates those practices which are considered 
actionable under s 52 and thus would be considered ‘illegal’ under s 52 of the Trade 
Practices Act.  Categories and behaviours are as described by Pengilley to ensure 
accuracy and proper credit. 
 
Category / Sub-category Deceptive Behaviour (Actionable Under s 52) 
Exaggerations and 
“Product Puff” 
 ‘puffing’ not actionable as not considered a 
representation; 
 Objective comments involve representation and are 
actionable (e.g., saying something is ‘the fastest’, 
‘the slowest’, ‘the heaviest’) because they can be 
objectively measured. 
Expressions of Opinion 
Claimed as “Opinion 
Only” 
 Negotiators claiming expertise but do not have such 
expertise – will be required to demonstrate and 
actionable if not found to be true; 
                                                 
626
 Adapted from Pengilley, above n 576, 113-129 (discussing the impact of Section 52 of the Trade 
Practices Act on making certain negotiation techniques illegal under the act as misleading or deceptive 
or likely to mislead or deceive). 
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Category / Sub-category Deceptive Behaviour (Actionable Under s 52) 
 Opinions stated which are not genuinely held or 
believed or have a basis upon rational grounds.
627
 
Silence or Lack of 
Disclosure 
 Half-truths – failing to disclose whole truth thus 
creating an erroneous impression is actionable;
628
 
 Actively concealing a fact that creates an impression 
that the fact does not exist is actionable; 
 Failing to correct a false statement thus implying the 
statement is true is actionable; 
 Failing to disclose facts when there is an obligation 
to do so in all circumstances is actionable 
 Not disclosing or correcting representations after a 
change of circumstances – actionable. 
 Continuing representations – if they become untrue, 
duty to correct representations from change in 
circumstances; if not corrected, then actionable as 
misleading or deceptive.
629
   
Disclaimers Limiting or 
Negating Misleading 
Representations 
 Making misleading statements or representations 
and then seeking to negate liability or negate the 
representations made via small print exclusions, 
general disclaimers, inconspicuous disclaimers or 
the like. 
Representations as to 
Financial Stability or 
Availability 
 Making statements/representations about a party’s 
ability to complete transactions or as to financial 
availability which is not accurate; overall impression 
created is what counts. 
Representations as to 
Particular Situation Post 
Agreement using ‘Side 
Letter’  
 Using side letters to conceal information from 
negotiating parties; side letters in and of themselves 
are not illegal and common in commercial 
transactions. 
                                                 
627
 See, eg, Stanton v A-Z Banking Group Ltd (1987) ATPR 40-755, at 48, 193 (holding that “[a] 
statement which involves the state of mind of the maker ordinarily conveys the meaning (expressly or 
by implication) that the maker of the statement had a particular state of mind when the statement was 
made and, commonly at least, that there was a basis for the state of mind.  If the meaning contained in 
or conveyed by the statement is false in that or any other respect, the making of the statement will have 
contravened s.52(1) of the Act.”).  In Stanton, a bank employee who offered an opinion (represented) 
that a certain person “would not do the dirty to anyone” when the person did in fact “do the dirty” was 
found not liable for misleading or deceptive conduct because “he believed what he said, the opinion 
given was genuinely held, and there was no reason to suggest that the opinion was incorrect.” 
628
 See, eg, McMahon v Pomeray Pty Ltd (The Balmain -ightclub Case) (1991) ATPR 41-125 (holding 
that “that silence may constitute misrepresentation and will do so if its effect is to convey half-truth.  If 
what is disclosed creates a half-truth, then there is an obligation to disclose the balance of the relevant 
factors so that the whole truth is available”. Here, the failure to disclose council’s limitation of hours 
constituted misleading or deceptive conduct.). 
629
 See, eg, Bikane v -etaf Pty Ltd (1988) ATPR (Digest) 46-041 (holding that “pre-incorporation 
misrepresentations are thus treated as having been made to the directors after incorporation if they are 
not corrected.  If post-incorporation directors are influenced by pre-incorporation misrepresentations 
[those not corrected] and the subsequently incorporated company enters into a contract to its detriment 
because of these misrepresentations, the subsequently incorporated company has an action under s.52 
in respect of the misrepresentations made.”). 
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Category / Sub-category Deceptive Behaviour (Actionable Under s 52) 
Representations as to 
Fictitious Prices or 
Fictitious Buyers 
 Making representations that there are other buyers 
for something when, in fact, there are not to pressure 
buyers to “sign now’ – if not true, representations 
are actionable. 
 Making representations regarding price that are not 
true. 
“Without Prejudice” 
Statements Made During 
Negotiations 
 Making misleading representations in negotiations 
then negating the statements by saying it is “without 
prejudice” – actionable; 
 Making misleading or deceptive representations at 
“without prejudice” conferences not protected – 
actionable.
630
  
 
Pengilley’s analysis of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) points out 
several categories of negotiating behaviour by Australian lawyers that may previously 
have been considered acceptable but is now considered legally actionable under the 
TPA, outside of the legal ethics codes.  With regards to the categories of potentially 
actionable behaviours under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) above, two aspects 
are worth mentioning.   
First, section 52 of the Trade Practices Act appears particularly relevant for 
attempting to control misrepresentation or lying in business practices as it prohibits 
businesses from ‘engage[ing] in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to 
mislead or deceive.’
631
  Through its broad application, section 52 certainly affects the 
negotiation behaviour of legal professionals, whether they are in the business of legal 
practice, represent businesses or engage in commercial transactions.  The message of 
s 52 appears to be one of broad application and zero tolerance for misleading or 
deceptive practices. 
                                                 
630
 See, eg, Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley & Associates Pty Ltd. (1990), Unreported, 
Federal Court of Australia, No G243 of 1990 (holding that “even if negotiation conference is conducted 
on a ‘without prejudice’ basis, evidence that misleading or deceptive conduct was engaged in during 
such conference will be admissible, as ‘without prejudice’ privilege does not extend to permit conduct 
of this kind.”).  
631
 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52.  
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In the context of this thesis, the TPA is one example of how legislation, either 
in conjunction with or apart from legal ethics codes, can impact the negotiation 
behaviour of legal professionals and why the profession must take steps to address 
this issue. 
3.6 COMMO DECEPTIVE TECHIQUES I EGOTIATIO 
Finally, Krivis highlights the most common, potentially deceptive tactics used 
by US attorneys in negotiation based on his experience in the United States.
632
  Krivis 
categorises these tactics into six major areas.  Some of these are common to the 
behaviours listed in the sections above while others are specific to Krivis’ experience 
with primarily US lawyer-negotiators.  Consistent with previous sections, Table 3.5 
below highlights these categories with a brief description of the technique.  This is 
followed by a discussion of key insights. 
Table 3.5:  Deceptive Tactics Used by Attorneys in egotiation (Krivis 2007)
633
 
 
Note:  The following is a summary chart of Krivis’ view of the deceptive techniques 
attorneys in the US most commonly use in negotiation.  Categories and behaviours are 
as described by Krivis to ensure accuracy and clarity of the techniques as described by 
Krivis. 
 
Category / Sub-category Deceptive Techniques  
Concealing the 
willingness to settle/ 
bottom line 
 “Conceal the bottom line as long as possible” 
 State that client will not accept less than one number 
but is happy leaving with significantly less at end of 
day – create/maintain doubt and uncertainty in mind 
of opponent; 
 Position himself at higher price level – thus 
“engaging other side in competitive match of 
numbers.” 
Making inflated demands  Starting off with inflated demands as an opening 
offer – using concessions to get to acceptable 
settlement – means parties never know other side’s 
true number. 
                                                 
632
 Krivis, above n 575 (highlighting some common allegedly deceptive techniques used by attorneys in 
negotiations, ones that they “have come to rely on.”).   
633
 Ibid.   
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Category / Sub-category Deceptive Techniques  
Exaggerating strengths 
and weaknesses 
 Exaggerating strength of own case to pressure other 
side to make more and/or later concessions; 
 Exaggerating weakness of opponent’s case; 
 Exaggerating on issues of speculation and opinion of 
value, 
Concealing client 
intentions 
 Playing a ‘game of hide and seek’ to keep party 
uncertain about what client truly values – to place 
higher value on certain items. 
Claiming lack of authority  Claiming attorney lacks full settlement authority 
even when he/she does – used to “force the 
opponent to lose confidence in himself/herself and 
maybe settle for less; 
 Improving bargaining position by claiming lack of 
authority so they may not have to make a further 
concession. 
Failing to volunteer 
relevant facts 
 Not revealing certain information which attorneys 
are not required to disclose under professional rules 
of ethics; 
 Withholding information that attorney has right to 
withhold – while may be dishonest, also not 
generally considered ‘unacceptable’. 
 
Krivis’ view of the most common deceptive techniques used by lawyers in the 
United States
634
 is based on several important factors as to why lawyers might engage 
in as well as attempt to justify the use of potentially deceptive behaviour. 
One key factor for why lawyers might engage in deceptive behaviour is the 
competitive market in which the business of law takes place, where even professional 
standards seem to come under attack.  This is often an overlooked aspect of rendering 
legal services to clients.  While it is true that law traditionally has been viewed as an 
elite profession that provides a type of social service to the public, today it is most 
                                                 
634
 Note:  Krivis’ article pertains primarily to lawyers in the United States.  However, these would most 
likely apply to lawyers in most common law jurisdictions operating under the adversarial system of 
justice.  
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likely seen as simply a service unlike any other service purchased by consumers in a 
competitive, market-driven economy.
635
   
As Krivis points out, ‘competition in our society promotes an atmosphere of 
freedom of choice and enables buyers and sellers to define the limits of 
acceptability.’
636
  As argued by many, it is this same competitive, market-driven 
economy that is negatively impacting the revered and high professional standards that 
both lawyers and the public expect of a profession designed to serve the public 
good.
637
  In addition, this same competitive environment rewards those who get the 
best deal and are able to do so within the limits of acceptability.  If competition and 
profit are key drivers, and competition is conducted with an adversarial mind-set, the 
limits of acceptable conduct may change both within the legal system and within the 
society that receives these legal services.  It may allow for certain deception in 
negotiation or other areas of legal practice as long as it does not cross the limits of 
acceptability.  As Terry notes, the combination of globalisation and the lawyers-as-
service-providers paradigm may cause lawyers to be subject to regulation from more 
and more entities.
 638
   
A second key factor in lawyers using deception is that lawyers who operate 
within this competitive environment attempt to get the best deal for their client.  
Krivis compares litigation to ‘a game of cards’ where the best hand wins and where 
                                                 
635
 See, eg, Terry, above n 548, 190-193 (discussing the new paradigm of lawyers as ‘service providers’ 
and the ramifications on the legal profession).  Cf Kronman, above n 547; Davis, above n 171.  
636
 Adapted from Krivis, above n 575. 
637
 See, eg, The Honourable Justice Michael Kirby AC CMB, Legal Professional Ethics in Times of 
Change (1996) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_stjames2.htm> at 9 August 2010; 
Merritt, above n 560, 2. 
638
 Terry, above n 548, 205-208 (discussing the ramifications of the ‘service provider’ paradigm for 
legal services in the future).  Terry argues that lawyers should embrace this change or risk being 
“marginalized in a world it does not know or understand and much of its rules arguments could be 
viewed by others as irrelevant.” (Ibid at 208). 
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negotiations especially are a matter of ‘[t]echnique and skill’ rather than a great hand 
and where a ‘good card player can improve his winnings if the other player 
overestimates his hand.’
639
  This is commonly associated with a distributive model of 
negotiations where the ‘poker player’ bargaining ethic prevails. This ‘poker player’ 
ethic relies on certain forms of deception.
640
   
In addition, the distributive model of negotiation is common and acceptable 
such that lawyers who do not, at some point, engage in value-claiming, may find 
themselves getting a lesser bargain than their client anticipates.  Regardless of 
whether lawyers operate within a public-service paradigm of legal practice or under a 
more market-driven, service-provider paradigm, it is reasonable to conclude that if 
lawyers continue to think of and conduct legal negotiations with this competitive, 
distributive mindset, then deception in negotiation will continue unless there is some 
intervention in the form of policy reforms.   
In summary, Krivis’ US-centric view of the common deceptive negotiation 
behaviour by lawyers is consistent with those described by Lerman and Wetlaufer in 
the U.S. context as well as those discussed by Davis and Pengilley in the Australian 
context.  Krivis’ assessment is important in understanding the underlying pressures 
and interests which drive such behaviour in legal negotiations and informs how ethics 
may best play a part in controlling such behaviour.  Furthermore, while the studies are 
from different legal jurisdictions, it is important to note that they involve the same 
common-law system where the tasks and pressures faced by lawyers are similar.  As 
such, these findings could be extrapolated to other areas of the same common law 
                                                 
639
 Adapted from Krivis, above n 575. 
640
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.6 (Theories of Bargaining Ethics) for a detailed discussion on this topic. 
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system as well as to other common law jurisdictions.  The next section provides a 
perspective of deceptive conduct as viewed under formal legal classifications.       
3.6.1 Legal Classifications of Deceptive Conduct 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, some scholars and practitioners see a distinction in 
definitions of lying and deception with regards to how they are applied to legal 
practitioners.
641
  These distinctions likely represent gradations in how law might view 
certain types of deception and lies, gradations which do not appear formally in the 
legal ethics codes.  The following table contains results adapted and extracted from 
the technical, legal definitions of certain types of deception.  
Table 3.6:  Legal Terms of Deception 
 
Note:  The chart below describes various potentially deceptive practices, definitions 
and related behaviours or conduct as may be manifested during legal negotiations, 
with the intent of using legal terminology to define such behaviour, where applicable.  
Some have potentially greater legal ramifications than others for the parties involved 
yet nearly all of them have grave ramifications for the legal practitioner who is found 
to have committed an ethical violation involving these practices. 
 
Term Technical Definition Conduct/Behaviour 
Falsification Introducing factually erroneous 
information into the 
negotiation
642
 
• Knowingly using false or 
outdated documents; 
• Falsified financial 
statements; 
• False statements of the 
parties. 
Fraud (General) ‘An intentional dishonest act or 
omission done with the 
purpose of deceiving.’
643
 
Deception used for personal 
gain – can be a civil law 
violation and a criminal act 
whereby the crime is of 
Causing someone to falsely 
witness a will for personal 
gain; 
Deceiving someone to transfer 
property or services; 
Negotiator knows what he is 
doing is against the law, 
                                                 
641
 See, eg, Guernsey, above n 34, 105 (stating that a lawyer’s definition of lying may be stated as “a 
statement made with the intent to deceive which purports to state the existence, in unequivocal terms, 
of facts and law contrary to the declarant’s express knowledge.”). 
642
 Adapted from Lewicki et al, above n 128, 168-170.  
643
 Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, above n 643, 182. 
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Term Technical Definition Conduct/Behaviour 
deliberately deceiving another 
in order to damage them by, for 
example obtaining property or 
services 
knowingly and intentionally 
deceives someone into thinking 
it is legal and achieves 
personal gain illegally 
Fraud in the 
inducement 
Use of deceit or trick to cause 
someone to act to his/her 
disadvantage; misleading other 
party as to the facts upon 
which the decision is made 
• Signing away a deed to 
property based on fraudulent 
information; 
• Signing agreement based on 
fraudulent figures; 
• “there will be tax advantages 
if you let me take title to 
your property”; 
• You don’t have to read the 
rest of the contract-it is just 
routine language” where it 
contains a huge balloon 
payment; 
• Where person signs a 
contract but the consent is 
induced by the fraud of 
another party. 
Fraud in the 
inception 
When a party is deceived 
concerning the nature of his or 
her acts and does not know 
what he/she has signed and 
does not intend to enter into a 
contract 
• A person who does not read 
relies on representations of 
another party that they are 
just signing a receipt when 
actually it is a release; 
Grantor of deed does not 
realise that s/he is signing a 
deed as formal instrument 
because of fraud of another 
– deed is void. 
Fraud in the 
factum 
Where the deception causes the 
other party to misunderstand 
the nature of the transaction in 
which he or she is engaging  
Altering the language of a 
contract or promissory note 
after the fact. 
Lie / Lying by 
commission 
1) false statement made with 
the intent to deceive; an 
intentional untruth;
644
 2) “all 
means by which one might 
attempt to create in some 
audience a belief at variance 
with one’s own.”
645
 3) one can 
lie by derailing (change 
• Change the subject to avoid 
the truth; 
• Pretend to be offended in 
order to stop a conversation 
about one’s questionable 
actions; 
• Deliberately use ambiguity 
                                                 
644
 The Random House Dictionary of English Language, above n 33, 1109. 
645
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1223. 
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Term Technical Definition Conduct/Behaviour 
subject), confusing (being 
ambiguous), misinforming 
(invent false story), or bluffing. 
to deceive or mislead or 
confuse the issue; 
• Invent or perpetuate a false 
story to deceive or mislead. 
Lying by 
omission 
Allowing another person to 
believe something to be true 
that one believes to be false by 
deliberately failing to reveal 
one’s belief; 2)  remain silent 
and thereby withhold a vital 
piece of information can 
sometimes be a lie by 
omission; subverts the truth 
• “Have you ever smoked 
marijuana?” – you remain 
silent or do not reveal whole 
truth; 
• Political ‘spin doctors’ – 
who intentionally speak only 
part of the truth. 
Misleading A person tells a statement that 
is not an outright lie but still 
has the purpose of making 
someone believe in an untruth 
• Negotiator stating that he or 
she does not have the 
authority to make a 
settlement decision or 
comment on an offer even 
though they have some 
authority 
Misrepresentation A false statement of material 
fact, with the intent to deceive, 
which is reasonably relied on 
by another person, to that 
person’s detriment. 
• Statement of fact with no 
reasonable basis to make the 
statement; 
• A promise of future 
performance made with 
intent not to perform as 
promised; 
• Statement of opinion based 
on a false statement of fact; 
• Expression of opinion that is 
false by one claiming or 
implying to have special 
knowledge of the subject 
matter (e.g. A doctor, 
lawyer); 
• Statement of opinion that the 
person knows to be false. 
Innocent 
misrepresentation 
‘A false statement or conduct 
which induces a party to enter 
a contract but which is not 
made or done with intent to 
deceive.’
646
  The person 
believes it to be true and has 
A negotiation agreement which 
contains the value of certain 
property known believed to be 
accurate at the time but later is 
shown as inaccurate. 
                                                 
646
 Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, above n 643, 224. 
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Term Technical Definition Conduct/Behaviour 
reasonable grounds to believe 
it is true.  
Fraudulent 
misrepresentation 
‘A false statement of fact, 
made by a person who does not 
believe the truth of the 
statement or is recklessly 
indifferent to whether it is true, 
to another with the intent that 
the other person will rely on 
it.’
647
 
 
• An agreement which 
contains an assessment of 
the value of a list of 
property to be transferred 
that is presented as true 
without first verifying this 
information through formal 
valuation. 
Negligent 
misrepresentation 
‘A statement of fact, advice, or 
opinion made in a business 
context which is inaccurate or 
misleading.’
648
  When the 
representation is made 
carelessly while having no 
reasonable reason for believing 
it to be true. 
• Lawyer who may provide 
an inaccurate assessment of 
the value of a case to the 
plaintiff; 
• An accountant who 
provides an inaccurate 
financial statement even 
where he believes it to be 
valid. 
Perjury Not the same as lying since it 
does not require intent to 
deceive; it is a ‘false statement 
on oath in a judicial proceeding 
concerning a matter material to 
the proceeding, while knowing 
that the statement is false, or 
not believing it to be true.’
649
 
one can lie under oath without 
perjuring oneself and one can 
perjure oneself without lying. 
• Stating the value of a case 
under oath which is known 
to be inconsistent with one’s 
professional judgment or 
documents discussed in for 
example, another setting. 
 
Puffery ‘Representation, statement, or 
conduct that clearly over-
exaggerates the attributes or 
characteristics of some product 
or service and is not intended 
to be an offer to be relied 
on.’
650
 
• Over-exaggerating the value 
of a case; 
• Over-stating the value of a 
particular product or service 
up for negotiation. 
 
 
                                                 
647
 Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, above n 643, 182. 
648
 Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, above n 643, 292. 
649
 Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, above n 643, 326. 
650
 Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, above n 643, 354. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 193 - 9-Aug-10 
3.6.2 Summary Analysis of Lawyers’ Most Common Deceptive 
Behaviours in egotiation 
 
To date, the information in this chapter shows that some lawyers appear to use 
many common, yet potentially deceptive behaviours, even in negotiation.  These 
behaviours, in some cases, appear to be considered not only legally acceptable but 
also acceptable under certain legal ethics codes and community standard of legal 
negotiation behaviour, such as in the case of personal injury cases. 
In reviewing these negotiation behaviours, it is important to keep two things in 
mind.  First, lawyers do work under certain sets of rules and codes of conduct in the 
adversary system that seems to allow for and encourage behaviour that may be 
perceived as deceptive and dishonest.  In addition, as stated in Chapter 1, some 
lawyers may engage in transactional or non court-related work, such as document 
production, that does not involve negotiation or issues related to deception in 
negotiation.   
The second point worth noting is nearly all of the alleged deceptive behaviours 
relate directly or indirectly to the structure of how most law firms operate, namely the 
billable hour paradigm – or as stated by Lerman, the ‘profit motivation’
651
 factor at 
the heart of most law firms and most businesses.  Nearly all the categories of 
deception in the existing literature can be linked to lawyers attempting to meet 
minimum billable hour requirements so as to maintain their jobs, seek promotions, 
live a particular lifestyle, pay debts, and remain employed.  In addition, even where 
                                                 
651
 Lerman, above n 60, 671-672, 755-756 (stating that “the engine that drives the machine is profit 
motivation.”).  See also Herbert M Kritzer, ‘The Dimensions of Lawyer-Client Relations: Notes 
Toward a Theory and A Field Study’ (1984) American Bar Foundation Research Journal 409, 410 
(confirming the conclusion of recent studies that "what is in the lawyer's economic interest may not be 
in the client's interest"); Thomas D Morgan, ‘The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility’ 
(1977) 90 Harvard Law Review 702, 706-712 (discussing the conflicting aspects of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility in appearing to give priority to the lawyers' interests over the interests of 
clients and the public). 
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more truthful, or at least less deceptive, options exist, the research seems to show that 
lawyers will continue to engage in certain deceptive behaviours and attempt to justify 
it based on their perception that the legal ethics rules permit such conduct.
652
   
As the American Bar Association (ABA) Section on Litigation study pointed 
out, the qualities which the public attributes to lawyers as positive (e.g. aggressiveness, 
competence in their knowledge of the law and applying it in service of the client, 
competitive)
653
 may be the same qualities which lead to public perceptions of lawyers 
being greedy and manipulative.
654
  This seems consistent with the distinctions 
between the primarily distributive and integrative models of bargaining, as well as 
Williams’ findings on the characteristics of cooperative/effective versus 
competitive/effective negotiators.
655
   
The adversarial model of justice that is so prevalent in nearly all common law 
jurisdictions appears to adopt a near-strict distributive bargaining model as seen by 
the literal reading of codes and rules.
656
  Distributive bargaining is a competitive, 
fixed pie, win-lose model of negotiation in which deception is the informational 
bargaining chip.
657
  It is a game mentality in which winner takes all.  If winner take all 
is still the primary modus operandi of most law firms and endorsed by the profession 
and the courts, then deception in negotiation is likely to be considered acceptable 
                                                 
652
 See, eg, Lerman, above n 60, 745-749 (discussing this point in greater detail and looking at whether 
deception can be regulated given the reality of the profession). 
653
 American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Public Perception of Lawyers:  Consumer 
Research Findings, above n 13, 17-20. 
654
 American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Public Perception of Lawyers:  Consumer 
Research Findings, above n 13, 7-16  
655
 Williams, above n 202, 20-26. 
656
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 215, 765-768. 
657
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 215, 765-768; Williams, above n 202, 20-26; Menkel-Meadow, above n 
19, 775-780 (describing various scenarios where lawyers may use deception in practice). 
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behaviour, consistent with the findings as presented by scholars and the recent ABA 
study. 
3.7 CHAPTER COCLUSIO 
A lawyer stated through an Internet blog that ‘[w]hat lawyers believe about 
practicing law has a huge impact on how we behave, and how we behave has 
significant influence on how we are perceived.’
658
  In order words, if lawyers feel they 
must deceive or mislead others in the practice of their profession in order to be 
effective and successful,
659
 the public’s perception of lawyers will tend to confirm this 
notion.  To extrapolate further, if a lawyer’s ‘bread and butter’ on a daily basis 
involves some form of negotiation and he/she believes that deception is appropriate 
and condoned in these interactions, then this has an enormous impact on how he/she 
views the practice of law and the profession as well as how such views are manifested 
in his/her interactions with all major stakeholders of the legal system. 
This chapter presented the results of several anecdotal studies and practitioner 
insights, both from the United States and Australia, which confirms that lawyers do 
engage in deceptive behaviour in general as well as in negotiations.  The results of 
Lerman’s small-scale anecdotal study almost mirror the American Bar Association 
Section on Litigation’s study.
660
  In addition, Wetlaufer, Davis, and Krivis confirm the 
potentially deceptive behaviour by lawyers in negotiation.  It is ironic that given the 
opportunity, lawyers are honest about their alleged dishonesty even if they disagree 
that such behaviour is really dishonest, particularly where the legal ethics codes are 
                                                 
658
 Public perception of lawyers (2006) <http://lifeatthebar.wordpress.com/2006/10/25/public-
perception-of-lawyers/> at 9 August 2010. 
659
 This might apply to any profession but affects lawyers more than most because of their standing in 
the community. 
660
 American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Public Perception of Lawyers:  Consumer 
Research Findings, above n 13. 
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concerned.  The majority of professional ethics codes studied in this thesis
661
 dictate 
that lawyers shall not lie or deceive under any circumstance but current research 
reveals that lawyers can and do, whether they wish to or not.   
The next chapter addresses the second research question, namely whether 
professional ethics codes address and provide an enforcement mechanism to control 
deceptive behaviour by lawyers in negotiation.  The focus of Chapter 4 is a cross-
jurisdictional analysis of the professional ethics codes in select common-law legal 
jurisdictions, rules designed to regulate lawyers’ behaviours in practice.     
 
                                                 
661
 See Chapter 4 (Efforts by Professional Ethics Codes to Regulate Deceptive Behaviour in 
Negotiation) for a detailed discussion on this topic. 
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CHAPTER 4 –  
EFFORTS BY PROFESSIOAL ETHICS CODES  
TO REGULATE DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOURS I EGOTIATIO 
 
 
‘...there is such a gap between how one lives and how one ought to 
live that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be 
done learns his ruin rather than his preservation.’ 
 
      ~ iccolo Machiavelli
662
 
 
 
This chapter describes and evaluates the results of the qualitative research 
regarding the second research question.  The second research question focuses on the 
ways in which professional ethics codes attempt to regulate lawyers’ behaviour, in 
general, and, in particular, the potentially deceptive behaviour of lawyers in 
negotiation.  An evaluation of the professional ethics codes is important since these 
ethics codes are meant to provide guidance on how lawyers ought to behave in the 
various areas of legal practice.  The following sections provide an international and 
Australian perspective on the ways in which the professional ethics codes attempt to 
regulate deceptive behaviour.  The chapter concludes with a cross-jurisdictional, 
comparative analysis of the various legal ethics codes and a summary of insights 
gained from this analysis.  The insights demonstrate the need for a strategic set of 
policy reforms, as outlined in Chapter 7, to better align the intent of the professional 
ethics codes and the successful management of the potentially deceptive behaviour of 
lawyers in negotiation. 
 
                                                 
662
 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1515) 52.  Machiavelli is quoted as being well-known for 
advocating deceptive tactics and a win-lose mentality.  In many respects his advice is contrary to what 
the legal ethics codes advocate for attorneys yet, even today, these tactics are used in many areas, 
especially business, and advocated by some legal scholars. See, eg, White, above n 60; Carr, above n 
532; Strudler, above n 67.  
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4.1 ITRODUCTIO 
The quote by Machiavelli seems to sum up the tension inherent between how 
lawyers tend to practice and the seemingly more stringent ethics rules under which 
lawyers are expected to practice.  This is particularly evident in the case of 
negotiations where the intersection between business and the profession of law collide 
with what is ethically appropriate and permissible.  For lawyers, what is ethically 
permissible is generally based on guidelines provided in the legal ethics code.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss the findings of the second research question, 
namely the manner in which legal ethics codes attempt to control the potentially 
deceptive negotiation tactics used by legal professionals.  Once again, as stated in 
Chapter 1, section 1.6, this study acknowledges that there may be other jurisdiction-
specific statutory controls on negotiation behaviour.  These are considered out of 
scope for the purposes of this thesis and this study.  The focus of this study and this 
chapter is on the legal ethics codes to which every practicing lawyer is subject as a 
member of the legal profession.    
Legal ethics and the codes of professional conduct provide the rules and 
guidelines by which lawyers are expected to conduct their daily practice.
663
  Each 
common law legal jurisdiction generally has its own code of professional conduct.  In 
addition, there may be national codes of professional conduct which are adopted at the 
state level, and sometimes adapted, by each major jurisdiction.  For example, in the 
United States, the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
is approved by a national body and adopted by nearly all individual states except for 
                                                 
663
 See, eg, Wolski, above n 124, 22-26.  
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California which has elected to use a state-specific professional code of conduct.
664
  
Similarly, in Australia, the Australian legal profession is currently regulated at the 
state and territory level.
665
  These professional codes of conduct are meant to not only 
provide rules of engagement with clients, dealings with other lawyers, and rules of 
legal practice, but also how a legal professional is to behave in key  aspects of their 
profession, such as when acting as a prosecutor, mediator, arbitrator, or judge.  A 
violation of an ethics code or rule generally results in disciplinary action by the 
professional association of that jurisdiction.  Appeals may be heard by the Court of 
Appeal of the relevant jurisdiction.
666
   
One of the most consistent rules of professional conduct appears to be that a 
lawyer shall not lie or engage in deceptive or misleading conduct.  However, the 
extent to which this particular directive is stressed seems to vary with each legal 
jurisdiction and with each unique function of a lawyer as demonstrated by the actual 
provisions within the codes of professional conduct.   
In an attempt to determine whether the legal ethics codes address the issue of 
deception in negotiation, it is important to conduct an assessment of these ethics codes.  
A cross-jurisdictional evaluation is necessary as a means to compare how various 
legal jurisdictions handle a commonly-known problem.  In addition, a cross-
jurisdictional perspective aids in determining commonalities and inconsistencies 
                                                 
664
 American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility, ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct: State Adoption of Model Rules (2009) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html> 
at 9 August 2010.   
665
 Mary Ann Noone and Judith Dickson, ‘Teaching Towards a New Professionalism: Challenging Law 
Students to Become Ethical Lawyers’ (2001) 4(2) Legal Ethics 127, 128-129.  Cf Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG), ational Legal Profession Reform (2009) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/legalprofession> at 9 August 2010 (providing a history and task force papers 
related to reforms aimed at having uniform regulation of the legal profession in Australia).   
666
 Note:  Here it is important to note that there is a difference between law and ethics as noted by 
several scholars.  This is also further discussed in Chapter 2 (Review of Literature). 
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across legal ethics codes that form part of the same legal system, namely the common-
law system as is the focus of this thesis.  This comparative analysis provides greater 
insight and decision-making clout to professional associations and governmental 
bodies when considering the policy reform proposals discussed in Chapter 7, 
regardless of whether a given jurisdiction faces the issues discussed in this thesis. 
The next sections of this chapter describe and evaluate a representative sample 
of legal ethics codes in select common law jurisdictions.  The following countries 
were part of this representative sample due to potential geographic, legal and cultural 
differences, however slight:  1) Australia; 2) Canada; 3) United States; and 4) Hong 
Kong.  Each section lists the key provisions of the jurisdiction’s legal ethics code that 
deals with a prohibition or conditional prohibition of deceptive conduct by lawyers.  
Particular attention is given to those provisions which specifically address the 
negotiation process and guidelines for negotiation behaviour, especially the use of 
deception in negotiation.  Each section is also followed by a discussion of key insights.   
The comparative analysis begins with an international perspective and continues with 
a primary focus on select Australian jurisdictions.  
4.2 ITERATIOAL PERSPECTIVES:  UITED STATES, CAADA, HOG KOG 
This section presents a comparative analysis of the legal ethics codes of three 
international, common-law jurisdictions, namely the United States, Canada, and Hong 
Kong.  
The subject of the first analysis is the United States and the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  The American Bar Association’s 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC or ABA Model Rules) are considered 
the professional ethics rules of the U.S. legal profession.  The ABA Model Rules 
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indicate the standard of conduct expected of all lawyers nationally.  The MRPC has 
been adopted in whole or in part by all states of the United States, except 
California.
667
  Until December 2008, New York retained the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility (MCPR)
668
 while both California and Maine drafted and 
adopted their own set of rules of legal ethics and professional responsibility.
669
  
However, New York adopted the MRPC as of 16 December 2008 while Maine 
elected to adopt the MRPC as of 26 February 2009,
670
 leaving California as the only 
state in the United States to retain its own state-specific set of professional 
responsibility rules.
671
     
The following table represents some of the key provisions of the ABA Model 
Rules as they pertain to regulating deceptive conduct.  Certain provisions of the ABA 
Model Rules, such as Model Rule 4.1, are especially relevant as they outline 
acceptable negotiation behaviour and are the subject of much scholarly debate.  A 
brief analysis follows Table 4.1 
Table 4.1:  United States:  Sample American Bar Association Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (MRPC or ABA Model Rules) Regarding Deceptive and 
Misleading Conduct
672
 
 
Model Rule Description 
Model Rule 1.5a 
(Fees) 
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect 
an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. 
                                                 
667
 See generally ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: State Adoption of Model Rules, above n 
6665. 
668
 American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility, ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct: Dates of Adoption (2009) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/chron_states.html> at 9 August 
2010.  
669
 See generally ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: State Adoption of Model Rules, above n 
665.  New York initially adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and has recently 
accepted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, California’s Supreme Court has adopted the 
California Rules of Professional Conduct, and Maine has adopted its own Code of Professional 
Responsibility 
670
 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Dates of Adoption, above n 669. 
671
 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: State Adoption of Model Rules, above n 665.  
672
 See generally American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, above n 293. 
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Model Rule Description 
Model Rule 1.6 
(Confidentiality 
of Information) 
 (a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, 
the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). 
Model Rule 1.16 
(Declining or 
Termination 
Representation) 
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw 
from representing a client if: 
… (2) the client persists in a course of action involving the 
lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal 
or fraudulent; (emphasis added) 
(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime 
or fraud; (emphasis added) 
Model Rule 2.1 
(Advisor) 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering 
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political 
factors that may be relevant to the client's situation. (emphasis 
added) 
Model Rule 3.1 
(Meritorious 
Claims And 
Contentions) 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact 
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law. (emphasis added) 
Model Rule 3.3 
(Candor Toward 
The Tribunal) 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:  
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made 
to the tribunal by the lawyer; (emphasis added) 
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, 
the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered 
material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the 
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if 
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer 
evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal 
matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. (emphasis 
added) 
Model Rule 3.4 
(Fairness To 
Opposing Party 
And Counsel) 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or 
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material 
having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or 
assist another person to do any such act; 
(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or 
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Model Rule Description 
offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law; 
(emphasis added) 
Model Rule 3.8 
(Special 
Responsibilities 
Of A Prosecutor) 
….(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material 
evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted 
defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was 
convicted, the prosecutor shall:  
(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or 
authority, and  
(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction,  
(A) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless 
a court authorizes delay, and…. (emphasis added) 
Model Rule 4.1 
(Truthfulness In 
Statements To 
Others) 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not 
knowingly: 
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third 
person; or 
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent 
act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6. 
(emphasis added) 
Comment [1] - A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing 
with others on a client’s behalf, but generally has no affirmative 
duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A 
misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms 
a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. 
Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading 
statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative 
false statements. For dishonest conduct that does not amount to a 
false statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in 
the course of representing a client, see Rule 8.4. (emphasis added) 
 
Comment [2] - This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a 
particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend 
on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in 
negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken 
as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed 
on the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an 
acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category, 
and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where 
nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. Lawyers 
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Model Rule Description 
should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to 
avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation.
 673
 (emphasis 
added) 
Model Rule 7.1 
(Communications 
Concerning A 
Lawyer's 
Services) 
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication 
about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is 
false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of 
fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement 
considered as a whole not materially misleading. (emphasis 
added) 
Model Rule 8.1 
(Bar Admission 
And Disciplinary 
Matters) 
An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection 
with a bar admission application or in connection with a 
disciplinary matter, shall not: 
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or 
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension 
known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly 
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an 
admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not 
require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
Model Rule 8.2 
(Judicial And 
Legal Officials) 
(a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to 
be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity 
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory 
officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or 
appointment to judicial or legal office. (emphasis added) 
Model Rule 8.4 
(Misconduct) 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another; 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation;… 
 
Table 4.1 presented several key provisions of the ABA MRPC that pertain to 
regulating deceptive and misleading lawyer conduct, with a focus on any provisions 
                                                 
673
 Note: Model Rule 4.1 is the one most often cited and debated as permitting deception in 
negotiations because of the Comment as italicised above.  Attempts to amend this provision have gone 
unheeded for the last ten-to-twenty years. 
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which specifically discuss negotiation behaviour.  Several points are worth noting 
about the ABA Model Rules. 
First, each of these rules specifies an affirmative duty for the lawyer.  The 
affirmative duty may be to the client, the tribunal,
674
 to the opposing party and 
counsel, or to a third person.  The affirmative duty is denoted by the use of ‘shall’ in 
each of the directive statements above.  Similar phrases which designate a duty to 
perform an obligation include ‘must’ or ‘is required to’.  In each of the model rules 
pertaining to potentially deceptive conduct, the words on the face of the statute 
indicate a duty to not engage in such conduct.  Interestingly, the duty is owed to a 
specific stakeholder as evidenced by a literal reading of the rules.   
 Second, despite the fact that each of the rules appears to designate a specific 
stakeholder to whom the duty is owed, Rule 8.4 appears all-encompassing and broad 
with regards to professional misconduct since it appears that any ‘conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation’
675
 is subject to a potential finding of 
professional misconduct, regardless of whether the rule on its face applies to a 
particular stakeholder. 
Third, the ABA Model Rules specifically states that certain behaviour in 
negotiations is exempt from being considered ‘material’ for the purposes of being 
treated as an ethical violation of the ABA Model Rules.  According to ABA Model 
Rule 4.1, estimates of price or value, acceptable settlement offers, and the existence of 
an undisclosed principal in the context of negotiations are not subject to the same 
                                                 
674
 Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), Rule 1.0 (m) (defining tribunal as “a court, an 
arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body 
acting in an adjudicative capacity.”). 
675
 See generally Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), Rule 8.4. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 206 - 9-Aug-10 
rules.
676
  Furthermore, these three exceptions are not all inclusive but simply some of 
the exceptions which are ’ordinarily in this category’ of ‘generally accepted 
conventions in negotiations’,
 677
 which are not actionable. There appears to be wide 
latitude and acknowledgment of certain potentially deceptive yet acceptable 
behaviours in negotiation that lawyers might have to engage in during the course of 
practice.  This provision demonstrates the integration of duty ethics with community 
ethics combined with some pragmatism as evidenced by the comments to Rule 4.1, 
which advise lawyers to be ‘mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid 
criminal and tortious misrepresentation.’
678
 This cautionary provision appears to be 
aimed at requiring lawyers to ensure that they mitigate any negative impact on the 
reputation of the legal profession. 
In the context of this thesis, the selected provisions of the ABA Model Rules 
appears to allow for a certain level of permissible deception in negotiation that does 
not cross the boundaries of tortious or criminal sanctions. 
Next, the focus is on Canada.  The Canadian Bar Association’s Code of 
Professional Conduct (the CBA Code) provides the professional ethics guidelines for 
lawyers in Canada.  Under the CBA Code, a lawyer is defined as ‘an individual who 
is duly authorized to practise law’
679
 and includes not only to those ‘engaged in 
private practice but also to those who are employed by governments, agencies, 
corporations and other organizations.’
680
  In Canada, much like the United States, the 
professions of barrister and solicitor are fused and referred to as ‘lawyers’ or ‘legal 
                                                 
676
 See generally Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), Rule 4.1 (comment).  
677
 See generally Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), Rule 4.1.  
678
 See generally, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), Rule 4.1, comment [2]. 
679
 See generally, Canadian Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct (2006) xiv 
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/code/> at 9 August 2010. 
680
 Canadian Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct (2006), above n 679, xiv.  The CBA Code 
defines ‘legal professional’ as “lawyers collectively”. 
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professionals’.  The CBA Code applies to all Canadian territories, the exception of the 
province of Quebec, which operates under the civil law tradition and maintains the 
distinction of lawyers and defines them as either ‘attorneys’ or ‘civil-law notaries’.
681
  
In Quebec, attorneys are much like those in the United States and operate both as a 
trial lawyer and a case lawyer.  As such, the discussions regarding Canada are focused 
primarily on those provinces, excepting Quebec, which still practice under the 
common-law system.  
The following table, Table 4.2, lists some of the key provisions of the CBA 
Code as they pertain to regulating deceptive conduct.  A brief discussion follows the 
list of provisions.  
Table 4.2:  Canada:  Sample Rules of the Canadian Bar Association Code of 
Professional Conduct (2006)
682
 Regarding Deception and Misleading Conduct 
 
Rule Description 
Chapter 3 
(Advising 
Clients) 
The lawyer must be both honest and candid when advising clients. 
(emphasis added) 
Chapter 3, Rule 
7 (Dishonesty or 
Fraud by Client) 
When advising the client the lawyer must never knowingly 
assist in or encourage any dishonesty, fraud, crime or illegal 
conduct, or instruct the client on how to violate the law and 
avoid punishment. The lawyer should be on guard against 
becoming the tool or dupe of an unscrupulous client or of 
persons associated with such a client. (emphasis added) 
Chapter 9, Rule 
1 (Guiding 
Principle) 
The advocate’s duty to the client “fearlessly to raise every 
issue, advance every argument, and ask every question, 
however distasteful, which he thinks will help his client’s case” 
and to endeavour “to obtain for his client the benefit of any 
and every remedy and defence which is authorized by law”2 
must always be discharged by fair and honourable means, 
without illegality and in a manner consistent with the lawyer’s 
                                                 
681
 See generally Pawel Laidler, ‘The Distinctive Character of the Quebec Legal System’ (2004) in M  
Paluszkiewicz-Misiaczek, A Reczynska, A Spiewak (eds), Place and Memory in Canada: Global 
Perspectives (2005).  
682
 See generally Canadian Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct, above n 679.  The CBA 
Code distinguishes between the lawyer’s function as advocate, prosecutor, mediator, and arbitrator.  
The Code also specifically has ‘Principles of Civility for Advocates’ (Appendix) and a provision for 
‘Courtesy’, a violation of which may cause the legal practitioner to be subject to disciplinary action 
(Chapter 9, Rule 16).  
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Rule Description 
duty to treat the court with candour, fairness, courtesy and 
respect. (emphasis added) 
Chapter 9, Rule 
2 (Prohibited 
Conduct) 
The lawyer must not, for example: 
 
(b) knowingly assist or permit the client to do anything 
that the lawyer considers to be dishonest or 
dishonourable;… 
 
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive or participate in the 
deception of a tribunal or influence the course of 
justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or 
law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive 
affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed or 
otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime or illegal 
conduct; 
 
(f) knowingly misstate the contents of a document, the 
testimony of a witness, the substance of an argument 
or the provisions of a statute or like authority; 
 
(g) make suggestions to a witness recklessly or that he or 
she knows to be false. The cross-examiner may 
pursue any hypothesis that is honestly advanced on 
the strength of reasonable inference, experience or 
intuition;… (emphasis added) 
 
Chapter 14, Rule 
3 (Advertising, 
Solicitation…) 
Advertising must not mislead the uninformed or arouse 
unattainable hopes and expectations, and must not adversely 
affect the quality of legal services, or be so undignified or 
otherwise offensive as to be 
prejudicial to the interests of the public or the legal 
profession (emphasis added) 
Chapter 14, Rule 
7 (Advertising, 
Solicitation…) 
Lawyers may offer professional services to prospective 
clients by any means except means: 
(a) that are false or misleading; 
(b) that amount to coercion, duress, or harassment;… (emphasis 
added) 
 
Table 4.2 identified some key provisions of the CBA Code.  A review of these 
ethics rules using the literal approach shows that, like the United States and Australia, 
the Code of Professional Conduct in Canada imposes certain affirmative duties on the 
part of the lawyer towards various stakeholders in the legal system.   
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First, consistent with the Australian Bar Association Model Rules (Barristers’ 
Rules) yet unlike the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
the Canadian Bar Association’s Code of Professional Conduct makes no exceptions 
for any deceptive or misleading conduct in the context of negotiations.
683
  In addition, 
the CBA Code does not distinguish between ‘material’ facts and non-material facts.  
On its face, it appears that all or any facts may fall within the scope of conduct 
deemed unethical if such conduct is deceptive, even where such conduct occurred 
within the context of a negotiation.  Taking this into account, it appears that the CBA 
Code is more closely tied to duty ethics (via professional standards) than to end-result, 
community, or pragmatism ethics.  By this I mean that the CBA Code favours a 
greater adherence to the professional codes of conduct that promote the lawyers’ 
zealous representation of the client, duty of candour and respect for the courts, duty to 
preserve the quality of legal services and to protect the interests of the public
684
 and 
the legal profession.
685
  As such, it might be fair to say that community standards,
686
 
such as the generally acceptable conventions in negotiation that allow for some 
deceptive conduct, are not explicitly condoned, at least on the face of the CBA Code.   
                                                 
683
 See, eg, Canadian Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct (2006), above n 679, 27-28, 
Chapter V, Rule 8 relating to conflicting interests in a contentious issue (stating in part that “if the issue 
is one that involves little or no legal advice, for example, a business rather than a legal question in a 
proposed business transaction, and the clients are sophisticated, they may be permitted to settle the 
issue by direct negotiation in which the lawyer does not participate.”).  This is the only reference to 
negotiation in the entire CBA Code and seems to preclude the lawyer participating in such a session so 
as to preserve the lawyer’s impartiality and retain the respect of the public. 
684
 Canadian Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct (2006), above n 679, Preface (stating that 
“[i]n order to satisfy this need for legal services adequately, lawyers and the quality of service they 
provide must command the confidence and respect of the public.”) 
685
 Canadian Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct (2006), above n 679, xiv (defining ‘legal 
profession’ as “lawyers collectively”.) 
686
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.5 (Theories of Ethics) for more information on the various ethics models.  
In the context of this thesis, ‘community standards’ refers to those standards of conduct established 
within a community or group outside of a professional body, such as lawyers or doctors, which imposes 
its own special set of ethics rules. 
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Within Canada, each province has its own legal professional body that 
regulates the lawyers within that particular jurisdiction.  Unlike the CBA Code 
discussed above, the Law Society of Alberta, Canada is noteworthy because of its 
approach to regulating the negotiation behaviors of lawyers.  The Law Society of 
Alberta’s Code of Professional Conduct
687
 (the Alberta Code) contains specific ethics 
rules for the lawyer as negotiator.  The provisions that deal with regulating deceptive 
conduct in negotiations are highlighted in the table below along with an assessment of 
the affirmative duty which the lawyer owes to various stakeholders to refrain from 
such deceptive or misleading conduct. 
Table 4.3:  Alberta, Canada:  Sample Rules of The Law Society of Alberta Code 
of Professional Conduct (2006)
688
 Regarding Deception and Misleading Conduct 
and Affirmative Duty to Stakeholders 
 
Rule Description Description of Affirmative 
Duty to Stakeholders 
Chapter 11, 
Rule 1 (The 
Lawyer as 
Negotiator) 
A lawyer must not lie to or mislead an 
opposing party. (emphasis added) 
Duty to an opposing party 
Chapter 11, 
Rule 2 (The 
Lawyer as 
Negotiator) 
If a lawyer becomes aware during the 
course of a negotiation that:  
 
(a) the lawyer has inadvertently 
misled an opposing party, or  
(b) the client, or someone allied with 
the client or the client's matter, has 
misled an opposing party, 
intentionally or otherwise, or  
(c) the lawyer or the client, or 
someone allied with the client or the 
client's matter, has made a material 
Duty to an opposing party 
and opposing client; duty to 
an third party allied with the 
opposing party or client 
                                                 
687
 See generally The Law Society of Alberta Code of Professional Conduct (2006) 
<http://www.lawsocietyalberta.com/resources/codeProfConduct.cfm> at 9 August 2010. 
688
 See generally The Law Society of Alberta Code of Professional Conduct (2006), above n 687. The 
Alberta Code specifically distinguishes between the lawyer’s function as advisor, advocate, mediator, 
arbitrator, and negotiator.  The Code has a specific chapter on the lawyer as negotiator, unlike the 
majority of other codes of professional conduct.  Only the rules related to the lawyer as negotiator are 
highlighted here for comparison purposes.  These rules appear to expressly prohibit forms of ‘bluffing’ 
that might be considered acceptable in other jurisdictions. 
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Rule Description Description of Affirmative 
Duty to Stakeholders 
representation to an opposing party 
that was accurate when made but has 
since become inaccurate,  
 
then, (subject to confidentiality - see 
Rule #7 of Chapter 7, Confidentiality) 
the lawyer must immediately correct 
the resulting misapprehension on the 
part of the opposing party. (emphasis 
added) 
Chapter 11, 
Rule 4 ((The 
Lawyer as 
Negotiator) 
A lawyer must not negotiate an 
agreement that the lawyer knows to be 
criminal, fraudulent or 
unconscionable. (emphasis added) 
Duty to anyone with whom 
the lawyer negotiates an 
agreement 
 
Table 4.3 highlighted several provisions of the Alberta Code related to the 
lawyer’s function as negotiator.  Several features of the Alberta Code deserve further 
discussion.  First, in addition  to identifying negotiation as a key distinct function of 
the lawyer, the Alberta Code specifically prohibits any deceptive or misleading 
conduct by a lawyer or his/her client towards the opposing party and the client’s third-
party allies, whoever they may be.
689
  The Alberta Code does not appear to condone, 
at least on its face, any form of acceptable deception as argued by negotiation scholars 
or as tacitly accepted under the ABA Model Rules. 
Second, the Alberta Code imposes a continuing affirmative duty on the lawyer 
to correct any deceptive or misleading conduct, including material misrepresentations 
which may have subsequently become inaccurate over the course of time in the 
negotiations.  The Alberta Code does, however, retain the reference to ‘material’ facts 
with regards to this affirmative obligation to correct deceptive or misleading 
information.   
                                                 
689
 Interestingly enough, the duty to be honest seems to be directed to the opposing party and client.  
There does not appear to be the same level of duty of honesty between the lawyer and his/her own 
client. 
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Finally, by specifically addressing negotiation as a function of a lawyer’s job, 
as distinct from the lawyer’s role as advisor, advocate, mediator, and arbitrator, the 
Alberta jurisdiction appears to acknowledge that while conventional negotiation 
practice may condone some deception in negotiation, the Alberta jurisdiction formally 
recognises this aspect of a lawyer’s practice.  In addition, by recognising the function 
of lawyer as negotiator, the Alberta jurisdiction appears to reject the view of adopting 
conventional negotiation practice in favour of imposing an affirmative obligation on 
lawyers in this jurisdiction to refrain from deceptive conduct in negotiation and 
encourages candour.  In the Alberta jurisdiction, professional duty ethics appears to 
trumps a community ethics or bargaining ethics model that might condone deception 
in negotiation. 
A final jurisdiction which was the focus of this comparative analysis of legal 
ethics codes is Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the Code of Conduct of the Bar of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2008)
690
 (the HK Code) and the Hong 
Kong Solicitor’s Guide to Professional Conduct (2008)
691
 (the HK Guide) govern the 
conduct of legal professionals.  The HK Code applies only to barristers while the HK 
Guide applies to solicitors.  The provisions that deal specifically with regulating the 
potentially deceptive conduct of legal professionals are highlighted in the table below, 
followed by a brief analysis.  
                                                 
690
 See generally Code of Conduct of the Bar of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2008) 
<http://www.hkba.org/the-bar/code-of-conduct/code-of-conduct.html> at 9 August 2010 (HK Code).   
691
 The Law Society of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Solicitors’ Guide to Professional Conduct (2008) 
<http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/pub_c/professionalguide/volume1/> at 9 August 2010 (HK Guide)   
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 213 - 9-Aug-10 
Table 4.4:  Hong Kong:  Sample Rules of the Code of Conduct of the Bar of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2008)
692
 and The Hong Kong 
Solicitors’ Guide to Professional Conduct (2008)
693
 Regarding Deception and 
Misleading Conduct 
 
Rule Description 
The HK Code, 
Rule 6 
It is the duty of every barrister 
(a) to comply with the provisions of this Code and with the 
undertakings (if any) which he made on his call to the Bar; 
(b) not to engage in conduct (whether in pursuit of his 
profession or otherwise) which is dishonest or which may 
otherwise bring the profession of barrister into disrepute, 
or which is prejudicial to the administration of justice; 
(c) to observe the ethics and etiquette of his profession;… 
(emphasis added) 
 
The HK Code, 
Rule 11 
A barrister must report to the Bar Council if he is convicted of a 
criminal offence which involves dishonesty or which may bring the 
profession into disrepute. In case of doubt the offence should be 
reported. (emphasis added) 
The HK Code, 
Rule 137 
If at any time before judgment is delivered in a civil case, a 
barrister is informed by his lay client that he has committed 
perjury or has otherwise been guilty of fraud upon the Court, the 
barrister may not so inform the Court without his client’s consent.  
He may not, however, take any further part in the case unless his 
client authorises him to inform the Court of the perjured statement 
or other fraudulent conduct and he has so informed the Court. 
(emphasis added) 
 
The HK Guide, 
Rule 10.03 (Duty 
to Court) 
A solicitor must never knowingly attempt to deceive or participate 
in the deception of a tribunal. (emphasis added) 
The HK Guide, 
Rule 11.03 (Duty 
to Report 
Misconduct) 
A solicitor is under a duty to report to the Council, where 
necessary after having obtained his client’s consent, any 
professional misconduct or dishonesty on the part of another 
solicitor or a member of his staff, or of any other person 
purporting to represent or to be in the employment of another 
solicitor or firm.  
 
Commentary 3 - A solicitor should inform the Law Society where 
he is charged with an offence involving dishonesty or deception or 
                                                 
692
 See generally Code of Conduct of the Bar of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2008), 
above n 690.  Note:  The HK Code applies strictly to barristers and is based on “the Code of Conduct 
for the Bar of England and Wales (1981) addition with variations warranted by local conditions and 
practice.” 
693
  Hong Kong Solicitors’ Guide to Professional Conduct (2008), above n 691. The Guide applies to 
solicitors. 
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Rule Description 
any other serious criminal offence. (emphasis added) 
The HK Guide, 
Intervention 
A solicitor should inform the Law Society where he is charged 
with an offence involving dishonesty or deception or any other 
serious criminal offence. 
 
 
Table 4.4 presented the key provisions of the HK Code and the HK Guide 
dealing with deceptive or misleading conduct.  Several features of the HK Code and 
HK Guide are worth nothing in comparison to the legal ethics codes discussed above.  
First, consistent with the other jurisdictions discussed above, Hong Kong also 
imposes certain affirmative duties on solicitors and barristers to refrain from engaging 
in potentially deceptive conduct.     
Second, neither the HK Code nor the HK Guide makes explicit exception for 
deceptive or dishonest conduct in negotiations.  The provisions in both codes of 
conduct in Hong Kong appear broad in application to solicitors and barristers.   
Third, based on a literal reading of these rules, the most salient feature is strict 
compliance with the duties of the profession including its ethics and etiquette.
694
 Duty 
ethics appears strong in the Hong Kong legal profession, even trumping community 
standards as evidenced by the HK Code’s Rule 6(b) which regulates personal conduct 
and prohibits lawyers from engaging in personal conduct (conduct not in the course of 
carrying out one’s profession as a barrister) that might be considered dishonest or 
impact the reputation of the profession or the administration of justice.   
Finally, the duty to the profession and the court or tribunal seems higher than 
the duty to the client even where the barrister or solicitor may need informed consent 
to disclose certain information. 
                                                 
694
 Code of Conduct of the Bar of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2008), above n 690, 
Rule 6. 
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In summary, the foregoing section presented a comparative analysis of the 
legal ethics codes of a select group of common law jurisdictions in the United States, 
Canada, and Hong Kong.  The next section focuses on the legal ethics codes of 
Australia. 
4.3 AUSTRALIA PERSPECTIVES:  QUEESLAD 
This section focuses on Australia, in general, and on Queensland, Australia in 
particular.  Historically, the legal system in Australia was a self-regulated profession; 
however today, it is part of a co-regulatory system consisting of courts and 
independent statutory authorities, such as the use of the Legal Services Commission 
for handling lawyer disciplinary matters.
695
  In addition, Australia’s legal profession is 
‘a double-barrelled profession’,
696
 depending on the state or territory.  In some states 
and territories, such as New South Wales and Victoria, the legal profession is 
separated into solicitors and barristers.
697
  In other states and territories, such as 
Queensland, South Australia, and Australian Capital Territory, the legal profession is 
‘fused’ and legal practitioners are considered ‘legal professionals’ (lawyers) though 
they may still practice as barristers and solicitors.
698
  In those states and territories 
where solicitors and barristers have separate duties, the professional association for 
barristers is called the bar association while, for solicitors, the professional association 
is the law society.
699
   
                                                 
695
 New South Wales Justice and Attorney General, Lawyer Regulation in Australia: Background (2009) 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/pages/lra_index> at 9 August 2010. 
696
 Lawyer Regulation in Australia: Background, above n 695. 
697
 Lawyer Regulation in Australia: Background, above n 695 (barristers specialise in court work while 
solicitors specialises in general legal services) 
698
 Lawyer Regulation in Australia: Background, above n 695 (proving a historical background to 
lawyer regulation in Australia and definition of key terms).  
699
 Lawyer Regulation in Australia: Background, above n 695. 
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The Australian Bar Association provides model rules of conduct specifically 
for barristers.  Until approximately 2004, the barrister discipline under Australian Bar 
Association was largely voluntary and barristers in Australia were not as heavily 
regulated as solicitors.
700
  The Australian Bar Association Model Rules (Barristers’ 
Rules) (the AusBar Model Rules) provides the professional code of ethics for 
barristers.
701
  Table 4.5 represents some of the key rules as they pertain to regulating 
the potentially deceptive conduct of barristers.  This is followed by a brief discussion 
and analysis of the AusBar Model Rules 
Table 4.5:  Australia: Australian Bar Association Model Rules (Barristers’ Rules) 
Regarding Deceptive and Misleading Conduct
702
 
 
Rule Description 
Preamble These Rules are made in the belief: … 
 
2. As legal practitioners, barristers must maintain high standards 
of professional conduct.  
 
3. The role of barristers as specialist advocates in the 
administration of justice requires them to act honestly, fairly, 
skilfully, diligently and fearlessly. … (emphasis added) 
 
Rule 21 A barrister must not knowingly make a misleading statement to a 
court on any matter. (emphasis added) 
Rule 22 A barrister must take all necessary steps to correct any misleading 
statement made by the barrister to a court as soon as possible after 
the barrister becomes aware that the statement was misleading. 
(emphasis added) 
Rule 29 A barrister will not have made a misleading statement to a court 
simply by failing to disclose facts known to the barrister 
                                                 
700
 See, eg, Levin, above n 587, 187-210; Haller, above n 587, 1; Linda Haller and Heather Green, 
‘Solicitors’ Swan Song?:  A Statistical Update on Lawyer Discipline in Queensland’ (2007) 19.1 Bond 
Law Review 140.  Each source provides a historical perspective on Australia’s lawyer disciplinary 
system with a special focus on Queensland. 
701
 The Australian Bar Association, Creation of the ABA (2006)  
<http://www.austbar.asn.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21&Itemid=28> at 9 
August 2010 (discussing the history of the Australian Bar Association and its creation and purpose). 
702
 See generally The Australian Bar Association, The Australian Bar Association Model Rules (2002) 
<http://www.austbar.asn.au/images/stories/PDFs/CurrentABAModelRules2002.pdf> at 9 August 2010.  
These model rules appear to pertain specifically to barristers and there is a special rule for barristers 
appearing as mediators, but not as negotiators.  Negotiation is listed as a skill and task of the barrister. 
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Rule Description 
concerning the client’s character or past, when the barrister makes 
other statements concerning those matters to the court, and those 
statements are not themselves misleading. (emphasis added)  
 
Rule 33 A barrister briefed to appear in criminal proceedings whose client 
confesses guilt to the barrister but maintains a plea of not guilty:  
 
(a) may return the brief, if there is enough time for another legal 
practitioner to take over the case properly before the hearing, and 
the client does not insist on the barrister continuing to appear for 
the client;  
(b) in cases where the barrister keeps the brief for the client:  
(i) must not falsely suggest that some other person 
committed the offence charged;  
 
(ii) must not set up an affirmative case inconsistent 
with the confession  
(emphasis added) 
Rule 51 A barrister must not knowingly make a false statement to the 
opponent in relation to the case (including its compromise).  
(emphasis added) 
 
Rule 52 A barrister must take all necessary steps to correct any false 
statement unknowingly made by the barrister to the opponent as 
soon as possible after the barrister becomes aware that the 
statement was false.  (emphasis added) 
Rule 53 A barrister will not have made a false statement to the opponent 
simply by failing to correct an error on any matter stated to the 
barrister by the opponent. (emphasis added) 
 
Table 4.5 listed key provisions of the AusBar Model Rules pertaining to 
deceptive or misleading conduct.  Four key points are worth noting about the AusBar 
Model Rules.   
First, under the AusBar Model Rules, barristers are considered ‘specialist 
advocates in the administration of justice’
703
 and are required, among other things, to 
act honestly.  Similar to the US ABA Model Rules, the AusBar Model Rules direct 
                                                 
703
 The Australian Bar Association Model Rules (2002), above n 702, Preamble. 
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barristers to refrain from engaging in any deceptive or misleading conduct and impose 
an affirmative duty to various stakeholders including the court and opponents.   
Second, the AusBar Model Rules appear to place a greater emphasis on the 
duty to the court and the opponent in relation to the duty to the client.  As such, the 
AusBar Model Rules seem to be more closely aligned to a loyalty to duty ethics than 
to community ethics or pragmatism as discussed in Chapter 2.   
Third, the AusBar Model Rules, unlike some of the provisions discussed 
above, does not make the distinction between ‘material’ and non-material statements 
that might be deceptive or misleading.  Under the AusBar Model Rules, the barrister 
has an affirmative duty to refrain from making ‘any’ false or misleading statements 
and to correct ‘any’ false or misleading statements known to have been made. 
Finally, the AusBar Model Rules make no exception to any deceptive or 
misleading negotiation behaviour as being exempt from a violation of these rules.  
However, as noted before, the AusBar Model Rules are not mandatory and barristers, 
even today, may be able to bypass adherence to these rules simply be giving up their 
membership.
704
  
Transitioning from Australia, in general, to one of the legal jurisdictions in 
Australia, this section now focuses on the legal ethics codes of Queensland, Australia.  
One of the focus areas of this thesis is Queensland, Australia in which the legal 
profession is ‘fused’ and barristers and solicitors
705
 are regulated under a common 
                                                 
704
 Levin, above n 587, 187-210; Haller, above n 587, 1. 
705
 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), Schedule 2 (Dictionary) (defining ‘solicitor’ as “a local legal 
practitioner who holds a current local practicing certificate to practice as a solicitor” or “an interstate 
legal practitioner who holds a current interstate practicing certificate that does not restrict the 
practitioner to engaging in legal practice only as or in the manner of a barrister.”).   
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legislation.  In Queensland, the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld),
706
 the Legal 
Profession Regulation 2007 (Qld),
707
 the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule2007 
(Qld),
708
 and the Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule2007 (Qld)
709
 provide the ethics 
rules which govern the legal professionals in this jurisdiction.  The rules which 
address the regulation of deceptive and misleading conduct for barristers and 
solicitors are highlighted in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7, respectively, based on each 
specific regulation.  
Table 4.6:  Queensland, Australia:  Sample Rules via the Legal Profession Act 
2007 (Qld) Regarding Deception and Misleading Conduct 
 
Rule Description 
s 328 (Setting 
aside costs 
agreements) 
…(2) In deciding whether or not a costs agreement is fair or 
reasonable, and without limiting the matters to which the 
Supreme Court can have regard, the Supreme Court may have 
regard to any or all of the following matters— 
(a) whether the client was induced to enter into the 
agreement by the fraud or misrepresentation of the law 
practice or of any representative of the law practice;… (emphasis 
added) 
Chapter 4, s 416 
(Complaints and 
Discipline) 
The main purposes of this chapter are as follows— 
(a) to provide for the discipline of the legal profession; 
(b) to promote and enforce the professional standards, 
competence and honesty of the legal profession; (emphasis added) 
s 420 (Conduct 
capable of 
constituting 
unsatisfactory 
professional 
conduct or 
professional 
misconduct) 
The following conduct is capable of constituting 
unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional 
misconduct— 
 
(c) conduct for which there is a conviction for— 
(i) a serious offence; or 
(ii) a tax offence; or 
(iii) an offence involving dishonesty;
710
 (emphasis added) 
 
 
                                                 
706
 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld). 
707
 Legal Profession Regulation 2007 (Qld). 
708
 Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2006 (Qld). 
709
 Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 2007 (Qld). 
710
 Under the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), dishonesty includes fraud. 
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Table 4.7:  Queensland, Australia:  Sample Rules via the Legal Profession 
(Solicitors) Rule 2007 (Qld) Regarding Deception and Misleading Conduct 
 
Rule Description 
(Statement of 
general principle) 
 
Solicitors, in all their dealings with the courts, whether those 
dealings involve the obtaining and presentation of evidence, the 
preparation and filing of documents, instructing an advocate or 
appearing as an advocate, should act with competence, honesty 
and candour. Solicitors should be frank in their responses and 
disclosures to the court, and diligent in their observance of 
undertakings which they give to the court or their opponents. 
(emphasis added) 
Rule 1 (Duty to 
client) 
A solicitor must act honestly and fairly, and with competence 
and diligence, in the service of a client. (emphasis added) 
Rule 14 
(Frankness in 
court) 
14.1 A solicitor must not knowingly make a misleading statement 
to a court.  
14.2 A solicitor must take all necessary steps to correct any 
misleading statement made by the solicitor to a court as soon as 
possible after the solicitor becomes aware that the statement 
was misleading. 
14.3 A solicitor will not have made a misleading statement to a 
court simply by failing to correct an error in a statement made to 
the court by the opponent or any other person…. (emphasis 
added) 
Rule 18 
(Communications 
with opponent) 
18.1 A solicitor must not knowingly make a false statement to 
the opponent in relation to the case (including its compromise). 
18.2 A solicitor must take all necessary steps to correct any false 
statement unknowingly made by the solicitor to the opponent as 
soon as possible after the solicitor becomes aware that the 
statement was false. 
18.3 A solicitor does not make a false statement to the opponent 
simply by failing to correct an error on any matter stated to the 
solicitor by the opponent…. (emphasis added) 
Rule 28 
(Communications) 
A solicitor must not, in connection with the practice of law, in 
any communication with another 
person: 
28.1 represent to that person that anything is true which the 
solicitor knows, or reasonably believes, is untrue; or 
28.2 make any statement that is calculated to mislead or 
intimidate the other person, and which grossly exceeds the 
legitimate assertion of the rights or entitlement of the solicitor’s 
client; or ….(emphasis added) 
Rule 30 (Standard 
of conduct) 
30.1 dishonest; 
30.2 calculated, or likely to a material degree, to: 
(a) be prejudicial to the administration of justice; 
(b) diminish public confidence in the administration of justice; 
(c) adversely prejudice a solicitor’s ability to practice according 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 221 - 9-Aug-10 
Rule Description 
to these rules. (emphasis added) 
Rule 36 
(Advertising) 
A solicitor must not advertise the solicitor’s expertise or practice 
if that advertising: 
36.1 is false; 
36.2 is misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive; 
36.3 is vulgar, sensational, or otherwise as would bring or be 
likely to bring a court, the solicitor, 
another solicitor or the legal profession into disrepute;… 
(emphasis added) 
 
Table 4.6 listed key provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) while 
Table 4.7 listed provisions of the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2007 (Qld) which 
address deceptive or misleading conduct.  The Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 
2007 (Qld) is similar to the AusBar Model Rules and is not repeated here.  Several 
points are worth noting about the provisions of the Queensland jurisdiction’s 
professional codes of conduct identified below.   
First, while the Statement of general principles under the Legal Profession Act 
2007 (Qld) indicates that solicitors have a discretionary power (as indicated by 
‘should’ statements) to be honest and frank in their responses and disclosures to the 
court,
711
 the rules themselves explicitly contain affirmative obligations to refrain from 
engaging in deceptive or misleading conduct (as indicated by ‘must’ statements).   
Second, solicitors are obligated to ensure that they do not bring the courts, 
other solicitors, or the profession into disrepute.  In this aspect, the Queensland rules 
seem aligned with the duty ethics as well as pragmatism ethics models since both 
professional duty and concerns for reputation underlie the ethics rules. 
Third, unlike Rule 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules, the Queensland legal 
profession rules do not make an explicit exception for any deceptive or misleading 
                                                 
711
 Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2007 (Qld), ‘Statement of General Principle’. 
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conduct that might occur in the context of a negotiation.  Through a literal 
interpretation of these provisions, deceptive and misleading conduct appears to be 
strictly prohibited, even in negotiations.  
Finally, whereas the ABA Model Rules make references to deceptive conduct 
in regards to ‘material’ statements of act or law, the Queensland rules do not appear to 
make this distinction.  The use of the term ‘statements’
712
 without a qualifier in some 
of the provisions seems to indicate that any statement made, material or otherwise, 
that is knowingly false or any statement that is not corrected within a reasonable time 
if unknowingly false may fall within the ambit of a possible ethics violation.   
In summary, the Queensland ethics codes discussed above, at least on their 
face, appear more stringent than community standards with regards to deception in 
negotiation and aligned closely to an integration of duty ethics and pragmatism ethics 
to promote and ensure the high standards of the profession.
713
  In the context of this 
thesis, the comparative analysis provides insight into determining whether the legal 
ethics codes are sufficient to deter deceptive or misleading conduct in negotiations 
and in developing the policy reform proposals outlined in Chapter 7.   
4.4 CROSS-JURISDICTIOAL SUMMARY AALYSIS 
A synthesis of the cross-jurisdictional analysis of the legal ethics codes shows 
the following with regards to whether the jurisdiction addresses the negotiation 
process, deceptive conduct in negotiations, and whether the professional ethics code 
                                                 
712
 See, eg, Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2007 (Qld), Rule 14 (Frankness in court) and Rule 18 
(Communications with opponents) 
713
 Cf Levin, above n 587 (citing to and discussing that even with these seemingly high standards, 
“there is something seriously wrong with lawyer discipline systems.”). 
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of conduct can be correlated to any of the five predominant ethics models discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2.
714
 
Table 4.8:  Cross-Jurisdictional Summary Analysis of Deception in egotiation 
in Legal Ethics Codes  
 
Jurisdiction Exception for  
egotiation? 
Map to Predominant  
Ethics Model 
US – ABA Code Yes • Community ethics (e.g. 
negotiations community) 
• Duty ethics 
• Pragmatism 
Australia – AusBar 
Model Code 
No • Duty ethics 
Queensland, 
Australia  
No • Duty ethics 
Canada – CBA 
Code 
No • Duty ethics 
Alberta, Canada Yes • Duty ethics 
• Pragmatism 
Hong Kong No • Duty ethics 
 
Professional ethics codes in the legal profession are the primary means to 
control the behaviour of lawyers in a variety of circumstances, including the use of 
potentially deceptive or misleading conduct by lawyers in negotiations.  Nearly all 
professional codes of conduct contain provisions which prohibit deceptive conduct in 
a variety of circumstances including while in court or tribunal hearing, when dealing 
with another lawyer, when advertising for services, and if appointed to judicial office.  
Some codes of conduct are highly explicit regarding the circumstances in which 
deceptive conduct is prohibited whereas others use a guiding principle that is meant to 
apply to all aspects of legal practice, in all forums, and with all persons whether they 
are the general public, clients, opposing counsel, or the court. 
                                                 
714
 See Chapter 2 (Review of Literature) for a more detailed discussion of theories of ethics, legal ethics, 
and bargaining ethics models. 
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For the purposes of this comparative analysis of legal ethics codes,   the 
following common-law jurisdictions provided a relatively diverse sample from which 
to compare and contrast the legal ethics codes for the purpose of addressing the 
second research question: 1) Australia; 2) Canada; 3) Hong Kong; and 4) United 
States.  I expected to see some differences between Australia and the United States, 
no differences between United States and Canada, and marginal differences between 
Australia and Hong Kong due to geographic proximity or lack thereof. 
Three primary insights stand out after evaluating the legal ethics codes in these 
select common-law jurisdictions.  First, law and ethics appear to collide within the 
professional ethics codes.  They come from different perspectives and are not 
necessarily congruent or integrated in their assessment of which deceptive conduct is 
permissible or not.  For example, lawyers are legally required to protect client 
confidences even where such confidences may lead the lawyer to ethically conclude 
that the client has engaged in wrong-doing.  This may be consistent with the view of 
some scholars who argue that law is less strict than ethics and the legal ethics codes 
are rules of law, not ethics.
715
  What this seems to mean is that even though the legal 
ethics codes place a broad prohibition on deception, lies and misleading conduct, 
these codes of conduct do not necessarily have as great a force for influencing 
behaviour as true societal ethics (general or community ethics) or even higher 
standards of personal ethics.  In addition, the legal ethics codes do not appear to 
provide detailed clarity on specific conduct that is considered deceptive or misleading 
in the course of practice while still fulfilling professional obligations under the legal 
ethics codes. This may lead to the conclusion that that lawyers, in the course of their 
                                                 
715
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1219. 
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duties, may use deception far more often than their personal ethics, or any ethics, 
might allow.
716
   
The legal ethics codes stem from legal positivism and are essentially 
disciplinary codes.  Thus, these rules are drafted and enforced by society and said to 
be ‘made by reason for the greater good.’
717
  This is different from rules of natural law 
discussed in Chapter 2.
718
 As discussed initially in Chapter 2, the legal ethics codes 
discussed in this thesis are primarily disciplinary codes.
719
  In contrast, society’s 
ethical standards and, in some cases, personal ethics seem to be tied to principles of 
natural law - unchangeable, applying universally, and superior to man-made laws.
720
  
As such, these ethics codes are presumably aspirational codes and meant to convey a 
higher standard of conduct consistent with society’s or an individual’s expectations of 
truth and justice,
 721
 standards which can conflict with the legal profession’s duties as 
espoused in the legal ethics codes.   
Second, the legal ethics codes studied in this thesis lack gradations between 
different kinds or degrees of wrong-doing and associated sanctions.
722
  The effect of 
this, as seen by analysing the ethics violation cases in Chapter 5, is a seemingly 
subjective standard of assessment against a legal practitioner alleged to have engaged 
in deceptive conduct.  Without explicit guidance on what is considered a violation of 
                                                 
716
 See Chapter 2 (Review of Literature) for a more detailed discussion of theories of ethics, legal ethics, 
and bargaining ethics models.  
717
 Carvan, above n 2, 4. 
718
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1 (Theories of Law) for more information on this topic. 
719
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3 (Theories of Legal Ethics) for more information on the difference 
between disciplinary codes and aspirational codes of ethics. 
720
 See Carvan, above n 2, 4. 
721
 This could stem from religious or spiritual beliefs about the nature of truth and justice and order in 
society. 
722
 See, eg, QLS Inc v Craig Stephen Bax [1998] QCA 089 (Pincus JA) (discussing the fact that there 
are shades of dishonesty though not expanding on them.  His view also did not affect the final 
outcome.).  In the Queensland, Australia jurisdiction, these gradations are not specified in the legal 
ethics codes used to judge potential ethics violations. 
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the legal ethics code in terms of deceptive or misleading conduct in negotiations or 
other areas of practice, the lawyer is subject to the hardest sanctions for a potentially 
minor violation or degree of unethical conduct.  Once again, it seems that a lack of 
gradations or degrees of prohibited deception is out of alignment with what the law 
allows and what society presumably condones in the case of negotiation behaviour. 
One can imagine a scenario where a legal practitioner could be convicted of 
some form of deceptive conduct under an ethics code whereas law and the community 
standards might see this conduct as acceptable and not legally actionable.  An 
example is a scenario where the lawyer’s opening offer in a negotiation is untrue, 
unrealistic or unsubstantiated yet this tactic of a high opening offer is expected under 
prevailing negotiation principles.  Under the explicit language of the legal ethics 
codes studied in this chapter, all the common-law jurisdictions, except the United 
States under the ABA Model Code, would presumably consider this deceptive or 
misleading conduct and therefore actionable as an ethics violation rather than this 
same conduct being considered mere ‘puffing’. This is more likely in such 
jurisdictions as Australia, where there are no distinctions in the legal ethics codes with 
regards to negotiation behaviour.
723
  In contrast, the American Bar Association’s 
MRPC, Rule 4.1 specifically states that some negotiation practices such as ‘puffing’ 
are not ‘material facts’ subject to an actionable ethics violation.  Condoning some 
forms of deception in a legal ethics code, regardless of how it might accurately reflect 
                                                 
723
 Note:  This is not to discount the potential impact of section 52 of the Trade Practices Act in 
Australia. It is, however, important to note many in the legal profession do not consider the Trade 
Practices Act to be binding to the profession in the strictest sense. Cf Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, Professions and the Trade Practices Act (2010) 19-20 <http://www.accc.gov.a 
u/content/item.p html?itemld=926503&nodeld =71b6c165a 
bc78f1a60fOa1643c9367&fn=Professions%20and%20the%20TPA.pdf> at 9 August 2010 (specifically 
reinforcing the obligation of the professions to refrain from deceptive and misleading conduct when 
dealing with clients).  This latter document is an updated document highlighting and reinforcing the 
application of the TPA on all professions in Australia, including the legal profession. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 227 - 9-Aug-10 
prevailing norms or prevailing law of that jurisdiction, has its problems.  These 
problems can be addressed through minor, yet effective policy reforms as discussed 
further in Chapter 7. 
Finally, the legal ethics codes take different approaches in how they view the 
role of negotiation.  The distinction I am making here is the difference between seeing 
negotiation as a skill or a function (i.e. role).  Negotiation is widely recognised as an 
important and required skill for the legal professional much like the ability to draft 
documents, conduct competent legal research, and make court appearances.  At the 
same time, the legal professional, in many circumstances, serves formally in the role 
of negotiator on behalf of his/her client, a corporation, or a governmental body.  This 
role of negotiator is distinct from, for example, the lawyer’s role as a trial advocate 
(i.e. barrister), mediator, arbitrator, or judge.  Each one of these roles (i.e. functions) 
requires the legal professional to adhere to certain defined codes of conduct, at least 
within the legal system.  As evidenced by many legal ethics codes, there are specific 
ethics rules that apply to the lawyer as advocate, mediator or third-party neutral, 
prosecutor, or judge.  However, in most of the legal ethics codes evaluated in this 
chapter, the function of ‘lawyer as negotiator’ is presumed yet not clearly 
distinguished from the lawyers’ other roles.
724
  In fact, with the increased use of 
alternate dispute resolution processes, a lawyer acts as a negotiator far more often 
than a litigator, advocate, or judge.
725
   
                                                 
724
 Note:  One exception, for example, is the Law Society of Alberta’s Code of Professional Conduct 
discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2. 
725
 This could be argued though in a less litigious society and on the international stage, it could be 
argued that the primary function of the lawyer is to negotiate on behalf his/her client’s interests, with 
litigation being the final option.  See, eg, Bordone, above n 96, 1 (discussing the need to formally 
recognise the distinction). 
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This issue of the distinction between a lawyer as negotiator and a lawyer who 
uses negotiation skills may be a fine and subtle distinction as well as controversial.  
On the one hand, explicitly recognising the role of a lawyer as negotiator means that 
the negotiation process as conducted by lawyers can be subject to specific ethical 
rules, such as those evidenced by the Alberta Code of Professional Conduct.
726
  On 
the other hand, not recognising the role of lawyer as negotiator could mean that the 
negotiation behaviour of lawyers, if deceptive, will continue under the radar without 
scrutiny and that lawyers might rely on non-legal standards, such as prevailing 
negotiation practices, during negotiations and thus potentially violate the legal ethics 
codes.  While the topic might be controversial, a discussion on this distinction may be 
warranted and useful in light of the negative perceptions facing lawyers today 
regarding their alleged deceptive conduct in negotiations, the potential impact of such 
conduct on the integrity of the bar, and the negative public perception of lawyers and 
the legal profession.  Positive and frank dialogue about explicitly recognising the 
lawyer’s role as negotiator along with constructive and objective assessment of 
amending the legal ethics codes to reflect this formal recognition may determine the 
extent to which legal ethics codes can successfully curtail the use of deception in 
negotiations. 
4.5 CHAPTER COCLUSIO 
In the legal profession, the professional codes of conduct of each jurisdiction 
are meant to provide guidance for how lawyers ought to behave as legal professionals.  
This includes whether lawyers can engage in potentially deceptive or misleading 
conduct in negotiations.  This chapter analysed the extent to which the legal 
                                                 
726
 See Chapter 4, Table 4.3 for more information. 
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profession’s ethics codes address the issue of the use of deception in negotiation 
through a cross-jurisdictional analysis of the legal ethics codes of a select group of 
common-law countries.  
The findings demonstrate a consistent approach to prohibiting deceptive or 
misleading conduct while showing a varied or non-existent approach to dealing with 
the lawyer as negotiator and his or her behaviour in this capacity.  This chapter 
concluded with a discussion of some insights gained from this qualitative and 
comparative study of legal ethics codes.  These insights pave the way for proposing a 
set of strategic policy reforms detailed in Chapter 7.   
The next chapter, Chapter 5, focuses on a single common-law jurisdiction’s 
handling of ethics violation cases alleging deceptive or misleading behaviour with an 
eye towards determining whether such behaviour in negotiations is or ever can be 
adequately and effectively regulated.   
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CHAPTER 5 –  
THE SUCCESS OF PROFESSIOAL ETHICS CODES  
I COTROLLIG LAWYERS’ DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOUR 
 
 
‘Truth is something which can't be told in a few words. Those who 
simplify the universe only reduce the expansion of its meaning.’ 
     
 ~ Anais in727 
 
 
Chapter 3 discussed the first research question while Chapter 4 focused on the 
second research question.  This chapter focuses on the third research question, namely 
whether the professional ethics codes are successful in curtailing deceptive behaviour 
of lawyers in general and deceptive behaviour in negotiation, in particular.  The 
chapter begins with an introduction to the Queensland legal jurisdiction and its 
attempts to curtail unprofessional conduct, unsatisfactory professional conduct, and 
professional misconduct in the form of misleading or deceptive behaviour.  Next, the 
chapter presents the results of a qualitative study of Queensland’s ethics violation 
cases with a focus on cases involving deception in negotiation.  This chapter 
concludes a brief summary of the results of this third research question and the 
implications of the findings on the law reform proposals discussed in Chapter 7. 
5.1 ITRODUCTIO (ICLUDIG A DEFIITIO OF SUCCESS) 
The third research question deals with whether the legal ethics codes can 
successfully control the lawyer’s deceptive behaviour in negotiation.  In order to 
address this question, it is necessary to look at how a legal jurisdiction uses and 
enforces the legal ethics codes when there is a violation of this provision of the code 
                                                 
727 Brainyquote.com, Anais in Quotes (2009) 
<http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/a/anaisnin391098.html > at 9 August 2010.  Anais Nin 
was an American author. 
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of conduct.  In this thesis, I conducted an original study of the ethics violation cases in 
the common-law jurisdiction of Queensland, Australia.  Queensland was selected as a 
sample jurisdiction for two main reasons. 
First, Queensland’s lawyer regulation framework provides that all ethics 
violation cases that are formally prosecuted be made available to the public through a 
public register.  This allowed for easy access to the necessary research materials 
required to undertake the study.  Second, Queensland’s legal ethics code provisions 
were sufficiently distinct from those of, for example, the United States’ ABA Model 
Code regarding deceptive and misleading conduct in negotiation, to serve as a point of 
useful comparison.  These two factors combined with the researcher’s geographic 
proximity to Queensland makes Queensland an ideal common-law jurisdiction on 
which to construct an analytical framework that can be leveraged in future studies on 
this topic. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Queensland’s legal ethics codes prohibit all forms 
of deceptive and misleading conduct regardless of forum or function.  In addition, 
Queensland’s legal ethics codes are silent regarding negotiation behaviour and make 
no exceptions for deceptive conduct in negotiations.728     
Prior to presenting the results of the empirical study of ethics violation cases, 
this section begins with a working definition of ‘success’ followed by a historical 
perspective of lawyer discipline in Queensland and an introduction about certain 
features of this jurisdiction.  The purpose of these foundation sections is to provide a 
context for discussing the findings of the study of ethics violation cases in section 
5.10.  
                                                 
728 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3 (Australian Perspectives – Queensland) for more information on select 
Queensland legal ethics code provisions relevant to this chapter. 
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One of the primary purposes of the legal ethics rules, as stated in section 3(a) 
of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) is to regulate legal practice in Queensland so 
as to ‘protect[]…consumers of the services of the legal profession and the public 
generally.’729  Protection of the public interest is such a priority that it ‘calls for 
effective vigilance over members of the profession and its standards of professional 
behaviour….to ensure as well as possible that the public may confidently place their 
business and affairs in its hands.’730  Disciplinary proceedings are the means by which 
the legal profession attempts to protect the public as well as the reputation of the 
profession.  While disciplinary proceedings are not meant to be a form of retribution, 
the Tribunal has acknowledged that ‘in order to protect the public and the reputation 
of the profession the consequences for the practitioner may need to be more severe 
than they would be if the only object of the proceedings was punishment.’731   
  Ideally, the punishment imposed would have a deterrent effect such that it 
would simultaneously protect the public and deter future misconduct.732  Deterrence is 
distinguished from retribution in several ways.  First, punishment as deterrence would 
prevent (deter) similar conduct in the future while punishment as retribution is simply 
punishment for its own sake.733  Second, punishment intended to have a deterrent 
effect is ‘designed to have a future protective effect’ and is therefore forward-looking.  
                                                 
729 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 3(a). 
730 Mellifont v The Queensland Law Society Incorporated (1981) Qd. R. 17, 30 (Andrews J with the 
concurrence of Connolly J) (Mellifont). 
731 See e.g. re Maraj (1995) 15 WAR 12; Queensland Law Society Incorporated v Smith [2000] QCA 
109; CA No 1052 of 2000, 4 April 2000 (describing the Bar as not an ordinary profession or 
occupation but one that requires that counsel “must command the personal confidence, not only of lay 
professional clients, but of other members of the Bar and of judges.”).  
732 Attorney-General v Bax [1999] 2 QdR 9  (Pincus JA noting that “Although I accept that remedies 
for suspension or striking off are not applied by way of punishment, but rather for the protection of the 
public, there is also a deterrent element.”) (Bax); Queensland Law Society v Carberry [2000] QCA 450, 
[38] (Moynihan SJA and Atkinson J saying in part “….As was pointed out in Attorney-General v 
Bax…there is a subsidiary purpose in the public interest and that is to deter other practitioners who 
might otherwise engage in professional misconduct.”). 
733 Haller, above n 587, 153-154. 
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In contrast, punishment intended as retribution ‘does not necessarily have a protective 
effect; it is merely thought “fair” that a person be punished’734 for a wrong conduct 
committed in the past and therefore ‘has a backward focus’.735 
In determining whether legal ethics codes are successful in regulating the 
deceptive behaviours of legal professionals in negotiations, ‘success’ as used in this 
thesis and for the purposes of this chapter, is defined as containing the following 
elements:  1) the legal ethics codes are successful in regulating deceptive behaviours 
of legal professionals in negotiations to the extent that the legal profession formally 
prosecutes lawyers who engage in deceptive conduct in negotiation; 2) the legal ethics 
codes are successful in regulating deceptive behaviours of legal professionals in 
negotiations to the extent that formal prosecutions of lawyers who engage in such 
conduct deter others from engaging in similar conduct in the future; 3) the legal ethics 
codes are successful in regulating deceptive behaviours of legal professionals in 
negotiations to the extent that there are low recidivism rates for lawyers who engage 
in such conduct in the future; and 4) the legal ethics codes are successful in regulating 
deceptive behaviours of legal professionals in negotiations to the extent that formal 
prosecutions of lawyers who engage in such conduct have enough of a deterrent effect 
on the future conduct of others such that the public is protected and public perception 
of lawyers as deceptive or manipulative is diminished or negligible.736  
Keeping this definition in mind, the next section explores the historical 
perspective of lawyer discipline in the Queensland jurisdiction as well as the primary 
legal ethics violation types in Queensland.  This is followed by the results and 
                                                 
734 Haller, above n 587, 154. 
735 Haller, above n 587, 153-154. 
736 Note:  This definition of success is formulated from the proceeding discussion on the deterrent and 
punitive concepts in regulating behaviour. 
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analysis of an empirical study of Queensland ethics violation cases over an eleven-
year period. 
5.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF LAWYER DISCIPLIE I QUEESLAD 
Historically, and until the end of the 20th Century, the professional 
associations of solicitors and barristers have undertaken most of the responsibility of 
disciplining Australian lawyers.737  Through the Queensland Law Society Act 1927 
(Qld),738 which created the Queensland Law Society (Law Society or QLS) as an 
incorporated body, a ‘Statutory Committee’ was created with the power to hear 
complaints against solicitors and strike them off the roll where necessary.739  
Decisions of the Statutory Committee could be appealed to the courts that retained 
ultimate jurisdiction over solicitor discipline.  During the 1920s and 1930s, the 
Queensland Law Society also monitored solicitors’ trust accounts and was granted the 
power to regulate issuance of practicing certificates.740  While the Queensland Law 
Society had the power to formally discipline solicitors, the Queensland Bar 
Association, established in 1903 as a voluntary association of barristers, had no power 
to discipline barristers.741  It was essentially considered a ‘toothless tiger’.742  
                                                 
737 D Weisbot, Australian Lawyers (1990), 193, 199-201.  See also Levin, above n 587, 187-210. 
738 Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) as amended by Queensland Law Society Acts Amendment 
Act 1938 (Qld) and now called Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) (establishing Queensland Law 
Society). 
739 Ibid. 
740 Trust Accounts Act 1923 (Qld) 
741 Note: This is different from historical perspective of the Australian Bar Association discussed above 
in this chapter. 
742 Levin, above n 587, 189. 
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During the 1970s, doubts began to surface about the effectiveness of lawyer 
self-regulation743 and the possible incorporation of a lay person or body and external 
ombudsman into the disciplinary process. 
In 1985, Queensland enacted legislation which established a Lay Observer and 
created a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT).744  Based on earlier 
recommendations, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal was a panel composed of two 
solicitors and one lay person.  The SDT could hear matters but could not strike off or 
suspend a solicitor.745 
In 1997, both the Statutory Committee established under the Queensland Law 
Society Act 1927 (Qld) and the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal established under the 
Queensland Law Society Act Amendment Act 1985 (Qld) were replaced by a single 
Solicitors Complaints Tribunal (SCT).746  Along with the SCT, a Legal Ombudsman 
was appointed with power to bring charges and to handle appeals to decisions of the 
SCT.747 
By early 2003, issues still remained with lawyer regulation and the discipline 
process in Queensland.  In 2003, upon request of the Queensland Attorney-General 
and Minister of Justice, the Legal Ombudsman conducted an investigation of the 
general complaints handling process conducted by the Queensland Law Society and 
issued a report stating that there was a ‘conflict of interest in maintaining a regulatory 
                                                 
743 See, eg, NSW Reform Commission, Discussion Paper No 2, ‘Legal Profession: Complaints, 
Discipline and Professional Standards, Part 1 (1979) 7 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/dp2out> at 9 August 2010. 
744 Queensland Law Society Acts Amendment Act 1938 (Qld). 
745 Levin, above n 587, 189 (citing Haller, above n 587, 4). 
746 Queensland Law Society Acts Amendment Act 1938 (Qld); Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld), 
s 6AI (1). 
747 Ibid. 
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role as well as maintaining their [sic] role as a Society to benefit the profession.’748  
The Legal Ombudsman recommended an independent body to handle lawyer 
complaints.749 
In 2003, Queensland’s Parliament passed the Legal Profession Act 2003 (Qld) 
(the 2003 Act) which established the independent lawyer discipline system and 
agency.  This was quickly followed by the enactment of the Legal Profession Act 
2004 (Qld) (the 2004 Act), which retained the independent lawyer discipline system 
and added provisions including those on multidisciplinary partnerships, the practice of 
foreign law, and details on what may constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct or 
professional misconduct.750 
The reforms to the Queensland lawyer discipline system under the 2004 Act 
are considered quite significant in comparison to other jurisdictions.  Under the 2004 
Act, the Queensland lawyer discipline system incorporates three main structural 
changes:  1) establishes the Legal Services Commissioner to receive, evaluate, refer 
complaints for investigations, and prosecute the case;751 2) establishes various 
procedures for how to handle certain categories of complaints;752 and 3) establishes 
two separate tribunals to hear disciplinary matters.753  In addition to the structural 
changes, the 2004 Act also represents a significant shift from a self-regulated 
                                                 
748 Jack Nimmo, The Queensland Law Society and Baker Johnson Lawyers (Legal Ombudsman, 
Brisbane, 2003), 2, 5, 7-9.  See also Baker v Legal Services Commission [2006] QCA 145 (Baker). 
749 Nimmo, above n 748, 2, 5, 7-9.   
750 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) (the “2004 Act”).  For the purposes of this thesis, I will refer to the 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) where necessary as a historical reference point and to the most current 
reprint, the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), in general as it contains all the relevant provisions of the 
2004 Act. 
751 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 414; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ss 582, 583 
752 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 245, s 244, s 262; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 440 
(consumer dispute), s 418 (unsatisfactory professional conduct), s 419 (professional misconduct).  
753 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 429, s 437, s 292 (1); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), ss 619, 
621 (establishing the Legal Practice Committee), s 598, 599 (establishing the Legal Practice Tribunal).  
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 237 - 9-Aug-10 
disciplinary system to one with a ‘decidedly consumer-oriented tilt’754 where the 
standard for discipline is not simply what the community of lawyers think but rather 
‘the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to 
expect of a reasonably competent Australian [legal] practitioner.’755  These and other 
relevant provisions of the Legal Profession Act that affect the regulation of a lawyer’s 
deceptive conduct are discussed further in the next section.   
5.3 ITRODUCTIO TO QUEESLAD LEGAL ETHICS 
As introduced above, the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (the 2007 Act) 
governs the practice of law in Queensland.  A precursor to the 2007 Act, the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (Qld) (the 2004 Act) was intended to cure the mischief of the 
profession having an ineffective and self-interested monopoly on regulating its 
members while disregarding the interests of the public. 
Consistent with statutory interpretation guidelines under the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), the purpose of the 2007 Act is: 1) to ‘provide for the 
regulation of legal practice in this jurisdiction in the interests of the administration of 
justice and for the protection of consumers of the services of the legal profession and 
the public generally’; and 2) ‘to facilitate the regulation of legal practice on a national 
basis across State borders.’756  The 2007 Act and the Queensland Law Society Act 
1952 (Qld) serve as the legal ethics norms of the legal profession in Queensland via 
the 2007 Act’s complaints and disciplinary system. 
In addition to providing redress to consumers of legal services, the 2007 Act 
aims to ‘promote and enforce the professional standards, competence and honesty of 
                                                 
754 Levin, above n 587, 192. 
755 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 244; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 418. 
756 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 3 (Main Purpose).  
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the legal profession’757 by disciplining legal professionals who violate such 
professional standards.  In addition, legal practitioners in Queensland are also subject 
to other regulations governing their conduct including the Queensland Law Society 
Act 1952 (Qld), the Queensland Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2006 (Qld) and the 
Queensland Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 2004 (Qld), though the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 and the Queensland Law Society Act 1952 provide the foundation 
with regards to disciplinary action against lawyers for unethical conduct.   
Under section 35 (2) (ii) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), a person is 
suitable for admission as a legal practitioner only if the court decides that s/he is ‘a fit 
and proper person to engage in legal practice.’758  The ‘fit and proper’ standard 
includes suitability matters in relation to the person upon application for admission or 
other matters deemed relevant by the court.759  The ‘fit and proper’ standard also 
relies on a legal practitioner reaching or maintaining ‘a reasonable standard of 
competence and diligence’.760  A ‘substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain 
a reasonable standard of competence and diligence’761 means that a legal practitioner 
could be subject to a complaint and subsequent disciplinary proceedings for 
unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.   
The Legal Services Commissioner (the LSC), appointed by the Governor in 
Council, is the person authorised under the 2007 Act762 to receive complaints, 
                                                 
757 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 416; Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 3. 
758 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 35 (2) (ii) (Suitability for admission); See also Legal Profession 
Act 2004 (Qld), s 30(1). 
759 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 31 (2).  ‘Suitability matters’ is further explained in s 9 of the 
2007 Act and may include a person’s character. 
760 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 418.   
761 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 419.   
762 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 584.   
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investigate complaints, to summarily dismiss complaints, 763 refer them to the Law 
Society or Bar Association for investigation and recommendations, and to prosecute 
the matter.764 
Lawyer complaints may fall under three primary categories: 1) unsatisfactory 
professional conduct; 2) professional misconduct; and 3) consumer disputes.  For the 
purposes of the focus of this thesis, complaints pertaining to unsatisfactory 
professional conduct and professional misconduct are relevant and discussed further 
below.  Consumer disputes765 will not be addressed in this thesis. 
In order to better understand the empirical study and analysis of the ethics 
violation cases in Queensland presented in Section 5.10, it is important to have a 
foundation for some key terms and principles of the legal ethics code in Queensland 
and the standards by which lawyers are held accountable and prosecuted if in 
violation of the legal ethics code in Queensland.  The next few sections provide the 
foundation of what is defined as unprofessional conduct, unsatisfactory professional 
conduct, and professional misconduct. 
5.4 UPROFESSIOAL CODUCT GEERALLY 
Unprofessional conduct was defined in the Queensland Law Society Act 1952 
as ‘….(a) serious neglect or undue delay; or (b) charging of excessive fees or costs; or 
(c) failure to maintain reasonable standards of competence or diligence; or (d) conduct 
described, under another Act, as unprofessional conduct or practice.’766  It did not 
limit the type of conduct or practice that may be regarded as unprofessional. 
                                                 
763 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 432; Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 259. 
764 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 447; Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 276. 
765 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 440 and s 441 (Consumer disputes are generally referred to a 
process of voluntary mediation and do not result in a hearing). 
766 Queensland Law Society Act 1952, s 3B. 
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The Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) replaced the use of ‘unprofessional 
conduct’ with ‘unsatisfactory professional conduct’. 
5.5 USATISFACTORY PROFESSIOAL CODUCT 
Chapter 4, Part 4.1, section 418 of the 2007 Act767 deals with unsatisfactory 
professional conduct and effectively states: 
418 Meaning of unsatisfactory professional conduct 
 
Unsatisfactory professional conduct includes conduct of an 
Australian legal practitioner happening in connection with the 
practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence 
and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect 
of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner. 
While no specific behaviours or conduct are noted here, this definition appears 
to be in line with the more consumer-oriented system envisioned by Parliament.  
Whereas the prior common-law definition of the professional standard looked to 
conduct that was ‘observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute 
and competency’,768 the current standard of behaviour appears to create a new, higher 
benchmark for the regulation of the legal profession in Queensland.  The former 
standard could be called the professional standard while the latter is referred to as the 
public standard. 
According to the Legal Services Commission (the Commission), the public 
standard is a higher standard of expected conduct because the legal professional’s 
conduct is now assessed not only against a professional standard of what a community 
of lawyers might think (duty ethics as expressed by the legal rules and codes of 
conduct) but also by a reference to a standard that ‘a member of the public’ is entitled 
                                                 
767 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 244.  See also Linda Haller, ‘Imperfect Practice Under the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (Qld)’ (2004) 23 The University of Queensland Law Journal 411, 417-419. 
768 See, eg, Re R, a practitioner of the Supreme Court [1927] SASR 58, 61. See also Haller, above n 
767, 417-419. 
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to expect.769 This public standard appears to be a community ethic expressed perhaps 
via social-contract principles whereby members of the public expect a certain level of 
competence, diligence, and ethics from their lawyers whom they hire for a service. 
The public standard is also one that encompasses more than just unethical or 
improper conduct as deemed solely by a community of lawyers.  The Commission 
believes it also includes conduct that consumers of legal services deem unethical or 
improper such as ‘honest mistakes, errors of judgment, and poor standards of client 
service.’770  In creating this potentially new benchmark, it appears that legal 
practitioners are accountable for two potentially conflicting standards of conduct  in 
an attempt to bring greater alignment between what lawyers expect of each other 
(legal ethics rules) and what society and consumers expect of lawyers they hire and 
the legal profession in general (an end-result or social contract ethic). 
Complaints alleging unsatisfactory professional conduct are generally heard 
by the Legal Practice Committee (LPC).771  The LPC is comprised of a chairperson, 
two solicitors, two barristers and two lay members.772  Decisions of the LPC can be 
appealed to the Legal Practice Tribunal (LPT) or, alternatively, with leave, to the 
Court of Appeal.773  The standard of proof for an allegation of fact is ‘on the balance 
of probabilities’,774 the satisfaction of which ‘varies according to the consequences for 
                                                 
769 Legal Services Commission, Prosecution Guidelines (2006) 5; See also John Britton, The Legal 
Services Commission – An Overview (Speech delivered at various district law associations, September 
– November 2004) <http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/speeches/2004Overview.pdf> at 9 August 2010 (stating 
that the phrase ‘a member of the public’ is new language and raises the standard of conduct for 
lawyers).  
770 Legal Services Commission, Prosecution Guidelines, above n 769, 5. 
771 Britton, above n 769. 
772 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 622; Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), ss 282(1), 469(2) (which 
only had two lawyers and one lay person on the Legal Practice Committee). 
773 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), ss 293(1), 294(2). 
774 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 649(1).  Note that this standard is intentionally lower than the 
criminal standard, though conduct is sometimes perceived to be criminal in respect of the penalties and 
sanctions imposed. 
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the relevant Australian legal practitioner or law practice employee, of finding an 
allegation to be true.’775  A legal practitioner could also be charge with professional 
misconduct either in lieu of or in addition to charges of unsatisfactory professional 
misconduct.  Professional misconduct is discussed in the next section. 
5.6 PROFESSIOAL MISCODUCT 
Chapter 4, Part 4.2, section 419 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) 
describes professional misconduct and states: 
419 Meaning of professional misconduct 
 
(1) Professional misconduct includes— 
 
(a) unsatisfactory professional conduct of an Australian 
legal practitioner, if the conduct involves a substantial or 
consistent failure to reach or keep a reasonable standard 
of competence and diligence; and 
(b) conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, whether 
happening in connection with the practice of law or 
happening otherwise than in connection with the 
practice of law that would, if established, justify a 
finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person 
to engage in legal practice. 
 
(2) For finding that an Australian legal practitioner is not a fit and 
proper person to engage in legal practice as mentioned in 
subsection (1), regard may be had to the suitability matters 
that would be considered if the practitioner were an applicant 
for admission to the legal profession under this Act or for the 
grant or renewal of a local practising certificate. 
 
From the literal reading of this provision, professional misconduct appears to 
be a more serious allegation than unsatisfactory professional misconduct since the 
legal practitioner is alleged to have engaged in conduct that not only violates the legal 
ethics code (‘that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in law 
                                                 
775 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 649(2).   
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practice’)776 but also the public’s expectations of how lawyers ought to behave 
(‘conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or keep a reasonable 
standard of competence or diligence’).777  In many ways, the public standard also 
incorporates the profession’s expectations of the conduct of a reasonably competent 
and diligent legal professional. 
Complaints alleging professional misconduct are heard by the Legal Practice 
Tribunal whose jurisdiction is to hear and decide lawyer-discipline applications.778  
The Tribunal is composed of the Supreme Court judges and constituted by one of its 
members.779  In addition, one member of the lay panel and one member of the 
practitioner panel sit with the Tribunal to hear and decide on lawyer-discipline 
applications.780  Decisions of the Tribunal can be appealed to the Court of Appeal.781   
While the sections on unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional 
misconduct do not particularly discuss behaviours, the 2007 Act does provide some 
context on what is meant by conduct subject to disciplinary proceedings. 
5.7 MEAIG OF CODUCT UDER THE LEGAL PROFESSIO ACT 
The Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) provides a non-exhaustive listing of the 
types of conduct which may be considered unsatisfactory professional conduct or 
professional misconduct. This list includes, but is not limited to, contravention of 
relevant law,782 charging excessive fees,783 insolvency under administration,784 and 
                                                 
776 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 419(1)(b).   
777 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 419(1) (a).   
778 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 601; See also Britton, above n 769.   
779 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 599. 
780 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 607(3). 
781 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 468(1); Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 292(1). 
782 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 420(a). 
783 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 420(b). 
784 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 420(d). 
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failing to comply with orders of a disciplinary body.785  Of particular relevance to this 
thesis is section 420(c), which states that ‘conduct for which there is a conviction for 
– (i) a serious offence; or (ii) a tax offence; or (iii) an offense involving dishonesty’786 
may be considered a violation of the Queensland ethics code.  Under section 11(1) of 
the 2007 Act, a conviction includes ‘a finding of guilt’787 or ‘the acceptance of a 
guilty plea’788 regardless of whether or not the conviction is recorded on sentence.  In 
addition, dishonesty is broadly interpreted and includes fraud.789  As such, it would 
seem that this includes deceptive or misleading conduct by the legal practitioner 
during negotiations.   
If the Committee or Tribunal finds that charges of dishonest conduct are found 
to be true, the legal practitioner is found guilty of such conduct.  That finding of guilt 
is considered a conviction for the purposes of section 420 of the 2007 Act and the 
legal professional will subsequently be found guilty of unsatisfactory professional 
conduct or professional misconduct.  Two items are worth noting at this point with 
regards to conduct as it does appear to impact the way ethics violation cases are heard 
and decided in this jurisdiction.790 
First, there is insufficient detailed information on the types or degrees of 
conduct which may be considered ‘dishonest’.791  Apart from the legal definition of 
fraud, there is little guidance in the 2007 Act about what constitutes dishonesty or 
                                                 
785 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 420(f). 
786 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 420(c). 
787 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 11(1)(a). 
788 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 11(1)(b). 
789 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), Schedule 2 Dictionary (defining ‘dishonesty’ as “includes fraud”). 
790 See Chapter 5, Section 5.9 for more discussion on the results of an empirical study of the ethics 
violation cases in the Queensland jurisdiction. 
791 Note: For the purpose of this thesis, ‘dishonesty’ can be achieved through the use of deceptive or 
misleading conduct.  As such, a person who acts in a way so as to deceive or mislead someone would 
be considered dishonest.  
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whether there are degrees or scales of dishonesty that are more egregious than others 
for the purposes of an ethics violation.  On its face, dishonesty in any form or forum 
appears to be strictly prohibited.  In the context of the use of deception in negotiation, 
one is left to presume that no amount or type of deception in negotiation is allowed 
under the Queensland legal ethics code.  In addition, any deception that would 
otherwise by acceptable under, for example, general negotiation practices, is 
presumably considered an actionable offence of dishonesty in this jurisdiction.   
Second, the lack of clearer distinctions between unsatisfactory professional 
conduct and professional misconduct needs to be remedied.  This may include a more 
precise definition of what a member of the public is entitled to expect from a legal 
professional versus what a member within the legal profession is entitled to expect 
from their colleagues, even under the same guise of ‘reasonable competence and 
diligence’.  To the extent that those expectations are not clear or are conflicting, the 
legal practitioner has little guidance but to be at the whim of the public on the one 
hand and the expectations of the profession on the other.  The same could be said of 
the sometimes conflicting duties to the client, the profession, the courts, the efficient 
administration of justice, and the public’s perception of legal services.792 
5.8 AGGRAVATIG AD MITIGATIG CIRCUMSTACES 
Aggravating and mitigating circumstances affect the degree to which the legal 
professional is prosecuted and punished for an alleged ethics violation.  The 
Commission has established two tests that must be satisfied post-investigation before 
                                                 
792 This topic is not the focus of this thesis and, as such, is not fully discussed.  There are numerous 
books and articles on these tripartite and sometimes conflicting duties, which explore this topic further. 
The reader is encouraged to read these for further information. 
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it will make an application to a disciplinary body to formally prosecute an alleged 
violation of the ethics code.   
First, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the practitioner will be found 
guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct by a 
disciplinary body based on the evidence (the reasonable likelihood test).793  Second, 
there must be a greater public interest in pursuing a formal disciplinary action (the 
public interest test) rather than not formally prosecuting the legal professional.794  The 
Commission must prove the allegations on the ‘balance of probabilities’.795 
In assessing the evidence, the Commission has the discretion to look at the 
totality of circumstances, including aggravating or mitigating factors in making their 
determination.796  Such factors include, but are not limited to, the seriousness of the 
conduct and the need to protect the public interest, the need to ‘send a message’ to 
deter other practitioners or employees from engaging in like conduct, whether the 
conduct involved dishonesty or taking advantage of vulnerable clients, whether there 
was a genuine mistake or misunderstanding, the cooperation of the respondent, the 
respondent’s health, age, or infirmity, whether there were any previous disciplinary 
actions, and special circumstances that require leniency.797 
It is well established that ‘the object of disciplinary action against legal 
practitioners is not to exact retribution... [but] to protect the public and reputation of 
                                                 
793 Legal Services Commission, Prosecution Guidelines, above n 769, 5. 
794 Ibid. 
795 Legal Services Commission, Prosecution Guidelines, above n 769, 5.; Legal Profession Act 2004, s 
479; See also Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 and SW Bar Association v Livesey [1982] 
2 NSWLR 231 at 238. 
796 Legal Services Commission, Prosecution Guidelines, above n 769, 6 
797 Legal Services Commission, Prosecution Guidelines, above n 769, 6-8. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 247 - 9-Aug-10 
the profession.’798  In addition, the Commission may take certain mitigating factors 
into account when considering formal prosecution of a lawyer in violation of the 
ethics code.  However, the review of the Queensland ethics violation disciplinary 
cases discussed in Section 5.10 shows a different story, one where post-appeal 
punishments and penalties amount to what could be the moral equivalent of 
retribution rather than deterrence even as the Commission may impose a more lenient 
disciplinary ruling. 
5.9 PEALITIES AD PUISHMETS 
The primary punishments when a legal practitioner is found guilty of 
unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct are suspension or 
striking off and a variety of costs orders.799   
As explained by Reynolds J in Mcamara, an order for suspension ‘must be 
based upon a view that at the determination of the end of the period of suspension800 
the practitioner will no longer be unfit to practice because, subject to any limitation 
imposed on the issue of a Practicing Certificate, his name will then be on the roll of 
solicitors and he may resume his practice.’801  Reynolds J goes on to indicate that the 
                                                 
798 Legal Services Commission, Prosecution Guidelines, above n 769, 7 (quoting Legal Services 
Commissioner v Baker [2005] QCA 482). 
799 See, eg, The Law Society of SW v Mcamara (NSW Court of Appeal, unreported 7 March 1980) 
(discussing the choices of strike-off and suspension) (‘Mcamara’); QLS v Maxwell James Mead 
[1997] QCA 083 (citing The Law Society of SW v Mcamara) (‘Maxwell James Mead’); Mellifont 
[1981] QdR 17, 30-31 (discussing the parameters of imposing a suspension). 
800 This appears to be a subjective assessment that looks to the expected conduct of the practitioner in 
the future.  For example, if the legal professional is suspended for six months, that period of suspension 
is based on the subjective view of the Tribunal that six months is adequate punishment and 
rehabilitation and that the lawyer will be re-instated and fit to practice after six months.  This seems 
highly subjective and arbitrary.  
801 Mcamara (NSW Court of Appeals, unreported 7 March 1980) 
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power of suspension can be a valuable punitive measure but ‘needs cautious 
application where fitness and the Court’s protective function is involved.’802 
A strike-off means that the legal practitioner is no longer considered a fit and 
proper person to practice law and is removed from the official roll of practitioners.803  
The practitioner would have to make a new application for admission at a future date 
to be reconsidered for admission to practice law again.  In the interim, the legal 
practitioner may not take any new instructions from clients and is, in effect, no longer 
considered a member of the profession.  The legal practitioner loses his/her practicing 
certificate and may not hold themselves out to the public as being a lawyer until such 
time as he or she re-applies and is re-instated onto the roll of legal professionals804 
There are many critical issues in imposing suspensions, strike-offs, and costs 
orders.  One involves the length of time that a legal practitioner should be suspended 
or struck-off.  A second issue is the additional imposition of an award of costs against 
the legal practitioner who has just been suspended or struck off.  A final issue is the 
extent to which the legal ethics codes infringe upon the lawyer’s personal conduct 
outside of professional obligations and when the legal practitioner is not engaged in 
the practice of law, such as when he or she is suspended or struck-off. 
As recent disciplinary actions in Queensland have shown, the Commission 
may be lenient and compassionate in taking mitigating circumstances into 
consideration; however the Queensland Law Society and Attorney General’s office as 
well as the courts, who operate on the basis of protecting the public interest as the 
                                                 
802 Mcamara (NSW Court of Appeals, unreported 7 March 1980). 
803 See, eg, Bax [1999] 2 QdR 4, 20 (“Where a practitioner is found to be unfit to practice, striking off, 
rather than a period of suspension, is generally appropriate.”). 
804 It is noted that in Queensland, there is no longer a distinction between solicitors and barristers.  One 
is now considered a ‘legal practitioner’.  I use the terms ‘legal professional’ and ‘legal practitioner’ 
interchangeably. 
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overriding concern, appear to have taken an almost zero-tolerance attitude towards 
legal practitioners who conduct themselves unethically and deceptively.    
The next three sections present the results of an empirical study of the ethics 
violation cases in Queensland over an eleven-year period.  These sections discuss how 
the Queensland jurisdiction decides ethics violation cases where the allegations 
involve misleading or deceptive conduct, with a specific focus on any such cases 
where the conduct took place in the context of a negotiation. 
5.10 QUEESLAD ETHICS VIOLATIO CASES 
The purpose of this section is to present the results of an original study I 
undertook which consisted of an analysis of the ethics violation cases in the 
Queensland jurisdiction between 1995 and 2006.  The study focused on cases that 
alleged deceptive or misleading conduct, regardless of forum, with special attention to 
cases where such alleged misconduct conduct happened in the course of a negotiation.  
This section begins with a brief discussion of some recent statistics of the Queensland 
Legal Services Commission (LSC) followed by the findings of the study of 
Queensland’s ethics violation cases. 
In 2007, John Briton, the current Legal Services Commissioner in 
Queensland,805 presented an update on the work of the LSC since its inception in 2004 
at the Barristers Association of Queensland Annual Conference.  The update included 
statistics on complaints received, complaints processed, and the subsequent 
disciplinary proceedings.  These statistics provide an important prelude to 
                                                 
805 Note: John Briton is not a lawyer.  This was considered an important symbolic and significant 
appointment in light of the reforms that led to the enactment of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld).  
See also Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 414 (stating that the Legal Services Commissioner can be a 
lay person or lawyer).  
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understanding the context of the subsequent analysis and discussion of ethics violation 
cases involving misleading and deceptive conduct. 
Prior to the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), the Queensland Law Society 
(QLS) dealt with lawyer complaints under the old system whereby the profession 
disciplined members of its own profession.  The QLS received 1,602 complaints in 
2002-2003 and 1,621 complaints in 2003-2004.806  At the inception of the LSC in July 
2004, the Commission had a backlog of almost 1,000 unprocessed and unresolved 
complaints, some of which had been in the old disciplinary system under the QLS for 
two or more years.807  Under the new system, the Commission received 1,450 
complaints in 2004-2005 and 1,074 complaints in 2005-2006.808  By March 2007, the 
Commission had worked through the backlog and finalized resolution of these 
complaints.  In addition, the Commission continued to receive ‘post-Act’809 
complaints.     
There are perhaps two primary reasons for the reduction in the number of 
complaints after the enactment of Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld).  One reason cited 
is the potentially artificial high number of complaints because of the Baker Johnson 
law firm scandal in 2002 and 2003 which dominated state and national headlines.810  
A second reason is most likely the process used by the QLS and the Commission to 
                                                 
806 John Britton, The Legal Services Commission: An Update 6 (Paper presented at the Bar Association 
of Queensland Annual Conference, 16–18 March 2007). 
807 Britton, above n 806, 1.  The old disciplinary system consisted of the Queensland Law Society’s 
enforcement of the legal ethics rules. 
808 Britton, above n 806, 6 (stating this is “a reduction of more than 130 new complaints a month to the 
fewer than 90.”). 
809 Note:  The term ‘post-Act’ refers to the enactment of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) which 
created the Legal Services Commission. 
810 Levin, above n 587, 190 (discussing a national Queensland case involving the misappropriation of 
funds from elderly clients);   Nimmo, above n 748,  2, 5, 7-9; Legal Ombudsman, The Queensland Law 
Society and Baker Johnson Lawyers (2003), 2, 5, 7–8. 
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pre-empt formal written complaints811 by dealing with consumer complaints 
informally in the first instance and formally if the matter could not be resolved to 
satisfaction through the informal process.812   
To explain the process briefly, both the LSC and QLS receive initial calls.  If it 
appears that the problem is minor (such as poor communication or misunderstandings), 
the LSC’s Compliant Officers or the QLS’s Client Relations Officers will attempt to 
resolve the matter informally and privately.813  If the LSC feels, for example, that the 
legal practitioner has undertaken restorative steps to correct the issues and prevent 
similar issues from occurring in the future, the LSC will, at its discretion, dismiss the 
complaint ‘in the public interest’.814  Conversely, if the LSC is not satisfied that the 
legal practitioner has taken restorative steps, the Commission may initiate a formal 
written complaint and call for an ‘own motion’ investigation.  An ‘own motion’ 
investigation means that the LSC can initiate a formal investigation into a matter or 
systemic issue without receiving a formal written complaint.815 
Returning to the statistical background of the complaints handled by the Legal 
Services Commission, the Commission finalised 978 conduct matters816 in 2005-
2006.817  Of the 978 conduct matters, 543 were related to solicitors, accounting for 9% 
of all solicitors in Queensland.  These complaints involved 459 law firms with the 
                                                 
811 Britton, above n 806, 6. 
812 Note:  The 2004 Act does not require an informal process and this was instituted by the Commission 
in 2004. 
813 Levin, above n 587, 193-194.  Complaints which are resolved informally and privately are not 
recorded and thus there is insufficient statistics to review these complaints. 
814 Levin, above n 587, 194.   
815 Legal Services Commission, ILP Investigations (2009) <http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/260.htm> at 9 
August 2010 (discussing an ‘own’ motion’ investigation). 
816 Note:  ‘Conduct matters’ refers to complaints alleging unsatisfactory professional conduct or 
professional misconduct.  These are different from ‘consumer disputes’ which may include disputes 
about fees and are not the subject of this study. 
817 Britton, above n 806, 6. 
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bulk of them being solo practitioner firms (258) or two-partner firms (76).818  Of the  
978 conduct matters finalised in 2005-2006, the primary complaints ranged involved 
alleged unethical conduct (4 in 10), poor service quality (1 in 5), costs/fees (1 in 6), 
and poor communication (1 in 10).819  Approximately 7 in 10 of these complaints 
were dismissed after investigation on the basis that ‘there was no reasonable 
likelihood of a finding by a disciplinary body of unsatisfactory professional conduct 
or professional misconduct.’820  In total, only about 8 in 100 of the 978 conduct 
matters (approximately 78 complaints) were the subject of formal disciplinary 
proceedings either in the Legal Practice Committee or the Legal Practice Tribunal.821   
The LSC 2005-2006 statistics regarding barristers in Queensland are under-
representative of the total number of barristers with a local practising certificate 
(773).822  The 2005-2006 statistics for complaints against barristers are under-
representative for three main reasons.  First, there are fewer barristers relative to the 
number of solicitors with practising certificates.823  Second, at the time these statistics 
were generated, the LSC database was not linked to the Queensland Bar Association 
database in order to provide a complete picture of barrister complaints.824  Third, 
barristers, except for those who accept direct briefs, deal less directly with clients and 
potential complainants than solicitors, who work directly with consumers of legal 
                                                 
818 Britton, above n 806, 8. 
819 Britton, above n 806, 6-7. 
820 Britton, above n 806, 7.  Note: This does not mean that there was not a valid complaint by the 
consumer of legal services. 
821 Britton, above n 806, 7.  
822 Britton, above n 806, 10 (stating also that the under-representation is not statistically significant 
because solicitors are more vulnerable to complaints because of the nature of their role in having more 
direct contact with consumers of legal services). 
823 Britton, above n 806, 9. 
824 Britton, above n 806, 9-10. 
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services most often and direct the barrister in court matters.825  Nevertheless, the 
statistics are insightful in regards to a barrister’s conduct and subsequent complaints. 
For example, between 2005 and 2006, the Commission received 57 complaints 
about barristers.  Of these, 25 were classified as conduct matters alleging either 
unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.  Of the complaints 
received by the Commission between July 2004 and December 2006, the majority of 
conduct matters were by the client or client’s solicitor (49%) or opposing client (15%).  
In addition, 15% of the conduct matters about barristers received by the Commission 
between July 2004 and December 2006 alleged ‘misleading conduct or dishonesty’ 
and 23% alleged ‘other unethical conduct’.826   
After investigation of the conduct matters involving barristers over the July 
2004 – December 2006 period, 67% were dismissed for lack of a reasonable 
likelihood of conviction by a disciplinary body.827  A further 20% of the conduct 
matters were finalised as dismissed based on other factors such as there being no 
public interest served in prosecuting the conduct.828  Currently, almost 15% of all 
conduct matters are dismissed on these grounds. 
The foregoing section provided a statistical background on the extent to which 
legal practitioners are formally prosecuted for violating the Queensland legal ethics 
codes.  The next section focuses on the results of the study of ethics violation cases 
alleging misleading or deceptive conduct. 
  
                                                 
825 Britton, above n 806, 9-10 (stating that barristers who accept direct briefs are over-represented’ with 
regards to barrister complaints received by the LSC). 
826 Britton, above n 806, 11.  
827 Britton, above n 806, 6.   
828 Britton, above n 806, 6 (noting that these figures are higher than in New South Wales). 
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5.10.1 Ethics Violation Cases Alleging Misleading/Deceptive Conduct 
(1996 – 2006) 
 
In attempting to determine whether legal ethics codes are successful in 
regulating the deceptive behaviours of legal professionals in negotiation, I undertook 
a study of the Queensland ethics violation cases between 1996 and 2006. The study 
looked at three primary factors:  1) the total number of ethics violation cases per year 
where the allegation was misleading or deceptive conduct; 2) the context in which the 
alleged violation occurred (e.g., in court or during a negotiation); and 3) the impact of 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances on a finding of guilt or during the 
punishment phase.  Each of these primary factors is discussed below.  
First, the focus of the study was on cases where the alleged violation was 
misleading or deceptive conduct and cases that were formally prosecuted via formal 
disciplinary hearings.  The period of eleven (11) years was selected because of the 
availability of case materials as well as because such a time period would be sufficient 
to show any major trends.  The cases reviewed and analysed as part of this empirical 
study were derived from the Commission’s public discipline register.829  These cases 
are those which could not be resolved through the Law Society’s or the Commission’s 
informal pre-emptive complaints handling process.   
Between 1996 and 2006, there were approximately twenty (20) formal 
disciplinary cases raised against barristers and solicitors involving some type of 
deceptive or misleading conduct resulting in the legal practitioner being found guilty 
of unsatisfactory professional conduct, professional misconduct, or both.830  Table 5.1 
and Chart 5.2 below provide both a breakdown of the number of cases per year and a 
                                                 
829 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), ss 296 and 474; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 472.   
830 See Chart 5.2 for a graphical representation of these cases over the years. 
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graphic representation of the total number of cases across the 1996 - 2006 periods, 
respectively. 
Table 5.1:  Ethics Violation Cases Alleging Deceptive/Misleading Conduct -
Queensland, Australia (1996 - 2006) 
 
Year # Cases (Deception) 
1996 1 
1997 2 
1998 3 
1999 0 
2000 3 
2001 3 
2002 1 
2003 2 
2004 2 
2005 1 
2006 2 
    
TOTALS 20 
 
 
Chart 5.2:  Ethics Violation Cases Alleging Deceptive/Misleading Conduct -
Queensland, Australia (1996 - 2006) 
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With regards to the deceptive or misleading conduct subject to discipline, 
approximately seven (7) of the cases involved misappropriation of client funds as a 
result of or in relation to a violation of duties under the Trust Accounts Act, four (4) 
cases involved submitting or presenting documents or affidavits that were false or 
with intent to mislead, one (1) case involved attempting to persuade a potential 
witness to perjure, four (4) cases involved failure to disclose information to a 
professional body or disclosing information to a professional body that was false or 
with intent to mislead, one (1) case involved fraudulent conduct in a personal capacity 
whilst relying on professional status, one (1) case involved excessive fines and 
dishonesty in charging fees, and one (1) case involved deceptive conduct in 
communicating with others and opposing counsel.  A summary of the alleged 
deceptive or misleading conduct is included below in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3:  Ethics Violation Cases – Summary of Alleged Deceptive or 
Misleading Conduct (1996 - 2006) 
 
umber of Cases Alleged Misconduct 
7 Misappropriation of client funds 
4 Document/affidavit false or with intent to mislead 
4 Failure to disclose information as requested/misleading 
information disclosed 
1 Induce witness to perjure 
1 Furthering client’s case by dishonest means 
1 Fraudulent conduct in personal capacity 
1 Excessive fees / dishonest charging of fees 
1 Deceptive conduct with opposing counsel and third-party 
 
 
Second, in addition to the general statistics on ethics violation cases alleging 
misleading or deceptive conduct, the study looked at the context in which the alleged 
violation occurred and the effect of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances on 
the final outcome of the case.  
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With regards to the context in which the offending conduct occurred, most 
involved daily practice.  Of the twenty (20) cases that were the focus of this study, it 
appears that approximately sixteen (16) of the cases involved ethics violation cases 
where the conduct occurred during the course of daily practice.  In addition, three (3) 
of the cases involved ethics violations where the alleged conduct occurred while in a 
formal hearing or in relation to a matter involving a professional body, such as an 
application for admission to the bar.  Finally, one (1) case involved an ethics violation 
where the conduct alleged occurred during the course of handling a personal 
transaction (personal conduct) which allegedly adversely reflected upon the 
profession to such a degree that formal disciplinary action was warranted.831   
In the context of this thesis and the issue of lying in negotiation, only one case 
was identified where the deceptive or misleading conducted occurred during 
negotiations.  The Mullins case is discussed further in Section 5.10.2.  The lack of 
formal prosecution of deception in negotiation appears to indicate that negotiation 
behaviour is not a prime focus of legal ethics violation cases.   
With regards to the impact of aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances on 
the decision of the case, in nearly each of the cases reviewed, aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances were presented to support a finding of guilty or not guilty or 
to support the final sentencing.  The common aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances cited and extracted from the cases in this study are listed in Table 5.4 
below. 
                                                 
831 See Appendix 2 (Queensland Ethics Violations Cases (1996 - 2007) Summary Analysis) for further 
information. 
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Table 5.4:  Ethics Violation Cases – Common Aggravating and Mitigating 
Circumstances (1996 - 2006)
832
 
 
Aggravating Circumstances Mitigating Circumstances 
• Failure to pay restitution for moneys 
lost; 
• Failure to show remorse for conduct; 
• Acknowledging wrong conduct on 
previous violation yet continuing to 
engage in wrong conduct; repeat 
offenders; 
• Not cooperating with Law Society 
investigations; 
• Prior findings and convictions of 
unprofessional conduct; 
• Persistent in wrong conduct over a 
period of time; not an isolated 
incident 
• Restitution made for any monies lost 
by client; 
• Years of experience (sometimes this 
was considered an aggravating 
circumstance); 
• Showing remorse; 
• Pleading guilty, conveying remorse, 
apologising; 
• No active or intentional deception; 
• Conduct was not intended to create 
personal pecuniary advantage at the 
expense of client’s disadvantage in 
monies 
 
 
In reviewing the impact of aggravating or mitigating circumstances on each 
case, it appears that, in particular, the range of mitigating circumstances varied yet 
seemed to have little or no effect on the final outcome.  By this I mean that, generally, 
no single aggravating circumstance or perceived aggravating circumstance had greater 
weight than mitigating circumstances.  In nearly all cases where the first level tribunal 
or committee hearing took into account mitigating circumstances,833 the case was 
subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal by the Attorney-General and Minister 
of Justice.  On appeal, in nearly all of these cases, the order of the Tribunal was set 
aside and the legal practitioner was struck off the roll.834  Aggravating or mitigating 
                                                 
832 See also Appendix 3 (Queensland Ethics Violations Cases (1996 - 2007) Analysis for 
Aggravating/Mitigating Circumstances) for a detailed analysis of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances per each case analysed in this empirical study. 
833 Note: As a result of taking into consideration the mitigating circumstances, the Tribunal or 
Committee generally decided to impose a heavy fine with costs or a suspended sentence with costs 
instead of heavier sanctions such as a strike-off.  See Chapter 4, Section 4.9 (Penalties and Punishment) 
for more information. 
834 See Appendix 2 (Queensland Ethics Violations Cases (1996 - 2007) Summary Analysis) for further 
information. 
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circumstances were not necessarily weighed equally, objectively, or even on the 
balance of probabilities that the practitioner could reform his conduct through less 
severe punishments.  The overriding reason provided for cases being overturned on 
appeal was the protection of the public interest, even to the significant detriment to the 
lawyer in terms of lost income, loss of a viable profession,  loss of the only means to 
earn a living for which s/he was trained, and financial ruin in some cases. 
It should also be noted that the fourteen (14) cases between 1996 and July 
2004, when the Commission came into existence, were all prosecuted directly by the 
Law Society in conjunction with the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, where 
there was no lay member representation on the panels deciding the case. 
Interestingly, the six (6) cases formally prosecuted after the enactment of the 
2004 Act seem to indicate a greater deference to the findings and orders of the 
Tribunal even after the case was appealed by the Attorney General or Minister for 
Justice.  In addition, the cases prosecuted by the Commission seem to take into 
account the mitigating factors at least in equal measure with aggravating 
circumstances.  Whether the fact that the current Commissioner is a non-lawyer and 
the current Legal Practice Tribunal has lay member representation has an impact on 
the findings and orders at first level hearings is difficult to establish.  It could have 
very little impact as lay members have no legal background, have expressed being 
overwhelmed by the process at times and have felt daunted when participating in the 
post-2004 Act cases.835   
On the other hand, the presence of lay members and those who actively 
participate in the hearings would likely bring to the hearings the ethical perspective of 
                                                 
835 See, eg, Levin, above n 587, 194-195 (discussing briefly some comments from lay members 
participating in the Legal Practice Committee and Legal Practice Tribunal for first level hearings.). 
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the community in which they live as well as the ethics standards of society in general.  
As Levin through his informal interviews with lay members of the Legal Practice 
Tribunal, lay members may have disagreed with the outcomes of the Tribunal hearing 
but ‘felt inhibited in terms of raising questions and talking during hearings.’836   
In addition, even where lay members may have had strong opinions against a 
proposed resolution to the case, they would have to write a dissent from the majority 
view, something ‘they may feel ill-equipped to do.’837  Finally, with regards to this 
thesis, of the twenty (20) cases that composed the focus of this empirical study, only 
one (1) case had a dissenting opinion and that opinion appears to be drafted by a legal 
practitioner, not a lay member of the panel.838   
Finally, none of the pre-2004 Act cases alleging deceptive or misleading 
conduct were in the context of formal negotiations.  However, during the post-2004 
Act, when the Legal Services Commission took over the lawyer discipline system, it 
appears that the LSC took a much broader view of the context in which a lawyer may 
violate the ethics codes.  Of significant importance to this thesis, the LSC did formally 
prosecute one case that involved potentially deceptive or misleading conduct in the 
context of a negotiation that was being conducted at mediation.   The case involved a 
barrister who allegedly engaged in deceptive or misleading in a 2003 insurance claims 
negotiation that took place during mediation.  This case will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section. 
                                                 
836 Ibid. 
837 Ibid. 
838  Bax [1998] QCA 089 (Pincus JA) (stating “It is not, in my opinion, every proved act of dishonesty 
on the part of the practitioner which justifies a substantial penalty; dishonesty, like other forms of 
misbehaviour, has grades of seriousness.”). 
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5.10.2 The Mullins Case – Deception in egotiation 
 
As previously discussed, during the period between 2005 and 2006, the 
Commission received 1,074 new complaints, of which 978 were classified as conduct 
matters.839  Of the 978 conduct matters finalised in 2005-2006, approximately 8 in 10 
(78 cases) were the subject of formal disciplinary proceedings.840  The Mullins case841 
was the only case formally prosecuted in which the allegation was alleged deception 
in the context of a negotiation conducted during a formal mediation process.  As such, 
the Mullins case represents less than 1% of all conduct matters finalised in 2005-2006 
and less than 2% of all conduct matters subject to formal disciplinary proceedings.  Of 
the twenty (20) cases over a period of 1996 to 2006 that were the subject of this 
empirical study where formal disciplinary proceedings were initiated and alleged 
deceptive or misleading conduct, Mullins appears to be the only case in which the 
violations occurred in the context of negotiations.842   
Theoretically, if between 2002 and 2004, the Queensland Law Society 
received a total of 3,223 complaints and between 2004 and 2006, the LSC  received 
2,525 complaints with approximately 1,000 new complaints in 2007, then the Mullins 
case represents 1 in a total of approximately 6,747 complaints over a five-year period 
where deception in negotiation was formally prosecuted.843  This does not even take 
into account the total number of complaints received between 1996 and 2002 which 
                                                 
839 Britton, above n 806, 6.  
840 Britton, above n 806, 7.   
841 Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins [2006] LPT 012 (Mullins). 
842 See Appendix 2 (Queensland Ethics Violations Cases (1996 - 2007) Summary Analysis) for more 
detailed information.  
843 Note:  These estimates were calculated from statistics provided in the following publication: John 
Britton, The Legal Services Commission: An Update 6 (Paper presented at the Bar Association of 
Queensland Annual Conference, 16–18 March 2007).  It should be noted that this is significant given 
that lawyers negotiate all the time in all facets of their profession and that negotiation is considered a 
critical and indispensable skill for successful and effective lawyers. 
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may have alleged similar misconduct and not been formally prosecuted or the total 
number of complaints alleging similar, yet less egregious conduct, which may have 
been informally and privately finalised by the Queensland Law Society or the 
Commission.   
Statistically speaking, the Mullins case may be considered an important case 
because it appears to be an aberration as compared with other types of cases formally 
prosecuted by the LSC and represents the LSC’s power of broad discretion to 
prosecute cases under the legal ethics rules which may have previously been 
considered ‘off-limits’ or non-actionable.  For these reasons and others as explained 
by the Tribunal, Mullins is a watershed case in terms of legal ethics and a seminal 
case in terms of permissible or actionable deception during negotiations in the 
Queensland jurisdiction, a jurisdiction that, unlike the United States, makes no 
exceptions on the prohibition of all forms of dishonesty, whether in negotiations, 
mediations, or elsewhere.  Having placed the Mullins case in context, the following is 
a detailed discussion of the case.844   
Mullins is a prominent Queensland barrister (respondent) who, in 2003, was 
retained to represent a former builder (White-claimant) who had become a 
quadriplegic845 as a result of a motor vehicle accident in 2001.846  The case revolved 
around Mullins’ conduct in connection with negotiations during a mediation setting 
for a claim for compensation for personal injuries against an insurer, Suncorp.847 
                                                 
844 Note:  Because the case is publically available via the Commission’s public discipline register, 
names as used in the Tribunal’s decision are also used here for ease of reference and clarity of 
discussion. 
845 Quadriplegic is the inability to use all four limbs.  
846 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 2 [2].  See also Annabelle McDonald, “Patel case lawyer fined for 
deception”, The Australian (Friday, November 24, 2006). 
847 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 2 [1], [2]. 
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In April 2001, White (claimant-client) retained solicitors in order to pursue a 
claim for personal injury damages.848  During the period between 2001 and 2003, the 
claimant’s solicitors presented to Suncorp (insurer) various reports including medical 
reports and comprehensive assessments (Evidex reports) regarding the claimant’s life 
expectancy, work-life expectancy, and future earning capacity.849  By mid-Sept 2003, 
a mediation was arranged in an ‘attempt to negotiate a compromise’ of the claimant’s 
personal injury claims.850  Both the claimant and insurer retained barristers to 
represent their interests in the mediation.  The claimant and his solicitors retained 
Mullins.851 
On 16 September 2003, Mullins held a conference with the claimant and the 
claimant’s solicitor to prepare for the mediation scheduled for 19 September 2003.852  
At this pre-mediation conference, the claimant disclosed that he had ‘secondary 
cancer’ which had been discovered on or about 1 September 2003 and for which he 
was undergoing chemotherapy treatments.853   
Apparently, there were no medical reports or records about the facts related to 
the cancer.854  Mullins advised the claimant and his solicitor that he thought the cancer 
facts should be disclosed to Suncorp prior to the mediation.855  The claimant, however, 
instructed both his solicitor (Garrett) and barrister (Mullins) to not disclose the cancer 
                                                 
848 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 2 [2].   
849 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 2 [3] – [6].   
850 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 2 [7].   
851 Ibid.   
852 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 2 [8].   
853 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 2 [9].   
854 Note:  There may have been reports but these reports were likely not generated as part of the 2001 
Evidex reports pursuant to the 2001 accident.  Whether they should have been included and the Evidex 
reports regenerated with updated information seems to be a key material issue.   
855 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 3 [10].  Given Mullins’ experience, he would have known this would 
impact life expectancy and all future estimates for damages.  This was also seen as a material issue in 
the Tribunal’s opinion, that being the timing of when Mullins became aware of this fact.   
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facts to Suncorp ‘unless he was legally obligated to do so’856 and to proceed with the 
mediation.  Apparently both Garrett and Mullins felt that they were not legally 
obligated to reveal the cancer facts to the insurer (Suncorp) and Mullins subsequently 
presented Suncorp’s barrister (Kent) with a two-page document outlining the 
claimant’s schedule of damages and argument at mediation.857  The Plaintiff’s Outline 
as prepared by Mullins repeatedly relied on and referred to the Evidex report as the 
basis of the proposed settlement figures contained in the Plaintiff’s Outline.858  This 
was despite the fact that Mullins knew of the life expectancy assumption in the 
Evidex reports as based on medical reports in 2001 and also presumably knew that the 
life expectancy assumption would be different given the 2003 disclosure of the 
claimant’s cancer.859  Between 16 September 2003 and 18 September 2003, Mullins 
spoke with Kent (Suncorp’s barrister) and, according to the “Statement of Agreed 
Facts”, again stated that the ‘claim for future economic loss was based on the [Evidex] 
report’ and did not seek to correct or disclaim860 any assumptions contrary to the 
Evidex reports.  Mullin’s representations were apparently accepted to the extent that 
Suncorp’s barrister and representatives of Suncorp concluded that consistent with the 
                                                 
856 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 3 [10].  See also Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), s 45(3) 
(requires the claimant to disclose to the insurer “a significant change in the claimant’s medical 
condition, or in other circumstances, relevant to the extent of the claimant’s disabilities or financial 
loss” within 1 month of becoming aware of the change.).  As the claimant was bound by the Act, the 
timing of disclosure would have significantly affected the claimant’s payout and was a material issue 
for the insurer, Suncorp.). 
857 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 3 [11] (called “Plaintiff’s Outline of Argument at Mediation” by the 
claimant and referred to here as the “Plaintiff’s Outline”).   
858 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 3 [11] – [13]. 
859 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 3 [13]. 
860 Cf Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592, 605 (Per Gleeson CJ, Hayne and 
Heydon JJ) (stating “In applying those principles, it is important that the agent’s conduct be viewed as 
a whole. It is not right to characterise the problem as one of analysing the effect of its “conduct” 
divorced from “disclaimers” about that “conduct” and divorced from other circumstances which might 
qualify its character. Everything relevant the agent did up to the time when the purchasers contracted to 
buy the Rednal land must be taken into account.”). 
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Evidex report, ‘the claimant had a life expectancy of 80% of that of a normal man of 
his age.’861   
During the same period and by 18 September 2003, Mullins apparently spoke 
to senior counsel about his situation regarding disclosure of the cancer facts and also 
conducted some research.862  He initially thought that the cancer facts should be 
disclosed.863  However, after receiving advice from senior counsel, Mullins concluded 
that ‘as long as the claimant’s lawyers [Mullins] did not positively mislead Suncorp 
and its [Suncorp] lawyers about the claimant’s life expectancy, they would not be 
violating any professional ethical rules’ by not disclosing the cancer facts.864  Mullins 
discussed this conclusion with White (claimant) and White’s solicitor and reiterated 
that White was not obligated to disclose the cancer facts, and that it was ‘not 
appropriate to make positive assertions during the mediation.’865 
The mediation proceeded on 19 September 2003 as scheduled, with Suncorp 
continuing to rely on the Evidex reports and Mullins or the claimant’s solicitor 
making no corrections to the assumptions based on changed circumstances on the part 
of the claimant.  The claim was settled at mediation866 which, according to the 
Tribunal was not conducted subject to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules.867 
                                                 
861 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 4 [14] - ]16], 2 [4]. 
862 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 5 [19]. 
863 Ibid. 
864 Ibid. 
865 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 5 [20].  The ‘positive assertions’ seem to be any statements made without 
being asked that might have a negative impact on the claimant’s ability to get a maximum settlement 
from the insurer.  
866 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 5 [21] – [24].  See also McDonald, above n 846 (saying the claim was 
settled for over $1 million). 
867 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 5 [15], n 7 (citing Rule 325 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 
(Qld), which requires that “the parties must act reasonably and genuinely in the mediation…”).  This 
particular mediation appears to be one conducted outside of the ‘court-annexed’ mediation (i.e. a 
private mediation) as envisioned by the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). 
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In 2006, the Legal Services Commissioner pursued formal disciplinary action 
against barrister Mullins alleging that Mullins was ‘guilty of professional misconduct 
in connection with negotiations…that the respondent knowingly misled an insurer and 
its lawyers about this client’s life expectancy.’868  The complaint alleged that the 
result of this misleading behaviour was that had Suncorp known about the cancer facts 
and potential change in life expectancy, they would not have agreed to the settlement 
at mediation.869  Mullins was accused of fraudulent deception.870 
During the Tribunal hearing, Mullins contended that because the negotiations 
were of a ‘commercial’ nature,871 there was a ‘tacit, common assumption that…the 
parties would rely exclusively on their own resources and information’,872 presumably 
meaning that there was no duty of disclosure.  Furthermore, it seems Mullins argued 
that there was ‘no reasonable expectation that influential information communicated 
during the negotiations would not knowingly be false.’873  In other words, Mullins 
appears to argue that because the negotiations were a commercial matter and outside 
of the court rules, legal ethics rules requiring honesty did not apply, there was not 
duty of disclosure as would apply in litigation, and the normal reasonable expectations 
were that negotiations would be conducted under generally accepted principles of 
negotiation, which allow for some permissible deception or lack of affirmative 
disclosure, such as lies by omission.  In this case, Mullins was trying to get the best 
possible settlement for his client with duty to the client trumping a duty of candour to 
the court or the profession. 
                                                 
868 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 2 [1]. 
869 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 5 [23]. 
870 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 5 [23], 8 [31].  See also McDonald, above n 846. 
871 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 6 [25].   
872 Ibid.   
873
 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 6 [25].   
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It appears the Tribunal was startled by these arguments874 and equally resolute 
to set right the obligations of legal professionals in this context.875  First, the Tribunal 
established that the commercial aspect of the negotiations did not preclude a duty to 
be honest during negotiations stating ‘that negotiations between a potential litigant 
and a tortfeasor’s insurer for a damages claim may be tinged with a commercial 
aspect serves rather to support the idea that the negotiations anticipate a measure of 
honesty from each other.  After all, honesty promotes confidence in the process.’876  
The Tribunal quoted Lord Bingham of Cornhill in the HIH Casualty case as stating 
that ‘[p]arties entering into a commercial contract…will assume the honesty…of the 
other[s]; absent such assumption they would not deal.’877 
Second, the Tribunal affirmed that just because lawyers participate in 
negotiations of such personal matters does not mean that ‘legal consequences will not 
attach to intentional deception about material facts.’878 
Third, the Tribunal referred to the relevant rules of the Bar Association of 
Queensland’s Code of Professional Conduct,879 namely Rules 51 and 52, which 
                                                 
874 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 6 [26] (the Tribunal states that the contentions are “at first blush startling” 
because they seem to say that neither law nor a more demanding ethical duty apply in this situation, 
something the  Tribunal obviously considered void of merit).   
875 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 6 [27] (“Context influences the extent of legal and equitable obligations of 
disclosure.” (citing Donne Place Pty Ltd v Conan Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 481, [42]-[44]; Magill v Magill 
[2006] HCA 51, [48], [58], [156]). 
876 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 6 [27].  
877 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 6 [27] (citing HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase 
Manhattan Bank [2003] UKHL 6, [15]; [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61, 68). 
878 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 6 [28], note 15 (citing Magill v Magill [2006] HCA 51, [140] (stating 
“[t]he cases in which a court could conclude that the party making the representation, and the party to 
whom it was made, both intended at the time of the representation that legal consequences should 
attach to the veracity of what was said or written would be rare indeed.  Unless both parties are shown 
to have intended that what was said or done should give rise to legally enforceable consequences, the 
action for deceit will not lie.”).  Magill concerned a family law matters and the court distinguished 
representations in the context of marriage versus representations in the context of contracts.  Mullins 
was about a contractual matter and therefore, actions could have legally enforceable consequences. 
879 See Chapter 4 for more information on the applicable legal ethics rules in Queensland.  
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impose a positive duty of honesty, and asserted that mediations are not ‘an honesty-
free zone’880 in which barristers can neglect or shed their ethical obligations. 
Finally, the Tribunal found that Mullins had ‘intentionally deceived’ the 
opposing barrister, the insurer Suncorp and Suncorp’s representatives.881  The 
Tribunal further found Mullins guilty of professional misconduct because the 
‘fraudulent deception…involved such a substantial departure from the standard of 
conduct expected of legal practitioners of good repute and competency.’882 
However, having found Mullins guilty of professional misconduct, the 
Tribunal fully acknowledged and gave weight to certain mitigating circumstances883 
and only imposed a penalty of a substantial fine and a public reprimand,884 stating that 
‘the protection of the public does not require more severe sanctions’885 since the 
public reprimand and fine would be a sufficient deterrent to similar future  behaviour.  
As Legal Services Commissioner John Briton stated post-hearing, the decision ‘…has 
provided a reminder to all members of the profession to act honestly and to be candid 
and accurate in the representation of their client’s cases whether in court, in 
mediations, or in everyday dealings.’886 
The Tribunal’s decision in Mullins could be described as a double-edged 
sword.  As discussed earlier, this case and the context of this case seem anomalous 
when compared to the thousands of complaints received and hundreds of formal 
disciplinary proceedings finalised over the last twenty years.  While the decision in 
                                                 
880 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 7 [29]; See also Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 2004 (Qld), Rule 21 
(requiring candour even in a matter that may be of adverse interest to the client) and Rule 14 (in which 
‘court’ is defined to include a ‘mediation’). 
881 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 7 [30]. 
882 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 8 [31]. 
883
 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 8 [33] – [34]. 
884 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 9 [36]. 
885 Mullins, [2006] LPT 012, 8 [35]. 
886 McDonald, above n 846. 
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Mullins is important, there is a real likelihood that the decision will not have a 
significant impact on the future potentially deceptive behaviours of legal practitioners 
in similar circumstances.  This is because the case represents only a single case in 
over 11 years that involves negotiation behaviour.  In addition, the punishment 
imposed by Tribunal is not a deterrent to future such conduct.   
On the one hand, the Mullins decision appears to have clarified and perhaps 
broadened the reach of legal ethics rules and positive duties of candour and 
truthfulness in Queensland beyond the comfort zones of most legal professionals.  As 
the Tribunal stated, legal practitioners should not consider mediations or negotiation 
behaviour in mediation as exempt from duties of honesty and candour. 
One the other hand, by imposing a penalty on the barrister that is: 1) like a slap 
on the wrist; and 2) substantially lenient as compared with prior decisions of the 
Tribunal or Court of Appeals, the Tribunal may have simply conducted a symbolic 
‘public flogging’ of one lawyer while, at the same time, tacitly acknowledging and 
condoning such behaviour in the future.  Certainly, if one is to believe the findings of 
Davis’ study of the negotiating attitudes and beliefs of personal injury lawyers in 
Queensland,887 Mullins’ behaviour is normal, to be expected, and essential to the 
nature of personal injury claims negotiations in Queensland, where both plaintiff and 
defendant lawyers misrepresent and exaggerate offers in order to obtain some sense of 
justice for their client.888  At the same time, Mullins’ reputation, to the extent that his 
clients and colleagues are aware of this ethics violation case and therefore concerned 
by such conduct, may be impacted by this matter. 
                                                 
887 Davis, above n 126.  
888 See Chapter 3 for a list of deceptive behaviours of personal injury lawyers based on Davis’ study. 
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In conclusion, the foregoing discussion of the Mullins case highlights a key 
finding of the empirical study of the Queensland ethics violation cases over the last 
ten years, namely that there is little to no formal prosecution of legal professionals 
who engage in allegedly deceptive conduct in negotiation.   
There could be several reasons for the lack of little to no formal prosecution of 
such cases.   First, as discussed previously, there may be a significant number of like 
cases which are not reported, cases which are reported and resolved or settled 
informally outside of the LSC dispute process, or cases which are reported and 
resolved informally within the LSC process so that formal prosecution does not serve 
the public interest.   
Another possibility for lack of little or no formal prosecution of such cases is 
that deceptive behaviour in negotiation does not happen as frequently in this 
jurisdiction as in other jurisdictions; however, in the case of personal injury claims, 
this would be contrary to Davis’ findings that strategic deception is a norm between 
plaintiffs and defendants in personal injury claims.889  The Mullins case confirms the 
findings of Davis’ study in this regard.  The difference is that the LSC decided to 
formally prosecute Mullins in this instance and possibly decided not to formally 
prosecute other legal practitioners who handle similar personal injury claims either 
because such claims were informally settled or the matter was not deemed egregious 
enough to warrant formal prosecution in the interests of the public.   
In cases where there is formal prosecution, the sanctions appear to be smaller 
and symbolic rather than large sanctions geared towards retribution, punishment, or 
rehabilitation of the legal professional in this regard.   
                                                 
889 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3 (Research About Legal Negotiation) for more information on Davis’ 
study. 
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In summary, section 5.1 defined the success of legal ethics codes in preventing 
deception in negotiation, in part, by its ability to serve as a deterrent to prevent future 
such conduct through effective formal prosecutions and low recidivism rates which 
then protect the public and reduce the public perception of  lawyers as deceptive or 
misleading.890  In assessing whether legal ethics codes are successful in curtailing 
deception in negotiation, several points can be made. 
First, the statistics of this unique study demonstrates a consistent pattern of 
ethics violations, sometimes increasing every year despite the presence of the same 
legal ethics code across those years.  The fact that only 20 cases of misleading and 
deceptive behaviour over an eleven-year period are formally prosecuted seems to 
indicate that there is not a large focus on deterring or punishing such conduct, 
especially in negotiations.   
Second, the Mullins case highlights the findings of the research on legal 
negotiation behaviour in personal injury cases as well as the effectiveness of ethics 
codes.  The Mullins case seems to confirm Davis’ findings that the use of deception in 
personal injury cases is considered normal and acceptable.891  Furthermore, the 
Mullins case appears to reinforce Wilkinson et al’s, Moliterno’s, and Lamb’s research 
that while lawyers do face ethical dilemmas, the legal ethics codes are not the primary 
source of guidance used by lawyers in deciding ethical dilemmas and, at times, do not 
provide sufficient guidance.892  In the case of Mullins, for example, the barrister’s 
                                                 
890 See Chapter 5, Section 5.1 (Introduction) for more information. 
891 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4 (Deception in Negotiation and Personal Injury) for more information on 
this topic. 
892 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4 (Research About Legal Ethics) for more information on this topic. 
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reliance on advice from senior counsel appears to have taken precedence over his own 
initial decision towards full disclosure, thus resulting in an ethics violation.893 
Finally, the legal ethics codes of this jurisdiction and similar jurisdictions, at 
least on the basis of this study and confirmed by the research in Chapters 2 and 3, 
support that possible conclusion that legal ethics codes, without more, are not as 
successful as they can be in curtailing deception in negotiation.  As such, more must 
be done to ensure that the legal ethics codes can effectively and successfully curtail 
deception in negotiation.  This can be achieved through the implementation of a set of 
integrated policy reforms as discussed in Chapter 7.   
5.11 CHAPTER COCLUSIO 
The main focus of this chapter was to present the results of an empirical study 
of the legal ethics violation cases in the state of Queensland, Australia.  This common 
law jurisdiction was selected for a number of strategic reasons:  1) sufficient number 
of cases were available to support the study objectives; 2) the ethics violation cases 
for Queensland were readily available via a central public register; 3) the legal ethics 
code of Queensland is sufficiently different from the ABA  MRPC so it served as a 
useful point of comparison between the actual rule and the perceived or actual 
behaviours in contravention of the ethics rules; and 4) the study provides an analytical 
framework which can be used in future, similar studies.  
After introducing the key statutory and disciplinary framework within the 
Queensland jurisdiction as well as some recent statistical data on prosecutions of 
ethics violation cases, this chapter discussed the results of the study of ethics violation 
                                                 
893 See Chapter 5, Section 5.9.2 (The Mullins Case – Deception in Negotiation) for a full discussion of 
the Mullins case.  See also Mullins, [2006] LPT 012. 
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cases.  A notable conclusion from the study is that across a decade of prosecuting 
ethics violation cases involving deceptive or misleading conduct, only one case 
involved negotiation.   A possible yet unlikely conclusion is that lawyer-negotiators in 
the Queensland jurisdiction are never deceptive or misleading and if they are, they are 
vehemently prosecuted in a manner that provides sufficient deterrence against future 
such conduct by other lawyers.  A more likely and reasonable conclusion, however, is 
that this single case was a token case prosecuted only because of the notoriety of the 
offending lawyer.  Furthermore, a lawyer’s deceptive and misleading behaviour in 
negotiations is not prosecuted with the same fervour as other, perhaps more egregious, 
violations of the Queensland legal ethics codes.   
The next chapter consolidates the findings of the  three primary research 
questions introduced in Chapter 1 and subsequently discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.  
The focus of the next chapter is to establish the implications of the foregoing research 
findings on the need for strategic, integrated policy reforms aimed at addressing this 
timely, yet unresolved issue within the legal profession.  
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CHAPTER 6 –  
THE FOUDATIO FOR CHAGE 
 
 
‘Wholesale cultural change is essential if we are to give life to the 
promise of the law. [Legal culture has] failed to evolve sufficiently 
with the law.  [The alternative is being to be part of] a revolution 
with the ordinary person in mind.’  
 
~ Victoria’s Attorney-General Rob Hulls
894
  
 
 
The preceding three chapters presented and discussed the analyses of the three 
primary research questions established in Chapter 1, including the findings from an 
analysis of the potentially deceptive behaviours of lawyers during negotiations, the 
ways in which legal ethics codes attempt to regulate such behaviours and a qualitative 
analysis of the legal ethics violation cases in one common law jurisdiction.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to summarise the critical findings and establish the case for 
change regarding the central issue of managing the use of potentially deceptive 
conduct by lawyers in negotiations.     
6.1 ITRODUCTIO 
Victoria’s Attorney-General Rob Hulls’ quote above echoes the sentiments of 
Victoria’s Director of Public Prosecutions, Jeremy Rapke QC, regarding the 
fundamental problems of the state’s adversarial criminal justice system.
895
  However, 
the sentiments apply equally across the entire legal system since the genesis of the 
profession’s current adversarial model for both civil and criminal matters stems from 
the criminal justice system model established since the seventeenth century.
896
  Today, 
                                                 
894
 Merritt, above n 560, 1. 
895
 Merritt, above n 560, 2. 
896
 Carrie Menkel-Meadow (2004) ‘Is the Adversary System Really Dead? Dilemmas of Legal Ethics 
as Legal Institutions and Roles Evolve’ in Jane Holder, Colm O'Cinneide and Michael Freeman (eds.) 
Current Legal Problems 85-115 (2004).  Menkel-Meadow provides a historical view of the legal 
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whether in criminal or civil matters, the primary and most often-used skill by lawyers 
on a daily basis is negotiation.
897
  Over the last 20 years, negotiation has played an 
even more important role in light of the ‘vanishing trial’ phenomenon,
898
 the increased 
mandate for settlement negotiations, and the ever-expanding use of alternative dispute 
resolution processes such as mediation and arbitration.
899
  As Chart stated, 
‘negotiation is therefore an inevitable and major part of what lawyers do, in terms 
both of their significance of their negotiation efforts for clients, and the amount of 
time they devote to it’.
900
  As such, how lawyers negotiate and the tactics and 
behaviours that form part of the lawyer’s negotiation repertoire transcend the 
individual lawyer and are a reflection of how the profession operates.
901
  Most 
importantly, it creates an image and a perception in the eyes of the public of lawyers 
in particular and the legal profession in general.
902
  How individual lawyers and the 
profession operate is important because, as Victorian Attorney-General Robert Hull 
stated, ultimately, the law and the legal system is ‘a taxpayer-funded system charged 
with solving people’s problems, with stopping and changing behaviour and, in doing 
                                                                                                                                            
process from the ‘trial by battle’ to ‘trial by court’ to the current evolution involving extensive use of 
alternative dispute resolution processes.  See also Rhode, above n 151, 51-58 (discussing the evolution 
of the advocate’s role and the current and dominant role morality of lawyers). 
897
 See, eg, Menkel-Meadow, above n 2; Williams, above n 202; Ross, above n 108; Rubin, above n 69; 
See also Lakhani, above n 268, 61, n. 6-9 (citing various sources to indicate the extensive use of 
negotiations in legal work causing over 955 of all cases filed for litigation to be settled before trial); 
Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1220. 
898
 Marc Galanter, ‘Reading the Landscape of Disputes:  What We Know and Don’t Know (And Think 
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society’ (2003), 31 University of 
California Los Angeles Law Review 4, 64-65. (the term “settle” here means ‘terminate in an outcome 
agreed upon by the parties, sometimes formally ratified by the court, sometimes only noted as settled, 
and sometimes, from the court's viewpoint, abandoned. The settlement process may begin even before 
the suit is filed. For example, a great majority of automobile injury claims are settled before filing.’). 
899
 Jane R Chart, ‘Lawyers’ Work and Legal Education: Getting a Better Fit’ (2000) 19 -ew Zealand 
Universities Law Review 177, 178-179.  
900
 Chart, above n 899, 178-179. 
901
 Chart, above n 899, 178-179 (discussing how modern legal firms work in teams where they must 
manage both internal negotiations within their own teams as well as external negotiations with 
opposing parties on behalf of their clients.) 
902
 See, eg, Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1220 (“The problem of lying in negotiations is central to the 
profession of law”). 
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so, with keeping the public safe.’
903
  When lawyers feel the need to use potentially 
deceptive negotiation practices, they might compromise the system and its broader 
goals.  Therefore, now more than ever, the issue of lawyers’ potentially deceptive 
conduct in negotiation requires urgent attention and resolution. 
6.2 LAWYER DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOUR I EGOTIATIOS IS A REALITY 
Chapter 3 addressed the first research question of whether lawyers engage in 
deceptive behaviours during negotiation.  Several important points are worth 
revisiting.  First, current literature and research on legal negotiation as well as 
research on attorney behaviour in negotiations affirms that lawyers routinely use 
potentially deceptive behaviours in negotiation as well as in other areas of practice.   
Second, lawyers appear to have various justifications for such conduct.  These 
justifications include:  1) the legal ethics codes do not regard such conduct as 
unethical or prevent and punish such conduct; 2) the lawyer’s role-morality means 
that such conduct is permissible; 3) the behaviour was a defence posture as a result of 
the opposing lawyer’s deceptive behaviour; and 4) certain deceptive behaviour in 
negotiation is neither illegal nor unethical because of either community or 
conventional negotiation standards of behaviour.
904
   
Third, literature on general negotiation appears to show that the use of such 
deceptive tactics is seen as acceptable, especially in the highly competitive, 
distributive bargaining, poker-player ethic of negotiation.
905
    
Finally, lawyers and other parties of the legal system, including negotiation 
scholars, seem to believe that the use of potentially deceptive tactics in negotiation is 
                                                 
903
 Merritt, above n 560, 3. 
904
 White, above n 60, 927-928; Lerman, above n 60, 659; Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1219. 
905
 See Chapter 2 (Review of Literature) for a detailed discussion on this topic. 
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condoned by the very nature of negotiations.  Seen primarily as a private practice with 
little formal regulation or consistent rules regarding conduct,
906
 the standard 
negotiation ‘dance’ invariably includes a certain amount of bluffing, puffing, and 
innocent misrepresentation which is not only allowed but expected.  Of course, such 
conduct has ramifications for the legal negotiator and despite allowances for less than 
ethical conduct, one must ask whether the legal profession is content with the way 
things are or whether the profession can strive to define how lawyers ought to act 
during negotiations.   
6.3 LEGAL ETHICS CODES ARE ISUFFICIET TO CURTAIL DECEPTIVE 
EGOTIATIO BEHAVIOURS 
Chapter 4 looked at one of the primary ways that the conduct of legal 
practitioners is managed and regulated.  Generally, the primary ways that the conduct 
of legal practitioners is regulated is through rules regarding expectations of 
professional and ethical conduct.  Particularly in the common-law jurisdictions that 
are the focus of this thesis, these rules take the form of professional legal ethics codes 
which may be defined as predominantly disciplinary codes (as opposed to aspirational 
codes) centred around positive morality (as opposed to critical morality) and rooted in 
legal positivism.
907
  These professional ethics codes are considered the standards 
which guide a legal practitioner’s behaviour and set the minimum moral principles for 
how lawyers ought to act in their role.
908
  Chapter 4 presented an analysis of a 
comparative study of the legal ethics codes of a select group of common-law 
                                                 
906
 Mize, above n 66,245 (describing negotiation a “voluntary process”, “lack the structure of a public 
courtroom”, and “casual and unstructured” which “saves money and allows greater flexibility in 
crafting the best settlement.”). 
907
 See Chapter 2 (Review of Literature) a discussion on the distinctions between the various types of 
codes and morality. 
908
 Loder, above n 42, 318; Condlin, above n 43, 317. 
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jurisdictions.  This study, which represents an original contribution to the field, is a 
critical analysis of the ways in which the legal ethics codes, charged with regulating 
attorney behaviour, deal with the issue of potentially deceptive conduct in negotiation.  
The findings lead one to the conclusion that legal ethics codes, without more, appear 
to be insufficient in curtailing the deceptive behaviours of lawyers.  These are 
discussed below.  In addition, the findings reveal several opportunities for 
improvement in the form of policy reforms, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
First, legal ethics codes appear to be adversarial in nature and tone.  What I 
mean by this is not that they explicitly require lawyers to be adversarial in their 
dealings with the court, their colleagues or third parties; however, the language and 
wording of the rules invite conflict in an adversarial manner.
909
  They do this in two 
primary ways.  One way is that they present various duties owed to the court, the 
client, to opposing counsel and to third parties where such duties are either 
inconsistent or conflicting.  For example, some rules explicitly state that the duty is 
owed to the court while other rules state the duty is owed only to the client.
910
  
Sometimes fulfilling a duty to the court might violate a higher duty to the client, such 
as attorney-client privilege.  The problem with conflicting duties as stated in the rules 
is that there is little-to-no guidance on how to overcome this conflict and which duty 
might trump another equally valuable duty.  While it is true that lawyers must 
constantly balance these various duties, the lack of explicit guidance in instances 
                                                 
909
 See, eg, Bordone, above n 96, 4 (“...negotiation continues to piggyback on the ethical guidelines 
used for litigation, namely, the MRPC [in the United States]”). 
910
 See, eg, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)above n 293, Rule 4.1 (which prohibits false 
statements of material fact or law); Cf Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), above n 293, 
Rule 4.1, comment (which states that the same lawyer “generally has no affirmative duty to inform an 
opposing party of relevant facts.”); See also Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2007 (Qld), Rule 14 
(which indicates a duty to be frank the court) and Rule 15 (which appears to indicate a similar duty of 
honesty to opposing counsel).  Neither imposes that same duty of honesty to the client.  
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where duties conflict or are inconsistent leaves room for potentially inconsistent and 
conflicting behaviours by legal practitioners.  Coupled with a predominantly 
adversarial legal ethics model that stresses zealous representation of the client above 
all, it should not come as a surprise that perceptions of lawyers and the legal 
profession come under attack on a regular basis.
911
 
A second way in which the legal ethics codes invite conflict is by not fully 
recognising changes happening within the provision of legal services and then 
adapting the ethics codes to reflect these changes.  Some of these changes include the 
fact that modern law firms work primarily in teams (rather than purely as individuals) 
where internal and external negotiations are key,
912
 globalisation of legal services,
913
 
greater democratisation of countries where greater efficiency in dispute resolution is 
required
914
 and the arguable phenomenon of the ‘vanishing trial’.
915
  The evolution in 
the distribution of legal services means that lawyers today perform a variety of 
functions (i.e. have a variety of roles) in the legal system, including but not limited to, 
their role as trial advocates (litigators or barristers).   These roles also include acting 
as a negotiator (while not representing a client or representing a client), mediator, 
arbitrator, panel member, or judge.  A key insight from the comparative study of legal 
ethics codes is that while the delivery of legal services has evolved, the legal ethics 
                                                 
911
 See Section 6.5 (Studies of the Legal Profession Recommend Change) for a detailed discussion on 
this topic. 
912
 Chart, above n 899, 178-179. 
913
 See, eg, Terry, above n 548; Noone and Dickson, above n 666, 5. 
914
 Alain Lempereur, ‘Negotiation and Mediation in France: The Challenge of Skill-Based Learning 
and Interdisciplinary Research in Legal Education’ (1998) 3 Harvard -egotiation Law Review 151, 
152-153.  While Lempereur specifically addresses the changes and needs in France and Europe, the 
changes he describes could easily apply to any country or legal jurisdiction with regards to changes in 
the need and provision of legal services. 
915
 Galanter, above n 92, 462-463; Cf Macfarlane and Manwaring, above n 465, 253 (discussing this 
phenomenon in Ontario, Canada). 
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codes have not evolved sufficiently to keep pace with such changes, particularly 
where the lawyer’s primary role is that of negotiator.     
While some ethics codes, particularly in the United States, Australia, and 
Canada, have attempted to delineate between the various roles of a legal practitioner, 
there is a lack of consistency in the treatment of these roles across the common-law 
jurisdictions studied in this thesis.  Where the function of a lawyer as negotiator is 
concerned, the legal ethics codes seem to take the position, by silence in most cases, 
that negotiation is a skill performed by the legal practitioner, not a unique function or 
role of the lawyer in a given situation.
916
  One notable exception is the province of 
Alberta, Canada which specifically has a chapter, statement of principles and ethics 
rules for lawyers acting as negotiators.
917
   
The impact of not formally recognising the unique function of lawyers as 
negotiators is that any unethical or misleading conduct that might occur in 
negotiations is not formally regulated and is considered permissible  either under 
generally accepted conventions of negotiation practice or considered ‘normal’ under 
the guise of being a zealous advocate within the adversarial and competitive legal 
system.
918
  In addition, lawyers may rely on other sources for guidance, sometimes 
resulting in a violation of the legal ethics codes.
 919
  
                                                 
916
 Note:  The term ‘skill’ in this chapter means a task that someone can do where as the term 
‘function’ in this chapter means a role that someone plays or is.  For example, one can ‘mediate’ a 
dispute as an ordinary skill that is acquired in the course of daily events yet one can be a ‘mediator’ as 
a particular role with specialised skills at a given place and time. See, eg, Mize, above n 66,  247 
(“...negotiation is a unique environment that must be treated differently from other forums.”); Bordone, 
above n 96,  3; White, above n 60,  926 (recognising negotiation as a separate function though his 
article is most well-known for condoning lying in negotiations). 
917
 The Law Society of Alberta Code of Professional Conduct, above n 687, Chapter 11 (The Lawyer as 
Negotiator). See Chapter 4, Section 4.2 (International Perspectives – United States, Canada, Hong 
Kong) for more information.   
918
 White, above n 60, 926 (discussing how the non-public nature of negotiation contributes to the view 
that “ethical norms can probably be violated with greater confidence that there will be no discovery and 
punishment.”).  See also Mize, above n 66, 247 (specifically addressing the Rules of Professional 
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While this may not be cause for great concern for some, I argue it is of vital 
concern to the extent that the misleading or deceptive negotiation behaviour of a 
single lawyer might be perceived as representative of a majority of lawyers, the 
profession as a whole, or the legal system.
920
  If the legal profession accepts the 
conventional standards of negotiation behaviour which advocate, condone, and expect 
some forms of deceptive and misleading conduct as ‘normal’, then the profession 
must also provide some explicit guidance on whether lawyers and members of the 
legal profession are to adhere to generally accepted negotiation practices or are 
subject to a higher standard of negotiation behaviour.
921
  If the legal profession does 
not provide explicit guidance in this most important area, there is a greater chance that 
lawyers might be seen as nothing more than ‘hired hands’ and no longer part of a 
profession charged with serving the public through the administration of justice.
922
 
  In summary, the focus of the second research question, discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4, was on a comparative study of the legal ethics codes of a select group of 
                                                                                                                                            
Conduct for Barristers and Solicitors in New Zealand and stating that because the Rules “do not clearly 
spell out whether strategic posturing is permitted....’[t]hey can be read as requiring total honesty, or as 
limiting the duty to be honest to certain circumstances, with negotiations possibly being outside the 
“many occasions”....”).  Mize’s assessment applies to each jurisdiction in this study with the exception 
of Alberta, Canada, which explicitly spells out the code of conduct for lawyers as negotiators. 
919
 See, eg, Chester Louis Karras, Give and Take:  The Complete Guide to -egotiating Strategies and 
Tactics (1974); Chester Louis Karras, The -egotiating Game:  How to Get What You Want (1970).  
Karrass is a renowned publisher of business negotiation books and explicitly advocates that bluffing 
and attempting to mislead the opponent is a regular part of negotiations.  Harry C Triandis et al, 
‘Culture and Deception in Business Negotiations:  A Multilevel Analysis’ (2001) 1(1) International 
Journal of Cross Cultural Management 73, 74-75 (discussing the use of deception in negotiation from 
a business perspective across individualist and collectivist cultures); Williams, above n 202 (discussing 
how some legal negotiators continued to use adversarial tactics, including deception, because it worked 
to get them a better deal)..  
920
 Note:  This is my own contention; however the Honesty and Ethics consumer poll conducted yearly 
by the Gallup organisation appears to affirm the  fact that consumers believe lawyers and the legal 
profession to be one of the least honest and ethical professions consistently across a ten-year period.  
This rating is far below the same rating given to the medical profession and even judges.  This is 
discussed in more detail further in this chapter. 
921
 See, eg, Mize, above n 66, 245 (discussing the nature of deception in negotiation by lawyers and 
arguing that lawyers should not be held to a higher standard than ordinary negotiators).  But see Rubin, 
above n 69, 577; Thurman, above n 148, 103; Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1219. 
922
 See, eg, Kronman, above n 547. 
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common-law jurisdictions, including Australia, United States, Canada, and Hong 
Kong.  While the foregoing insights are aimed at the jurisdictions analysed, the 
implications of these issues are global in nature.  As discussed further in Chapter 7, 
reforming the legal ethics codes toward greater consistency is one simple, yet 
effective way to achieve some harmony within the profession in a highly global, 
multicultural world of clients and legal jurisdictions.
923
 
6.4 LEGAL ETHICS CASES I QUEESLAD DEMOSTRATE IEFFECTIVE 
EFORCEMET OF DECEPTIVE EGOTIATIO BEHAVIOURS 
Chapter 5 illustrated the legal ethics code in action within a particular 
common-law jurisdiction when faced with the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation. 
Legal ethics cases arise out of violations of the legal ethics codes.  For 
example, if a particular rule within the legal ethics codes prohibits misleading or 
deceptive conduct, a lawyer may be subject to disciplinary proceedings for violating 
such a professional and ethical standard.  In Chapter 5, I analysed the legal ethics 
cases in Queensland where the violation involved deceptive or misleading conduct.
924
  
In nearly each of the common-law jurisdictions, legal ethics cases are available to the 
public as a means of providing some disclosure to those purchasing legal services.  In 
Queensland in particular, it is a step towards recognising that legal services should, in 
some respects, be subject to greater scrutiny in an effort to promote and provide ‘more 
flexible and efficient provision of legal services…’
925
 as well as monitoring lawyer 
conduct for the protection of the public.   
                                                 
923
 See Chapter 7 (Implications for Law Reform) for more information. 
924
 The focus of the analysis was only cases alleging deceptive or misleading conduct with a focus on 
any such cases where the conduct occurred in the course of a negotiation.  Therefore, the discussion 
and summary analysis in this section deals only with these specific cases.   
925
 Trade Practices Commission, Study of the professions: Summary of Final Report - Legal (1994). 
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The findings from an analysis of the ethics violation cases of this jurisdiction 
indicate that there is ineffective enforcement of the ethics code with regards to 
deceptive negotiation behaviours by legal practitioners.  In addition, even where there 
is formal enforcement of such conduct, prosecution is minor and not significant 
enough to serve as a deterrent to similar conduct in the future.  The analysis of the 
legal ethics cases in Queensland, Australia shows several opportunities for improving 
the enforcement mechanism for more effective regulation, especially with regards to 
misleading or deceptive behaviour in negotiation.  These opportunities and insights 
are discussed below while potential policy reform proposals are outlined in Chapter 7.   
The empirical study also provides a framework from which to conduct similar studies 
in other jurisdictions to ascertain consistent or comparable findings.  
First, the ethics cases available show virtually no prosecution for misleading 
or deceptive conduct in negotiations.  It is possible that complaints were reported and 
simply settled or dismissed.  In terms of official enquiries and cases brought against 
legal practitioners for misleading or deceptive conduct, only one formally prosecuted 
case was found in Queensland.  This may be for several reasons.  As stated earlier, 
original complaints may have been dismissed during the standard intake process for a 
variety of reasons including lack of severity of the offending conduct and a decision 
that formal prosecution would not serve the public interest.  A second reason for lack 
of prosecution is that any such reported cases may have been privately settled between 
the complainant and the legal practitioner.
926
  Finally, a more probable reason is that 
because negotiations are generally private and not formally regulated, potential 
claimants may not file a formal complaint, either because they have achieved a 
                                                 
926
 See Chapter 5 (The Success of Legal Ethics Codes in Controlling Lawyers’ Deceptive Behaviour) 
for more information. 
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favourable result in line with their own interests in the negotiations or because they 
are not aware that they can file a complaint against their lawyer in this context.  
Theoretically, because some deceptive or misleading conduct is ‘generally’ accepted 
in negotiations, clients may not consider such behaviour as unethical and may even 
expect it of their attorneys, perhaps as long as clients achieve their own objectives and 
their interests are maximised.
927
 
Second, ethics violation cases show very little in terms of the context in which 
the violation occurred and whether different ethical principles were applied 
accordingly.  By this I mean that, in most ethics violation cases, there is very little 
information to determine whether, for example, the lawyer was charged with 
misleading or deceptive conduct while in court, in mediation, in negotiation or 
otherwise.  In the Queensland jurisdiction, the analysis of the legal ethics violation 
cases involving deceptive or misleading conduct revealed only one case that involved 
negotiation.  In addition, there is little information to suggest whether different ethical 
standards were considered depending on the context of the situation.  In most cases, if 
the attorney was charged with misleading or deceptive conduct, this was a sufficiently 
egregious violation of the professional ethics codes to sanction the attorney or strike 
him/her off the role, with or without additional sanctions such as costs and further 
continuing legal education (CLE) course requirements. 
Finally, the ethics violation cases where the charge was misleading or 
deceptive conduct show a marked tendency towards imposing punitive judgments as 
opposed to remedial punishment or use of restorative justice principles.  In most cases, 
                                                 
927
 Note: This theoretical assumption would be a good topic of future empirical research on the extent 
to which consumers will accept or not accept potentially deceptive conduct on the part of their lawyer 
in relation to achieving a favourable result in the negotiations. 
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whether the charge was minor or major was irrelevant.  Legal practitioners were still   
sanctioned through heavy fines, public reprimands, or being struck off the roll of 
practitioners.  One possible reason for this is that there does not appear to be a 
gradation of the severity of misleading or deceptive conduct on which to objectively 
determine the severity of the offending conduct or an objective analysis of the severity 
of the charge in relation to other more serious violations of the ethics rules.  In most 
cases, if a sufficient argument can be made that the lawyer’s conduct would 
negatively affect the public interest or tarnish the reputation of the profession, the 
lawyer was considered guilty of the charges.  It appears that not only are ethics 
violations cases frequently dismissed but that when there are official charges filed and 
the legal practitioner is formally prosecuted, subjective reasoning and severe punitive 
judgments take precedence over fully understanding the context in which the violation 
occurred, the intent or motive of the lawyer in possibly violating the professional 
ethics code, and a fully reasoned opinion that is based on more intellectual rigor and 
analysis of precedent.  As a result, a number of legal scholars criticize legal ethics 
cases as failing to provide uniform guidance and succeeding only in showing 
conflicting judgments which do not help lawyers in achieving sound ethics as part of 
the public profession.
928
   
In summary, a study of the ethics violation cases in the Queensland 
jurisdiction seems to indicate that if allegations involve misleading or deceptive 
behaviour, negotiation does not appear to be a focus for prosecution while the 
                                                 
928
 See, eg, Haller, above n 587, 152; Linda Haller, ‘Smoke and Mirrors:  When Professional Discipline 
May Cause Harm’ (2005) 8(1) Legal Ethics 70; Levin, above n 587, 187-210; Eileen Libby, ‘When the 
Truth Can Wait: There are times when a lawyer may engage in a bit of deception – but not many’ 
(2008) 94 American Bar Association Journal 26, 27-28 (discussing some of the inconsistencies in 
ethics violation cases in the United States).  
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disciplinary measures seem to be more punitive than reformative.  The public 
disclosure of such cases seems to only taint the reputation of the profession.  As a 
result, what lawyers and the legal profession face is a negative public perception 
consistently confirmed through independently-commissioned consumer and 
professional industry studies – studies which call for a change.
929
 
6.5 STUDIES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSIO RECOMMED CHAGE 
The review of literature in Chapter 2 supports a conclusion that, despite the 
fact that practitioners, scholars, and various stakeholders acknowledge the issue of 
deception in negotiation, all seem powerless to do something about it.  As a result, 
thus far, there has been no measurable action taken to address this issue.  While it is 
plausible that a self-regulated profession can continue to disregard ‘the elephant in the 
room’, hoping it will go away or is a figment of someone’s imagination, consumer 
and industry studies of the legal profession in various common-law jurisdictions, 
especially in the United States, provide stark reminders of what appears to be the 
public’s consistent dissatisfaction with the legal profession.  This feedback from the 
consumers of legal services should prove reason enough to finally and effectively 
address this issue.
 930
 
                                                 
929
  See generally Chapter 6, section 6.5 for a full discussion of the consumer studies reflecting the 
perception of the legal system and lawyers.  These studies focus mainly on Australia and the United 
States as data was more readily available.  See also Canadian Bar Association Futures Report, Crystal 
Clear: -ew Perspectives for the Canadian Bar Association (August 2005) 
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/futures/pdf/crystalclear.pdf> at 9 August 2010 (discussing similar issues 
from the perspective on the Canadian Bar Association and noting that “[p]erhaps the biggest threat on 
the demand side is the current poor image of lawyers held by the public.” (Section 2.4)). 
930
 See, eg, Honorable Mark D Fox and Michael L Fox, ‘It’s No Joking Matter: Our Profession 
Requires Greater Civility and Respect’ (2009) -ew York State Bar Association Journal 11, 14 (putting 
into context the need to maintain the high standards of the profession of law as the means to “safeguard 
society” and “the base upon which our democratic government...finds its foundations.”)  The more 
important point by Fox and Fox is a reminder to practitioners that the legal profession is meant to stand 
as “one of the bulwarks of an ordered society of laws” and “the guardians of law and justice” such that 
if the legal profession is seen to fail (in Fox and Fox’s example of being uncivil), then that ordered 
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A historical perspective of the views of consumers of legal services is 
important in establishing the need for change.  This is further reinforced by studies of 
the legal profession by various industry organisations.  The consumer perspective is 
presented first, beginning with one of the most noteworthy consumer studies on 
lawyers and the legal profession from the United States.  This is followed by studies 
of the legal profession by industry organisation.  
One of the first relevant consumer studies on lawyers and the legal profession 
is the Gallup Organisation’s Honesty and Ethics poll in the United States.  In 1976, 
the Gallup Organisation of the United States conducted one of the earliest consumer 
studies of honesty and ethics across various industries and professions, including 
lawyers and the legal profession.
 931
  Since 1976, the Gallup poll on honesty and 
ethics has been conducted in the United States on a yearly basis.  What is astonishing 
is the consistency with which lawyers and the legal profession are viewed by the U.S. 
public on the honesty and ethics ratings since 1992.
932
  Between 1992 and 2006 
inclusive, only between 13% and 18% of respondents rated the honesty and ethical 
standards of lawyers as either ‘high’ or ‘very high’,
933
 with the average rating across 
these years being only 15.56% of the surveyed public who said that the honesty and 
ethics standards of lawyers was either ‘high’ or ‘very high’.  In contrast, between 
                                                                                                                                            
society would be in jeopardy and regress, even if the failure is a perception of failure as discussed in 
the context of these consumer studies.  
931
 See generally The Gallup Organisation at www.gallup.com.  The Gallup Organisation is based in 
the United States and has offices in Australia.  To date, the Honesty and Ethics poll has been conducted 
only in the United States.  As such, the discussion in this section about the results of the Gallup’s 
annual Honesty and Ethics poll applies only to the United States.  The results may be applicable to 
Australia and other jurisdictions given their mutual association to the same common law jurisdiction 
practices. 
932
 Note:  Data is publically available online for the period of 1992-2008.  See generally 
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2006-12-11-ethics.htm> at 9 August 2010.  As such, 
these results are the focus of this discussion.  Data is not publically available online for the periods 
1976-1992 and has been requested by Gallup.  
933
 See generally <http://www.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2006-12-11-ethics.htm> at 9 
August 2010.  
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1992 and 2006 inclusive, the public rated another major profession, medical doctors, 
as between 47% and 69% in terms of having ‘high’ or ‘very high’ honesty and ethical 
standards,
934
 with the average across these years being 55.69%.  As compared with 
other professions, lawyers were not considered honest or ethical. 
In addition, when asked about the respondents’ overall view of a particular 
industry, the trend analysis from August 2001 to August 2008 shows a consistently 
negative view towards the legal industry with respondents predominantly having  a 
‘neutral’ or ‘very/somewhat negative’ view of the legal industry.
935
  Across this same 
time period, each year yielded a negative ‘net positive’ result in terms of the public’s 
overall view of the legal industry.
936
 
A second important consumer study of the legal profession took place in 1993 
in the United States.  In 1993, the American Bar Association commissioned a 
comprehensive survey to determine the U.S. public’s attitude towards lawyers, the 
American legal system and the ABA itself.  The survey was a nationwide telephone 
survey of 1,202 adults who were considered representative of the public combined 
with various focus groups to elicit comments.
937
  The characteristics of the 
representative sample in the study included the following:  1) about two-thirds of 
those surveyed had retained a lawyer in the prior 10 years; 2) three out of four of 
those surveyed said they personally knew a lawyer; 3) half of those surveyed said they 
dealt with a lawyer on a semi-regular basis; and 4) one-fourth of those surveyed had 
never used a lawyer at all.
938
   
                                                 
934
 Ibid. 
935
 Ibid. 
936
 Ibid.  
937
 Hengstler, above n 13, 60-61. 
938
 Hengstler, above n 13, 61. 
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While lawyers generally rated highly and positively with regards to 
competency, knowledge, and zealous representation, this study also ‘suggest[s] a 
disturbing pattern that the more a person knows about the legal profession and the 
more he or she is in direct personal contact with lawyers, the lower an individual’s 
opinion of them.’
939
  This seems to suggest that in 1993, while the public feels 
positively about what lawyers do, they are not happy with how lawyers do what they 
do, especially where those tasks impact on their clients.  In essence, lawyers are 
viewed as competent on the hard skills (knowledge of the law, competent in the 
courtroom, zealous representation for their clients, etc.) while lacking on soft skills 
such as being compassionate, caring, and having high ethical standards.  These soft 
skills are what the public seems to expect of professions whom they rate highly on 
nearly every factor.   
In this same survey, the issue of legal ethics was quite problematic as only 
22% of those surveyed would classify lawyers as ‘honest and ethical’ and nearly half 
of those surveyed (48%) said that ‘as many as 3 in 10 lawyers lack the ethical 
standards necessary to serve the public’.
940
  The survey did not focus exclusively on 
any one aspect of a lawyer’s role such as whether they were acting as an advocate, 
negotiating, mediating or representing the client in a trial.  However, given that 
negotiation is such an important and consistent part of what a lawyer does on a daily 
basis, one could extrapolate that these findings could apply to deception in negotiation 
as honesty infers that there is no deception, regardless of the task at hand.   
                                                 
939
 Hengstler, above n 13, 62. 
940
 Ibid.  This 48% for lawyers was significantly higher than the ratings for accountants (22%), doctors 
(28%) and bankers (30%).   See also Rhode, above n 151, 3-7. 
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While Hengstler argues that these ratings are likely the result of  the public’s 
misunderstanding of the ethics of the legal profession, it nevertheless points to a 
glaring discrepancy between how the public expects lawyers to act, how lawyers 
themselves expect to act within the bounds of professional duty, the public’s 
understanding of the nature of legal ethics, and the profession’s lack of effort in 
reducing these glaring discrepancies of perception between the law, legal ethics, and 
the public which it is meant to serve. 
For example, in this same 1993 ABA survey, when consumers were asked 
what they considered as the most important roles for lawyers and their most important 
priorities as a profession, only 29% cited ‘an advocate for their client’s interests’ as 
critical while a majority (52%) regarded ‘a protector of basic rights’ as the top 
purpose of a lawyer and 37% selected ‘a prosecutor of wrong-doers’ as an important 
role for lawyers.
941
  This 1993 ABA survey affirms that the legal profession’s  
perceptions of the primary role of lawyers in the United States (i.e., as zealous 
advocates for their clients within the bounds of the law) is markedly different and out 
of step with what consumers of legal services customers expect and are now 
demanding with ever-increasing urgency. 
A third noteworthy consumer study of the profession is the April 2002 
American Bar Association Section of Litigation’s commissioned study on the United 
States’ public perception of lawyers.  The purpose of the 2002 ABA study is similar 
to that of the 1993 ABA study discussed earlier in this section.  However, unlike the 
1993 ABA study, the 2002 ABA study consisted of three primary stages:  1) a 
                                                 
941
 Hengstler, above n 13, 62.  In addition to 29% who cited “an advocate for their client’s interests” as 
critical, 26% selected “a settler of disputes”, 20% selected “a defender of the underdog”, and 13% 
selected “leader in the community”. 
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national survey by telephone of 450 representative U.S. households in April 2001; 2) 
ten focus group discussions in five U.S. markets in summer 2001; and 3) a national 
survey by telephone of 300 representative U.S. households in January 2002.
942
   
The results of the national telephone surveys found that while the American 
public thinks lawyers are competent, knowledgeable about the law, and provide good 
practical service to their clients,
943
 the American public considers American lawyers 
to be ‘greedy, manipulative, and corrupt’.
944
  The study further found lawyers to be 
deceptive and misleading.  Specifically, respondents stated that lawyers ‘misrepresent 
their qualifications, overpromise, are not upfront about their fees and charge too much 
for their services, take too long to resolve matters, and fail to return client phone 
calls’.
945
  As a result, it is not surprising that one of the other key findings was the 
public’s belief or perception that the state bar associations of the individual states do a 
poor job of regulating and policing lawyer conduct in the interests of the public.
946
  
With regards to manipulative behaviour, over 73% of respondents believe 
lawyers not only manipulate the system but they also manipulate the truth to win at all 
costs.
947
  Corruption was another issue for the public.  The study reported that 
respondents, through personal experience, believe that lawyers use unethical and 
                                                 
942
 American Bar Association, Public Perception of Lawyers: Consumer Research Findings, above n 
13, 2-4. 
943
 American Bar Association, Public Perception of Lawyers: Consumer Research Findings, above n 
13, 4, 18.  Interestingly enough, over 59% of those surveyed agreed that lawyers were knowledgeable 
and interested in serving their clients.  In addition, many blamed the system, not lawyers, as the source 
of the problem. 
944
 American Bar Association, Public Perception of Lawyers: Consumer Research Findings, above n 
13, 4.   
945
 Ibid. 
946
 Ibid. 
947
 American Bar Association, Public Perception of Lawyers: Consumer Research Findings, above n 
13, 7-8. 
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sometimes illegal tactics.
948
  As lawyers are constantly negotiating on behalf of their 
clients, the use of deception in negotiation would be included in the use of such 
unethical or illegal tactics.
949
 According to results of the focus groups conducted as 
part of this 2002 ABA study, illegal or unethical tactics included staging accidents, 
offering to bribe prosecutors or judges, and sending clients to doctors for injuries they 
do not have.    
Overall, while lawyers are seen as providing a valuable and much-needed 
service, especially in times of crisis, the U.S. public perception of lawyers and the 
legal profession is consistently low, even where they have had a good experience with 
lawyers.  This appears to be a direct reflection not of what lawyers do for clients but 
of how they perform their jobs and how their methods, tactics and interactions with 
clients are perceived by the public, regardless of whether the end result for the client 
is positive.   
A final consumer study of the legal profession worth noting is the latest 2008 
Gallup annual Honesty and Ethics poll, where lawyers were considered one of least 
well-rated professions for honesty and ethics, second only to labour union leaders.
950
  
Only 18% of respondents rated lawyers’ honesty and ethics as ‘very high/high’ while 
45% rated lawyers’ ethics and honesty as ‘average’ and 37% rated lawyers’ ethics and 
honesty as ‘low/very low’.
951
  Once again, these results with respect to lawyers and 
the legal field are consistent with prior years’ results in the Gallup Honesty and Ethics 
annual poll, demonstrating that lawyers and the legal field are rated less favourably  
                                                 
948
 American Bar Association, Public Perception of Lawyers: Consumer Research Findings, above n 
13, 9. 
949
 See Lewicki and Robinson, above n 536, 665-682; Rivers, above n 77. 
950
 See generally Lydia Saad, -urses Shine, Bankers Slump in Ethics Ratings (2008) 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/112264/Nurses-Shine-While-Bankers-Slump-Ethics-Ratings.aspx> at 9 
August 2010. 
951
 Ibid. 
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when compared against results for medical doctors and sometimes worse than 
business executives.
952
 
With regards to consumer views of the legal profession, these statistics seem 
generally consistent with the annual Gallup Organisation Honesty and Ethics 
consumer polls and ABA consumer studies discussed above.  Next, the focus is on the 
studies of the legal profession and its members conducted by legal and industry 
organisations.  These studies reflect the views of current and future lawyers about the 
legal profession. 
In 1994, the Trade Practices Commission of Australia undertook a similar 
study of the legal profession in Australia though the focus was primarily the 
government’s perspective of the legal profession rather than the consumer perspective.  
However, since government is often a purchaser of legal services, government is also 
a consumer. 
In March 1994, the Trade Practices Commission of Australia (The 
Commission) published its final report on a study of the legal profession.
953
  Overall, 
the Commission concluded that the ‘Australian legal profession is heavily over-
regulated and in urgent need of comprehensive reform’
954
 because these regulations 
‘impose substantial restrictions on the commercial conduct of lawyers and on the 
extent to which lawyers are free to compete with each other for business.’
955
  The 
Commission looked at regulations affecting the structure of the legal services market 
as well as the regulations affecting and controlling the conduct of legal 
                                                 
952
 Saad, above n 950. See generally <http://www.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2006-12-11-
ethics.htm> at 9 August 2010. 
953
 See generally Study of the Professions – Legal:  Summary of Final Report, above n 925; Trade 
Practices Commission, Study of the Professions – Legal profession:  Issues Paper (1992); See also 
Trade Practices Commission, Study of the Professions – Legal:  Draft Report (1993). 
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 Study of the Professions –Legal:  Summary of Final Report, above n 925, 3. 
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 Ibid. 
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practitioners.
956
  The Commission’s findings and recommendations on the regulation 
of the conduct of legal practitioners are of particular importance to this thesis.   
With regards to the regulation of lawyer conduct, the Commission 
recommended that the Trade Practices Act 1974 (the TPA) should cover the conduct 
of legal professionals, the market conduct of the legal profession as a whole, and 
extend even to ‘the rule making and other activities of its professional associations.’
957
  
The legal profession, at the time of the Commission’s report, is said to be exempt 
from the provisions of the Act because the profession is considered to be self-
regulated and bound by a myriad of professional rules, such as court rules and ethics 
codes; however, others have argued that the TPA does apply to the legal profession as 
well because the provision of legal services is a trade like any other profession and 
serves the public, who is the intended beneficiary of the protections of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974.
958
  By 2010, this latter view was reinforced by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, who published a formal document on the 
application and impact of the Trade Practices Act to all professions, including the 
legal profession.    
By recommending that the Trade Practices Act 1974 apply to the legal 
profession, the Commission is making some implicit statements, namely that the 
conduct of legal professionals in general is deceptive and misleading, especially since 
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 Study of the Professions – Legal:  Summary of Final Report, above n 925, 4-6. 
957
 Ibid.   
958
 See, eg, Pengilley, above n 576, 113-129 (discussing the effects of Trade Practices Act 1974 s 52 on 
common negotiating techniques of legal professionals, which includes deceptive and misleading 
conduct).  See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Professions and the Trade 
Practices Act (2010) 19-20 <http://www.accc.gov.a u/content/item.p html?itemld=926503&nodeld 
=71b6c165a bc78f1a60fOa 1643c9367&fn=Professions%20and%20the%20TPA.pdf> at 31 July 2010 
(specifically reinforcing the obligation of the professions to refrain from deceptive and misleading 
conduct when dealing with clients).  This latter document is an updated document highlighting and 
reinforcing the application of the TPA on all professions in Australia, including the legal profession. 
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one of the key purposes of the Act is to prevent incentives to mislead consumers of 
products and services.  In addition, the Commission’s report also seems to allude to 
the fact that current legal ethics rules and rules governing professional and ethical 
standards and disciplinary procedures are not effective in curtailing misleading 
behaviour even as the rules on their face explicitly prohibit deceptive or misleading 
conduct by legal professionals.
959
   
If the Trade Practices Act 1974 does apply to the legal profession, it would 
actually put the legal profession on the same footing as any other business or 
occupation where a certain amount of deceptive or misleading conduct is 
permissible.
960
  While such conduct might be reduced under the Trade Practices Act 
1974, the conduct would not be entirely eliminated because under the current legal 
ethics rules, any form of deceptive or misleading conduct, including the use of such 
conduct in negotiations is strictly prohibited and subjects the legal professional to 
disciplinary proceedings for ethics violation.   
As discussed in earlier chapters, the adoption of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
as applying to legal professions would likely put it at odds with the legal ethics rules.  
These inconsistencies will potentially cause inconsistent lawyer behaviour in regards 
to negotiations and needs to be addressed.  One way to address this issue is through 
strategic policy reforms as discussed further in Chapter 7.  
The Commission also recommended, among other things, greater effectiveness 
and public accountability of the legal profession, an increase in the type of matters 
that could be the subject of a formal complaint against a legal professional, and lay 
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 See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of the specific legal ethics codes analysed in this thesis.  
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 Note: I am making a distinction between a ‘profession’ and any other ‘occupation’. For further 
discussion see Lakhani, above n 268, 61 (discussion lawyers as part of a profession versus any other 
occupation and therefore why the profession expects a higher standard of behaviour).   
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representation on complaints and disciplinary tribunals to be at least equal to the 
number of lawyer representatives on the same panels.
961
  
Regardless of any inconsistencies between what the Commission recommends 
and what the profession deems appropriate, it is clear that professional reforms are 
imperative to not only allow for sustainability of the legal profession in a global 
market but also to ensure greater public accountability and informed choice.  A 
significant part of this reform mandate is targeted towards how legal professionals 
carry out the business of justice on a daily business – a business that has constant and 
daily negotiations as a foundation.  
A second study of the legal profession worth noting is a recent 2008 
commissioned study in Australia.  In November 2008,
962
 The Australian reported on a 
national, large scale commissioned study of law students and the legal profession 
conducted by Professor Ian Hickie at the Sydney University Brain and Mind 
Institute.
963
  The study involved a survey of 2,413 lawyers consisting of 738 students 
                                                 
961
 Note:  Some of these have been addressed in Queensland through the implementation of the Legal 
Services Commission through the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld).  However, at the time of writing, 
lay representation on ethics violation complaints and disciplinary bodies was not equal to lawyer 
representation and lay representatives felt overwhelmed or overlooked in terms of their role and 
influence.   See e.g., Haller, above n 587, 1; Haller and Green, above n 701, 145 and 157 (suggesting 
that lay member and practitioner representation and input into disciplinary panels and decisions has 
actually decreased since the initial study conducted in 2001).  See Chapter 5 (The Success of 
Professional Ethics Codes in Controlling Lawyers’ Deceptive Behaviour) for more information on this 
topic. 
962
 Note: The full report was released in January/February 2009.  See N J Kelk, G M Luscombe, S D 
Medlow and I B Hickie, Courting the blues: Attitudes towards depression in Australian law students 
and legal practitioners, BMRI Monograph 2009-1 (2009) <http://www.bmri.org.au/research/mental-
health-clinical-translational-programs/index.php> at 9 August 2010; Ian Hickie, The mental health of 
Australian lawyers:  A challenge for the law schools and the profession 18-44 (18 September 2008) 
<http://www.bmri.org.au/research/mental-health-clinical-translational-programs/index.php> at 9 
August 2010.;  Beaton Consulting, Annual Professions Study 2007 (2007). 
963
 See also Nicola Berkovic, Research finds depression very high in legal profession (2008) 2 The 
Australian <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24367557-17044,00.html> at 9 
August 2010. 
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from 13 law schools nationally, 924 solicitors, and 751 barristers.
964
  Professor Hickie 
cited the competitive and individualistic nature of the profession versus a more 
collegiate approach as a factor in the findings which confirmed high rates of physical 
and mental ailments within the legal profession.   
These findings are consistent with studies among lawyers in the United States.  
The views among lawyers found that one of the biggest concerns was the standing of 
the profession in the eyes of both lawyers and the public.
965
  Lawyers in the United 
States further agreed that improving the standing and perception of the profession was 
the ABA’s top priority.  Lawyers also reported ‘a decline in ethical values and the loss 
of the professional soul’
966
 as a result of the current culture of the profession being 
more profit-oriented due to increased commercialisation and competition.
967
  In 
addition, lawyers cited a decreased emphasis on public service, instability in lawyer-
client relationships because of competition and market-driven practices, increased 
billable-hour requirements, and ethical rules which are not demanding and under-
enforced as other reasons for a feeling of general malaise about the profession.
968
  
This general malaise about the profession and law practice has resulted in a profession 
marred by high rates of thoughts of suicide,
969
 severe depression, alcohol and drug 
                                                 
964
 The University of New South Wales, Depression a disabling problem in legal profession – study 
(2009) <http://www.unsw.edu.au/news/pad/articles/2008/sep/Jepson_release.html> at 9 August 2010.  
See also Kelk et al, above n 962. 
965
 Hengstler, above n 13, 60. 
966
 Rhode, above n 151, 8. 
967
 Rhode, above n 151, 9. 
968
 Rhode, above n 151, 9-12. 
969
 Michael J Sweeney, The devastation of depression: Lawyers are at great risk – It’s an impairment 
to take seriously (2009) <http://www.abanet.org/barserv/22-6dev.html> at 9 August 2010 (discussing a 
1991 North Carolina Bar survey that found  that 12 percent of members said ‘they contemplated suicide 
at least once each month’); E Mounteer, ‘Depression Among Lawyers’ (2004) 33 Colorado Lawyer 35 
((most lawyers who suffer from depression also suffer from suicidal thoughts); Richard G Uday, ‘That 
Frayed Hope’ (2003) Utah State Bar Journal (citing Meyer J Cohen, Bumps in the Road, GPSOLO, 
July/Aug. 2001, at 20) (citing suicide as the leading cause of premature death by lawyers); Lynn 
Johnson, ‘Stress Management’ (2003) Utah State Bar Journal. (discussing the 1992 Annual Report of 
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addiction, and other ailments that affect the physical and mental health of the legal 
professional at rates nearly three times higher than the general public.
970
     
As discussed in earlier chapters, the overly competitive nature at the heart of 
an adversarial approach in the legal system and in negotiations fosters deceptive and 
misleading conduct because the core of competitive negotiations is seen as a game 
where winning takes precedence over anything else, including justice.  For example, 
the use of terms such as ‘plaintiff’ and ‘defendant’ or ‘state versus defendant’ creates 
the perception of competition and adversarial challenges.  As such, these findings 
should not be surprising but serve as an immediate call to action. 
In summary, the primary activity of lawyers on a daily basis is negotiation, 
whether on behalf of a client or in serving a client’s interests when engaged with 
opposing counsel or the courts.  Therefore, how lawyers carry out this function is 
what clients see the most.  What clients see and experience most often is likely 
reflected in their perception of lawyers and the legal profession.  As such, a change in 
how lawyers negotiate (i.e., through the use of specific strategies and tactics) is one 
strategic and effective way to have a positive impact on the public perception of 
lawyers and the legal system.
971
  Unfortunately, to date, a number of proposed 
solutions have failed to create a sense of urgency in addressing this issue. 
                                                                                                                                            
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health which found that male lawyers are twice as 
likely to commit suicide as compared with the general population); Hickie, above n 962, 18-44. 
970
 Rhode, above n 151, 8-9 (citing Nancy McCarthy, ‘Pessimism for the Future,’ (1994) California 
Bar Journal 1; Mary Ann Glendon, A -ation under Lawyers (1994) 85-87.  See also Berkovic, above n 
963, 2.  The findings were reported by a study conducted by Professor Ian Hickie at the Sydney 
University Brain and Mind Institute.  Professor Hickie cited the competitive and individualistic nature 
of the profession versus a more collegiate approach as a factor in the findings.   
971
 See Chapter 7 (Implications for Law Reform) for a detailed discussion of the strategic policy reform 
proposals recommended in this thesis. 
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6.6 FAILURE OF PRIOR PROPOSED SOLUTIOS AD A CALL TO ACTIO 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the three primary ways in which 
practitioners and academics have attempted to resolve the issue of deception in 
negotiation and provide eight core reasons why these solutions have not been adopted 
or implemented.   
Both practitioners and academics have recognised since the 1980s that there is 
an issue with the use of potentially deceptive behaviours by lawyers in negotiation.  
The prevalence of literature and debate on this issue, dating as far back as the early 
1960s,
972
 is impossible to ignore.  In addition, practitioners and scholars have 
proposed a myriad of solutions aimed at addressing the issue of lawyer deception in 
negotiations.  Yet it seems that, based on the review of literature in Chapter 2, none of 
these proposed solutions have been accepted or adopted.  This section looks at prior 
proposed solutions, the possible reasons why they were not adopted, and why there is 
now an urgent call to action to address this foundational issue within the legal 
profession.  This section begins with some of the proposed solutions to the issue of 
lawyers’ deceptive tactics in negotiation.   
One of the most common solutions has been to adopt an entirely new legal 
ethics model as proposed by scholars such as Menkel-Meadow, Simon, Thurman, 
Fletcher, and Parker and Evans.  This comes on the heels of years of commentary and 
arguments that the current legal ethics model is too adversarial
973
 and that legal ethics 
                                                 
972
 Carr, above n 532, 143-153 (“But from time to time every businessman, like every poker player, is 
offered a choice between certain loss and bluffing within the legal rules of the game. If he is not 
resigned to losing, if he wants to rise in his company and industry, then in such a crisis he will bluff-
and bluff hard.”).  While the focus of this article appears to be the business world, lawyers are business 
people as well and law firms are businesses with a very strong profit motive. 
973
 See, eg, Rhode, above n 151, 8-12; David Luban (ed.) The Ethics of Lawyers (1994); Menkel-
Meadow, above n 19, 761; D’Amato and Eberle, above n 174, 764-770 (referring to this dominant 
model as the ‘autonomy model’ of legal ethics). 
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today should be more socially responsible in a way that is attuned to and ‘reflects 
public values and curbs excessive adversarial processes.’
974
  The core argument seems 
to be that the adversarial nature of the current legal ethics model is flawed and causes 
lawyers to be too competitive and thus resort to one of the most common competitive 
negotiating tactics – deception – in order to win at all costs.
975
  
As introduced earlier, W H Simon is among those who recommend adopting a 
new legal ethics model.  Simon proposed adopting a more contextual or situation 
ethics model.  According to Simon, the ‘dominant’ view of legal ethics (i.e., the 
adversarial model) seems to encourage injustice, even if it does so unconsciously or 
subconsciously.
976
  Simon’s proposal is to adopt a more contextual ethic whose ‘basic 
maxim [must be] that the lawyer should take such actions as, considering the relevant 
circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice’.
977
  Under 
Simon’s approach, a lawyer’s personal ethical views of what is right and wrong would 
take greater precedence over the prevailing legal ethics requirements and obligations.  
Thurman
978
 and Fletcher
979
 proposed similar approaches and explored the 
implications of a contextual or situational ethics model.   
                                                 
974
 Rhode, above n 151, 8-12 (“...professional conduct implicates public values, and they [public values] 
should figure more prominently in the formulation and enforcement of professional standards.”).  See 
also Simon, above n 191, 2 ("No social role encourages such ambitious moral aspirations as the 
lawyer's, and no social role so consistently disappoints the aspirations it encourages."). 
975
 Deborah L Rhode, ‘Symposium Introduction: In Pursuit of Justice’ (1999) 51(4) Stanford Law 
Review 867 (“...bar’s prevailing ethics norms are fundamentally flawed and that their inadequacies 
carry a substantial cost for both the profession and the public.”). 
976
 Simon, above n 191, 109; See also M B E  Smith, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' 
Ethics. (Review Essay / Can a Lawyer Be Happy?) (2000) 2 <http://www.articlearchives.com/law-
legal-system/legal-services-lawyers/1051660-1.html> at 9 August 2010. 
977
 Simon, above n 191, 9; Mary Jo Eyster, ‘Clinical Teaching, Ethical Negotiation, and Moral 
Judgment’ (1996) 75 -ebraska Law Review 752, 782-790 (agreeing with Simon).  Cf Smith, above n 
976.  This article is also published in Criminal Justice Ethics publication.  Smith criticizes Simon’s 
approach and does not consider it practical or viable for practitioners.  
978
 Thurman, above n 148, 103. 
979
 Fletcher, above n 192, 35. 
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Another proponent of adopting a new legal ethics model is Parker and Evans.  
Parker and Evans as well as Gilligan, among others, recommend a move towards an 
ethics of care model
980
 where lawyers would adopt a more relational lawyering 
approach where personal values and context are key factors in the lawyer’s approach 
to lawyer-client relations. 
In addition, D’Amato and Eberle propose adopting a deontological model of 
legal ethics as opposed to the current model that appears to be based on utilitarianism 
principles.
981
  Under the deontological model, D’Amato and Eberle argue that four 
primary rules would govern ethical decision-making by lawyers.
982
  These sample 
rules, in effect, attempt to put a hierarchy of priority where duties to the client, court, 
and justice system conflict.  They seem to set up rules or guidelines for when one duty 
might trump another.  Presumably, the rule imposing a moral obligation to avoid fraud 
and perjury would encompass the use of deception in negotiations.  Notwithstanding 
the primary criticism that this model might compromise attorney-client confidentiality 
to some degree as well as the issue of determining how many other ‘rules’ might be 
required, D’Amato and Eberle argue that these rules are currently implied and 
reflected in the Model Rules
983
 and only puts the client on notice that confidentiality is 
not the only or primary value within the legal system.
984
  Therefore, client 
confidentiality cannot be used to bypass standard norms of expected behaviour, 
especially when it comes to a conflict between disclosure and harm to another party. 
                                                 
980
 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 23, 31; Maughan and Webb, above n 188, 36; Gilligan, above n 189. 
981
 D’Amato and Eberle, above n 174, 772-774. 
982
 D’Amato and Eberle, above n 174, 772-774; See also Chapter 2 (Review of Literature) for more 
information on this topic. 
983
 Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983), Rule 1.6(b) (1) (“(b) A lawyer may reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm…”). 
984
 D’Amato and Eberle, above n 174, 778. 
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A second proposed solution to the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation is 
to impose candour in negotiations either through additional rules of legal ethics or 
stricter enforcement mechanisms.  Both Judge Rubin and supporters such as Thurman 
argue that the legal ethics rules represent only a minimal standard of behaviour and 
that lawyers are obligated to always be scrupulously honest in all their dealings, 
including negotiations.
985
  Thurman contends that lawyers should be expected to 
adhere to a higher level of truthfulness than the minimum standard imposed by legal 
ethics codes.
986
   
For example, Menkel-Meadow proposes requiring honesty in negotiations by 
imposing a golden rule of candour.
987
  According to Menkel-Meadow, this golden rule 
of candour appears to be a less rigid form of the current paternalistic standard in 
favour of a more self-interested standard that consists of two enquiries of ethical 
decision-making:  1) whether the lawyer as the client rather than the lawyer as a 
professional would want to know the truth in a given situation (thus asking the lawyer 
to put himself/herself in the shoes of the client in regards to truth-telling);
988
 and 2) 
whether ‘[t]he lawyer should be as truthful to the client as she expects the client to be 
with her.’
989
  Menkel-Meadows sees this second enquiry of the Golden Rule of 
Candour as embodying the full potential of reciprocal honesty as imagined by the rule, 
thus making the lawyer’s moral obligation to the client very clear and less subject to 
ambiguity and concern regarding ethical decision-making.
990
   
                                                 
985
 Rubin, above n 69,  577 
986
 Thurman, above n 148, 103.  See also Loder, above n 533, 87. 
987
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 19, 761. 
988
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 19, 770. 
989
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 19, 780 (italics in the original).  
990
 Ibid. 
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One of the more obvious issues with Menkel-Meadow’s suggestion is that the 
client’s moral code may be in conflict not only with the legal profession’s minimal 
ethical standards but may also conflict with a lawyer’s own stricter standard of ethics.  
In addition, how would such a golden rule of candour be enforced or measured since 
adopting it would seem to place the lawyer once again in a contextual mode of ethical 
decision-making with the added variable of taking into account the client’s or his/her 
community’s ethical standards?  Should one be compromised for another?  
Loder offers yet another option for imposing by reframing the lawyers’ view 
of their work and the value of their roles.  According to Loder, the legal profession 
would be well-served to question the apparent majority opinion that negotiation is 
inherently deceptive.
991
  Loder argues that instead of accepting that negotiations are 
inherently deceptive, lawyers should view negotiation as a truth-seeking process.
992
  
She, therefore, condones regulations that encourage affirmative disclosures during the 
process as well as affirmatively discouraging deception by statements and/or 
conduct.
993
  In effect, it seems Loder would prefer to see the current rules enhanced to 
include explicit prohibitions on deceptive conduct as well as rules requiring lawyers 
to affirmatively disclose certain information to their counter-parts in the interests of 
promoting honesty and truth-seeking within a more collaborative negotiations process. 
Finally, a third solution offered to address the issue of lawyer deception in 
negotiation is to simply do nothing about it.  This view appears to stem from three 
primary observations.  First, as suggested by White, deception in negotiation is a sine 
                                                 
991
 Loder, above n 533, 102. 
992
 Loder, above n 533, 99. 
993
 Loder, above n 533, 100.  Reed does not go into details on how these rules should be formulated or 
enforced. 
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qua non
994
 of lawyers and the legal profession, regardless of what the ethical rules say.  
White has argued that regulating deception by lawyers is impossible because 
deception is the essence of negotiation as a process.
995
  Second, White argues that 
regulating deception in negotiation by lawyers would be difficult because of the 
paradoxical nature of the negotiator who must be fair and truthful as well as deceptive.  
Third, there is a very low probability of punishment for deception in negotiation, thus 
making any mandatory rules against deception subject to failure.
996
  According to 
White, imposing rules of candour in this arena and the potential failure of such rules 
due to ineffective enforcement would have a greater negative impact on the legal 
profession than simply doing nothing about it.  This potentially negative impact fuels 
the argument that more rules will not necessarily resolve the issue and only cause 
further confusion among legal practitioners. 
To date, this third solution, namely to do nothing about the issue of lawyer 
deception in negotiation, appears to be most common, especially in the United States, 
where there has been widespread criticism of the current model rules of professional 
conduct and its apparent explicit support for deception in negotiation.
997
  This also 
appears to be the preferred solution in other common law jurisdictions such as 
Australia, most of Canada, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom, where, on the face, 
legal ethics codes appear to prohibit deception in any form yet do not seem to address 
negotiation as a separate subject with regards to such prohibitions.
998
 
                                                 
994
 Oxford English Dictionary, above n 33 (a Latin legal term for "(a condition) without which it could 
not be" or "but for..." or "without which (there is) nothing.") 
995
 White, above n 60, 927-928. 
996
 White, above n 60, 927. 
997
 Referring mainly to Rule 4.1 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 
998
 See, eg, Mize, above n 66, 245 (discussing the lack of clarity in the professional ethics codes of New 
Zealand regarding this issue).  The same could be said of the legal ethics codes analysed in this thesis.  
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To date, three primary solutions have been proposed to manage the issue of 
lawyer deception in negotiation.  While the decision to do nothing and thus refrain 
from managing lawyer deception in negotiation may be justified, the prevailing news 
from consumer and industry studies of the profession discussed above suggest that 
this issue can no longer be ignored.  There are at least eight plausible reasons why the 
proposals above have not as yet been adopted and why the issue of lawyer deception 
in negotiation remains an uncharted area for serious reform. 
The first most common reason for lack of reform on this issue appears to be 
the nature of the negotiation process itself.  Negotiation is largely seen as a private 
dispute resolution process.
999
  The private, informal, and voluntary nature of 
negotiations as well as its flexibility and confidentiality is precisely what makes it an 
attractive process for deal-making and reaching acceptable agreements.  Behaviours in 
negotiation are not subject to the same public scrutiny as behaviours in more public 
dispute resolutions forums such as arbitration or trials.
1000
  Negotiation, at least to date 
within the legal forum, has not been subject to formal rules and regulation or ethical 
standards.  Unlike mediation, which has undergone an evolution to now be formally 
recognised as a function of lawyers
1001
 with specific mediation ethics codes and 
accreditation requirements, negotiation has not been part of the same evolutionary 
process.  Yet negotiation is an integral foundation process to mediation and other 
recognised dispute resolution processes.   
                                                                                                                                            
See Chapter 4 (Efforts by Professional Ethics Codes to Regulate Deceptive Behaviours in Negotiation) 
for a detailed study and discussion of legal ethics codes. 
999
 White, above n 60, 926; Mize, above n 66, 246-247 (discussing the features of negotiation which 
make it hard to regulate in terms of deception or, as Mize terms it, strategic posturing.). 
1000
 White, above n 60, 926. 
1001
 Note:  By this I mean that nearly all the common-law legal ethics codes studied in this thesis 
recognise the lawyer’s role as a mediator (third-party neutral) by stipulating this in a separate chapter of 
the legal ethics code with specific legal ethics rules or referring to it in the body of the legal ethics code.  
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 306 - 9-Aug-10 
Because of the private and informal nature of negotiation, the opportunities to 
use deceptive tactics are abundant and the chance of punishment for such behaviour is 
low.  In addition, negotiation is ubiquitous to society since it happens in various 
forums on a daily basis.  Finally, the prevailing literature on negotiation seems to 
glorify the level of acceptable lying and misrepresentation in negotiations, making it 
harder to regulate.
1002
   
A second reason for lack of reform on the issue of lawyer deception in 
negotiation is that for many practitioners and scholars, law is considered just a game 
with its own set of unique rules.
1003
  An integral component of those who consider law 
as just a game is that negotiation is also a game.  It is not separate from law but 
integrated into the business of law.  Because negotiation is considered integral to the 
practice of law,
1004
 it could be argued that not only is it inefficient to impose harsh 
regulations around the behaviour of a ‘game’, but that changing the rules of the game 
would only confuse the players, who already accept the rules, written or not.
1005
  This 
view has as much to do with prevailing negotiation theory and principle as with the 
limitations of the legal system.  The impact of negotiation theory and principles on the 
lack of reform is discussed briefly below. 
First, negotiation theory and principles recognizes the use of distributive, 
fixed-pie, competitive negotiation tactics, including deception.
1006
  While negotiation 
                                                 
1002
 See, eg, Karrass, above n 919, 23, 107; Karrass, above n 919, 187.  Karrass is regarded as a leader 
in business negotiation books, and actually states that bluffing and a level of misrepresentation are part 
of negotiation. 
1003
 Discussion Paper 62, above n 560, 7; Cooley, above n 27, 274-276; Van M Pounds, ‘Promoting 
Truthfulness in Negotiation: A Mindful Approach’ (2004) 40 Willamette Law Review 181, 189. 
1004
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1220.  There are also numerous books and articles that support this. 
1005
 Cf Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1248-1250 (arguing that the ‘it’s part of the game’ excuse is ethically 
impermissible because there are no rules to negotiation within the meaning of the word ‘rules’). 
1006
 Note:  Some would argue that distributive, fixed-pie negotiations is no longer the more widely 
supported negotiation theory and that interest-based negotiation is the new model (See, eg, Bordone, 
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theory does not directly support the use of lying in negotiations, it does recognize that 
parties to a negotiation, even one that starts out as interest-based, may engage in 
deceptive tactics as part of the game.  As discussed earlier in Chapter 2 regarding 
various bargaining ethics models, a negotiator with a ‘poker’ ethic,
1007
 end-results 
ethic or personalistic ethics that condones lying is not likely to have a problem with 
using deceptive tactics, regardless of his opponent’s view or ethics model.  A 
deceptive tactic is simply an acceptable part of the game. 
Second, if the legal ethics codes are considered to be part of the rules of the 
game for the legal professional, then we have seen that they permit a certain amount 
of deception, consistent with acceptable negotiation theory and principles.  In the 
United States, for example, Rule 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct has withstood over twenty years of debate and criticism regarding its 
apparent support for certain perceived deception in negotiations.
1008
  It appears that 
even the drafters of Rule 4.1, when referring to ‘generally accepted conventions in 
negotiation’,
1009
 recognize that there are certain understood and acceptable steps to the 
negotiation process, such as history of offers, puffing, and certain exaggeration, that 
are normal.  Furthermore, scholars provided insight that the drafters of the ABA 
Model Rules most likely realized that words alone are insufficient to impact 
behaviour and that imposing additional rules would only as another bargaining chip 
under the current legal culture.
1010
 
                                                                                                                                            
above n 96,  16-20); however, such views are also disputed, especially in more competitive markets 
such as commercial negotiations and some international trade negotiations. 
1007
 Shell, above n 227, 65-69. 
1008
 Pounds, above n 1003, 189, 195-196 (more recently, modifications to Rule 4.1 were considered at 
the Ethics 2000, but not adopted). 
1009
 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, above n 293, Rule 4.1. 
1010
 Pounds, above n 1003, 195-196.  See also Discussion Paper 62, above n 560, 7-9. 
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Similarly, in Australia, Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 also allows 
for certain levels of deception, such as opinions that might inadvertently turn out to be 
false and subjective assessments of products and services.
1011
  While s 52 imposes a 
standard of proof lower than the ‘reasonable person’ standard, it nonetheless appears 
to allow for shades of deception.
1012
 
Finally, practitioners recognize that deception and some forms of lying are an 
inherent part of negotiations, whether they are mediated negotiations or those 
conducted between the parties themselves.  As such, no amount of regulation will 
completely eliminate its use.  The examples of mediation are used here because the 
mediation process is essentially facilitated negotiations and thus these examples serve 
to illustrate the extent to which negotiation behaviour permeates other areas of the 
lawyer’s role.
1013
  For example, Cooley argues that a mediator can end up being one 
of the most ardent users of deceptive tactics in order to manipulate information for the 
benefit of the parties, especially in caucused mediations.
1014
  Furthermore, as the 
‘chief information officer’ of the negotiation, a mediator is in a unique and powerful 
position to control the flow of information, the content, the framing of information, 
and engaging in his/her own set of tactics quite apart from those used by the 
parties.
1015
  Even if additional rules were implemented to impose candour, Cooley 
argues that the rules ’must be compatible with the game’s nature and purpose...must 
                                                 
1011
 Pengilley, above n 576, 114.   
1012
 Pengilley, above n 576, 113-117.  
1013
 See, eg, Laurence Boulle, Mediation Skills and Techniques (2001); Laurence Boulle, Mediation: 
Principles, Process, Practice (1996) (defining ‘mediation’ as “all forms of decision-making in which 
the parties concerned are assisted by someone external to the dispute, the mediator, who cannot make 
binding decisions for them but can assist their decision-making in various ways”) 
1014
 Cooley, above n 27, 264-266. 
1015
 Cooley, above n 27, 264-266; See also Christoper M. Moore, The Mediation Process:  Practical 
Strategies for Resolving Conflict (1986) 269 (“[t]he ability to control, manipulate, suppress, or enhance 
data, or to initiate entirely new information, gives the mediator an inordinate level of influence over the 
parties.”). 
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not significantly interfere with the means by which the players can accomplish the 
game’s purpose [i.e., to resolve conflict]…must be comprehensible, reasonable, and 
fair… [and they] must be capable of compliance by all the game’s players in all 
situations.’
1016
  This seems a high bar to place on imposing truthfulness in 
negotiations.  
In brief, the second plausible reason for lack of reform is that negotiation is 
widely understood to be a game where certain accepted and tacitly agreed-upon 
‘rules’ apply.  Part of those unspoken rules of the bargaining game is that tactics such 
as deception, puffing, and exaggeration are normal and not to be taken at face value.  
In fact, they are sometimes considered efficient to the extent that parties expect them 
and the transaction costs are likely built-in to the negotiation.  If this is the prevailing 
view in society, it seems implausible to impose honesty by lawyers in a process that, 
by its very nature, appears to demand dishonesty in order to succeed.   
A third reason for lack of effective reform in this area, particularly in the 
United States, appears to be due to the American Bar Association’s 
1017
 reluctance or 
failure to see that there is an issue with regards to lawyers’ deceptive behaviour in 
negotiation.  There is a high degree of consensus among legal scholars that the ABA’s 
failure to recognise key issues, including lawyer deception in negotiation, and its 
failure to act on them, is foundational to the problems plaguing the U.S. legal 
                                                 
1016
 Cooley, above n 27, 274-277. 
1017
 The term ‘Bar’ in this chapter is used to mean the bar associations of each country and legal 
jurisdiction responsible for regulating it members and their conduct under various rules and 
professional ethics codes.  In this case, I am specifically referring to the American Bar Association 
since it appears to recognise negotiation and deceptive behaviour in negotiations in line with general 
conventions of negotiation. 
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profession today.
1018
  Some argue that the ABA appears to have gone even further by 
actually advocating for greater leniency in allowing some level of deception in 
negotiation.
1019
  This is primarily in the form of imposing a ‘materiality’ requirement 
on the facts or law stated to induce or be considered deceptive or fraudulent.  By this I 
mean that the ABA legal ethics rules generally refer to lawyers not being deceptive 
about ‘material facts or law’ rather than requiring a blanket prohibition on deception 
of all facts or law.  However, at least one legal scholar in the United States believes 
the ABA has reviewed the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation and has taken 
appropriate action given an understanding of human nature, the negotiation process, 
and what the ABA and state bar associations can effectively control.
1020
     
In Australia, even though commercial and consumer regulation such as 
Australia’s Trade Practice Act 1974 appears to be aimed at the Australian legal 
profession,
1021
 the profession itself does not appear to readily recognise its 
applicability to their members.  However, as stated earlier in this chapter, the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission consider the Trade Practices Act 
as applicable to all professions, including the legal profession.     
A fourth interrelated reason for lack of reform on this issue is the largely self-
regulated nature of the legal profession, which is more likely to act in accordance with 
                                                 
1018
 Lowenthal, above n 28, 411; Loder, above n 533,  45; Wetlaufer, above n 31,  1219; Rubin, above n 
69,  577; Deborah L Rhode, ‘Law, Lawyers and the Pursuit of Justice’ (2002) 70 Fordham Law Review 
1543, 1556-1559. 
1019
 Thurman, above n 148, 103-104. 
1020
 White, above n 60, 927-931 (discussing the possible issues that the drafters of the American Bar 
Association Model Rules may have considered in determining the difficulty of imposing ethical norms 
on negotiation).  This discussion does not appear to be as robust in Australia. 
1021
 Pengilley, above n 576, 113-129; See also Study of the Professions – legal:  Summary of Final 
Report, above n 925, 7 (recommending that the Act apply equally to legal professionals). 
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its own best interests.
1022
  One of the common features of a predominantly self-
regulated model is a profit-motivated enterprise and a role-morality ethic that many 
credit as being the reason why lawyers potentially act outside the bounds of society’s 
expectations of acceptable behaviour.  The role-morality ethic of lawyers allows them 
to act in accordance with the best interests of their clients and the legal profession 
regardless of whether such conduct may be inconsistent with how society expects 
lawyers to behave.  Any external regulation which would negatively impact the 
profession would likely not be imposed or accepted.  This is even more so in the case 
of imposing certain core values, such as honesty in negotiation.  In addition, the 
profession may not see the issue of deception in negotiation as a serious enough issue 
to warrant reformatory action.  For example, the lack of ethics violation cases in 
Queensland stemming from prohibited conduct in negotiation would seem to allude to 
the possibility that, at least in Queensland, the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation 
is isolated or non-existent and does not warrant any regulatory controls.
1023
 
A fifth plausible reason for lack of reform in the area of lawyer deception in 
negotiation is that clients who expect a certain amount of zealous advocacy from their 
lawyers are not likely to complain if their lawyer ‘wins’ the case and protects or 
maximises the client’s interest , even if the lawyer engaged in deceptive conduct.  
Many such clients, if they are happy with the outcome, are likely to praise the result 
rather than admonish the potentially deceptive tactics used to gain a favourable 
outcome.  Another potential scenario is that because the use of certain 
                                                 
1022
 See, eg, Parker and Sampford, above n 200.  Note:  The Queensland legal system discussed in 
Chapter 4 is an example of a system that is currently more co-regulated with the intervention of other 
professional and governmental bodies. 
1023
 See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the analysis of legal ethics violation cases in 
Queensland for deceptive or misleading conduct.  
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misrepresentations and deceptions is widely accepted in negotiations and because 
clients themselves may engage in such behaviour on a regular basis, they are less 
likely to consider the deceptive behaviour of their own lawyer, albeit against an 
opponent, as immoral or unacceptable.
1024
   
A sixth potential reason for lack of reform in this area is the nature of human 
beings as it relates to lying and the effort it might take to change engrained behaviours 
in the social fabric.  It could be argued that lying is as old as time.  It is part of the 
fabric of human nature.  From the time of the Ten Commandments, where lying was 
strictly forbidden,
1025
 society has ‘evolved’ to  accept that there may be times when 
lying is necessary and the best strategy, such as when attempting to avoid hurting 
other people’s feelings or when it might cause harm.  Society even appears to tolerate 
outright lying in certain circumstances.
1026
 
In 1894, John Locke recognized this fascinating aspect of human nature, 
stating ‘[i]t is evident how men love to deceive and be deceived since rhetoric, that 
powerful instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is publicly 
taught, and has always been had in good reputation; …men find pleasure to be 
deceived.’
1027
 
In 1968, Arendt argued that ‘our ability to lie – but not necessarily our ability 
to tell the truth – belongs among the few obvious demonstrable data that confirm 
                                                 
1024
 Note: This possible reason for lack of reform might conflict with the consumer studies discussed 
earlier; however, at this time, there do not appear to be studies that report on the correlation between a 
client being happy with the results of their case and therefore having a positive perception of their legal 
practitioner or the converse.  As such, this paragraph provides only one of several possible explanations 
for the lack of reform on the issue of lawyers’ deceptive conduct in negotiation.   
1025
 Most commonly recognized as the 9
th
 Commandment - Exodus 20:16 "Thou shalt not bear false 
witness against thy neighbour."   
1026
 Cooley, above n 27, 263.  
1027
 Barnes, above n 7, 3.   
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human freedom.’
1028
  Scholars argued that lying is one of humankind’s distinguishing 
features from the animal kingdom.  The ability to tell a lie and to do so effectively 
became the hallmark of human creativity and freedom, a God-given right as argued by 
some.
1029
 
In 1983, Barwise and Perry affirmed this by basically arguing that it is only 
because people violate the conventions of language (i.e., by lying) that we are able to 
‘recognize truth as uniformity across certain utterance situations.’
1030
  They seem to 
argue that it is because people lie that we are able to tell what is considered a standard 
of truth; if they did not, then we would ‘never notice truth as a property of some 
utterances and not others’.
1031
   
 Scholars may justify lying by stating that it was essential to human creativity 
and freedom.  However, social psychology confirms the propensity of people to lie in 
a variety of circumstances simply because the heuristics and systematic biases 
inherent in human nature increase the probability of lying.
1032
  For example, it is 
natural for people to: a) believe our own cause is just over the other party’s saying the 
same; b) to assume the worse with regards to our adversary’s motives, character, and 
conduct yet assume the best with respect to our own; c) to accept as sufficient the 
justifications we give to ourselves regarding the lies we tell but to devalue the 
justification of others; d) to believe that the lies we tell are better justified that those 
told by our opponent; and e) to devalue an offer or opinion of another party without 
                                                 
1028
 Barnes, above n 7, 3 (discussing Arendt (1968: 250)). 
1029
 Ibid. 
1030
 Barnes, above n 7, 3 (discussing Barwise and Perry (1983: 18)). 
1031
 Barnes, above n 7, 3 (discussing Barwise and Perry (1983: 18)). 
1032
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1232; See also Korobkin and Guthrie, above n 79, 795; Chris Guthrie 
‘Insights from Cognitive Psychology’ (2004) 54 Journal of Legal Education 42. 
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any reason, simply because they come from someone else.
1033
  Such inherent human 
biases combined with a competitive negotiation environment only increase the 
probability that people will lie in negotiations.
1034
 
Additional evidence of the nature of human behaviour with respect to lying 
can be found simply in the engrained workings of modern society.  Today, a global 
economy, advanced technology, and the economic rise of once third-world economies 
have created increased competition.  Competition, by nature, involves the importance 
and pursuit of ‘winning’.
1035
  Competitors generally engage in competitive, win-lose, 
fixed pie thinking.
1036
  As a result, parties in competition will tend to use distributive 
bargaining tactics to claim the maximum value from a presumably fixed-pie.  Such 
distributive bargaining tactics are, by their very nature, not cooperative.  Lying is one 
such tactic and can be used strategically in an attempt to gain maximum advantage in 
a negotiation.  This appears even truer for legal professionals in an adversarial system, 
whose careers depend on effective negotiations to deliver results.
1037
 
The use of deception is also engrained into society by the legal professionals’ 
clients who demand a certain level of success from their lawyers.  Clients have come 
to expect the lawyer to serve as advocate and protector of the client’s interests as 
affirmed by the lawyers’ tenets of duty, loyalty, and zealous representation of their 
clients.
1038
  These professional tenants influence the negotiation behaviour of legal 
                                                 
1033
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1232; Korobkin and Guthrie, above n 79, 795; Guthrie, above n 1032, 42 
(discussing the impact of heuristics and biases in negotiations). 
1034
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1232 (citing Sisela Bok as stating that “[b]ias skews all judgment, but never 
more so than in the search for good reasons to deceive.” Sisela Bok, Lying: Moral Choices in Public 
and Private Life 26 (1978)). 
1035
 Pounds, above n 1003, 187. 
1036
 Win-lose and fixed-pie mentality are generally associated with distributive bargaining.   
1037
 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1220. 
1038
 Pounds, above n 1003, 182; see also Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1220 and 1272 (discussing the nature 
of lying as used by legal professions under the guise of the duty of loyalty and zealous representation).  
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professionals in such a way that lawyers may use deception to obtain the best possible 
outcome for their clients.  The legal system expects this and so do clients.   
However, some argue that the duty of loyalty and zealous representation does 
not logically translate into an excuse to engage in deceptive tactics that might reflect 
poorly on the lawyer (by committing ‘bad acts’), the legal profession, or the public’s 
perception of the integrity of the legal profession.  The argument appears to be that 
the legal practitioner could condition an offer of representation by stating that the 
lawyer will not commit ethically improper acts.
1039
  This might be a challenge because 
it requires a change in engrained behaviours.  Lawyers and the public have been 
trained on and come to accept certain negotiation practices as permissible, including 
the use of some deception in negotiation.
1040
  As social scientists have repeatedly 
observed, changing such engrained behaviours is fundamentally hard given natural 
human tendencies even if you are trying to make a ‘discerning choice’.
1041
  In addition, 
controlling such practices may have an impact on expectations of justice or on durable 
agreements long considered the hallmarks of effectively negotiated agreements.     
A seventh and perhaps most important consideration for lack of reform in the 
area of lawyer deception in negotiation are the transaction costs of imposing candour 
in negotiation.  While there may be potential benefits of imposing laws on candour in 
negotiations, there are likely to be costs which might outweigh the potential benefits.  
First, the legal system is not without its limitations.  It has contextual constraints, time 
constraints and is subject to resource and cost constraints just like any other business.  
For example, law deals with attempting to reconstruct past events, not so much in 
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 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1255. 
1040
 Cooley, above n 27, 268. 
1041
 Pounds, above n 1003, 224, n 252. 
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‘finding facts’ but in attempting to re-determine what might have happened based on 
many peoples’ perspective of the events.
1042
  Because law, and therefore legal 
professionals, become a ‘player’ after the game has already started, there is possibility 
for error on many levels.
1043
  In addition, law must account for transaction costs 
associated with providing the service of ‘justice’.  Due to these inherent limitations of 
the adversarial system, it is argued that law might have to accept some forms of 
deceits, such as those which will not affect the overall outcome of the case, impose an 
insurmountable burden of proof, or those which are undetectable.
1044
  In an effort to 
meet the goals of closure to disputes, access to courts, speedy trials, administration of 
justice, and remedies, the legal system must weigh the transaction costs of doing 
justice with the costs of actually uncovering the truth. 
Furthermore, while imposing candour in negotiations is an admirable goal, 
even proponents recognize that the transactions costs associated with this would be 
the biggest hurdle.  A higher standard might become ‘one more weapon in the 
adversarial arsenal, with each side threatening to bring ethics violation charges against 
the other.’
1045
  This would result in an increase in overall transaction costs for 
handling the case. 
Finally, the eighth reason why each of the various solutions proposed to date 
have not been implemented or adopted is because they appear to be an attack on the 
legal profession and reinforce a litany of reasons why the profession is failing.  This is 
likely to put the legal profession on the defensive where the profession and its 
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 Wetlaufer, above n 31, 1235.   
1043
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
1045
 Pounds, above n 1003, 195 (citing Robert H Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning: -egotiating to 
Create Value in Deals and Disputes (2000) 293-294).   
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members will either act defensively and try to further hold on to their current position 
and justify it or not act at all.   
From the perspective of the legal profession, one could argue that each of the 
three main solutions proposed to date are isolated solutions, addressing only one 
aspect of a more complex problem involving multiple stakeholders.  Attempting to 
adopt one particular solution over another would be costly and potentially ineffective, 
especially since decision making theories seem to suggest that there is insufficient 
deterrence for lawyers to not lie in negotiations.
1046
  The solutions proposed to date 
also lack sufficient empirical evidence to ensure success or viability on the one hand 
and appear to be too broad and costly on the other.  Therefore, both a new perspective 
and an integrated approach are needed to address this timely issue impacting the legal 
profession, both internally among legal practitioners and externally in the eyes of the 
public whom the legal profession is meant to serve.  This integrated path to policy 
reform is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
6.7 CHAPTER COCLUSIO 
This chapter summarised the critical findings of the research questions 
established in Chapter 1 and identified the opportunity for professional reform 
recommendations to address the issue of lawyers’ use of deception in negotiation.   
The results of the first research question confirm that lawyers do engage in 
deceptive tactics, even in negotiation, regardless of whether the legal ethics code 
condemns all forms of deception. The results of the second research question, which 
consisted of a comparative study of legal ethics codes, revealed that the legal ethics 
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 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.7 (Decision Making Theories Affecting Legal Negotiation); See also 
Kahneman and Tversky, above n 265, 263-291; Guthrie, above n 505, 163; Rachlinski, above n 269, 
113 (noting that “[e]xpected utility theory predicts that people make either risk-averse or risk-neutral 
choices.”). 
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codes of the selected group of common law jurisdictions do not consistently address 
the issue of deception in negotiation and fail to provide explicit guidance on how 
lawyers ought to behave in negotiations.  The results of the third research question, 
which consisted of an original study of the Queensland ethics violation cases alleging 
misleading or deceptive conduct, confirm that deception in negotiation is not as 
effectively regulated as other violations of the legal ethics code.  Finally, the findings 
of numerous studies on lawyers and the legal profession provide a compelling case for 
reviewing the impact of the legal ethics codes on influencing the behaviour of legal 
professionals.    
The collective findings from the three primary research questions and the 
resulting insights as discussed in this chapter establish a compelling argument for 
policy reforms.
1047
  The issue can no longer be ignored.  The consumer studies 
discussed in this chapter appear to indicate that the problem lies with how some 
lawyers behave and conduct themselves in carrying out their responsibilities on a 
daily basis.  As the Gallop poll and ABA consumer studies are primarily from the 
United States, and similar statistical data is not available for Australian lawyers, the 
comments are directed specifically to the behaviour and tactics used by some 
percentage of US lawyers.  Since negotiation is a primary means by which lawyers 
carry out their responsibilities, the way lawyers negotiate and the tactics and 
behaviours they display (because they do so at every level of the legal process) are 
sufficient enough reason to look at serious policy reforms in this area.  If lawyers are 
deceptive in negotiations, the profession will be considered deceptive and lacking 
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 See e.g. Kirby, above n 677 (discussing Dean Anthony Kronman’s book The Lost Lawyer: Failing 
Ideals of the Legal Profession and its impact and relevance to the Australian legal profession, including 
proposals for reforms in the areas of legal ethics, professional reform, and legal ethics education). 
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integrity.  This will be directly reflected in how lawyers and the profession are viewed 
in the eyes of the public it is entrusted to serve.  Regardless of whether the issue of 
lawyer deception is considered a minor or major issue, there is hope through 
implementing strategic, incremental changes that can have a positive, lasting impact.  
Reforms aimed at how lawyers negotiate and minimising the use of tactics or 
behaviours which are considered deceptive or misleading is a positive step towards 
managing negative perceptions and improving the effectiveness of legal professionals 
in serving their clients in the interests of justice and public welfare.  To the extent that 
policy reforms can influence the negotiation behaviours of lawyers toward the use of 
more ethical, honest negotiation approaches as opposed to adopting ‘generally 
accepted negotiation conventions’ that consist of potentially deceptive negotiation 
behaviour is the direct extent to which negative perceptions of the legal profession 
may be minimized by the profession and the public.  The next chapter outlines a tri-
partite, integrated policy reforms framework and discusses the aims, benefits, and 
methodology for implementing the proposed reforms. 
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CHAPTER 7 –  
IMPLICATIOS FOR LAW REFORM 
 
 
‘Any occupation or profession is unworthy if it requires of us that we 
do as a functionary what we would be ashamed to do as a private 
person.’  
 
~ Sydney J Harris
1048
  
 
This chapter focuses on the potential for integrated, systematic, and creative 
legal and non-legal policy reforms to address the issues discussed in this thesis.  This 
chapter develops a tripartite
1049
 response approach to this cross-jurisdictional, 
multidisciplinary issue.  It offers recommendations for several reform proposals along 
with a discussion of benefits and risks.  In addition, this chapter discusses cross-
disciplinary views of how to engage effective and lasting behavioural changes in 
order to implement the policy reform proposals discussed herein.  Finally, this chapter 
concludes with a call to action for the legal profession to finally recognise that the 
profession has the opportunity to redefine itself in terms of the research questions 
posed in this thesis and must now take solid forward-thinking steps to address the 
issue of lawyer deception in negotiation. 
7.1 ITRODUCTIO 
Chapter 2 provided an extensive review of literature in the areas relevant to the 
research questions posed in this thesis, including areas of legal ethics and negotiation.  
Chapter 6 highlighted several solutions that have been previously introduced to 
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 D’Amato and Eberle, above n 174, 762 (quoting Sydney J. Harris).  See also BrainyQuote, Sydney 
J. Harris Quotes <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/s/sydney_j_harris.html> at 9 August 
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 The term is adopted from Professor Charles Sampford in Stephen Parker and Charles Sampford, 
Legal Ethics and Legal Practice:  Contemporary Issues (1995).  Sampford talks about an integrated 
three-part solution to multi-disciplinary, complex issues such as those presented in this thesis and, thus, 
the term is appropriate. Synonymous terms include: ‘trilateral’ or ‘three-way’. 
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resolve the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation and the reasons why these 
proposals have not, to date, been adopted.  These proposals included the modifying 
the current legal ethics code, adopting an entirely new model of legal ethics,
1050
 and 
maintaining the status quo.
1051
  These various suggestions point to the difficulty in 
addressing the issue of ethics, namely that irrespective of whether practitioners and 
scholars agree that the current legal ethics codes may be flawed,
1052
 they appear to 
disagree on exactly what to do about it and how to execute that change.
1053
  This 
leaves the profession in a predicament because there are essentially two diametrically 
opposed views along a continuum of possible solutions. 
Along one end of the solutions continuum is the prevailing view to maintain 
the status quo by keeping the adversarial-type ethic that appears to serve as the 
hallmark and foundation of the common-law justice system.  The current legal ethics 
model is generally described as the standard conception model consisting of two 
primary elements forming the core of the role-morality of lawyers.  The first element 
is called the ‘principle of partisanship’ and the second element is described as the 
‘principle of non-accountability’.
1054
  The partisanship principle is one of the 
hallmarks of the legal system in terms of zealous representation of clients.  The 
ramification of the partisanship principle is that it creates an impression (often 
                                                 
1050
 Note:  I am referring primarily to the literature from the United States regarding the American Bar 
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct because of the significant debate surrounding Rule 
4.1 and negotiations.  While the same issues may not apply to the other common-law jurisdictions, the 
concern that the legal ethics code based on an adversarial system is flawed is applicable to these same 
jurisdictions and that is the focus of this section. 
1051
 See Chapter 6, Section 6.6 (Failure of Prior Proposed Reforms and A Call to Action) for more 
information. 
1052
 Rhode, above n 151, 0-21 (“....bar ethical codes are not an adequate source of guidance....end up 
reflecting too high a level of abstraction and too low a common denominator of conduct.”). 
1053
 Rhode, above n 975, 867 (“...bar’s prevailing ethics norms are fundamentally flawed and their 
inadequacies carry a substantial cost for both the profession and the public.  Where the commentators 
differ, both with Simon and each other, is on plausible prescriptions...”) 
1054
 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 21-23; Luban, above n 157.  See also Chapter 2 (Review of 
Literature) for a more detailed discussion of the standard conception model of legal ethics. 
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negative) in the minds of clients and the public (especially those who feel they have 
not received justice or their interests have been compromised) that lawyers are amoral, 
which is commonly perceived as lawyers not being accountable for their actions.
 1055
   
This triggers the non-accountability principle.  While a lawyer is meant to serve all 
equally, a lack of integrity in the way the lawyer carries out his/her task (e.g., by 
engaging in deceptive conduct in negotiations) leads scholars and practitioners to 
argue that the current legal ethics model is flawed and irreprehensible in 
contravention of the public interest.
1056
  Scholars acknowledge the limitations of 
partisan advocacy yet also argue that a totally non-partisan system is likely impossible 
since those disputes which cannot be resolved by negotiation may end up in court, 
where partisan advocacy prevails.
1057
  It seems that the legal system which appears to 
receive so much criticism from the public and the profession is the same system 
which places value on client loyalty, rewards zealous representation of the client’s 
legitimate goals within the bounds of the law, advocates without discrimination, offers 
representation regardless of a client’s financial means, and strives to set aside personal 
loyalties, values, and morals when representing a client.
1058
   
Despite these virtues of the standard conception model (adversarial ethic), the 
ambivalence about the legal system and its practitioners appears to come not from the 
adversarial ethic itself but from the lack of fulfilment of the highest standards that the 
standard conception model is meant to signify within the context of the fulfilment of 
                                                 
1055
 Note:  I would argue that it is unrealistic to expect that lawyers are completely not aware of their 
own personal morals and values in the course of representation or that these personal beliefs do not 
impact their representation. The key here is that without specific and practical tools of dealing with the 
possible ethical conflicts, a lawyer might revert to a personal ethic that is in direct conflict with the 
lawyer’s role as an officer of the court and defender of public interest. 
1056
 Whitton, above n 603; Rhode, above n 975, 867. 
1057
 Mize, above n 66, 248. 
1058
 Parker and Evans, above n 156, 16-17; Rhode, above n 151, 15. 
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the promise of law.  By this I mean that the most ethical interpretation associated with 
the principle of partisanship is a client’s ability to have his/her interests heard and 
accounted for by a legal professional versed in representing those legitimate interests 
in a forum of ordered dispute resolution.  In addition, the most respectable view 
associated with the principle of non-accountability is not that the lawyer is completely 
devoid of good morals or values and thus is amoral.  Instead, in this case, perhaps a 
more reasonable interpretation is that the lawyer is expected and bound by the legal 
ethics code to represent equally without discrimination or judgment and not allow 
conflicting personal values to infringe upon the client’s legitimate
1059
 representational 
goals.  The erosion of that high standard of professionalism is reflected, in part, in the 
way lawyers negotiate, the use of potentially deceptive behaviours in negotiations, 
and a lack of clarity on the standards that apply to a lawyer’s now most prominent 
function – negotiators of deals, information, and agreements.
1060
  These three factors 
affect the extent to which the legal ethics codes can be successful in addressing the 
issues related to lawyer deception in negotiation. 
On the other hand of the solutions continuum is a recommendation to adopt an 
entirely new legal ethics model.
1061
  For example, Simon would argue for a legal ethic 
based on contextualism.
1062
  Simon argues that lawyers should abandon the dominant 
                                                 
1059
 By this I mean requests and objectives which are within the bounds of the law and consistent with 
the role of the lawyer as and officer of the court. 
1060
 Eyster, above n 977, 756-757 (“...the reasons we have been unsuccessful in achieving a satisfactory 
negotiation ethic go to the heart of our system of legal education and our related beliefs about 
professionalism.”); Rhode, above n 151, 210; Davis, above n 171, 347 (discussing how professionalism 
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 See Chapter 6, Section 6.6 (Failure of Prior Proposed Reforms and A Call to Action) for more 
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1062
 See generally Simon, above n 191.  See also Thurman, above n 148, 103 (discussion situation 
ethics and arguing against it in favour of greater veracity by lawyers in negotiation and in all their 
dealings). 
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view (standard conception) that allows lawyers to pursue any justifiable and legal 
goals of the client in favour of a model of legal ethics called ‘contextualism’.
1063
  
Under this approach, ‘lawyer should take such action as, considering the relevant 
circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice’.
1064
  This means 
that, for example, in the context of negotiations, a lawyer would ‘factor into her 
decision-making and conduct her personal values and professional ethics’
1065
 and not 
be constrained by or ‘take [ ] refuge behind categorical rules of zeal, confidentiality, 
and moral neutrality toward the client's ends.’
1066
 
For example, where a lawyer is representing a poor or powerless client against 
a more formidable, forceful and powerful adversary, Simon suggests that the lawyer 
should not be constrained by rules of ethics and should try and achieve a fair and just 
result, even if that means working with and assisting the adversary.
1067
  Eyster appears 
to agree with Simon to the extent that ‘...attorneys should indeed be governed in their 
decisions and actions by their moral beliefs.’
1068
  In addition, both Luban and Simon 
agree on the basic principle of advocating for ‘ethically ambitious or high-
commitment lawyering’.
1069
   
However, there is danger in adopting Simon’s approach wholesale.  One 
troublesome aspect of Simon’s proposal is the potential for total disregard of the legal 
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 Simon, above n 191, 109. 
1064
 Simon, above n 191, 5-9; See also William H Simon, ‘Ethical Discretion in Lawyering’ (1988) 101 
Harvard Law Review 1083,  1090. 
1065
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1067
 Eyster, above n 977, 780 n 90 and 91 (citing Simon, above n 1064, 1105-1106, 1098-1099). 
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 Eyster, above n 977, 780. 
1069
 Simon, above n 191 9; David Luban, ‘Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics’ (1999) 51 Stanford Law 
Review 873, 885-888 (critiquing Simon, above n 191). 
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rules which are meant to set the boundaries between professional duties and personal 
beliefs.  Another area of concern is the extent to which an individual lawyer’s 
personal judgement is consistent with or in contravention of definitions of justice.  For 
example, ‘justice’ may mean one thing to a client, another to the lawyer, and yet have 
another, different meaning within the justice system.  By allowing or advocating for 
potentially unfettered or unreasoned personal judgment in the context of executing a 
public servant role, the lawyer acting under contextualism (situation ethics) may 
undermine more than help the client.   
Further, practitioners have criticized Simon’s preferred theory of legal ethics 
as far reaching, lacking in statistical data, and devoid of ‘detailed anthropological 
studies of particular lawyerly cultures’ that prove the malaise and collusion that 
Simon believes is plaguing the profession.
1070
  Perhaps a central concern is expressed 
by another prominent legal ethics theorist, that Simon’s proposal of contextualism is 
‘a law-centered theory... [t]he values he wants lawyers to further are legal values; the 
justice he means them to pursue is legal justice’.
1071
  The concern appears to be that 
Simon’s contextualism essentially attempts to dilute the adversarial nature of the 
current legal ethics model in favour of Simon’s own view of how values such as 
justice and fairness can be achieved, albeit still within the legalist structure of the 
current system.   
Luban argues that Simon’s approach is still about ‘legal judgments grounded 
in the methods and sources of authority of the professional culture’, excluding 
                                                 
1070
 Luban, above n 1069, 885-888 (critiquing Simon, above n 191); Smith, above n 976, 2-4. 
1071
 Ibid. 
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considerations of ordinary morality.
1072
  This is in direct contrast with more morality-
centred legal ethics models.
1073
  Eyster appears to recognise this concern and states 
that while personal beliefs and judgement should be part of a lawyer’s decision-
making process, discretion, in order to be exercised responsibly, must be through the 
development of moral judgment within the profession and that the profession must 
accept moral judgment as a norm, something that appears to be highly lacking in the 
current environment.
1074
   
In summary, adopting one approach (amend the legal ethics code) or the other 
(adopt a new legal ethics code) is an on-going debate that has been unresolved over 
the better part of the last twenty years.  Regardless of whether the majority of the 
profession and practitioners agree that the current legal ethics model is outdated or too 
adversarial, the fact remains that there is no growing consensus on how to address this 
aspect of the profession’s discontent.
1075
  Furthermore, adopting either approach as the 
single solution to the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation seems to be a classic 
case of trying to solve an issue within the inherent constraints of the profession’s 
expertise.  As paraphrased from Einstein, solutions to problems cannot be approached 
from the same consciousness that created those problems else insanity ensues.
1076
  The 
issue of lawyer deception in negotiation is a complex, multi-disciplinary issue 
involving multiple stakeholders.  It is an issue which cannot be resolved solely by the 
profession. 
                                                 
1072
 Ibid.  Luban argues that this approach is in direct contrast to morality-centred theories of legal 
ethics. See also Luban, above n 157 (advocating for a more morality-centred view of legal ethics). 
1073
 See, eg, Luban, above n 157 (advocating for a more morality-centred view of legal ethics). 
1074
 Eyster, above n 977, 780-781. 
1075
 Rhode, above n 975, 867-872. 
1076
 Thinkexist.com, Albert Einstein quotes (2009) <http://thinkexist.com/quotes/albert_einstein/> at 9 
August 2010.  This is paraphrased from two well-known quotes by Einstein:  “No problem can be 
solved from the same level of consciousness that created it.”  The second quote is: “Insanity: doing the 
same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” 
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The solution to the issues identified in this thesis as related to lawyer 
deception in negotiation requires an alternative perspective.  This includes a 
multidisciplinary approach which aims to take small, measurable steps utilising varied 
expertise targeted towards the development of incremental, progressive changes using 
a different mindset.  This can be achieved through the policy reform proposals 
recommended and discussed in this chapter.   
The tripartite approach of ethical standard setting, legal regulation 
modifications and institutional design reform, discussed in the next section, provides 
an opportunity for all key stakeholders to be participants towards progressive 
evolution of the profession, especially in addressing the issue of lawyer deception in 
negotiations.  This, in turn, will create a positive impact across all areas of a lawyer’s 
daily practice.  The tripartite framework adopted here was initially proposed by 
Professor Sampford in the context of business ethics and public sector ethics 
issues.
1077
  This tripartite combination of ethical standard setting, legal regulation and 
institutional design reform has also been called an ‘ethics regime’,
1078
 an ‘ethics 
infrastructure’,
1079
 and an ‘integrity system’
1080
 by various noted authors and 
                                                 
1077
 Parker and Sampford, above n 200, 11-12 (discussing that many of the “key problems faced by the 
West in the late twentieth century are institutional problems” and that answers to many of the problems 
require a tripartite response that consists of a combination of: 1) legal reform; 2) ethical standard 
setting; and 3) institutional design).  As with any major problem, an integrated solution that invites and 
involves the various stakeholders is an important and necessary element of success.  See also the 
various publications of Professor Sampford in relation to business ethics and public sector ethics:  
Charles Sampford, ‘Law, Institutions and the Public Private Divide’ (1992) Federal Law Review 20, 
185; Charles Sampford and David Wood, ‘The Future of Business Ethics: Legal Regulation, Ethical 
Standard Setting and Institutional Design’ (1992) Griffith Law Review 1, 56; Charles Sampford, 
‘Institutionalising Public Sector Ethics’ in Noel Preston (ed), Ethics for the Public Sector: Education 
and Training (1994). 
1078
 Noel Preston, Charles Sampford and Carmel Connors, Encouraging Ethics and Challenging 
Corruption: Reforming Governance in Public Institutions (2002) 7 (citing Sampford 1994a) 
1079
 Preston, Sampford, and Connors, above n 1078, 7, 9-10 (citing PUMA/OECD 1997: 12); 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Proceedings of the 1997 OECD 
Symposium on Ethics in the Public Sector (1999) 69-70 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/15/2093526.pdf> at 9 August 2010 (discussing the definition of an 
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international agencies.  The goal is to present the policy reform proposals with the 
recommendation that an integrated solution is required, not just reforming one aspect 
in hopes that it will sufficiently and fully address the problems discussed in this thesis.  
7.2 POLICY REFORM PROPOSALS -  A TRIPARTITE RESPOSE 
The tripartite response to the issue of deception in negotiation involves an 
integrated set of strategic policy reforms, each discussed in separate sections below.   
These reform proposals are centred on legal regulation reforms, reforms in ethical 
standard setting, and institutional design reforms.  By integrated, I mean that the 
reform proposals under each of the three areas are meant to complement each other so 
as to achieve a cohesive, consistent response to the issues discussed in this thesis.    
Collectively implemented, the following are the principal goals of these 
recommended reforms: 
• to consider the issue from a multi-faceted, integrated approach which 
recognises that a lasting solution must have the participation and 
cooperation of all key stakeholders; 
• to encourage greater consistency and clarity in the language of legal ethics 
codes such that they recognises the various functions of lawyers in today’s 
global marketplace, especially the increasingly important role of lawyer as 
negotiator; 
• to introduce recommendations for greater education in the areas of ethics 
that consists of moral reasoning, greater moral analysis of legal problems 
                                                                                                                                            
ethics infrastructure as indicated in PUMA’s 1997 report Managing Government Ethics, as 
“comprising eight key elements,  two of the elements being “an effective legal framework,” and “an 
ethics co-ordinating body.”) 
1080
 Preston, Sampford, and Connors, above n 1078, 7 (citing Transparency International 2000); Jeremy 
Pope, TI Sourcebook 2000 Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a 5ational Integrity System (2000) 
<http://www.transparency.org/publications/sourcebook> at 9 August 2010. 
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and consistency of decisions between legal ethics and general morality; 
and 
• to propose changes to both the legal ethics and negotiation curriculum 
taught at law schools so that law students who take these courses have a 
clearer understanding of the interdependencies between these topics and its 
impact on the daily tasks of legal professionals. 
The reform proposals start by looking at reforms in legal regulation, then 
address proposed changes to ethical standard setting and conclude with suggested 
reforms on institutional design which frequently affect the ability to effectively 
implement and enforce policy choices and intended behavioural changes.  Finally, a 
discussion and analysis of various means of implementing the recommended policy 
proposals demonstrates that these proposals can be successfully implemented with 
maximum benefit and minimum risk. 
7.3 LEGAL REGULATIO REFORMS 
As defined in Chapter 1, legal regulation is integral to regulating the conduct 
of members of the profession by re-enforcing existing codes of conduct and providing 
disincentives for engaging in poor conduct.  As Preston, Sampford and Connors argue, 
legal regulation plays a part in an integrated system of each jurisdiction’s overall 
governance.
1081
  Where legal regulation is inconsistent with or in contravention of the 
values it is meant to serve and the means used to achieve those values, it should be 
amended accordingly.
1082
 
                                                 
1081
 Preston, Sampford, and Connors, above n 1078, 187. 
1082
 Ibid.  See also W William Hodes, ‘Truthfulness and Honesty Among American Lawyers: 
Perception, Reality, and the Professional Reform Initiative’ (2002) 53 South Carolina Law Review 527, 
537 (“Unless the organized bar cleans its own house, sooner or later government agencies will remove 
the unique measure of self-regulation granted to the legal profession and step in to clean it for us.”).  
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One of the central questions that seem to underpin the possible lack of reform 
in the area of legal regulation is evidence-based conclusions of whether the legal 
ethics codes are really effective in providing sufficient guidance to lawyers in 
managing and regulating lawyer conduct.
1083
   
Historically, lawyers received guidance on how to conduct themselves in 
professional settings through information ‘handed down from one generation of 
lawyers to another through word of mouth, law society dealings in disciplinary 
matters, remarks from the bench, and so on.’
1084
  At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, 
the North American legal profession formally adopted professional codes of conduct 
meant to provide guidance on how lawyers should behave professionally.  The intent 
of these professional codes of conduct was to assist lawyers in engaging in a 
consistent and appropriate course of conduct in their daily practice.  However, despite 
the intent of the professional codes of conduct in providing guidelines for appropriate 
conduct in practice, they do not appear to be the primary source that lawyers refer to 
when attempting to resolve ethical dilemmas.   
Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer’s research initiative on this topic in Ontario, 
Canada seems to confirm that the majority of lawyers practicing in Ontario, Canada 
who participated in the study ‘demonstrate[d] a lack of reliance on professional codes 
for the purpose of resolving ethical issues... [and that] such codes tend[ed] to inhibit 
ethical deliberation by those lawyers who refer to them for assistance in solving 
                                                                                                                                            
Hodes was referring to the 2002 Professional Reform Initiative’s primary goal in the US to encourage 
honesty and truthfulness among US lawyers. 
1083
 See, eg, Rhode, above n 151  (speaking about the American Bar Association’s  Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct and perhaps also the state professional ethics codes and arguing that “bar ethical 
codes are not an adequate source of guidance....end up reflecting too high a level of abstraction and too 
low a common denominator of conduct.”). 
1084
 Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, above n 472, 647 (citing Loder, above n 42, 318).  
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specific problems.’
1085
  This view is consistent with the issues associated with 
disciplinary codes based on positive morality as discussed in Chapter 2. 
The Ontario, Canada study, discussed in Chapter 2, is important in providing a 
perspective into the legal regulation reforms proposed in this section.  At best, the 
study confirms that legal regulation and ethics codes, at least in the Ontario, Canada 
jurisdiction, do play a role in shaping lawyer behaviour in resolving ethical issues.  At 
worst, it sheds light that while legal ethics codes may play an explicit or implicit role 
in helping lawyers resolve some ethical dilemmas, they are certainly not the main 
driver in ensuring an integrity-based system of lawyer conduct.   
The three recommended legal regulation reform proposals presented below 
take these observations into account in addressing the potentially deceptive behaviour 
of lawyers in negotiations.  
7.3.1 Proposal 1 – Formally Recognise egotiation as a Process Separate 
from Litigation or other ADR Mechanisms 
 
The first legal regulation reform proposal recommends a modest clarification 
to the legal ethics code.  As established in previous chapters, negotiation is widely 
recognised as the quintessential skill of an effective and successful lawyer.  Also as 
established in previous chapters, not all lawyers are engaged in legal work, such as 
document preparation, that involves negotiation.  As courts, judges, and clients 
continue to seek more non-adjudicated resolutions and agreements to their legal issues 
and as the legal profession becomes more global with complex, multi-party issues and 
deals, negotiation will continue to evolve into a dominant legal dispute resolution 
process and be the foundation of other alternative dispute resolution processes such as 
mediation and arbitration.  Furthermore, a review and analysis of legal ethics codes 
                                                 
1085
 Ibid.  See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4 (Research on Legal Ethics) for more information on this study. 
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undertaken in Chapter 4 indicates that, while lawyers negotiate on a daily basis, the 
professional bodies that regulate lawyer conduct do not necessarily regard lawyer-
negotiators in the same way that they regard lawyers as mediators, arbitrators, or 
judges.  The distinction here is critical.   
One can negotiate in the sense of an action verb, to negotiate.  However, one 
can also be a negotiator in the sense of the noun, negotiator.  The legal profession, 
lawyers, and clients recognise that lawyers may and do negotiate; however, they do 
not seem to fully recognise that lawyers may serve as negotiators, much like lawyers 
serve as  advocates, mediators, arbitrators, or judges at various points in their legal 
career.
1086
  To date, most legal ethics codes formally recognise that there are certain 
rules for when a lawyer serves as an advocate, prosecutor, third-party neutral 
(arbitrator or mediator), or judge.  This same distinction is not formally recognised 
when a lawyer serves as a negotiator.   
This first legal regulation reform proposal is to formally recognise that a 
lawyer is a negotiator and to more formally recognise this function in the legal ethics 
codes.  This requires a slight amendment to the legal ethics codes at the national and 
jurisdictional level.  This can be most easily accomplished by adding a section to the 
legal ethics codes, entitled ‘Lawyer as Negotiator’ or ‘Lawyer Serving as Negotiator’.
 
                                                 
1086
 See, eg, Anthony T Kronman, ‘Living in the Law’ (1987) 43 University of Chicago Law Review 
834, 840 (discussing the distinction of task and function between “those involvements and activities 
that constitute his character or personality, on the one hand, and those, on the other, that do not, 
between those that make someone the person he or she is and those one merely has or does.”) (italics in 
the original).  See also White, above n 60, 929 (who acknowledges that the American Bar Association 
is finally moving in the right direction by acknowledging negotiation as a separate process).  Despite 
White’s observation, the ABA has not fully realised their intended vision because of imbedding the role 
of negotiation and negotiators into one of the most controversial rules of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, namely Rule 4.1.  This is unlike the more direct and conspicuous approach taken 
by Canada as discussed more fully in Chapter 4.  I would argue here that in the lawyer’s case, the 
lawyer is a negotiator on a daily basis and this does shape his character and personality within the legal 
system and affects the perception of the legal profession by the way he functions as a negotiator. 
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1087
  This is a modest change that clarifies the lawyer’s role and does not run afoul of 
potential concerns that such an amendment would infringe on any other ethical duties.  
In fact, as the Ontario, Canada legal ethics code survey showed, lawyers do positively 
consult the professional ethics codes for clarification of their roles and obligations, 
even if they do not find specific guidance on a particular ethical dilemma.  The benefit 
of this first legal regulation reform proposal is two-fold. 
The first benefit of this legal regulation proposal is that it formally recognises 
what has been informally known by clients and the profession as a whole, that by and 
large, what most lawyers do consistently and continually on a daily basis is to 
negotiate on behalf of their clients’ best interests, whether internally among their 
colleagues, externally with opposing counsel or through third parties.
1088
  At best, this 
formal recognition could establish the distinction between lawyers as negotiators and 
their other professional roles and obligations within the legal system.  The silent 
treatment currently given to negotiations in legal ethics codes can, by adopting this 
reform proposal, have an explicit voice that prevents lawyers from concluding that 
certain negotiation behaviour, namely deception, is acceptable.  On the other hand, the 
clarity may also cause conflict if that clarity contravenes acceptable negotiation 
practice, community standards, or case law.  This is not to say that community 
standards or negotiation principles are not viable; however it is to stress that the legal 
profession can take this opportunity to clarify professional standards related to 
negotiation relative to any conflicting community standards, including whether the 
use of potentially deceptive or misleading practices is permissible by lawyers.  Any 
                                                 
1087
 Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, above n 472, 656-657. 
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 Chart, above n 899, 178-179 (“Negotiation is therefore an inevitable and major part of what 
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conflicts that arise can and should also be addressed as soon as possible within the 
ethics codes to ensure further clarity on the role of lawyer as negotiator. 
A second benefit of this legal regulation proposal is that it can address the 
questions and perceptions related to of whether lawyers are professionals or simply 
consultants and business people who pursue the profit motive above their duty to 
serve the public interest.  As Loder and Morawetz, among others, have pointed out, 
those who enter law school and the profession enter with a moral predisposition that 
might only be further accentuated through law school training.
1089
  If this is the case, 
most future lawyers as law students would see very little value in professional ethics 
courses.
1090
  This seems to be further reinforced by the fact that, at most law schools, 
professional ethics education is relegated to a single second-level required or elective 
course.
1091
   
Collectively, what this seems to indicate is a pattern where incoming lawyers 
see ethics as a personal choice to be made by the individual, not a choice imposed by 
external rules as in the case of legal ethics codes.  The tension is between the 
individual lawyer exercising his/her own personal sense of what is right and wrong 
and the professional obligations as codified under the legal ethics codes since, 
generally, ‘the notion of ethics itself...presumes that persons are autonomous moral 
agents’.
1092
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 See, eg, Loder, above n 42, 333; Morawetz, above n 481; Zacharias, above n 481, 386. 
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 Moliterno, above n 453, 259. 
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 See generally Moliterno, above n 453, 259 (comparing the teaching of professional ethics among 
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1092
 Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, above n 472, 648-649 (quoting Ladd, above n 19, 105.)  See also J  
Honsberger, ‘Legal Rules, Ethical Choices and Professional Conduct’ (1987) 21 Law Society Gazette 
113 (stating that codes of conduct are at odds with most notions of ethics, which involve personal 
choice, not rules imposed by external agents). Cf W William Hode, ‘Rethinking the Way Law is 
Taught: Can We Improve Lawyer Professionalism by Teaching Hired Guns to Aim Better?’ 
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The key point here and the central issue to be addressed by this first legal 
regulation proposal is that when individuals, exercising their own personal ethics prior 
to entering law school, become law students and subsequently enter the legal 
profession, they cease being independent moral agents and must, at least within their 
professional capacity, have the skills to make ethical decisions consistent with the 
intent and purpose of the legal ethics codes.  They may also need to discern and 
balance a course of action that is consistent with their personal morals and 
professional ethics.  To the extent that they lack proper moral reasoning skills or the 
ethics codes are silent on the prescribed code of conduct, lawyers as professionals 
may have no choice but to revert to their personal ethics or the prevailing ethical 
views for guidance.  This guidance may directly conflict with perceived professional 
obligations and duties.  In the case of lawyers as negotiators, bringing clarity to the 
minimum standard of behaviour expected by lawyers in negotiation can only benefit 
the profession.           
An example of how this proposal can be easily integrated into the current legal 
ethics codes, as presented and discussed in Chapter 4, is Chapter 11 of the Law 
Society of Alberta’s Code of Professional Conduct in Alberta Canada, which formally 
and progressively recognises that certain ethical obligations do apply when lawyers 
serve in the capacity of negotiators.
1093
  The Law Society of Alberta’s Code of 
Professional Conduct also addresses the issue of law as a business in Chapter 8.
1094
  
Chapter 8 explicitly recognises the significant business aspects of the practice of law 
                                                                                                                                            
(1998/1999) 87 Kentucky Law Journal 1019, 1046-1049 (describing Notre Dame Law School’s ethics 
programme in the United States, where law students are encouraged “to establish their own personal 
standards of professionalism and to face up to the difficult choices that a life in the law can bring.”). 
1093
 The Law Society of Alberta Code of Professional Conduct, above n 687, 11-1.  
1094
 The Law Society of Alberta Code of Professional Conduct, above n 687, 8-1 (Statement of 
Principle).  
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by requiring lawyers to comply with the highest standards of business ethics in this 
aspect of the profession.
1095
  However it also clearly and unambiguously relegates the 
business aspect of practice to its primary role, stating that ‘[a]t all times, however, the 
lawyer remains a professional and has an obligation to behave as such.’
1096
 
In summary, the inclusion of a separate section on lawyers as negotiators is an 
explicit and timely recognition by the Alberta legal jurisdiction that not only is the 
Alberta legal jurisdiction cognisant that deception might be considered a generally 
acceptable negotiation practice but that lawyers practicing as negotiators within 
Alberta’s jurisdiction are barred from using such deception and are expected to 
uphold the highest standards of honesty and integrity, even as negotiators.  The 
message is consistent, clear, unambiguous, and obligatory, upholding the highest 
standards of professional conduct even at the lowest level of a lawyer’s function or 
task.  
7.3.2 Proposal 2 - Establish Consistency within Legal Ethics Codes 
Regarding egotiation Behaviour 
 
The second legal regulation reform proposal involves establishing consistency 
within the legal ethics codes regarding the appropriate behaviours expected of legal 
professional, especially with regards to deception in negotiation.
1097
 
One  of the most consistent and important criticisms of addressing the issue of 
lawyer deception in negotiation is that the inconsistency regarding conduct in 
negotiation within the legal ethics code potentially leads to even more confusion and 
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Principle), Commentary G.1. 
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 Michael D Daigneault and Jack Marshall, ‘A House Divided’ (1997) 44-MAY Federal Lawyer 18 
(“It is also clear that many attorney conduct rules applied to negotiations, particularly those modelled 
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inconsistency in lawyer conduct.
1098
  This can result in inconsistent behaviours among 
those using and interpreting the legal ethics codes.  One way to create consistency 
within the legal ethics code is to remove the offending phrases within the legal ethics 
codes so that a consistent message is retained and communicated regarding expected 
behaviour.   
For example, Rule 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules has often been criticised as 
making an exemption for deception in negotiation and thereby creating a slippery 
slope in terms of condoning deceptive conduct.  Critics argue that Rule 4.1 is in direct 
contravention of the ABA Model Rules Preamble, which requires honesty in 
negotiations.
1099
  A relatively simple solution to this inconsistency is to adopt this 
proposed reform and remove the inconsistency in the legal ethics code of the 
American Bar Association.  This may be done in several ways as recommended below. 
One way to create consistency is to remove the problematic phrase in the 
comment to Rule 4.1 that refers to generally accepted conventions in negotiations.  
This would mean that the only reference to negotiation would be in the Preamble and 
would apply across all rules.  In turn, this would mean that lawyers would be subject 
to the goals of the Preamble with regards to negotiations and must strive to conduct 
such negotiations with honesty and integrity. 
A second way to create greater consistency within the legal ethics code might 
be to remove any reference to negotiations in the Preamble of the ABA MRPC.  By 
doing so, lawyers would be held only to the standard of Rule 4.1.  This is likely to be 
                                                 
1098
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© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 338 - 9-Aug-10 
a controversial approach because the comment to Rule 4.1, on its face, appears to 
condone deceptive or misleading conduct by lawyer-negotiators, a concept which 
would likely run afoul of the high standards of professional and personal conduct 
expected of those in the legal profession and as expressed in other rules of the ABA 
MRPC.  
A third, potentially middle-of-the-way approach, to create greater consistency 
in the legal ethics code involves two phases.  A precursor to this approach is the 
understanding that there is an interdependent relationship between law and morality 
and negotiation is one key dispute resolution mechanism where this intersection is 
more readily evident.
1100
  In the first phase of this compromise approach, the 
provision of the Preamble of the ABA MRPC could be retained along with a proviso 
or footnote referring to certain key cases where the common law courts have held 
certain negotiation practices in certain jurisdictions as being permissible, such as 
puffing or bluffing on the final settlement figure.   
The second phase of this compromise approach involves amending the 
comment to Rule 4.1 so that it is consistent with the message of the Preamble.  This 
would ensure that if references to negotiation are included within the Preamble and 
the comment to Rule 4.1, such references are consistent in content and meaning.  To 
be sure, exceptions to the professional ethics obligation of honesty, trustworthiness, 
and fairness for every lawyer should be explicitly stated in the legal ethics code and 
not left to the whim of those interpreting general and relatively limitless phrases such 
as ‘generally acceptable negotiation conventions’ without an empirical, legal, or 
evidentiary basis for so doing.  
                                                 
1100
 See, eg, Honoré, above n 115 (discussing the importance of understanding the integration of law 
and morality as it affects the development and implementation of rules). 
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The benefits of this second legal regulation reform proposal towards greater 
consistency within a code of professional ethics are numerous.  They include a greater 
chance of consistency in behaviour, a clear and achievable standard of behaviour for 
the profession, a measurable standard for those who might violate the particular 
provisions of the ethics code, and a gauge by which to teach negotiation ethics in a 
clear, consistent approach.   
7.3.3 Proposal 3 – Dissolve the ‘Materiality’ Requirement for Facts and 
Law in the egotiation Context 
 
The third legal regulation reform proposal recommends a modest change to the 
legal ethics codes to take into account the nature of the negotiation process. 
Generally, law and the rules and legal ethics codes which support the 
application and enforcement of legal regulations work under the legal and ethical 
obligation to disclose only materially relevant documents and information.
1101
  This 
requirement, termed the ‘materially relevant requirement’ in this section, is intended 
to ensure that all parties have knowledge of facts and law that is materially relevant to 
resolving the dispute.  What is materially relevant is not always defined, either in case 
law or in the legal ethics codes.  However, at least one U.S. court has defined 
‘material facts’ as those ‘which, if known to the client, might well have caused him, 
acting as a reasonable man, to alter his proposed course of conduct.’
1102
  
In addition, what is considered materially relevant to one party may or may 
not be the case for the opposing party or third parties having an interest in the dispute.  
In the case of negotiations, a generally private process, what is considered materially 
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 Lerman, above n 60, 686 (quoting Spector, 361 F.Supp. 30, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on other 
grounds, 485 F. 2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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relevant by the courts may be downright irrelevant in getting a good negotiated 
agreement or resolution to the dispute.
1103
  It appears that the materially relevant 
requirement is based on the assumption that one side should only have to disclose 
what is absolutely necessary to win their case, whether facts or law.  Each side can 
thus hide or are not required to disclose ‘shades of grey’ information or information 
which may be in the other party’s best interests unless it is intentionally disclosed, 
found out by the opposing party, or revealed in court.  This is the crux of the 
adversary system, to protect one client’s interests and zealously defend their case 
against another client.   
Negotiation, however, is a critical and important process that encourages and 
relies, in part, on full disclosure of all facts and law in order to reach a resolution to 
the dispute.  One of the hallmarks of why negotiation is successful is because of the 
flexibility and opportunity to be fully open and honest about each party’s underlying 
interests and to disclose any information without fear that such information will be 
used against either party.
1104
  The goal of the ‘good outcome’ in negotiation as 
discussed by Bordone and other scholars
1105
 depends not on revealing only what is 
materially relevant but also on disclosing anything which might aid in resolving the 
dispute to each party’s relative satisfaction.  I use the term ‘relative’ in reference to 
satisfaction here because each party generally comes to a negotiation with different 
requirements and interests and the satisfaction of these terms and interests are specific 
to the negotiating party.  At its worse, the materiality requirement as applied to 
                                                 
1103
 See, eg, Mize, above n 66, 247 (arguing that negotiation is different from other contexts). 
1104
 See, eg, Mize, above n 66, 246-247 (discussing some of the benefits of negotiation over other 
processes); Lewicki et al, above n 25. 
1105
 Bordone, above n 96, 16-18.  See also Fisher, above n 98, 107-08; Bruce Patton, ‘Negotiation’ in 
Michael L Moffitt and Robert C Bordone (eds) The Handbook of Dispute Resolution (2005) 285-286. 
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negotiation invites competitive, distributive bargaining tactics of which deception is a 
central strategy.   
The recommendation of the third legal regulation reform proposal is to 
dissolve the ‘materially relevant’ requirement for negotiations, allowing lawyers to 
conduct the negotiation with the obligation or option to disclose all facts (and law if 
relevant) necessary to ensure an effective, durable, and just agreement that brings 
about  resolution of the dispute.  The materially relevant requirement may be efficient 
in a court of law or arbitration that is constrained by court rules, rules of evidence, and 
costs; however, it is likely inefficient and unnecessary in the context of a negotiation, 
where parties may be well-resourced, well represented, and must have sufficient trust 
and disclosure to not only ascertain the truth but to also reach a good outcome 
consistent with the interests of justice.
1106
  Amending the materially relevant 
requirement as it applies to negotiations so as to completely dissolve this requirement 
or to allow for the obligation of revealing all facts (and law, where needed) would 
have two primary benefits.   
The first benefit of this third legal regulation reform proposal is that it would 
ensure that lawyers, as negotiators, are able to work on a level playing field with those 
clients who would choose to be self-represented or represented by a non-lawyer.
1107
  
A self-represented person also has an interest in the outcome of the negotiation while 
a non-lawyer is someone who is not a qualified and registered lawyer.  Removing the 
materiality requirement also removes the internal conflict created by deliberating what 
can and cannot be revealed.  It might also allow for greater cooperative or mixed-
                                                 
1106
 Carol Bowen, ‘Reconciling Truth and Efficiency’ (2008) Update 6-7.  Update is a publication of 
LEADR Association of Dispute Resolvers. 
1107
 Mize, above n 66, 248 (arguing that the same standards should apply to lawyer-negotiators as non-
lawyer negotiators). 
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motive negotiations where deception (or strategic posturing) does not have to be a 
generally accepted modus operandi of negotiations.  
A second benefit of this legal regulation reform is that it allows lawyers as 
negotiators to have greater leeway in zealously representing their clients and their 
client’s interests within the bounds of the law.  This proposal does not take away 
zealous representation of clients.  It does, however, expand the scope of effort and 
resources available to the lawyer as negotiator in assisting his or her client to reach an 
agreeable resolution to the dispute that also has the greatest potential to maximise the 
benefit to both parties.  It also addresses criticisms that lawyers hide behind the 
materially relevant requirement as a means to retain the upper hand and be too 
adversarial.  Finally, it would address the concern and perception that lawyers are 
deceptive or not fully forthcoming due to the legal ethics rules and the justifiable 
excuses by lawyers based on these rules.   
In the best case scenario, amending the materially relevant requirement may 
increase the chances of greater candour and greater efficiency in resolving disputes. 
One could argue that deception, while accepted as a normal part of current negotiation 
theory, could not be as efficient and honest as cases where deception is not an 
inherent part of the bargaining dance.  The distinction I am making here is between 
intentional deception used as strategic posturing versus deception caused as a result of 
misunderstanding, misinformation, non-information, or just simple oversight.  The 
latter might fall under the category of unintentional, correctable, and mitigating 
deception.    
However, some may argue that this proposal may be hard to implement simply 
because there is an engrained culture in law and negotiation that is built on an 
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adversarial foundation and thrives on the game of conflict.  Regardless of potential 
disagreements, looking at the materiality requirement as it applies, or should not apply 
to negotiations, is a step towards ensuring that legal regulations offer the best hope of 
effectively, consistently, and efficiently resolving disputes. 
In summary, this section presented and discussed the benefits of implementing 
three legal regulation reforms to address the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation.  
As discussed earlier, legal regulation plays a key role in a rule-based, positivist legal 
culture.  At the same time, as research and current practices demonstrate, legal 
regulation is only part of the solution.  Legal regulation reform requires 
complimentary changes in the form of ethical standard setting and institutional design.  
The legal regulation policy reforms recommended above are one part of a three-part 
solution to addressing the issue of lawyers’ potentially deceptive conduct in 
negotiation.  A second, equally crucial component of the tripartite solution is ethical 
standard setting reforms.  While the legal regulation reforms change the letter of the 
law, the ethical standard setting reforms ensure that changes to the letter of the law 
reflect the values the profession strives to encourage and that these values and 
principles are effectively taught to those who enter the profession.  Furthermore, 
ethical standard setting reforms ensure that the ethics principles underlying the law 
are understood and consistently practiced.  The next section discusses three ethical 
standard setting reform proposals.   
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7.4 ETHICAL STADARD SETTIG REFORMS 
Ethical standard setting
1108
 refers to ethics being at the heart of any 
governance reform.  In this case, the governance reform is an integrated reform of 
how lawyers might negotiate as legal professionals and how codes of professional 
conduct play a part in setting the standards of behaviour.  Ethical standard setting can 
be most easily accomplished through the establishment of ethics codes, preferably 
those which are ‘first and foremost aspirational (setting out the highest ideal of public 
service) while containing disciplinary elements (imposing sanctions on those that fall 
unacceptably short).’
1109
  In addition, ethical standard setting can go further and 
ensure that such ethics codes have weight and meaning and are living embodiments of 
the values it proposes to uphold.
1110
  The ethical standard setting reform proposals 
presented in this section are aligned towards the goal of fully integrating the highest 
possible moral compass amongst legal professionals, especially with regards to the 
potential use of deception in negotiation. 
7.4.1 Proposal 1 – Establish Core Values Across the Legal Profession 
Regardless of Function  
 
The first ethical standard setting reform proposal involves explicitly defining 
the core values of the legal profession as whole, regardless of function or jurisdiction. 
As discussed above, lawyers play a variety of roles in the course of their 
practice.  In this thesis, ‘role’ is synonymous with ‘function’, meaning that a lawyer 
                                                 
1108
 Preston, Sampford, and Connors, above n 1078, 5 (explaining ‘ethical standard setting’ as “creating 
codes of conduct and trying to get relevant players to abide by them.”). 
1109
 Preston, Sampford, and Connors, above n 1078, 174. 
1110
 Preston, Sampford, and Connors, above n 1078, 164 (arguing that “[e]thical norms are primarily 
and essentially positive proscriptions.  Ethics is not primarily about what you should avoid but what 
you should seek to achieve.”).  In many ways this might apply to other professions, but law appears to 
be driven by more negative proscriptions on what you should not do and this same thinking is used in 
ethics codes (i.e. they are seen as rules that elicit punishment and not as positive aspirations of what 
you should attempt to achieve as a legal professional in any particular setting.). 
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may be acting in a variety of functions in order to serve clients.  These functions 
include serving as negotiator, advocate, mediator, arbitrator, prosecutor, and judge.  
As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the expected and minimum standard of behaviour 
for each of these key roles is generally defined in the legal ethics code of the relevant 
jurisdiction.
 1111
   
In recent years, and this may be the prevailing yet unexpressed feeling for 
many years, there has been increased literature and consensus among practitioners and 
scholars that changes in how law is perceived as a profession have resulted in a 
marked decrease in retaining the core values of the profession.
1112
  Some of these 
changes include a greater globalisation of the profession, an increased focus in law as 
a business rather than a profession, a greater profit motive amongst the largest firms 
combined with less focus on pro bono or public service work, increased billable hour 
requirements, lamentable rates of health issues among those in the legal profession, 
and a loss of the core values that are the foundational and guiding principles of the 
legal profession.
1113
  Certainly, if one were to believe the consumer studies of the 
Gallup organisation and the American Bar Association in the United States as well as 
similar studies in Australia as discussed in Chapter 6, 
1114
 the legal profession has 
been in a state of crisis at least over the last ten (10) years.   
Globalisation of the legal profession has been a key contributor to the 
perceived erosion of values.  It has been argued that the aspects of ‘professionalism’, 
                                                 
1111
 See Chapter 4 (Efforts by Professional Ethics Codes to Regulate Deceptive Behaviours in 
Negotiation) for more information on this topic. 
1112
 See generally, Kronman, above n 547; Kirby, above n 677; Bok, above n 547. 
1113
 Rhode, above n 151.  See also Deborah L Rhode, ‘The Profession and Its Discontents’ (2000) 61 
Ohio State Law Journal 1335; Kirby, above n 677; Berkovic, above n 963, 2; Merritt, above n 560, 2; 
Bok, above n 547, 1. 
1114
 Please see Chapter 6, section 6.7 (name of section) for a detailed discussion of these various 
consumer studies.  
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such as collegiality, loyalty to the profession, and public service,
1115
 that are so critical 
to the profession of law and the promise of the law have been brushed aside in favour 
of the business of law, creating all manner of tension within and outside of the 
profession.
1116
  Globalisation of legal practice
1117
  has also played a part in the 
evolution of multidisciplinary practices and an increased use of technology and ADR 
in the legal profession.  Greater scrutiny and heightened discussion about the impact 
of such external forces and events upon the internal stabilizing values that guide the 
legal profession is necessary.
1118
  Now more than ever, such heightened awareness 
needs to be cross-jurisdictional and global. 
One way to address the concerns of market-based lawyering, globalisation, 
and an erosion of professional standards is to implement this first ethical standard 
setting reform by formally and clearly establishing core values across the broad 
spectrum of activities within the legal profession.  Today, the legal ethics codes seem 
to implicitly identify at least four core values of the legal profession – serving the 
public interest, zealous representation, honesty, and fairness.  However, these are not 
consistent across legal ethics codes, certainly not across the legal ethics codes which 
were the focus of this thesis.
1119
   
                                                 
1115
 See, eg, Davis, above n 171, 342-343.  
1116
 See, eg, Davis, above n 171, 342; Postema, above n 160; Merritt, above n 560, 63-89;  Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, ‘Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility in Negotiation’ in Phyllis Bernard 
and Bryant Garth (eds), Dispute Resolution Ethics:  A Comprehensive Guide (2002) 119-146. 
1117
 Note:  This includes the Australian legal profession’s move towards reforms to foster national legal 
practice. 
1118
 See, eg, Steven Mark, ‘Harmonization or Homogenization?  The Globalization of Law and Legal 
Ethics – An Australian Viewpoint’ (2001) 34 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1173 
(discussing the impact of globalisation on legal ethics and the future of law practice with a focus on 
New South Wales, Australia). 
1119
 Please see Chapter 4 (name of chapter) for further discussion on the results of an original 
qualitative and cross-jurisdictional study of legal ethics codes.  
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This proposal recommends an explicit, visible, and penetratingly measurable 
raison d’être for the legal profession in the 21
st
 century.  Scholars such as Preston, 
Sampford, and Connors have called this the ‘justification’ for why the institution 
exists
1120
 and the values that drive that justification.   In addition, these core values are 
not function or task specific but apply equally across all activities of the institution.  
Applied equally, the justification can provide institutional integrity to both internal 
and external stakeholders, such as academic institutions, clients, and non-legal 
organisations, as well as to all activities and tasks carried out by the institution.  As 
stated by Preston, Sampford, and Connors, ‘[i]f we know the values we should be 
furthering and what we should be doing to further them, then, we can identify a large 
range of activities that do not further those values.’
1121
  Furthermore, the legal ethics 
codes can begin to align expected behaviours with those values.  This would be 
especially beneficial in the case of the use of deception in negotiation since 
negotiation as a dispute resolution process is a clear demonstration of law intersecting 
with morality (values).
1122
    
While it might not be possible to implement a global legal ethics code that 
applies across all legal jurisdictions to all legal professionals as suggested by Hazard 
and Dondi, it is possible to establish a set of core values that legal professionals can 
strive towards across legal jurisdictions.  These core values might represent, for 
                                                 
1120
 See generally, Preston, Sampford, and Connors, above n 1078;  
1121
 Preston, Sampford, and Connors, above n 1078, 164.  See also Queensland Public Sector Ethics Act 
1994 (describing some key guiding values). 
1122
 Daigneault and Marshall, above n 1097, 18 (“In the absence of better guidelines regarding 
negotiation tactics, attorneys should consider not only the legal implications but how they personally 
feel about and are affected by deceptive and misleading negotiation practices, and act accordingly. 
Whenever possible, attorneys need to identify and use alternative approaches to negotiation that make 
the process more open, fair, ethical, and more mutually beneficial for all parties involved. Where 
scholarship has failed, professional integrity may yet triumph.”).  In this section, I argue that a 
consistent and conspicuous set of professional values can assist in this process.      
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example, the promise of the law as envisioned by the legal profession such as serving 
the public interest, honesty and fairness in dealing with clients and colleagues alike, 
and pursuit of justice within the bounds of the law.  This is similar to a constitution at 
the level of the profession that provides unifying values and clear mandates which 
guide the legal profession regardless of geographic location, jurisdiction, function, or 
task.
1123
  The ideal means of implementing this reform proposal is to establish the core 
values and principles of the profession first, align the ethics code or rules of law with 
those core values and then structure legal education, clinical training, CLE courses, 
and other activities around this foundation.   
One way to ensure this integration and reinforcement of core values is by 
implementing the second and third ethical standard setting proposals discussed below.      
7.4.2 Proposal 2 – Increase CLE Courses on Ethics 
 
The second ethical standard setting reform proposal recommends increased 
continuing legal education (CLE) courses for current and future legal practitioners.  
As the core values of the profession are re-established in a measurable way, 
the profession can incorporate more continuing legal education courses (CLE) on 
ethics and handling ethical dilemmas, particular in the case of the use of potential 
deceptive tactics in negotiation.   The professional ethics course is taught in law 
schools,
1124
 though, at least in the United States, it is generally taught after the all-
important first-year core courses.  In the case of the common law countries discussed 
in this thesis, these professional ethics courses discuss the ethics of the profession 
                                                 
1123
 Note:  It is acknowledged that the focus of this thesis has been on the common-law jurisdiction.  
However, while individual legal regulations may differ across legal jurisdiction, I argue that the core 
values which guide the legal professional’s work in each of these jurisdictions can be aligned.  This 
does not necessarily change what the law is; however, it may change how the lawyer explains, enforces, 
implements, and uses the law in service to his/her client. 
1124
 Mize, above n 66, 248 (“honesty in negotiation can be encouraged with education and gradually 
changing attitudes...shift has already begun...”). 
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primarily through memorisation of the legal ethics rules, discussion of case law, and 
analysis of the ethics violation cases in the relevant jurisdiction.   
More importantly, as confirmed by the research on legal ethics discussed in 
Chapter 2, legal practitioners in the US and Canada appear to learn about acceptable 
and impermissible lawyer conduct more through the visible actions of senior lawyers 
in each legal jurisdiction. 
1125
  It is reasonable to expect that the same could be true in 
other countries such as Australia and Hong Kong.  In the context of this thesis, relying 
solely on legal ethics courses to teach appropriate negotiation behaviour is no longer 
sufficient because negotiation today is not a regulated process and therefore not a 
focus of greater scrutiny.
1126
  The professional body of each jurisdiction would benefit 
from an increased number of required CLE courses on ethics as well as greater quality 
of such courses to go beyond the current ethics rules and case law analysis.  There are 
several ways to implement this second ethical standard setting reform proposal. 
One way to implement this second ethical standard setting proposal and 
increase the quality of such CLE courses is to incorporate the discussion of 
comparative legal ethics codes.
1127
  This means discussing the specific legal ethics 
rules in light of other jurisdictions and the possible implications, for example, of 
following the home jurisdiction’s ethics code versus that of the visiting jurisdiction.   
This would foster a deeper understanding of ethics in the profession of law, the reason 
                                                 
1125
 See, eg, Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, above n 472, 645 (discussing a study of the use and 
effectiveness of legal ethics codes in Ontario, Canada and finding that for the majority of practicing 
lawyers, the legal ethics code is not necessarily the first point of reference for ethical issues).  
1126
 Note:  I am not arguing that negotiation should be highly regulated. 
1127
 Laurel S Terry, ‘U.S. Legal Ethics: The Coming of Age of Global and Comparative Perspectives’ 
(2005) 4(3) Washington University Global Studies Law Review 463, 533 (arguing that comparative and 
global perspectives will be increasingly important in US legal ethics debates, primarily as “[t]heory has 
significantly lagged behind the reality of transnational legal practice issues and developments.”); 
Geoffrey C Hazard, Jr and Angelo Dondi, Legal Ethics: A Comparative Study (2004) (reinforcing the 
need for comparative legal ethics education and discussing a comparative study of lawyers’ roles in a 
variety of jurisdictions). 
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for potential cross-jurisdictional differences, if any, and a continuing critical analysis 
and evolution of the legal ethics code.
1128
  The benefit of this approach is to gradually 
increase the extent to which lawyers feel confident discussing the ethical issues they 
face on a daily basis as well as to develop critical morality
1129
 rather than being 
confined by role morality.
1130
 
A second way to implement this second ethical standard setting proposal is to 
integrate a set of moral reasoning CLE courses into the current set of CLE courses.  
Moral reasoning is different from ethics courses in that moral reasoning is aimed at 
developing one’s judgment to the point of being considered to have good judgment 
that will aid in making sound decisions when faced with ethical dilemmas.   
Kronman defines judgment as ‘the process of deliberating about and deciding 
personal, moral, and political problems.’
1131
  It is not just this basic level of judgment 
that lawyers must have.  Lawyers, given their professional status, must have good 
judgment, which is judgment beyond simple deduction or intuition.  Kronman 
describes ‘good judgment’ as follows: 
 ‘most clearly revealed in just those situations where the 
method of deduction is least applicable, where the 
ambiguities are greatest and the demand for proof most 
obviously misplaced....to do something more than merely 
apply a general rule with special care and thoroughness, or 
follow out its consequences to a greater level of detail.’
1132
    
                                                 
1128
 See, eg, Hazard and Dondi, above n 1127 (discussing a comparative study of lawyers’ roles in a 
variety of jurisdictions); See also Amalia D Kessler, Review: Legal Ethics:  A Comparative Study by 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Angelo Dondi.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004 (2005) 
<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/hazard-dondi105.htm> at 9 August 2010 
(reviewing Hazard and Dondi’s book). 
1129
 Parker and Sampford, above n 200 (discussing the importance of developing critical morality in 
legal ethics).  
1130
 See eg David Luban, ‘The Adversary System Excuse’, in David Luban (ed.), The Ethics of Lawyers 
(1994) 139-147 (discussing the aspects of role morality that drive lawyers and the legal profession in 
the adversary system).  
1131
 Kronman, above n 1086, 846-848. 
1132
 Kronman, above n 1086, 847. 
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Kronman advocates for the importance of developing good judgment, 
especially as related to US lawyers, because he argues that legal ethics courses in the 
US seem to focus more on applying general rules than on developing a level of 
professional judgement necessary to handle ethical dilemmas.  Ethically ambiguous or 
ethically challenging situations such as those found by Lamb and Lerman in their 
separate anecdotal studies
1133
 are precisely those types of situations where lawyers 
need to be able to do something more than just apply legal rules, determine long-range 
consequences, or conduct a risk-benefit analysis.  Lawyers may be skilled in knowing 
the boundaries of the professional ethics rules; however, today, lawyers need to be 
more skilled in the ‘grey’ areas where rules and boundaries are less clear, more 
ambiguous, and potentially career-threatening.   
In summary, the benefit of implementing this second ethical standard setting 
proposal is that lawyers will develop good judgment and be more skilled in handling 
difficult ethical situations through critical morality while engaged in role-morality 
tasks.            
7.4.3 Proposal 3 – Integrate In-depth Ethics and Moral Reasoning 
Education into Law School Curriculum 
 
The third ethical standard setting reform proposal involves the integration of 
in-depth ethics and moral reasoning skills into the core law school courses.  This 
proposal is aimed at law students and those who might consider entering the legal 
profession.  First, it is important to address the difference between legal reasoning 
skills and moral reasoning skills as used in the context of this reform proposal and this 
thesis. 
                                                 
1133
 Lamb, above n 448, 217-234.  See also Lerman, above n 60. 
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Legal reasoning refers to the ability to read legal rules and principles, such as 
statutes and case law, find and dissect legal issues, and build a case for the client 
based on the application of law to the facts of the case.  Legal reasoning skills help 
law students ‘think like a lawyer’ in terms of legal analysis and the technical aspects 
of being a legal professional. 
In contrast, moral reasoning as introduced earlier in section 7.4.2
1134
 refers to 
the skills necessary for a legal practitioner to exercise sound judgment when faced 
with the types of ethical dilemmas discussed by scholars such as Lamb and Wilkinson 
et al in Chapter 2.
1135
  Developing moral reasoning skills is less about ‘how to think 
like a lawyer’ and more about ‘how to be a lawyer’, ‘how to be an ethical lawyer’, or 
even ‘how to be an honest lawyer’.  This is particularly important when dealing with 
issues such as deception in negotiation given that this issue intersects both law and 
morality with multi-disciplinary influences, such as business and economics. 
Legal education in most common-law jurisdictions centres primarily on the 
development of legal reasoning skills.  While a legal ethics course is now usually a 
required course, there appear to be two primary issues with current legal ethics 
courses.   
The first issue with current legal ethics courses is that such courses are 
primarily a rules-based course that focuses on remembering the legal ethics rules and 
the application of those rules to ethics problems encountered in practice.
1136
   
                                                 
1134
 See Chapter 7, Section 7.4.2 (Proposal 2 – Increase CLE Courses on Ethics) for more information. 
1135
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4 (Research About Legal Ethics) for more information on the research 
by Lamb and Wilkinson et al. 
1136
 Note:  It is acknowledged that there may be legal ethics courses that are taught differently and are 
more in-depth; however, the majority are still rules-based legal ethics courses. Cf Mary Keyes and 
Richard Johnstone, ‘Changing Legal Education: Rhetoric, Reality, and Prospects for the Future’ (2004) 
26(4) Sydney Law Review 537, n 103-105 (describing the law school curriculum in Australia as 
discussed in the Australian Universities Teaching Committee (AUTC) Report); Michael Robertson, 
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The second issue with current legal ethics courses is that the majority of law 
schools in the common-law jurisdiction require only one legal ethics course over a 
three- or four-year legal education programme.
 1137
  This single legal ethics course is 
generally taken as one of the last required courses in law school and consists of a 
cursory review of the black-letter legal ethics rules of the prevailing jurisdiction along 
with some study of some relevant case law.
1138
  For example, in Australia, this meets 
with the required ‘Priestley 11’ subjects and is consistent with the ‘knowledge of 
professional rules’ approach of legal ethics teaching as described by Robertson.
1139
  
This ‘knowledge of professional rules’ approach is also common in the United 
States
1140
 where it has been criticised as ‘the functional equivalent of legal ethics 
without the ethics’.
1141
 
These two issues related to the ability of current common law jurisdiction 
legal ethics courses to influence ethical conduct underscore the findings of the 
research on legal ethics discussed in Chapter 2.
1142
  To briefly summarize, in 1995, 
Moliterno’s U.S. study of the ability of a legal ethics course to prepare graduates for 
handling professional ethics issues in practice demonstrated that a single ethics course 
                                                                                                                                            
‘Renewing a Focus on Ethics in Legal Education?’ (2008) (discussing the AUTC Report on law 
schools’ commitment to ethics learning and describing it as ‘patchy’).  This paper is on file with the 
author.  See also Deborah Rhode, ‘Integrity in the Practice of Law: If Integrity is the Answer, What is 
the Question?’ (2003) 72 Fordham Law Review 333, 340 (discussing legal ethics education in the 
United States). 
1137
 Moliterno, above n 453, 259 (discussing the law school curricula of four leading law schools in the 
United States and how they address professional ethics education).  See also Keyes and Johnstone, 
above n 1136, 537(discussing the nature of how legal ethics is taught in Australia – as a compulsory 
subject in most law schools though not necessarily as a first-year course). 
1138
 Moliterno, above n 453, 259. 
1139
 Robertson, above n 1136, 3 (discussing the ‘knowledge of professional rules’ approach).   See also 
Keyes and Johnstone, above n 1136, 537 (discussing the Priestley 11 requirements and criticisms of 
this approach). 
1140
 See, eg, Moliterno, above n 453, 263-264 (describing the professional ethics curricula at four top-
rated law schools in the United States). 
1141
 Rhode, above n 1136, 340 
1142
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4 (Research About Legal Ethics) for more information on this research. 
A brief summary of key points that relate to this reform proposal is provided here. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 354 - 9-Aug-10 
without ‘more’ is not sufficient to prepare legal practitioners for the rigors of handling 
actual ethics dilemmas.
1143
  The reason Moliterno’s own law school (William and 
Mary Law School) rated higher in graduate preparedness over other law schools in the 
study is because William and Mary Law School integrates legal ethics skills education 
within an intensive two-year required skills program.
1144
  Law students at William and 
Mary Law School learn black-letter legal ethics rules as well as how to solve ethical 
dilemmas in a simulated practice environment integrated with core law school courses 
over an intense two-year period.
1145
  As applied to this thesis, issues such as deception 
in negotiation are handled by teaching negotiation tactics alongside of ‘truth-telling in 
negotiation’ to help students understand ‘legitimate client and lawyer considerations 
other than merely beating an opponent.’
1146
  
Second, in 1999, Schweitzer and Croson’s US study on curtailing deception in 
negotiation through the use of direct questions found that an ethics course did not 
statistically affect a respondent’s use of deception in negotiation.
1147
  Respondents 
who took an ethics course were just as likely to use deception in negotiation in the 
context of the study as those who did not take an ethics course.
1148
 
Third, in 2000, Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer published the findings of a 
Canadian study on whether legal ethics codes shape legal practice and the behaviours 
                                                 
1143
 Moliterno, above n 453, 271 (discussing the mean scores on professional ethics preparation across 
the law schools involved in the study, with William and Mary scoring the highest). 
1144
 Moliterno, above n 453, 264-266. 
1145
 Moliterno, above n 453, 264-269. 
1146
 Moliterno, above n 453, 267-268. 
1147
 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 234. 
1148
 Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 234 (stating that this does mean ethics courses cannot 
influence behaviour though it did not prevent the use of deception in this specific study).  One 
perspective is that the scenario of used-car sales is a common negotiation scenario where potentially 
deceptive tactics, such as bluffing and puffing, are expected. 
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of legal professionals.
1149
  They found that legal practitioners relied less on the legal 
ethics codes for guidance on key ethical dilemmas and relied more on advice from 
senior legal practitioners or personal morals.
1150
 
It is possible to conclude from the research conducted to date on the 
effectiveness of legal ethics courses that it is not sufficient to simply require law 
students to take a single ethics course and conclude that these future lawyers are fully 
prepared for the ever-increasing ethical challenges they will likely face in practice, 
especially in the slippery slope forum that is negotiations.
1151
  As discussed in earlier 
chapters, the issue of the use of deception in negotiation is complex and requires more 
than just knowledge of black-letter ethics rules and reliance on case law.  More must 
be done. 
As discussed earlier, the foundational competencies of what it takes to be a 
lawyer, not just think like one, are set in law school.  Furthermore, as observed by 
Loder, MacKenzie, Toulmin, Morawetz, and Zacharias among others, most students 
entering the legal profession have moral predispositions that may only be further 
accentuated through indoctrination into the practice of law rather than modified 
through legal ethics courses.
 1152
  This is because of the generally accepted view in 
society that ethics is an internal, personal choice not a set of rules to be imposed by an 
external group.
1153
  Incoming law students will likely face their first important ethical 
dilemma by attempting to reconcile their personal ethics rules with those that will be 
                                                 
1149
 See generally, Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, above n 472, 645. 
1150
 Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, above n 472, 678-680. 
1151
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2 (Deception as a Negotiation Strategy) for more information on the 
implications of this strategy). 
1152
 See generally, Loder, above n 42, 311; G MacKenzie, ‘The Valentine's Card in the Operating 
Room: Codes of Ethics and the Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession’ (1995) 33 Atlanta Law Review 
859, 869; S Toulmin, ‘Ethics and Equity: The Tyranny of Principles (1981) Law Society Gazette 240, 
244; Morawetz, above n 481; Zacharias, above n 481, 231. 
1153
 Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, above n 472, 648-649; See also Honsberger, above n 1092. 
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imposed on and expected of them through the lawyers’ professional ethics rules.  This 
must be dealt with at the foundational level by implementing this third ethical 
standard setting reform proposal and integrating in-depth ethics and moral reasoning 
skills education into the law school curriculum. 
The most effective and long-lasting ethical standard setting reforms must be 
aimed at bringing the current law school curriculum into the 21
st
 century consistent 
with changes in global legal practice.
1154
  One of the primary ways to bring the current 
law school curriculum forward is to leverage Kohlberg’s findings on moral 
development
1155
 and to create a legal education environment that helps legal 
practitioners move towards greater moral maturity and integrity in decision making, 
especially as it relates to professional duties and obligations.  This is particularly 
important to addressing the issue of lawyers’ deception in negotiation. 
Incoming law students need to be educated on the notion that, in some respects, 
they need to subordinate (or at best integrate) their personal values as independent 
moral agents in favour of other, overarching values
1156
 and obligations when they 
enter the legal profession,
1157
 where their professional actions must be consistent with 
the goals and ideals of the profession as embodied in the legal ethics code. 
This tension between being an autonomous moral agent and exercising sound 
judgment in fulfilling the ethical obligations of the profession cannot be reconciled 
                                                 
1154
 See generally Chart, above n 899, 177.  While Chart’s views are aimed primarily at New Zealand’s 
legal education curricula, her observations, insights, and recommendations can be applied equally to 
legal education in other jurisdictions. 
1155
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4 (Research About Legal Ethics) for more information on this topic. 
1156
 See Chapter 7, Section 7.4.1 (Establish Core Values Across the Legal Profession Regardless of 
Function) for a discussion on the ethical standard setting reform proposal aimed at addressing the 
values of the legal profession. 
1157
 Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, above n 472, 648-649 (discussing the fundamental issues and 
criticisms underlying professional ethics codes as conflicting with the general view that individuals are 
“autonomous moral agents”). 
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within a single legal ethics course.  Strictly teaching and following legal ethics rules 
may actually be detrimental to a lawyer’s critical thinking and moral development.  
According to Loder, the ethics rules create a minimum standard that prevents lawyers 
from ‘reaching beyond moral mediocrity’
1158
 and may encourage ‘undesirable 
customs and habits’.
1159
  In addition, the Brockman study further identified that the 
rules only provide another challenge for lawyers to find ways to circumvent them 
given their training and propensity to hide information for a living.
1160
  Rizzo further 
concurs by stating that ‘[m]orals become reduced to checking the code of professional 
responsibility; if the code does not prohibit an act, the act is moral.’
1161
  In essence, 
the legal ethics rules can actually curtail moral development, cause moral apathy or 
expression, and create a general malaise about following the ethics rules.
1162
  These 
issues are especially relevant in the case of negotiation because, as observed by the 
comparative study of legal ethics codes in Chapter 4, there is little to no guidance 
found in the legal ethics codes on how lawyers should behave in negotiations.
1163
 
A practical way of leveraging Kohlberg’s research on moral development in 
legal education is to adopt a different perspective of teaching legal ethics.  Instead of 
using the current dominant ‘knowledge of the professional rules’ approach to legal 
ethics teaching, this third ethical standard setting proposal recommends adopting a 
                                                 
1158
 Loder, above n 42, 312. 
1159
 Ibid. 
1160
 J Brockman, ‘The Use of Self-Regulation to Curb Discrimination and Sexual Harassment in the 
Legal Profession’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 209, 219. Brockman’s study was about 
reducing discrimination.  The comments by respondents about the general nature and views of lawyers 
in a self-regulated profession are applicable here. 
1161
 P L Rizzo, ‘Moral for Home, Morals for Office:  The Double Ethical Life of a Civil Litigator’ 
(1988) 35 Catholic Lawyer 79, 82. 
1162
 See, eg, Loder, above n 42, 311. 
1163
 Daigneault and Marshall, above n 1097, 18-19 (“Negotiation is an area that the legal community 
has failed to define, analyse, and codify adequately. Attorneys are left to blindly navigate its muddy 
waters at their own peril.”).  Despite the numerous books on legal negotiation and legal ethics, I would 
argue that this statement is as true today as it was in 1997.  There has not been a significant, effective, 
measurable step towards providing sufficient guidance. 
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‘sound judgment’ approach
1164
 through the strategic integration of moral discourse 
into legal education.
1165
  Two concepts are important to discuss here. 
The first important concept is the ‘sound judgment’ approach, which is 
markedly different from the prevailing ‘knowledge of the professional rules’ 
approach.  The goal of the ‘sound judgment approach is to go beyond knowing and 
applying the legal ethics rules to ethical dilemmas as other black-letter courses.  It is 
about putting the ethics back into legal ethics by developing a process of decision-
making that can be used when faced with ethical dilemmas.  This includes exercising 
moral judgment through moral discourse and critical morality, practicing the use of 
sound judgment in solving ethical dilemmas, and developing the ability to reconcile 
tensions between professional obligations as defined in the legal ethics code and 
personal morals so as to effectively and ethically execute the tasks associated with a  
lawyer’s professional obligations. 
The second important concept in this reform proposal is the strategic 
integration of moral discourse.  Similar to the difference between legal reasoning and 
moral reasoning discussed at the beginning of this section, there is a difference 
between legal discourse and moral discourse, though both elements are critical to 
addressing multi-disciplinary issues such as deception in negotiation. 
Legal discourse is generally based on an extensive review and analysis of the 
facts of the case, law, holding of the case, and potential societal impact as seen 
through already decided appellate case opinions.  Strict legal discourse involves legal 
reasoning.  When legal discourse is also applied to ethics problems, the result is 
                                                 
1164
 The ‘sound judgment’ approach is paraphrased from Robertson’s ‘judgment’ approach. See 
Robertson, above n 1136, 3-4. 
1165
 See, eg, Robertson, above n 1136, 4 (supporting the use of this approach for legal ethics education 
in Australian law schools).  
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legalism
1166
 of ethics, where ethical lawyering is simply a matter of following 
rules.
1167
  This legal discourse is based on reductionism in that it is ‘a definable way 
of knowing and speaking about the world’
1168
 where the world of legal education and 
the world of lawyers are seen by some as ‘bound worlds’
1169
 that do not necessarily 
mirror or complement each other.
1170
  This means that what is up for debate is very 
narrow, bound, defined, and controlled through rules and regulations which allow for 
legalistic discussions.  Legalistic discussions only allow for ‘what is’ (e.g., evidence) 
and do not necessary allow for what ‘ought’ to be (e.g., value judgments or intuition). 
In contrast, ethical discourse is one in which ‘we engage our students in 
dialogue about what it means to be a good lawyer, the nature of professional 
responsibility and the role of their own ideals in their professional development.’
1171
  I 
would also argue that moral discourse needs to include ethical reasoning based on 
principles of logic.
1172
  Keeping the above distinctions in mind, there are two primary 
recommendations to adopt and integrate moral discourse into the current law school 
curriculum. 
The first recommendation for integrating moral discourse into the current law 
school curriculum is to include a required ethics and moral reasoning skills 
component in every core and non-core law school course, such as constitutional law, 
                                                 
1166
 Judith Shklar, Legalism (1964) 1. 
1167
 James R Elkins, ‘Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education’ (1982) 32 Journal of Legal 
Education 12, 19.  Note:  This is not to say that following rules is improper but to stress that ethics 
issues cannot be wholly distilled to following ethics rules.  See, eg, Lamb, above n 448, 217-234 
(discussing the Australian perspective); Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, above n 472, 645 (discussing 
the Ontario, Canada perspective); Daigneault and Marshall, above n 1097, 18 (discussing the United 
States perspective on rules, or lack thereof, to assist in ethical negotiation).  
1168
 Elkins, above n 1167, 13. 
1169
 Elkins, above n 1167, 15 (citing Scott Turow, One L (1977)). 
1170
 Ibid.  Elkins does make the qualification that there is no longitudinal study of whether legal 
education paves the way for legal practice; however, there is ample criticism of this.  See, eg, Chart, 
above n 899, 177. 
1171
 Elkins, above n 1167, 14. 
1172
 See, eg, Luban, above n 1130, 169-178.  
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property law, criminal law, contracts, equity, ADR courses, and intellectual property 
law.   While it is acknowledged that some law schools might already adopt this 
approach, it is not the norm.  This first recommendation is to more formally adopt an 
integrated approach to ethics and moral reasoning skills development so that the 
lawyers of tomorrow become so as a direct result of the legal education they 
undertake today.
1173
  For example, Luban encourages the use of applying logical 
arguments to ethical dilemmas using moral discourse to determine possible courses of 
action.
1174
  In the context of the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation, students may 
enter law school as honest lay persons
1175
 with a strong personal ethic against 
deception and leave as future lawyers who understand that deception is a necessary 
part of negotiation because they do not hear otherwise and the legal ethics codes do 
not provide sufficient guidance.  Formally integrating ethics and moral reasoning skill 
training will address this gap so that lawyers are able to discern between ethically 
ambiguous choices, such as whether to use deception in negotiation.      
One option for integrating moral discourse into the current law school 
curriculum through ethics and moral reasoning skills development is by adopting an 
approach similar to the one used by William and Mary Law School in the United 
States as discussed earlier in this section.
1176
  A similar approach is also used by 
Vermont Law School, also in the United States, the difference being that while 
                                                 
1173
 Felix Frankfurter, cited in Rand Jack and Dana Jack, Moral Vision and Professional Decisions: The 
Changing Values of Women and Man Lawyers (1989) (“In the end, the law is what the lawyers are.  
And the law and the lawyers are what the law schools make them.”) 
1174
 Luban, above n 1130, 169-178.  
1175
 See the discussion above about Kohlberg’s stages of moral development and its impact on an 
individual’s moral development as they progress through law school.  This again is another rich area 
for research. 
1176
 See also Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4 (Research on Legal Ethics) for a detailed discussion of 
Moliterno’s study and the approach used by William and Mary Law School for legal ethics skills 
training); Moliterno, above n 453, 259. 
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William and Mary’s program is mandatory, Vermont Law School’s General Practice 
Program (GPP) is voluntary and restricted to a select group of students.
1177
  In 
Australia, the Queensland University of Technology is recognised as one of first law 
schools to embrace the challenge of integrating legal and generic skills training with 
traditional legal theory and black-letter law training by adopting a ‘a co-ordinated and 
incremental approach to developing...knowledge and skills.’
1178
  These types of 
programmes ensure that substantive law and ethical issues are addressed together.   
A second option for integrating moral discourse into the current law school 
curriculum through ethics and moral reasoning skills development is to increase the 
number and quality of clinical practice programmes that are required during one’s 
legal education and to fully integrate these programmes into the core and specialised 
law school curriculum.
1179
  The purpose of these clinical practice courses is to 
integrate theory with practice and to continually reinforce not only basic legal skills of 
proper research, writing, case analysis, legal reasoning and argument but to also 
consistently reinforce the proper negotiation and ethics aspects of nearly every legal 
issue, whether it is in a criminal or non-criminal context.
1180
  The benefit of this type 
                                                 
1177
 Note: Comments on Vermont Law School’s General Practice Program is based on personal 
experience. 
1178
 Keyes and  Johnstone, above n 1136, 537  (discussing the law curriculum changes and approach 
used by Queensland University of Technology among others); Sharon Christensen and Sally Kift, 
‘Graduate Attributes and Legal Skills: Integration or Disintegration’ (2000) 11 Legal Education Review 
207; Sally Kift, ‘Harnessing Assessment and Feedback to Assure Quality Outcomes for Graduate 
Capability Development: A Legal Education Case Study’ (2000) (Paper presented at the Australian 
Association Research in Education Conference); Rachel Spencer, ‘Teaching Legal Skills at Flinders – 
An Integrated Practical Legal Training Program’ (2003) 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 217. 
1179
 Cf Condlin, above n 43 (providing a good historical account of how clinical education was 
introduced into the mainstream of legal education and arguing that the current clinical legal education 
program, especially in the area of legal ethics, fails to guide students properly in dealing with the most 
common ethical dilemmas faced by practitioners).  I would agree with Condlin in regards to legal 
ethics.  I disagree about its failure in total and argue that it can certainly be improved.  
1180
 I use the terms criminal and non-criminal context in reference to Kronman’s argument that perhaps 
legal ethics may be different in criminal context as opposed to non-criminal contexts because they 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 362 - 9-Aug-10 
of structure is to prepare law students to be effective, ethical, and contributing lawyers 
and to engrain them in a legal culture that is consistent with practice, consistent with 
the values of the legal institution, and consistent with the goals of the justice system in 
serving the public even as it serves both business and personal interests.
1181
   
For example, given the prevalence and mandatory use of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) mechanisms in practice,  ADR courses, along with the courses 
discussed under the ethical standard setting section, should be considered core 
subjects and required for every graduating law student and those entering the 
profession.  These ADR courses should be considered core subjects because incoming 
law students need to be indoctrinated
1182
 in seeing a clear and complete dispute 
resolution continuum from conciliation to court (or as I would call it, ‘conversation-
to-litigation’) in terms of dispute resolution options in the practice of law.
1183
 
The second recommendation for integrating moral discourse into the current 
law school curriculum is to develop a new legal ethics curriculum that consists of two 
primary components taught in the first year of law school where foundational skills 
are established. These two components consist of the following:  1) a course in logic 
and reasoning; and 2) a course on comparative legal ethics with a focus on the legal 
ethics code of the prevailing jurisdiction.  Each component of this second 
recommendation is discussed in further detail below. 
                                                                                                                                            
serve different interests.  This is one way of looking at the issue of negotiation and legal ethics.  See 
generally Kronman, above n 1086, 834. 
1181
 Eyster, above n 977,  756-757 (“Only by making fundamental changes in the way we view our 
professional roles, and in the way we educate our professionals, can we achieve a satisfactory solution 
to the presently intractable dilemmas posed by common negotiation practice”). 
1182
 See, eg, Chart, above n 899, 192-195 (defining ‘acculturation’ as “absorbing particular values and 
ways of responding to conflict; acquiring a professional--and ultimately a personal—identity” and 
arguing that the acculturation process “occurs not only through what we teach, but how we teach it and 
what we reward in our students.”) 
1183
 See Chart, above n 899, 191. 
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The first component of a new legal ethics curriculum involves a course in 
logic and logical reasoning, to be taught in the first year of law school.  The course in 
logical reasoning includes both inductive and deductive reasoning skills.  Logical 
reasoning
1184
 skills are specifically designed to assist in recognising and using 
inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, abductive reasoning, defeasible reasoning, 
legal fallacy, and logical argument.  Because logical reasoning is extracted from 
various disciplines,
1185
 it allows legal and non-legal arguments to be based on a multi-
disciplinary approach.  This is invaluable given that in the course of legal practice, 
lawyers must engage and negotiate with various disciplines in establishing their 
client’s case.  This type of logical reasoning skills can also be used in dealing with 
ethical dilemmas to look more closely at some of the morally and ethically ambiguous 
situations that a future lawyer might find themselves in both on a personal and 
professional level.   
For example, Chapter 2 introduced Lamb’s anecdotal study that resulted in a 
set of approximately forty (40) real and practical ethical dilemmas that Australian 
lawyers face in the course of their practice in Queensland, Australia.
1186
  Both 
Wetlaufer and Lerman also discuss negotiation-related ethical issues, including the 
use of deceptive tactics, faced by lawyers in the United States, and ways which these 
lawyers dealt with these issues.
1187
  In addition, Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer’s 
study of the use and effectiveness of legal ethics code in the Ontario, Canada 
jurisdiction includes a rich set of mini-transcripts of over 100 ethical scenarios faced 
                                                 
1184
 See, eg, D Q McInerny, Being Logical: A Guide to Good Thinking (2005); Anthony Weston, A 
Rulebook for Arguments (2008); James H Kiersky and Nicholas J Caste, Thinking Critically: 
Techniques for Logical Reasoning (1995). 
1185
 See McInerny, above n 1184, ix, 26-30 (discussing the basic principles of logic); Weston, above n 
1184, Kiersky and Caste, above n 1184. 
1186
 Lamb, above n 448, 217-234.  See Chapter 2 (Review of Literature) for a more detailed discussion. 
1187
 Wetlaufer, above n 31; Lerman, above n 60. 
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by lawyers in the Ontario jurisdiction.
1188
  By applying the logical reasoning skills to 
such practical ethical scenarios, law students and future legal practitioners can begin 
to develop and cultivate good judgment. 
The second component of a new legal ethics curriculum involves a course in 
comparative legal ethics, to be taught in the first year of law school.  The course in 
comparative legal ethics is essentially an extended, modified version of the legal 
ethics course currently taught in a majority of law schools as a higher-level required 
or elective course after the completion of first-year core courses.  The legal ethics 
course should be built on the foundational teachings in logic and reasoning discussed 
above.  The principle advantages of this comparative legal ethics course as compared 
with the manner in which it is generally taught today are two-fold.  First, the 
comparative legal ethics course would entail a comparative analysis of various legal 
ethics codes instead of only focusing on the professional ethics code of the prevailing 
jurisdiction.  This allows law students to analyse the professional ethics codes of their 
jurisdiction in relation to other jurisdictions in order to have greater understanding of 
its impact on the legal practitioner.  The second benefit of a comparative legal ethics 
course  is that lawyers will be able apply the logical reasoning skills to the ethical 
dilemmas they might face under various legal ethics codes, including the ability to 
distinguish between the role-morality of their profession, the general morality of 
society, and the potential conflict with their own personal ethics.  These skills are 
even more applicable in the negotiation context where certain unwritten rules might 
apply and tactics such as bluffing, puffing, high first offers, low-balling and other 
potentially deceptive tactics are considered acceptable by negotiators in various 
                                                 
1188
 Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, above n 472, 657-678. 
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jurisdictions.  Furthermore, these fully integrated and well-rounded skills can be 
applied across all the important areas of a legal professional’s life.   
In conclusion, this subsection discussed the third ethical standard setting 
reform proposal by recommending the integration of in-depth ethics and moral 
reasoning education into the current law school curriculum. 
In summary, the three ethical standard setting reform proposals discussed in 
this section 7.4 complement the legal regulations reforms discussed in section 7.3.  
Together, these reform proposals can work to encourage the establishment of a 
consistent set of standards that can be followed by legal professionals in carrying out 
their professional duties.  By removing ambiguity and inconsistency and, at the same 
time, providing clarity in areas such as negotiations and the use of certain deceptive 
tactics in negotiation, the reform proposals to date can pave the way towards greater 
harmony between thinking like a lawyer and being an ethical lawyer as well as 
encouraging greater consistency between what is taught and what is practiced.  The 
final link, however, must be through the integration of both the legal regulation 
reforms and ethical standard setting reforms into the institutions that support and 
regulate the profession as a whole.  This integration can be accomplished by 
implementing the institutional design reforms discussed in the next section.  
7.5 ISTITUTIOAL DESIG REFORMS 
This section deals with two key proposals for institutional design reforms.  In 
the context of this thesis, institutional design refers to an institutional environment 
that is conducive to fostering the ideals and goals of the legal regulation reforms and 
ethical standard setting and compliance proposals outlined in the prior subsections.
1189
  
                                                 
1189
 Coady and Sampford, above n 200, 11. 
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In looking at the ideals and goals of legal regulations and ethical standard setting, 
institutional design reforms constantly ask the questions of ‘what structure, what 
design, what kinds of relationships between members of an organisation are likely to 
aid the institution in achieving the values that justify its privilege of incorporation’
1190
 
and therefore more positively achieve what it is designed to accomplish.   
In the context of the legal system in general, the desired result is justice for 
parties to a dispute.  In the context of legal education, the goal is preparing law 
students to be practicing lawyers so that they may serve the larger goal of achieving 
justice within the legal system through resolution of disputes.
1191
  Taken one step 
further, the aspired result of a negotiation is an agreement between the parties as a 
result of having achieved a sense of justice and satisfaction of personal interests, 
termed by some as the ‘good outcome’.
1192
  As discussed earlier, these goals may or 
may not be achievable within the current adversarial legal system and an institutional 
design that fosters the teaching of an adversarial legal system.  Therefore, in order to 
successfully implement the legal regulation and ethical standard setting reform 
proposals discussed in prior sections, the institutional design reforms address the 
structural changes that must take place within the profession, education systems, and 
legal systems in order to support other integrated reform proposals.  
The institutional design reforms proposed in this section are based on the 
philosophy that sometimes complex issues such as lawyers’ deceptive conduct in 
                                                 
1190
 Coady and Sampford, above n 200, 15 (explaining further that this also means “looking at some of 
the aberrations that prevent it achieving those values.”). 
1191
 Note: This is certainly another area ripe for research in terms of clearly defining measurable goals 
and outcomes of law schools and law school graduates.  An example is the law graduates professional 
ethics readiness survey conducted by Moliterno at William and Mary Law School in the United States.  
See Moliterno, above n 453, 259.  Another example is conducting incoming and exit surveys measuring 
a student’s perceived readiness to conduct various legal skills, analysis, and writing tasks necessary for 
incoming practitioners.   
1192
 Patton, above n 1105, 285-286.  
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negotiations are not individual issues but symptomatic of the institutional design, 
structure, and culture in which such behaviours occur.  An incremental chance in the 
institutional design may encourage a monumental change in behaviour thus creating a 
ripple effect on the behaviour of lawyers and the perception of lawyers and the legal 
profession in the eyes of the public it is meant to serve.   
7.5.1 Proposal 1 – Reform the Legal Ethics Code Enforcement 
Mechanism  
 
The first institutional design reform proposal is aimed at the legal ethics code 
enforcement mechanism, namely the professional bodies assigned to the tasks of 
bringing ethics violation charges where a legal practitioner is alleged to have run afoul 
of the legal ethics code of the jurisdiction.
1193
  Two primary areas are worthy of 
further scrutiny and reform specifically as they relate to a lawyer’s potentially 
deceptive conduct in negotiations. 
First, assuming that the legal ethics code includes negotiation as a primary 
function of lawyers as recommended in Section 7.3.1, this distinction should become 
part of how legal ethics cases are heard and decided.  The first part of amending the 
legal ethics enforcement mechanism extends to beyond negotiation and recommends 
that there be more sensitivity and analysis of ethics violation cases based on the 
context of the alleged violation of the legal ethics code.  By context, I am specifically 
talking about the role or function of the lawyer at the time of the alleged violation.  
For example, if the lawyer, at the time of the alleged violation, was a mediator, 
negotiator, or trial advocate, there should be relevant standards by which his/her 
                                                 
1193
 Rhode, above n 151, 19-20, 211 (“major challenge is to build a more coherent system that balances 
the needs for public accountability with professional autonomy”; “our current one-size-fits-all model of 
legal education and professional regulation badly needs revision”; “profession needs to develop more 
effective and accountable disciplinary structures”). 
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conduct is measured and assessed in light of the alleged violation.  This is not to 
diminish the public interest standard.  It is to complement the public interest standard 
by ensuring that all relevant information and perspectives are taken into account when 
judging whether an attorney has violated the legal ethics code of a particular 
jurisdiction.  This is especially important in the area of negotiations because, as 
established earlier, there is a lack of consistent standards of behaviour within a 
jurisdiction as well as across jurisdictions.
1194
 
For example, in Chapter 4, after conducting an analysis of the legal ethics 
cases in Queensland where the alleged violation was deceptive or misleading conduct 
in the context of negotiation,
1195
 the results revealed that the context and function of 
the lawyer in which the alleged violation occurred was not considered and was not a 
key factor in the final decision.  I do not argue that deceptive or misleading conduct 
should be excused depending on the context or circumstances; however, I do 
recommend that this contextual factor be seriously considered in determining the final 
guilt or innocence of the alleged offender as well as the relevant punishment.   
The legal ethics code for Queensland, as well as most common law 
jurisdictions, provide for specific punishment or set of punishments for violating the 
provisions of the legal ethics codes.  In the case of Queensland, for example, the 
primary rationale for finding a lawyer guilty and punishing the offending lawyer is 
                                                 
1194
 Bordone, above n 96, 3 (“Though separate ethics rules exist for lawyers who mediate or arbitrate, 
there continues to be no separate ethical rules for lawyers engaged in the process of negotiation...”); 
Eyster, above n 977, 773 (“structural features designed to guarantee procedural and outcome fairness 
when lawyer is an advocate are “totally absent in the negotiation process”); Mize, above n 66,  247 
(“More guidance needs to be given on acceptable negotiating behaviour.”); Daigneault and Marshall, 
above n 1097, 18 (“Negotiation is an area that the legal community has failed to define, analyse, and 
codify adequately. Attorneys are left to blindly navigate its muddy waters at their own peril.”).  
1195
 Please see Chapter 5 (Analysis of the Success of Professional Ethical Codes of Conduct of 
Queensland in Controlling Lawyers’ Deceptive Behaviour) as well as the charts in the Appendices for 
further discussion and information on this qualitative study. 
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based on a protection of public interest regardless of surrounding or mitigating 
circumstances.
1196
  In addition, while the resulting punishment seems consistent with 
the provisions of the legal ethics code, the punishment, in many cases, seems 
inconsistent, highly onerous and punitive relative to the offence, the function of the 
lawyer at the time of the alleged violation, and the context in which the alleged 
conduct occurs.  There appear to be more strike-offs and punitive fines than an 
attempt for restorative or remedial justice measures.
1197
  In the ten years of cases 
studied where the alleged offence was misleading or deceptive conduct, there is little 
to no information on whether the alleged violation occurred in the context of a trial, a 
court appointment, a meeting or a negotiation; however, this can be discerned 
implicitly from a more detailed review of the cases.
1198
   
A second area of reform related to the legal ethics code enforcement 
mechanism is aimed specifically at clarifying the degree of severity of the offending 
conduct, such as misleading or deceptive conduct in negotiations, in relation to other 
violations of the legal ethics codes.  First, a review of ethics violation cases must 
determine if the misleading or deceptive conduct occurred in the context of a 
negotiation and whether it falls within the spectrum of offending conduct.  This is 
especially the case if the profession continues to judge lawyer behaviour when the 
lawyer is serving as negotiator under the same standards as when the lawyer is an 
                                                 
1196
 See, eg, Mellifont (1981) Qd. R. 17 Andrews J (with the concurrence of Connolly J at 30 (“The 
public interest calls for effective vigilance over members of the profession and its standards of 
professional behaviour and great concern to ensure as well as possible that the public may confidently 
place their business and affairs in its hands.”); See also re Maraj (1995) 15 WAR 12; Cf Bolton v Law 
Society [1994] 2 All ER 486 
1197
 Haller, above n 928, 70 (arguing that professional discipline imposed primarily for the purpose of 
maintaining the profession’s reputation can cause more harm than good, especially where it intersects 
with issues of trust and public perception). 
1198
 See Appendices for further information on these cases. 
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advocate, third-party neutral, and judge, whether explicitly, implicitly by conduct, or 
by silence. 
An example of the impact of not having an objective spectrum of offending 
conduct in the area of misleading or deceptive conduct is most clearly illustrated by 
QLS Inc v Craig Stephen Bax,
1199
 a case of the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of 
Queensland.  The judge found that the solicitor failed to explain his actions properly, 
did not display remorse, and continued with the offending deceptive conduct in a 
persistent manner.
1200
  As a result of this behaviour, the Court of Appeal affirmed the 
Tribunal’s guilty finding, struck the solicitor off the role of solicitors, and ordered him 
to pay costs.
1201
  However, Pincus AJ disagreed with the majority’s decision.  Pincus 
AJ indicated in his dissenting opinion that ‘dishonesty, like other forms of 
misbehaviour, has grades of seriousness’
1202
 and that the solicitor in this case had not 
committed the gravest form.
1203
  Unfortunately for the solicitor, Pincus AJ did not 
elaborate on the grades of dishonesty that fall within or outside the bounds of 
violating the professional ethics codes.  As a result, the aggravating factors combined 
with the fact that there is not an explicit list of the ‘grades of seriousness’ for 
dishonesty meant that the judges could only rely on the legal ethics rules and existing 
case law to determine the final outcome.
1204
  This is not to say that dishonesty should 
                                                 
1199
 QLS Inc v Craig Stephen Bax [1998] QCA 089 (‘Craig Stephen Bax’). 
1200
 Craig Stephen Bax [1998] QCA 089, 4, 6-7, 13-15. 
1201
 Craig Stephen Bax [1998] QCA 089, 18. 
1202
 Craig Stephen Bax [1998] QCA 089, 13. 
1203
 Ibid. 
1204
 Craig Stephen Bax [1998] QCA 089, 13 (Pincus, JA) (“…it appears that what the solicitor did was 
unwisely succumb to the temptation to assist, by fraudulent means, a client facing bankruptcy. It was 
not suggested against him that he derived any personal benefit - except such general benefit as may be 
obtained from achieving a satisfactory result for a client.”).  This again highlights the tension in the 
duties of a lawyer as profession, the need for better standards for assessing violations, and the 
importance of educating lawyers on how to manage these issues so as to avoid ethics violations 
proceedings. 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 371 - 9-Aug-10 
be fully condoned.  This case is illustrative of the point made by many practitioners 
and scholars that the ethics codes alone do not provide sufficient consistent guidance 
in adjudicating cases of this type.
1205
 This is especially so for cases involving 
negotiations as illustrated by the Mullins case
1206
 where the barrister was found guilty 
of misleading and deceptive conduct but only received a fine, a result quite 
inconsistent with Bax.    
In summary, by implementing this first institutional design reform proposal 
and aligning the enforcement mechanism of ethics violations with more consistent and 
objective standards, the profession can ensure an effective and accountable 
disciplinary structure that accomplishes remedial goals (e.g. education) as well as 
maintaining the highest standards of the profession.  The result, when measured, 
should be increased positive public perception of lawyers and the legal profession. 
7.5.2 Proposal 2 – Adopt More Formal Mentoring and Research 
Partnerships Between Professional and Educational Bodies 
 
The second institutional design reform proposal focuses on the relationships 
between law practitioners, professional organisations, and educational institutions.  
The second institutional design reform proposal recommends adopting formal 
mentoring and research partnerships between the profession and legal academia.   
The primary area of enquiry here is whether there is sufficient integration, 
interdependence, and interrelationships between major stakeholders so as to ensure 
seamless development and education of future lawyers who are able to balance both 
                                                 
1205
 See, eg, Daigneault and Marshall, above n 1097, 18; Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, above n 472, 
645; Rhode, above n 151, 211. 
1206
 See Chapter 5, Section 5.9.2 for a detailed analysis and discussion.  
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professional and personal obligations.
1207
  There is a variety of criticism that law 
schools do not effectively prepare students for law practice.  Even in law school, 
recent studies have shown that law students tend to develop or increase existing 
personality traits of perfectionism, duality and competitiveness to succeed in law 
school.
1208
  Furthermore, as these traits are carried on to professional lives, lawyers 
appear to have a higher than average rate of health problems, including depression, 
alcoholism, and drug abuse.
1209
 
This would tend to demonstrate that there is a ‘disconnect’ between the 
academic instruction of future lawyers and actual law practice as well as a lack of 
awareness within the educational and professional environments of the real pressures 
affecting lawyers, especially in dealing with ethical issues.
1210
  By disconnect, I mean 
that what one is taught is not what one actually practices and vice versa.  For example, 
law students may be taught in legal ethics to always be honest and fair, yet when they 
subsequently take a negotiations class or a commercial transactions class or actually 
practice law, a series of events or conversations or lessons will make it clear that the 
                                                 
1207
 See, eg, Macfarlane and Manwaring, above n 465; Craig Stephen Bax [1998] QCA 089; Chart, 
above n 899, 177; Eyster, above n 977, 752; Berkovic, above n 963, 1 (stressing the importance of the 
profession and education institutions to work more closely).   
1208
 See Berkovic, above n 963, 1.  See also Keyes and Johnstone, above n 1136, 537 (discussing the 
central issue of law school curriculum in Australia and citing Zimmerman who observed that ‘the root 
of institutional concern [about the use of group work] lies in four notions embedded in traditional legal 
education: competitiveness, teacher control, authorship/individualism, and individualized grading’); 
Clifford Zimmerman, ‘ “Thinking Beyond My Own Interpretation”: Reflections on Collaborative and 
Cooperative Learning Theory in the Law School Curriculum’ (1999) 31 Arizona State Law Journal 
957,986; Helen Brown, ‘The Cult of Individualism in Law School’ (2000) 25 Alternative Law Journal 
279, 287. 
1209
 Berkovic, above n 963, 1; P J Schiltz, ‘On being a happy, healthy, and ethical member of an 
unhappy, unhealthy, and unethical profession’ (1999) 52(4) Vanderbilt Law Review 869-951. See also 
Judith McNamara, Rachael Field, Catherine Brown, Learning to Reflect in the First Year of Legal 
Education:  The Key to Surviving Legal Education and Legal Practice (2009) (discussing the statistics 
of discontent and health problems plaguing the profession and recommending the use of reflective 
practice in the  law school curriculum and in law practice as preventative measures).  This unpublished 
paper is on file with the author.  
1210
 See, eg, Keyes and Johnstone, above n 1136, 537 (discussing the relationship of and issues between 
legal academy and the legal profession in Australia). 
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way to behave is dishonestly, sometimes unfairly, and in a highly competitive manner.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, the legal profession is a demanding and honourable 
profession yet it is also perceived as greedy and dishonourable.
1211
  If lawyers are 
considered analogous to doctors in terms of reputation, high professional ethics, and 
service to society, why do doctors and the medical profession as well as judges fare 
better in consumer and industry studies of the legal profession than lawyers?
1212
 
One option for addressing this seeming disconnect between the various 
stakeholders of the legal profession is by engaging in greater empirical research of 
lawyers, lawyer behaviour, and the legal profession so that the profession could 
benefit from the findings of relevant research.
1213
  This would aid in reducing the 
problems that plague the profession and the constant negative perception of the legal 
profession in the eyes of the public.  Out of any other professions mentioned to date, 
the legal profession, charged with protecting the public interest as well as their 
client’s interests, needs to lead the way to possible professional reform.      
A second option for addressing this issue between the various stakeholders of 
the legal profession is by creating partnerships with local law firms or community law 
practices.  This recommendation is slightly different from those discussed in Section 
7.4.3.  The ethical standard setting proposal discussed in Section 7.4.3 involved 
recommendations for integrating ethics and moral reasoning training in each of the 
core law school courses in a simulated law practice environment.  This institutional 
                                                 
1211
 See Chapter 6 (The Foundation for Change) for an in-depth discussion and analysis of consumer 
studies regarding the perception of lawyers and the legal system, especially in the United States.  
Perspectives from Australia and other jurisdictions are also discussed. 
1212
 See Chapter 6 (The Foundation for Change) for an in-depth discussion and analysis on this topic.   
1213
 Keyes and  Johnstone, above n 1136, 537 (advocating for a “more mature ‘consultative and 
respectful’ relationship, in which the function of the academy is regarded as significantly broader than 
the preparation of graduates for private practice, and the production of research of utility to 
practitioners and judges.”). 
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design reform proposal, however, involves a law student undertaking apprenticeship 
training at local or community law practice firms.
 1214
   
Historically and prior to the introduction of clinical legal education, lawyers 
were trained through an apprenticeship at a law firm.
1215
  This proposal involves the 
integration of legal education and apprenticeship.  The difference is in the degree of 
integration, the degree of real law practice and a greater sense of reality in terms of 
what law practice is actually like.  Under this approach, local practitioners are 
continually engaged with the law school to mentor upcoming lawyers.  
A third option to address this issue and increase collaboration between the 
legal academy and professional practice is to create legal clinics on the grounds of 
each law school.  This option is different from law students attending apprenticeship 
training at external law firms as discussed above.  Legal clinics can be stand-alone, 
revenue generating enterprises such as those at, for example, Vermont Law School 
and Stanford Law School.  Legal clinics can and should also be connected with 
research centres of excellence.  These legal clinics provide ways for all key 
stakeholders of the legal community to join with academia and create an environment 
where the best in academia, law practice, and community organisations come together 
to serve real clients while integrating theory and practice in one setting.  In addition, 
these legal clinics provide a rich venue in which to conduct empirical research, an 
activity that needs to be more fully integrated into legal academia and law practice.   
A key benefit of establishing legal clinics at or near the law school ensures 
that law students have a forum in which to apply what they are learning in class, 
                                                 
1214
 Condlin, above n 43, 318-320 (providing a historical perspective of clinical legal education and the 
apprenticeship model). 
1215
 Ibid. 
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integrate classroom learning with practical experience, engage in mentoring 
relationships with practicing attorneys and contribute to resolving real disputes in a 
real-time setting.  This also allows both the faculty and practicing attorneys to gauge a 
student’s progress and provide a realistic, positive mentoring so as to reward positive 
behaviour, encourage potential behavioural adjustments for greater professional 
success, or reinforce substantive knowledge at the most foundational level.  As stated 
earlier, lay persons begin the journey to being future practicing lawyers at law school.  
To the extent that law school can take the initiative to begin or continue to shape the 
legal and moral development of practitioners towards greater maturity is the extent to 
which lawyers can be successful practitioners.  The result is a greater chance that 
graduating law students will uphold the values and goals of the profession in practice.     
In conclusion, this section recommended two effective institutional design 
reforms aimed at ensuring that the legal regulation and ethical standard setting 
reforms discussed in prior sections have the greatest chance of success in addressing 
the issue of deception in negotiation.  Institutional design reforms aimed at improving 
that journey from start to graduation is one of the best and most effective means of 
reversing a cycle of potentially unethical or unworthy professional behaviour, 
including potentially deceptive behaviour in negotiation.  Changing behaviours and 
perceptions which have been engrained for so many years as part of a dominant legal 
culture may seem impossible; however this is no longer so impossible as to risk 
remaining with the status quo.  Change is possible and change must happen. 
7.6 IMPLEMETIG BEHAVIOUR CHAGES GEERALLY 
The purpose of this section is to introduce ways in which the reform proposals 
discussed above can be implemented to address the issues highlighted by the research 
© 2010 Avnita Lakhani - 376 - 9-Aug-10 
questions in this thesis.  One of the key aspects of the question of lawyer deception in 
negotiation is that it involves the behaviour of lawyers in a particular setting, 
behaviour which may be hard to see, measure, or change.  In addition, other issues 
identified throughout this thesis, such as through the comparative study of legal ethics 
codes in Chapter 4 and a study of the ethics violation cases in Chapter 5, reflect a 
need for behavioural changes which can be fostered through the implementation of 
the reform proposals outlined in prior sections. 
Changing behaviour is hard for any ordinary person.  Changing the behaviour 
of lawyers may seem impossible given such a rich history and engrained culture 
generally consisting of competitiveness, adversarialism, winning, zealous 
representation, confidentiality, and partisanship.  Changing the behaviour of a large 
group to the extent that there is sufficient impact on society and the profession itself 
can be a challenge.  However, changing behaviour is possible by understanding 
existing theories of behaviour modification and strategically using certain models that 
aid in effective change. 
From a policy and behaviour modification perspective, there are several 
theories for changing behaviour.  This section will introduce and discuss current 
theories of encouraging behavioural changes as a means of showing that there are 
several options available to key stakeholders for undertaking successful, effective, and 
measurable reform.  This section will also recommend some policy and behavioural 
change theories that would appear to be beneficial in addressing the issues raised in 
this thesis.  More importantly, the purpose of this section is to stress that it is no 
longer an option to avoid or sideswipe the issue, especially as there are many ways to 
address it. 
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To date, rational choice theory has dominated policy making, legal decision-
making, and pervaded other areas of society.  Rational choice theory is based on the 
assumption that people will assess the choices available to them, determine the costs 
and benefits of each available choice, and make a rational choice that yields the 
highest net benefit.
1216
  The standard tools of public policy to change behaviour under 
the rational choice model are now well-known:  ‘sanctions (fines and other penalties), 
price signals (taxes, financial incentives) and the provision of information.’
1217
  
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the rational choice model has limitations, which 
are addressed through prospect theory and the frivolous framing theory discussed in 
Chapter 2, section 2.3.7.
1218
  The rational choice model and its derivatives are the 
most common models used in the legal reforms area.  In addition to these theories, 
behavioural change can also be implemented using other theories. 
Behavioural change at the individual level can be influenced through theories 
of conditionality, classical conditioning, cognitive consistency theory, social cognitive 
theories, and heuristics and biases. 
Conditionality means changing behaviour through rewarding or punishing the 
consequences of the behaviour.
1219
  Classical conditioning involves rewarding or 
punishing behaviour based on an association with different stimuli.
1220
  Cognitive 
consistency theory encourages behavioural change by making associations between 
the desired change and the individual’s values and beliefs, ensuring there is 
                                                 
1216
 Australian Public Service Commission, Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective (2007) 
7 <http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications07/changingbehaviour.pdf> at 9 August 2010; Gary S Becker, 
The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1976); David Hume, A Treatise of Human 5ature (1888). 
1217
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 7. 
1218
 Please see Chapter 2, section 2.3.7 (Decision-Making Theories Affecting Legal Negotiation) for a 
detailed discussion.  See also Guthrie, above n 265; Rachlinski, above n 269, 121.  
1219
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 9-12. 
1220
 Ibid. 
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consistency, so that the individual is more likely to adopt the change on a long-term 
basis.  Social cognitive theories emphasise individual self-empowerment and self-
confidence through small goals, reinforcement, and monitoring.
1221
  Finally, heuristics 
and biases at the individual level, such as anchoring, scarcity, loss or gain, and peak 
experience influence the degree to which there is a consistent bias in decision-
making.
1222
 
With regards to lawyer’s use of deception in negotiation, heuristics and biases 
as well as cognitive consistency theory can play a role in decision-making.  In Chapter 
2, Lee et al’s 2004 study
1223
 emphasised the difference between pro-social deeds (e.g. 
truth-telling) and anti-social deeds (e.g. telling lies) and how they can be influence by 
culture.  In the context of the legal system and the use of deception in negotiation, the 
legal system, through the legal ethics codes studied in Chapter 4, can be considered a 
culture that rewards pro-social deeds (e.g., honesty and candour) yet the individual 
lawyer’s success is based on using anti-social deeds (e.g., deception) in negotiations.  
As the results of the comparative study of legal ethics codes in Chapter 4 indicate, the 
legal system has not created any strong positive or negative associations between 
using deception in negotiation and the resulting negative consequences.  As such, 
consistent with prospect theory, deception in negotiation is not viewed as a high-risk 
behaviour to the extent that it deters practitioners from using it to gain an advantage.   
                                                 
1221
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 10-11. 
1222
 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ in 
David Halpern et al, Personal Responsibility and Changing Behaviour: The State of Knowledge and Its 
Implications for Public Policy (2004) 24 
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strategy/assets/pr2.pdf> at 9 August 2010; 
Korobkin and Guthrie, above n 79; Guthrie, above n 1032. 
1223
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2 (Research About Deception/Lying) for a detailed discussion about Lee 
et al’s studies on this topic. 
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To alter this behaviour at the individual level, the profession could implement 
the legal regulation and ethical standard setting reforms to create a consistency in the 
values and beliefs of legal practitioners.  Then, cognitive consistency as well as social 
cognitive theories can be used to associate the desire for behaviour consistent with 
these values by rewarding the desired behaviour.  Consequently, legal practitioners 
may achieve a certain level of self-empowerment and self-confidence that reinforces 
the notion that the benefits of not using deception in negotiation are greater than those 
derived by adopting deceptive tactics in negotiation. 
In addition to influencing behavioural change at the individual level, there are 
several theories of behaviour modification at the inter-personal level.  These include 
authority theories, reciprocity and mutuality, face-to-face approach, and inter-personal 
heuristics and biases. 
Authority theory is based on the view that people will comply and change 
behaviour if told to do so by someone whom they admire or feel is legitimate on the 
basis of a social role, expert opinion, or reward and punishment.
1224
  For example, 
teachers, managers, partners, or entertainment and sports heroes may fall under this 
category of influential authority figures.  Reciprocity and mutuality theories attempt 
to influence behavioural change through mutual gain or reciprocated favours.
1225
  
Both reciprocity and mutuality are generally used in conjunction with cognitive 
consistency and conditionality theories discussed above.  A face-to-face approach can 
be used to increase commitment to behavioural change.
1226
  This approach is effective 
when combined with the authority theory.  Finally, interpersonal heuristics and 
                                                 
1224
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 13-16. 
1225
 Ibid. 
1226
 Ibid. 
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biases can also influence behavioural modification goals.
1227
  Since heuristics and 
biases are mental shortcuts that occur automatically, any behavioural modification 
program must take into account such factors as attribution error,
1228
 inter-group 
bias,
1229
 false consensus,
1230
 and false uniqueness.
1231
 
With regards to addressing the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation at an 
inter-personal level, the current standard conception model of ethics
1232
 seems to 
indicate that attribution error, inter-group bias, and false uniqueness are the likely 
heuristics and biases that must be taken into consideration when developing an 
effective change program.  Legal practitioners, as a largely self-regulated profession, 
are likely to disproportionately agree with their own group’s view of issues such as 
deception in negotiation and discount the views of external groups who contend that 
lawyers are deceptive in negotiations.  In addition, due to the competitive nature of an 
adversarial legal system, lawyers are likely to overestimate their own skills at the 
expense of another or blame external factors rather than taking personal responsibility 
for unsuccessful or less than optimal outcomes in negotiations.   
Given the structure of most law firms and legal services organisations, a 
combination of authority theory and face-to-face approach can be used to curtail 
deception in negotiation.  For example, as research by Lerman, Lamb, Macfarlane and 
                                                 
1227
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 16; See also David Halpern et al, 
above n 1222, 27.  
1228
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 16 (defined as “tendency to 
over-emphasize dispositional factors about people and under-emphasise situational factors”). 
1229
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 16 (defined as “tendency for 
people to flatter themselves...and underestimating their peers’ abilities”). 
1230
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 16 (defined as tendency to 
“overestimate the extent to which other agree with their own opinion” thus providing false consensus 
of one’s own personal opinion). 
1231
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 16 (defined as “tendency for 
people to flatter themselves...and underestimating their peers’ abilities”).  
1232
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3 (Theories of Legal Ethics) for more information on this topic. 
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Manwaring, and Wilkinson et al shows,
1233
 lawyers tend to place greater emphasis on 
the advice given by partners and senior practitioners than on the actual ethics codes 
when faced with specific ethical dilemmas.  Therefore, at the interpersonal level, law 
firm partners, senior legal practitioners, and judges can play a key role in encouraging 
behavioural changes. 
A final set of theories which can be leveraged to influence behavioural 
modification is aimed at the group level.  Behavioural modification at the group level 
can be accomplished by using social capital theory, diffusion of innovation, tailoring 
messages and information, and the social marketing approach. 
Social capital theory works on the basis of creating and using social networks 
and social norms to increase social cohesion and spread the message for desired skills 
and behavioural changes.
1234
  Diffusion of innovation theory encourages behaviour 
modification by using influential people, organisations, and partnerships with key 
groups to spread behavioural change messages in innovative ways.
1235
  Tailoring 
messages and information is especially relevant and useful when behavioural change 
must be targeted towards demographically or culturally distinct groups,
1236
 such as 
legal practitioners.  Finally, the social marketing approach, developed by Kotler and 
Lee,
1237
 is focused on ‘influencing behaviours that will improve social outcomes such 
                                                 
1233
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4 (Research About Legal Ethics) for more information on this topic.  
See also Chapter 3, Section 3.2 (Lawyers Deceiving Clients) for more information on Lerman’s study. 
1234
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 17-20 (defining ‘social capital’ 
as consisting of “networks, norms, relationships, values, and informal sanctions that shape the quantity 
and cooperative quality of a society’s social interactions.”). 
1235
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 17-20; See also S Godin, 
Unleashing the Idea Virus (2002); J Collins et al, Carrots, Sticks and Sermons (2002) 17. 
1236
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 17-20 
1237
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 21-28; P Kotler and N Lee, 
Marketing in the Public Sector: A Roadmap for Improved Performance (2006) 193-211 (discussing the 
twelve (12) principles underlying the social marketing approach to influencing behavioural change).   
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as improving health or improving injuries’” thus improving overall quality of life.
1238
  
The changed behaviours are meant to improve the individual and the environment, 
resulting in newly established social norms.
1239
     
 In the context of addressing the issue of deception in negotiation at the group 
level, the social marketing approach combined with tailoring messages to the culture 
of the legal system might work to increase awareness of the impact of using deception 
in negotiation as well as ways to sustain pledges for behavioural modification. 
In addition to the individual, inter-personal, and group approaches to 
behavioural modification discussed above, there are also a number of other theories of 
behavioural change proposed by economists, social scientists, and psychologists.  One 
of the most well-known of these are a set of principles developed by Dale 
Carnegie
1240
 based on the work of contemporary psychologist B F Skinner.  These 
principles are based on a positive reinforcement approach rather than the more 
common negative reinforcement approach (punishment) of the most behavioural 
change models.  As these principles appear to overlap with those of the social 
marketing approach above, they are not discussed in detail here.  Attempts to change 
behaviour may be different within a specific context, such as negotiating with an 
opponent only one time versus negotiating with a particular person on a repeated 
basis.
1241
  Furthermore, behavioural changes can also be reinforced through the 
                                                 
1238
 Changing Behaviour:  A Public Policy Perspective, above n 1216, 21.  
1239
 Ibid.  
1240
 See generally, Dale Carnegie, How to Win Friends and Influence People (1987). 
1241
 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering’ (1992) 8 Georgia State University 
Law Review 385, 397-398 (discussing the application of Robert Axelrod’s experiments to negotiation 
behaviours, discovery and disclosure behaviours in law).  See also Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of 
Cooperation (1984). 
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influence of parents or other adult role models
1242
 as well as socio-cultural factors, 
such as being identified as part of a ‘globalized’ humanity rather than a 
‘particularised’ humanity, causing one to adopt behaviours or change them based on 
the extent of role or socio-political identification.
1243
 
So far, this section has laid out various theories of initiating behavioural 
change at the individual, interpersonal, and group or community level combined with 
an example of how some of these theories might be used to address the issues of 
deception in negotiation and to implement the policy reform proposals.  In addition, 
the prior chapters have established the foundation for change and this chapter has 
identified and recommended certain reform proposals for managing that change.  Now, 
I address the question of which behavioural change approaches might best be suited to 
address the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation and the issues identified by 
answering the related research questions posed in this thesis. 
In 2004, Halpern and his colleagues in the U.K. Prime Minister’s Strategy 
Unit issued a discussion paper aimed at generating discussion on ‘imaginative 
thinking about how policies could be designed in the future’
1244
 to accomplish the 
goals of government as requested or mandated by its citizens.  One of the key areas 
was on the importance of personal responsibility and working in partnership with 
                                                 
1242
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 1242, 398-399 (discussing social psychologist Eva Fogelman’s findings 
of the study of rescuers of Jews or collaborator regimes during World War II for determinants of 
altruistic behaviour in certain situations, especially where such behaviour was unlikely).  See also Eva 
Fogelman, Moral Heroes of Our Time:  Christian Rescuers, America 161 (December 9, 1989); Samuel 
P Oliner and Pearl M Oliner, The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in 5azi Europe (1988). 
1243
 Menkel-Meadow, above n 1242, 399 (discussing further studies on possible determinants of 
altruistic behaviour). See also Kristen R Monroe et al., ‘Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action:  
Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe’ (1990) 101 Ethics 103; Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759); Adam Smith, The Wealth of 5ations (1776). Menkel-Meadows’s view is that 
Smith’s views are contradictory with regards to human behaviour and altruistic tendencies. 
1244
 David Halpern et al, above n 1222, 3. 
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government to implement effective behavioural change because government cannot 
do it alone.
1245
 
Halpern et al’s emphasis on personal responsibility as a driver for behavioural 
change is central to my recommendations on implementing the policy reform 
proposals discussed in this Chapter given the high level of personal responsibility that 
practicing lawyers undertake in the course of their practice.  The emphasis on 
personal responsibility also attempts to establish a new relationship between the state 
and the individual, where encouraging personal responsibility increases empowerment 
which, in turn, encourages behavioural changes towards desired results.   
Halpern and his colleagues identified three key factors that are important to 
consider in recommending a course of action.  First, major policy outcomes require 
‘greater engagement and participation from citizens’
1246
 in the sense that individuals 
must be willing to change in order to create long-term improvements.  Second, 
Halpern and his colleagues stress that ‘there are strong moral and political arguments 
for protecting and enhancing personal responsibility’.
1247
  In essence, government 
works better when its citizens are empowered to make decisions on their own best 
interests rather than decisions being imposed by government.
1248
  Finally, 
behaviourally-based interventions rooted in personal responsibility are ‘significantly 
more cost-effective [and better] than traditional service delivery’.
1249
  Traditional 
service delivery presumably means that the government takes greater ownership for 
                                                 
1245
 David Halpern et al, above n 1222, 6 (discussing the key pressures and factors that require 
government to focus on co-production and behavioural change approaches to accomplish policy goals). 
1246
 David Halpern et al, above n 1222, 3. 
1247
 Ibid. 
1248
 Ibid. 
1249
 Ibid. 
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providing the solution than the individual.
1250
  This notion of encouraging more 
personal responsibility is consistent with the nature of the legal profession and views 
of legal scholars.
1251
 
The legal profession and its practicing members are still generally self-
regulated and, therefore, would seem more conducive to personal responsibility 
approaches to behavioural changes.  In light of this view, I recommend a multi-level 
approach to addressing the central issues of this thesis by leveraging Dale Carnegie’s 
underlying principle of positively influencing behavioural change and Halpern’s 
recommendation of encouraging personal responsibility.  The reason for 
recommending this multi-level approach is that the legal system is, by nature, a blame 
game, consequentialist, utilitarian, punitive, focused on past events, and geared 
towards a win-lose mentality.
1252
  In order to successfully implement the tripartite 
policy reforms solution discussed in this chapter, it is important to frame the issues 
differently and to engage lawyers in a different way so as to yield honest opinions and 
effective outcomes.   
As Carnegie and psychologists such as B F Skinner have observed that ‘when 
criticism is minimised and praise emphasized, the good things people will do will be 
                                                 
1250
 David Halpern et al, above n 1222, 8-9, 12-13 (showing people’s opinions on the importance of 
personal responsibility versus government responsibility on key policy issues.  Halpern et al state that 
“...people in [sic] Britain appear fairly comfortable with the balance that UK policy has generally 
struck between state and individual responsibility. In contrast, the publics of both USA and some 
Scandinavian countries have tended in recent years to favour a shift towards more individual 
responsibility, while the publics of Latin America, Japan and the Former Soviet Union have wanted to 
see their governments take more responsibility.”).   In seen in Figure 6, Canada is closely aligned with 
the United States while Australia is higher on personal responsibility yet still more comparable with 
Britain.   
1251
 Rhode, above n 151, 209, 213 (“We need to socialize lawyers  to accept more personal 
responsibility for their professional actions...working conditions....regulatory process”;    “...challenge 
is to enlist both the public and the profession in reforms that reconnect the ideals and institutions of 
legal practice....”). 
1252
 Chart, above n 899, 191-196 (discussing the characteristics of legal education and the case method 
approach to legal education creates disharmony with how lawyers approach negotiations and how they 
are conducted). 
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reinforced and the poorer things will atrophy for lack of attention.’
1253
  The legal 
profession, from the moment one enters law school, is rife with rules-veneration, 
competition, high stress, high expectations, and as reported more recently, low civility 
and collegiality among practitioners.  Some of this might be attributed to economic 
competition as well as changes to the profession; however, the more likely reason is 
the culture of the legal profession.  This can be counteracted with more 
encouragement and professionalism in the context of implementing reforms.  
Therefore, to encourage ethical negotiation behaviour, one must engage practitioners, 
encourage them to adopt pro-social behaviour, and praise them for such desired 
behaviour as much as possible – catch them doing something right and reward it.
1254
   
The first recommendation of a multi-level approach to implementing the 
policy reform proposals discussed in this chapter involves conducting a structured, 
statistically-based empirical study aimed at determining the attitudes and perceptions 
of lawyers regarding the use of deception in negotiation, the importance of negotiation 
in their daily practice, the role of the legal ethics codes in helping them make ethical 
decisions, and the issues underlying any of these major areas, including whether 
lawyers felt they had received sufficient education to deal with these issues.
1255
  These 
studies may involve using multiple assessment tools and can be extensions of those 
studies already discussed in this chapter or developed with a specific jurisdiction in 
mind.  The purpose of this first recommendation is to engage the key stakeholders of 
the legal system, namely practicing lawyers, so as to produce evidence-based data 
                                                 
1253
 Carnegie, above n 1240, 254 (quoting B F Skinner).  
1254
 Note: This would be consistent with several of the behaviour modification theories discussed 
earlier such as conditionality, classical conditioning, and cognitive consistency where the legal 
practitioner believes that being honest as a lawyer is consistent with his/her personal beliefs. 
1255
 See, eg, Avnita Lakhani, “Deception as a Negotiation Tactic: A Study of the Views and Perceptions 
of Practitioners” Update (October 2009). Update is a monthly publication of LEADR. 
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which can serve to determine the areas of greatest potential for immediate and 
positive reform.   
The second recommendation of a multi-level approach to implementing the 
policy reform proposals discussed in this chapter is a readiness assessment of those 
individuals, groups, and organisations who might be the primary beneficiaries of the 
proposed changes.  One way to conduct the readiness assessment is by understanding 
the stages of change
1256
 that each major stakeholder might be in and adapting 
proposed changes in behaviour accordingly.  For example, lawyers who are not 
cognisant of using deceptive tactics in negotiation or the impact of such behaviour 
may be in the pre-contemplation stage and need to see evidence of a problem first.  In 
contrast, if law schools concur that the current legal education curriculum is 
insufficient to help incoming practitioners deal with ethical issues, they are at the 
contemplation stage and ready to move towards the preparation stage and plan for 
changes to the curriculum.   
An effective example of how to use this readiness assessment approach is 
documented by Richard Wu
1257
 in discussing an important reform to Hong Kong’s 
legal education programme based on a commissioned review of Hong Kong’s legal 
education system.  The independent review of Hong Kong’s legal education system 
was the first in over three decades and consisted of reviewing the legal education 
curricula against the Marre Report discussed earlier.
1258
  The independent review 
                                                 
1256
 David Halpern et al, above n 1222, 21-22, figure 8 (describing the stages of change); See also O J 
Prochaska and C C DiClemente, ‘Stages and processes of self-change of smoking:  Toward an 
integrative model of change’ (1983) 51 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 390-395. 
1257
 See generally, Wu, above n 471, 153.  Wu is Associate Dean and Associate Professor, Faculty of 
Law, University of Hong Kong. 
1258
 Wu, above n 471, 153 (citing to General Council of the Bar and the Council of the Law Society, 
London, A Time for Change:  Report of the Committee on the Future of the Legal Profession (the 
Marre Report) (1988)).  
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resulted in fundamental changes to the curriculum by reducing lectures and increasing 
problem-based learning, integrating skills training in various legal and lawyering 
skills, use of training groups that encourage law students to work in teams, and 
teaching and assessment methods that are more skills-based rather than knowledge-
based.
1259
  In the case of Hong Kong’s example, the government appears to have gone 
through a readiness assessment and clearly recognised a need for reform and moved 
through the stages of change to act on recommendations for reform as well as 
implement a maintenance plan to ensure that those changes are durable and 
measurable. 
The second recommendation of a multi-level approach to implementing the 
policy reform proposals discussed in this chapter is to use the social marketing 
approach to target specific, measurable, small changes towards those who are ready 
for change.  The social marketing approach is ideal for this particular issue because it 
allows for change to take place gradually and thus builds trust among all stakeholders 
to ensure that whatever change is implemented will be durable.  This is especially 
important because the specific issues to be addressed in this thesis are complex, 
contentious, and require patient, reasonable, and measured response.  Every 
stakeholder discussed in the aforementioned proposals is important to the overall 
success of an integrated, effective reform agenda.  Law and the legal profession are 
perceived as notoriously blind to professional reform and radical change.  The social 
marketing approach allows for flexibility and a variety of options in delivering the 
right message and encouraging the desired behaviours.  It is also more conducive to 
                                                 
1259
 Wu, above n 471. 
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personal responsibility approach rather than imposed governmental or professional 
mandates.   
Finally, as Halpern et al have observed, the best, most effective and long-term 
way to help someone is to find a way where they can help themselves by recognising 
that ‘policy can have twin goals which operate together - policy must at once 
empower and give choices, but at the same time policy should set the default to be in 
the best interests of individuals and the wider public interest...[and] [t]o be effective, 
this twin approach needs to be built around a sense of partnership between state and 
individual.’
1260
  I would further argue that this partnership needs to include the public 
as well as educational institutions to truly implement changes which will create 
positive public perceptions of the legal profession.  More than ever, as highlighted by 
scholars such as Rhodes, Menkel-Meadow, Luban, Chart, Eyster and others, lawyers 
need to start playing an active part in professional reform and feel as if they are 
owners of the system they devote such an enormous part of their life to, both on a 
personal and professional level.   
In conclusion, this section highlighted various theories of encouraging and 
implementing behavioural changes.  While still considered a dominant approach to 
behaviour change, the rational choice model is no longer the most dominant or highly 
effective approach, especially in the area of complex behavioural change issues.  In 
addition, this section discussed how some of the aforementioned theories can be used 
to address the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation.   
The theories and approaches presented in this section suggest that there is 
hope in encouraging behavioural change and a variety of tools and techniques such 
                                                 
1260
 David Halpern et al, above n 1222, 60-61.  
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that the profession should not be discouraged from attempting to implement the policy 
reform proposals discussed in this chapter.  Instead, the profession should be 
encouraged to act where necessary to address behavioural changes using positive and 
effective methods.  Law is generally considered a predominantly reactionary 
profession rooted in tools of rational analysis and punitive measures to diagnose, 
analyse, and control behaviour.  However, with the introduction of ADR, law is 
slowly evolving and this means that change may be required to the ways and means 
used to practice law.   
By implementing the policy reform proposals discussed in this chapter through 
the strategic use of established and successful theories and approaches, such as those 
discussed above, the profession stands to reap enormous benefits.  The potential goals 
and benefits to be derived from implementing the proposed policy reforms are 
discussed in the next section.   
7.7 IMPLEMETIG THE PROPOSED POLICY REFORM PROPOSALS 
Attempting to address the issue of a lawyer’s use of potentially deceptive 
behaviour in negotiation has been the basis of significant scholarly debate since the 
early 1980s and continues to today.  It remains a timely and unaddressed issue 
because it is complex, multi-disciplinary, and cross-jurisdictional.  A single solution is 
likely not as effective as an integrated, multi-disciplinary approach to this issue.    
The goal of any reform proposal should be to improve the lives of those who 
are recipients of or subject to the reform as well as to offer improved services to those 
who may be the intended beneficiaries of such reforms.  The net result is increased 
quality in the performance and satisfaction of all key stakeholders, resulting in 
financial stability and professional viability.  The importance of addressing this issue 
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and the potential benefits can be seen from the perspective of what Fleming, Coffman, 
and Harter call the ‘human sigma’.  In the context of this thesis, the goal of 
implementing the policy reform proposals discussed in this chapter is to increase the 
‘human sigma’ of the legal profession in a positive way. 
In manufacturing, quality and value of a given business is generally managed 
and measured through methodologies such as Six Sigma principles.  Six Sigma 
principles are quality improvement guidelines that are applied in the manufacturing 
sector to ensure that value is created in the factory floor.
1261
  It works well in 
manufacturing because of predictable properties and variables.  The profession of law 
is a service organisation where the product is more service-oriented in the form of 
intellectual legal advice, reasoned opinions, negotiated agreements, and court or legal 
documents.
1262
  In a service organisation, the predictable properties are less and 
variability is potentially greater because of volatile human dimensions.
1263
   
As discussed earlier, rational choice is not the only thing guiding human 
behaviour in the legal context.
1264
  Other factors, such as external influences, 
environmental factors, peer pressure, and emotions can significantly affect certain 
decisions.  In the profession of law, employees are the individual lawyers and the 
customer is the client (or plaintiff and defendant).  It is in the interests of the employer 
(i.e., the legal profession in the form of law firms, non-profit organisations, 
corporations, etc) that both employees and clients are happy.  Lawyers provide a 
                                                 
1261
 John H Fleming, Curt Coffman, and James K Harter, ‘Managing Your Human Sigma’ (2005) 
Harvard Business Review 107, 108. 
1262
 See, eg, Bok, above n 547, 1 (describing universities and law firms (and practice of law) as 
‘intellectual institutions’ affected negatively by competition and stating “competition in intellectual 
pursuits is problematic in that it is often hard to measure the quality of the product.”).  The purpose of 
this section is to address how the human sigma approach can be used to measure the quality of a 
service-oriented organisation such as law. 
1263
 Fleming, Coffman, and Harter, above n 1261, 108. 
1264
 Please see Chapter 2, section 2.37 for a more detailed discussion. 
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service to clients in the form of negotiations, legal advice and formal representation of 
the client’s interests.  Within such a service profession, there can be enormous 
variability in performance within each jurisdiction and within each local legal services 
provider, including those who offer ADR services. .   
To address quality and value in a service organisation, Fleming, Coffman and 
Harter developed a quality improvement approach called human sigma, designed to 
reduce variability, improve performance, improve the quality of the customer-
employee relationship and, thus, improve financial performance and satisfaction of 
both the client and the employee.  This, in turn, creates greater stability, financial 
viability and positive perception of the employer (the institution or business).  Human 
sigma argues that in a sales and service organisation, there are ‘enormous variations in 
quality at the work-group and individual levels’ in the employee-customer 
encounter.
1265
  This creates local variability to the extent that it affects performance of 
the workgroup and the company as a whole.   
For example, in the legal profession, a client may be very happy with the 
attorney-client relationship yet have a completely negative view of the legal 
profession as a whole.
1266
  By reducing local variability and managing the quality of 
the employee-customer encounter at the foundational level through a consistent 
method of assessment and process management, the human sigma score of a company 
(i.e., a law firm or association) can improve and result in greater financial 
                                                 
1265
 Fleming, Coffman, and Harter, above n 1261, 108. This can certainly be verified by the fact that 
while consumers may have a negative perception of the legal system as a whole, they generally have a 
positive perception of their own lawyer, owing greatly to the individual lawyer and the quality of the 
lawyer-client relationship based on loyalty and partisanship. 
1266
 See, eg, Public Perception of Lawyers:  Consumer Research Findings, above n 13 (confirming the 
public’s general perceptions versus individual perceptions of individual attorney-client relationships). 
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improvement.
1267
  An added benefit not fully discussed by the authors is the positive 
perception and views of the employer as a result of this quality improvement.   
Fleming, Coffman and Harter assert that the quality of that employee-customer 
interaction can be improved through both ‘short-term transactional interventions (such 
as coaching) and long term, transformational ones (such as changing the processes for 
hiring and promotion)’.  The core principles of human sigma can be applied to the 
issue of lawyers’ deceptive conduct in negotiations as explained below. 
One could argue that while lawyers are part of a collective profession with a 
common goal and set of rules, law is also highly variable and lawyers may act 
differently based on their local jurisdiction.  In the context of negotiation and without 
guidance from the profession through its legal ethics codes, lawyers may negotiate 
quite differently using different styles depending on their personal style or the 
community negotiation standards of their jurisdiction.
1268
  In effect, this means that 
there is enormous local variability in how lawyers negotiate and whether they use 
deceptive behaviours in negotiations. This local variability may extend to each 
negotiation and to each lawyer-client relationship.   
As discussed in Chapter 4, one jurisdiction, such as Alberta, Canada has strict, 
explicit rules on lawyers’ behaviour as negotiators.  Another jurisdiction, such as 
Queensland Australia or Hong Kong may be completely silent on the issue while yet 
another, such as the United States, may appear to allow some forms of deception 
based on generally accepted negotiation conventions recognised in that jurisdiction 
                                                 
1267
 Fleming, Coffman, and Harter, above n 1261, 108. 
1268
 See eg Williams, above n 225 (finding different negotiation and lawyering styles in even a single 
jurisdiction). 
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without clearly defining those conventions.
1269
  This is an example of how the 
differences in the legal ethics codes can perpetuate local variability on one simple 
issue, thus creating a ripple effect on legal practice.    
Local variability is not necessarily undesirable; however, if the local 
variability impacts on performance, quality of the service, or perception of a 
professional or the company he/she is part of, then local variability may be considered 
undesirable or even detrimental to the organisation’s success.  While some might 
argue that a degree of local variability is normal and that the reputation effect or 
market economics will take care of these issues, the best way to consistently manage 
these types of cases before they create lasting damage is to be clear on the rules and 
processes which apply in that situation.  Without measuring the effectiveness and 
satisfaction of the employer-employee-customer interaction from all sides, it is not 
appropriate to simply say there is no issue or that the issue does not require some 
degree of attention and resolution.   
In this case, the situation is whether lawyers are allowed to use deceptive 
tactics or engage in allegedly deceptive behaviours in negotiations.  By setting clear 
guidelines, creating consistency in the legal regulations, and creating the institutional 
environment that supports changed behaviours, local variability can reduced and 
measured consistency can be increased across the local, national, and international 
legal work groups.  The result is greater employee and customer satisfaction 
combined with stronger performance at the professional, personal, and financial levels 
for all key stakeholders. 
                                                 
1269
 See generally Daigneault and Marshall, above n 1097, 18 (highlighting the precarious position of 
lawyers in the area of negotiations as well as the issues with Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct in the United States). 
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To date, Fleming, Coffman and Harter have successfully applied their human 
sigma methodology to the retail banking and call centre management areas which are 
heavy in human interaction and variability.  Comparatively, given the extensive and 
sometimes intense nature of human interactions and volatility in the legal profession, 
human sigma principles can be used in the area of law and legal education.  More 
importantly, the human sigma principles can be used in implementing and measuring 
the success of the proposed policy reform proposals recommended in this chapter. 
7.8 CHAPTER COCLUSIO 
This chapter presented a tripartite set of policy reform proposals for addressing 
the issue of lawyers’ use of potentially deceptive tactics in negotiation in an integrated 
and multi-disciplinary approach.  The policy reform proposals were centred on 
targeting legal regulation, ethical standard setting and institutional design.  Further to 
the policy reform proposals, a discussion and analysis of various behavioural change 
models affirms that there are a variety of effective ways to address this complex issue.  
Addressing this issue in a concrete and measurable way will go a long way towards 
reducing the local variability and confusion on appropriate standards of behaviour for 
lawyers in negotiation.   
The potential benefits of implementing the policy reform proposals include 
decreased local variability resulting in better performance, increased consistency in 
the way lawyers practice as negotiators, clarity in the standards of negotiation 
behaviours, reduction in ethics violation cases, and greater positive public trust in and 
perception of lawyers and the legal profession. The next chapter provides a thesis 
summary and concludes with remarks on the impact of the findings and 
recommendations in this thesis to future research, practitioners, and theory. 
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CHAPTER 8 –  
THESIS SUMMARY AD COCLUSIOS 
 
 
‘In the last analysis, the law is what the lawyers are.  And the law and 
the lawyers are what the law schools make them.’ 
 
      ~ Felix Frankfurter
1270
  
 
‘And the day came when the risk to remain tight in a bud was more 
painful than the risk it took to blossom.’ 
 
      ~ Anais in
1271
 
 
The foregoing chapters outlined four primary research questions, discussed the 
results of an analysis into each research question, established a foundation for change, 
and presented a set of strategic, integrated policy reform proposals for the issues 
arising out of this research.  This chapter begins with assessing the implications of this 
study on future research and practice.  Next, the chapter discusses the relationship of 
the results to existing or future theory.  Finally this chapter concludes with a call to 
action to implement the policy reform proposals outlined in Chapter 7 in order to 
address the issues discussed in this thesis. 
8.1 ITRODUCTIO 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 presented and discussed the results of analysing each of 
the three significant research questions outlined in Chapter 1.  The research led to the 
conclusion that strategic policy reforms are essential to addressing the issue of a 
lawyer’s use of deception in negotiation.  Chapter 7 outlined these recommended 
policy reforms using an integrated, tripartite approach. 
                                                 
1270
 Felix Frankfurter, cited in Rand Jack and Dana Jack, Moral Vision and Professional Decisions: The 
Changing Values of Women and Man Lawyers (1989).  See also Sisela Bok, ‘A Flawed System of Law 
Practice and Law Teaching’ (1983) 33 Journal of Legal Education 570, 583 (“...law schools train their 
students more for conflict than for the gentler arts of reconciliation and accommodation.  This emphasis 
is likely to serve the profession poorly.”). 
1271
 Anais in Quotes, above n 727.  Anais Nin was an American author.  
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The first research question, discussed in Chapter 3, confirmed that lawyers 
tend to engage in deceptive and misleading conduct in practice, including during 
negotiations.  Williams’ long-range study combined with Lerman, Davis, and 
Wetlaufer’s anecdotal studies in the United States and Australia identified ways in 
which legal practitioners tend to use deception in practice and ways in which lawyers 
attempt to justify such conduct.
1272
  One of the key insights from these studies is that 
legal practitioners seem to believe that such conduct is either explicitly permissible 
under the legal ethics code of their jurisdiction or acceptable because the legal ethics 
code does not explicitly prohibit such conduct.  The insights from the first research 
question established a sound basis for investigating the second research question. 
The second research question, discussed in Chapter 4, focused on whether 
legal ethics codes regulate the issue of deception in negotiation.  Chapter 4 contains 
the results of a study of the legal ethics codes of four common-law jurisdictions.
1273
  
The study revealed that legal ethics codes, which are meant to guide lawyer conduct 
and curtail deceptive or misleading conduct of legal practitioners, are broad, highly 
aspirational, and out-of- step with societal ethics,
1274
 especially with regards to 
negotiation behaviour. 
Historically, law and ethics (morality) have been separated in terms of law and 
legal education.  However, there is an equally strong argument that law and ethics are 
interdependent such that they can coexist and are not mutually independent of each 
                                                 
1272
 See Chapter 3 (Alleged Deceptive Behaviours of Lawyers) for more information. 
1273
 See Chapter 4 (Efforts by Professional Ethics Codes to Regulate Deceptive Behaviours in 
Negotiation) for more information.  
1274
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2 (Theories of Ethics) for a discussion on ethics and dominant theories 
of ethics.  
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other.
1275
  In some respects, the legal ethics codes represent the morality of the 
profession while statutes and regulations represent the law (rules) of the same 
profession.  They are meant to work together.   
With regards to the application of the legal ethics codes to guide professional 
conduct in negotiations, a review of  legal ethics codes across four common law 
jurisdictions raises several questions:  1) whether negotiation need to be explicitly 
defined as a function of the legal professional; 2) whether the legal ethics codes need 
to have special rules for lawyer as negotiator which are different from traditional 
‘rules’ of the bargaining process; 3) whether all legal ethics codes make exceptions 
for certain permissible deception in the context of negotiation consistent with 
generally acceptable negotiation standards; 4) whether legal ethics codes, cross-
jurisdictionally, should be consistent with regards to deceptive or misleading conduct, 
especially in negotiations; and 5) whether legal ethics codes need to be amended to 
include gradations or categories of deceptive conduct with corresponding sanctions 
which are aligned to reflect prevailing legal precedent.  These foundational questions 
were addressed and incorporated into the policy reform proposals discussed in 
Chapter 7 with the aim of improving the extent to which ethics can influence the 
behaviour of legal professionals on this issue.   
The recognition that lawyers engage in deceptive tactics in negotiation and 
that the legal ethics codes fail to provide sufficient guidelines on appropriate 
negotiation behaviour led to the third research question, a study of ethics violation 
cases as discussed in Chapter 5. 
                                                 
1275
 See, eg, Honoré, above n 115.  
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The third research question involved an analysis of whether the legal ethics 
coded are successful in curtailing deceptive behaviour in negotiation.  Chapter 5 
presented the results of a unique study of the ethics violation cases of one common-
law jurisdiction, namely Queensland, Australia.  This common law jurisdiction serves 
as a representative sample from the jurisdictions studied in Chapter 4.  The results of 
this analysis confirmed earlier research on legal ethics discussed in Chapter 2
1276
 and 
led to the conclusion that the legal ethics codes do not appear to be entirely successful 
in curtailing the deceptive conduct of legal professionals, whether in negotiation or 
otherwise.  For example, the analysis of the ethics violations cases seem to confirm 
Schweitzer and Croson’s findings that ethics education is not a sufficient deterrent 
and is a negligible factor in preventing deceptive behaviour in negotiation.
1277
  This 
might be due  to lack of resources, lack of adequate ‘policing’ of lawyers in a self-
regulated profession, discretionary choices on which violations are egregious enough 
and deserve to be prosecuted, or some other factor.  
The ethics violation cases also show that the profession will only vigorously 
pursue and prosecute the most egregious violators and that the number of prosecutions 
are small compared to the total number of lawyers in that jurisdiction.
1278
  As such, 
these cases could be seen as ‘token’ prosecutions that serve as reminders of a ‘public 
flogging’ should lawyers violate the code of professional conduct and as examples to 
the public that the profession takes these violations seriously.  Furthermore there is a 
                                                 
1276
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4 (Research About Legal Ethics) for more information. 
1277
 See generally Schweitzer and Croson, above n 326, 225-228.  The qualification is that ethics 
education in law school, as it is taught today, is not a sufficient deterrent.  If this was amended, there 
may be a greater chance that ethics education in law school could help lawyers deal with ethical 
dilemmas in practice.  See Chapter 7 (Implications for Law Reforms) for proposals related to this issue. 
1278
 For example, the Queensland Law Society states that it has 6,000 members as at March 2008 yet 
the total number of ethics violation cases alleging deceptive or misleading conduct in a 10 year period 
between 1996 and 2006 is approximately 20.  See Chapter 5 and Appendices for further details on this 
analysis. 
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lack of clear, consistent sets of decisions which would lead one to predict the analysis 
or outcome of future cases (apart from saying the legal professional will be struck off) 
because so much subjectivity seems to go into determining the severity of the conduct 
and subsequent punishment.  In many of the cases, it can be inferred that each 
member of the tribunal that hears an ethics violation case has their own personal 
ethics, a societal ethic, or even their own lawyer ethic which influences their view of 
the attorney’s alleged bad conduct and potentially clouds their final judgment.  The 
lack of clear distinctions means that those hearing ethics violation cases have little 
concrete and consistent guidance on which to make sound judgment free of criticism 
or appeal, even with the benefits of prior case law decisions.
1279
 
In summary, the foregoing chapters established a case for change in which the 
profession must firmly address the issue of lawyer deception in negotiation.  One 
important way to do so is by implementing the policy reform proposals outlined in 
Chapter 7.  These policy reform proposals, based on an integrated, tripartite response 
consisting of legal regulation, ethical standard setting and institutional design reforms, 
serve to address the issue of deception in negotiation. In addition, the policy reform 
proposals create a foundation for moving the profession forward to meet the 
challenges of serving a global legal services market.  As such, this thesis has 
implications for further research, valuable practice recommendations for academia 
and legal practitioners, and provides a tool for policy makers to engage in effective 
policy reforms as discussed in this thesis.  Each of these implications arising out of 
the contribution of this thesis is discussed below.       
                                                 
1279
 See, eg, Craig Stephen Bax [1998] QCA 089 (recognising that there are gradations of deceptive 
conduct that would be considered egregious yet not having any impact on the punishment imposed on 
the practitioner charged with intent to deceive).  This view of the lack of objectivity and consistency in 
ethics violation cases has been shared by many legal scholars.  
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8.2 IMPLICATIOS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The findings of this study and the application of these findings to addressing 
the issue of deception as a legal negotiation strategy have highlighted some avenues 
for future research. 
First, the profession and academia would benefit from extending the work of 
Lerman, Rivers, Lewicki, Wetlaufer, and Davis by developing an objective, 
systematic catalogue of the negotiation behaviours of lawyers.  This taxonomy could 
then be used to conduct quantitative studies to determine the extent to which lawyers 
actually engage in the categories of behaviours defined by the taxonomy.  The 
taxonomy could also be used cross-jurisdictionally to gain a better perspective on the 
global nature of this issue.
1280
 
Second, the comparative legal ethics code study conducted in Chapter 4 
combined with the research findings of Lamb, Manwaring and McFarlane, Moliterno, 
and Wilkinson et al can be leveraged to undertake further research on other common-
law as well as civil-law jurisdictions to determine the extent to which legal ethics 
codes can serve as a valuable and practical tool for legal practitioners when 
addressing ethical dilemmas such as deception in negotiation.  Policy makers can use 
the study in Chapter 4 to review the national legal ethics code and state-wide ethics 
codes for consistency and alignment with practical expectations of ethical conduct.  
Consistency is a hallmark of care and quality and this includes consistent language, 
interpretation, and application of the ethical codes of conduct. 
In addition to implications for further research, the findings of this study have 
implications for practitioners.  
                                                 
1280
 Note:  The work of Professor Harry C Triandis is exemplary as a model of conducting cross-
jurisdiction and cross-cultural studies.  
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8.3 IMPLICATIOS FOR PRACTICE  
The findings of this study suggest several implications for practice.  First, 
legal practitioners and scholars need to look at the negotiation process in context.  
What I mean by this is that the term ‘negotiation’ is generally used as an all-
encompassing term for a process that involves the exchange of goods and services, 
and in many cases of dispute resolution, the exchange of information.  Context with 
regards to negotiation is equally important because the context can change the rules 
by which negotiation takes place.  For example, negotiation in the business context 
(business negotiators) may be relatively simple as having a reservation price, making 
an offer, listening and responding to counter-offers, making appropriate concessions, 
and closing the deal.  This process is well known and articulated.  Little discussion of 
ethics takes place such that action precedes thought (i.e. generally action of a 
negotiation task precedes any thoughts of ethical implications).   
In contrast, negotiation in the context of law (legal negotiation) may require 
more thought before action.  In other words, I submit that legal negotiators need to put 
ethics at the forefront of negotiation and think more seriously about the ethical 
framework in which their negotiations take place to ensure that their actions (use of 
strategy and tactics) are aligned accordingly. 
Second, practitioners need a more comprehensive and well-rounded education 
(discourse) on ethics, as discussed in Chapter 7, through implementation of the ethical 
standard setting reforms.  This is especially important today where legal practice 
continues to evolve in a functional, structural, and operational manner.  Nearly all law 
schools require law students to take an ethics course that instructs them on the 
prevailing ethics rules and case law.  While legal ethics courses are helpful, the 
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findings of research into legal ethics as well as deception in negotiation demonstrates 
that a single required legal ethics code does not guarantee or have an impact on 
whether the individual will refrain from using deception in negotiation or engaging in 
other deceptive or misleading practices.  As such, the current legal ethics courses, 
without more, may be insufficient in providing proper guidance on how lawyers 
should behave. 
Third, policy makers should undertake a review of the national legal ethics 
code and state-wide ethics codes for consistency and alignment with practical 
expectations of ethical conduct.  This might include providing greater clarity about the 
rules and guidelines which apply to the varied functions of a legal professional as well 
as incorporating more objective, specifically defined distinctions between professional 
misconduct, unprofessional conduct or malpractice with corresponding sanctions.  
Consistency in thought and application is one relatively simple way to weave a 
stronger ethical fabric upon which to base future conduct.  By implementing the 
policy reform proposals centred on the integration of ethical standard setting, legal 
regulation, and institutional design aligned with core values,
1281
 the profession can 
ensure consistency and improve performance.  More importantly, the consistency 
created by implementing the policy reform proposals is likely to improve the 
perception of legal professionals currently held by the public as evidenced by the 
consumer studies discussed in Chapter 6.
1282
  
In summary, this study provides many avenues of further development for 
practitioners and policy makers in understanding the nature and importance of 
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 See Chapter 7 (Implications for Law Reform) for more information on these policy reform 
proposals. 
1282
 See Chapter 6, Section 6.5 (Consumer Studies of the Legal Profession are the ‘Sting in the Tail’) 
for more information. 
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negotiations, negotiation theory and principles, the ethics of negotiation and how 
practitioners can embody the best possible ethical principles in negotiation in line 
with their existing duties to the client, the justice system, and society as a whole.   
8.4 RELATIOSHIP OF RESULTS TO THEORY 
This thesis began with a journey to understanding whether and the extent to 
which lawyers use deceptive behaviour in negotiation and whether legal ethics codes, 
principally charged with regulating lawyer conduct and providing guidance to lawyers 
on acceptable and unacceptable professional conduct, are successful in curtailing such 
deceptive behaviours.  This journey led to the conclusion that a strategic set of 
integrated policy reform proposals is necessary and beneficial to not only addressing 
the issues discussed in this thesis but to align with recent recommendations on the 
nature of professionalism and legal education as they pertain to the legal 
profession.
1283
   
The findings and conclusions have implications to the prevailing theory of 
legal ethics, commonly called ‘adversarial ethics’ or ‘standard conception’.   
Deception in negotiation is common and expected, especially where the negotiator is 
using a distributive bargaining theory of negotiation; however, it is also common in 
interest-based and mixed-motive negotiations because they eventually contain some 
distributive items.  The primary strategy for distributive bargaining is value-claiming, 
fixed-pie, win-lose mentality where the focus is simply on winning.
1284
 
                                                 
1283
 See, eg, Gary Davis, International Conference on the Future of Legal Education: Report to Council 
of Australian Law Deans (Summary) (2008) 2-8 
http://www.cald.asn.au/docs/FutureOfLegEdConfRptSummy.doc> at 26 February 2010.  
1284
 See generally Lewicki, Sanders and Barry, above n 25; Karrass, above n 919; Williams, above n 
202, Fisher, Ury and Patton, above n 536. 
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The legal system, or the adversarial system as many call it, is principally a 
system based on the same mentality – win-lose – or it has been for many years until 
recently with the incorporation of more ADR processes into the mainstream of the 
judicial system.  The legal system is considered ‘adversarial’ because the trial 
mentality of win-lose, plaintiff-defendant, or prosecutor-defender, seems to turn every 
dispute into a contest of who will win and who will lose.  It is also constantly 
portrayed as adversarial in the media, in popular culture, and in the law firm culture.  
Furthermore, the nature and purpose of the ‘adversarial’ aspect has been diluted and 
misunderstood in light of the historical context in which this was envisioned, as a 
means of uncovering the truth.
1285
   
Because traditional bargaining is still a win-lose mentality and the legal 
system is a win-lose system, lawyers are likely to use deception in negotiations if they 
can get away with it.  Further, the legal ethics codes across a majority of common-law 
jurisdictions, to date, provide little or no guidance on how lawyers should behave in 
negotiations.  Therefore, lawyers might assume the ‘general negotiation conventions 
are acceptable’ posture due to silence regarding alternate acceptable behaviour.   
Critics lament the current ‘standard conception’ model of legal ethics 
(adversarial ethics) as an excuse to continue with potentially unethical behaviour.  As 
a reminder, the standard conception model consists of the principle of partisanship, 
the principle of neutrality, and principle of non-accountability (role morality).
1286
    
Critics argue that the combination of these three principles is the reason why lawyers 
                                                 
1285
 Carvan, above n 2, 70. 
1286
 See, eg, Tim Dare, The Counsel of Rogues?  A Defence of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s 
Role (2009) 3-11 (discussing these three principles of the standard conception model and describing 
some of the main criticisms of this model of lawyer’s role); Luban, above n 1130, 139-178. 
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are seen as ‘amoral’, hold themselves not accountable for their actions in fighting for 
their client’s interests, and are alienated from ordinary morality.
1287
 
However, the results of this study show that the views regarding the principles 
of the standard conception model are not as simple or conclusive as they would seem 
to the outsider or the public.  First, there is a difference between being ‘amoral’ and 
‘immoral’.  Amoral means that while a person does believe in the existence of moral 
principles, the individual has a complete lack of belief in any sort of existing morality 
or ethical code.
1288
  Immoralism, on the other hand, rejects moral standards and 
directly opposes morality.
 1289
   
On the basis of this study, it appears that most lawyers are neither ‘immoral’ 
nor ‘amoral’.  They may have to abide by a role-morality but that is expected of any 
profession, especially the legal profession charged with the highest standards of 
upholding the availability of pursuing justice for all, not just for one person or for 
whom they personally find more favourable, rich, poor, or famous.  Lawyers, even in 
their capacity as negotiators, have to be able to withhold their personal morals from 
infringing upon a potential client’s right to access justice and to make a choice in their 
defence.
1290
  In this case, they may be regarded as adopting not a ‘role-morality’ but a 
‘role-neutral morality’. 
The results from this study seem to indicate that while critics say lawyers use 
the principle of nonaccountability (due to role-morality), this is likely not the case in a 
                                                 
1287
 See, eg, Dare, above n 1286, 3 (describing some of the main criticism of the standard conception); 
Luban, above n 1130, 139-178. 
1288
 Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who eeds It (1984) 47-50; Anita Superson, The Moral Skeptic 
(2009) 127-159. 
1289
 See, eg, Ronald D Milo, Immorality (1984). 
1290
 Dare, above n 1286, 10-12 (discussing how the principle of non-accountability is often 
misunderstood and causes lawyers and others to incorrectly assume that the lawyer “identifies or 
sympathise[s] with their client’s goals… [whereas] the lawyer might have strong moral objections to a 
client’s projects, but be forbidden form relying upon those objections by the principle of neutrality….”). 
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majority of situations.  The principle of nonaccountability argues that lawyers do not 
feel accountable for their actions.  The results seem to indicate that it is not that 
lawyers feel they are not accountable because, clearly, they face ethical dilemmas 
often and can explain those dilemmas, including whether to be deceptive in 
negotiations.
1291
  The results seem to indicate that when lawyers do face these ethical 
challenges, there are insufficient resources to help them deal with these ethical 
challenges such that they may appear unaccountable or be perceived as unaccountable.  
The studies indicate that there is a disconnect between their exposure to ethical 
dilemmas and the guidance available to them in order to effectively and consistently 
deal with those ethical issues in practice, with the legal ethics codes providing little 
direct and practical guidance. 
This study challenges the way that the adversarial ethic or standard conception 
is viewed, taught, perpetuated, and perceived.  This study implores and challenges 
practitioners and academia to find new ways to explore, discuss, and educate lawyers 
about the standard conception ethic, what it is meant to be, and to help future lawyers 
to understand their place in society – to understand that by adopting a role-morality, 
or rather a role-neutral morality, that is presumably higher than ordinary morality, a 
lawyer takes on ethical obligations which might require conduct in negotiations that is 
above generally accepted negotiation conventions.  Such a critical discussion may 
serve as the basis of determining whether the standard conception is no longer 
applicable or whether, as Dare argues, the standard conception is merely suffering 
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 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5 (Synthesis of Literature Review) for more information on the research 
findings regarding the types of ethical dilemmas lawyers face in practice.  
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from a lack of poor perception and understanding.
1292
  Without such a critical 
discourse, lawyers, in their increasingly important capacity as negotiators, might 
never reach resolution on how they are to act in negotiations and whether the use of 
deceptive conduct in negotiations will serve the public and the profession.  On the 
other hand, by having such a discourse, lawyers can help their clients, colleagues, 
academia, and those who come in contact with the legal system to also live by the 
standards conducive to a well-ordered society. 
8.5 THESIS SUMMARY AD COCLUSIO 
Negotiation skills are an ever-increasing and critical component of a lawyer’s 
practice.  Negotiation is also the foundation of other dispute resolution processes, 
such as settlement conferences, mediation, and arbitration.  Because lawyers negotiate 
so often, how they negotiate with clients and colleagues alike is just as important as 
what they accomplish during those negotiations.  How a lawyer negotiates is directly 
tied to negotiation behaviour as reflected by the strategies and tactics employed in the 
negotiation.  Positive and negative behaviours may create perceptions in the minds of 
clients and colleagues about the nature of the legal practitioner as well as the legal 
profession.  As seen by the studies discussed in Chapter 6, these perceptions, to date, 
have been negative as compared with the perception consumers have of similar 
professions, especially with respect to the perception of lawyers as ethical and honest. 
Prevailing conventions in negotiation theory and principles suggest that 
deception is an inherent part of the bargaining process.  When applied to legal 
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 Dare, above n 1286, 10-12 (discussing how “a good deal of the widespread public dissatisfaction 
with the ethical standards of the law profession flow precisely from the tendency of observers to do 
what the principle [of nonaccountability] says they should not do – assume that lawyers endorse or 
sympathise with their client’s causes.”).  Note:  Luban, a foremost critic of the standard conception, as 
well as other ‘observers’ generally only refers to the principle of partisanship and the principle of 
nonaccountability. 
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negotiations, these conventions tend to conflict with the lawyer’s ethical duties to the 
courts, fellow practitioners, clients, and the public. 
This study was an attempt to question the validity of prevailing notions of 
deception in negotiation and to investigate the extent to which lawyers use deception 
in negotiation, how ethics codes attempt to regulate such conduct, and whether such 
attempts are or can be successful.  In addressing the research questions, this study 
used a primarily qualitative methodology with a cross-jurisdictional and 
multidisciplinary approach that involved a triangulation of theories, methods, and data.  
The study consisted of a catalogue of negotiation behaviours, an original cross-
jurisdictional comparative analysis of legal ethics codes, and an original comparative 
analysis of the ethics violation cases of a sample common-law jurisdiction. 
As a result of the findings and insights obtained through addressing the 
research questions, this study recommends implementing a set of integrated policy 
reforms in the areas of legal regulation, ethical standard setting and institutional 
design.  The legal regulation reform proposals are targeted towards creating greater 
consistency in the legal ethics codes and behavioural norms on the ethics of legal 
negotiation.  The ethical standard setting reforms are designed to establish core values 
that align the profession and improve the ethical decision-making skills of current and 
future lawyers consistent with the legal regulation reforms.  The institutional design 
reforms are aimed at improving the enforcement of ethics violations that might 
involve deceptive or misleading conduct in negotiations as well as encouraging 
greater collaboration between the legal education institutions and the profession so as 
to align future legal education with what lawyers of the 21
st
 century actually do in 
practice.  
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The goal of this integrated approach is to make an incremental yet measurable 
difference in the way lawyers do what they do most often – negotiate.  By creating an 
incremental, positive change in behaviour, local variability in negotiation practice (e.g. 
use of deception in negotiation) is decreased, resulting in better personal, professional, 
and financial performance.  In addition, such reforms are likely to result in greater 
consistency of expected negotiation behaviour that translates into increased 
performance and positive perceptions of legal practitioners.  Finally, this research and 
subsequent findings provide a rich and substantial basis for future application in 
practice, application to theory, and further research.   
In light of evolutionary factors such as increased globalisation and 
democratisation of countries, the continuing use and necessity of negotiation as a 
critical dispute resolution process, and the increased deployment of mandatory 
negotiation-based processes such as mediation, judicial settlement conferences, and 
arbitration, the time to act is now.   
As expressed at the beginning of this chapter, the risk in remaining silent, in 
the corner, or on the fence is far greater than the risk to simply take one step towards 
integrated policy reform.
1293
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 Note:  This statement is paraphrased from the quote by Anais Nin, above n 727: “And the 
day came when the risk to remain tight in a bud was more painful than the risk it took to 
blossom.” 
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Appendix  2
Queensland Ethics Violations Cases (1996 - 2007) Summary Analysis
Note:  The following is a summary analysis of the Queensland ethics violation cases alleging deceptive conduct
For confidentiality reasons, names of practitioners and/or any identyfing information has been omitted. Example in Thesis: 1-S = Case 1 re Solicitor)
No Year Alleged Violation
Context/
Function
Aggravating (A) / Mitigating (M) 
Circumstances?
Hearing/Tribunal Appeal
1 1996/1997 
(solicitor) 
Mead
18 charges - Trust Accounts 
Act, failure to protect client 
interests among others; 
NO allegations of fraud or 
deceptive behaviours
during course of 
practice
A - yes
M - yes
Sept 1996
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--suspended till July 1999 
(approx 3 yrs);
--pay costs
April 1997
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--suspension order set 
aside;
--solicitor struck off;
--pay costs
2 1997 
(solicitor) 
Smith
fraudulently convert trust 
moneys
during course of 
practice
A - yes
M - yes (personal and medical)
April 1997
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--suspended till able to 
satisfy fit and proper 
criteria
--pay costs
April 1997
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--suspension order set 
aside;
--solicitor struck off;
--pay costs
3 1997/1998 
(solicitor/ 
partner for 
past 5 yrs) 
Bax
falsely backdating document 
with intent to mislead
during course of 
practice - acting 
for client in 
mortgage 
transaction
A - yes
M - none cited
July 1997
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--ordered to pay $15,000 
fine
May 1998
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--order for fine set aside;
--solicitor struck off;
--pay costs - fixed
4 1998 
(solicitor) 
Williams
10 charges - 3 of them for 
fraudulent misappropriation of 
funds resulting in false and 
misleading statement of 
accounts
during course of 
practice
A - yes
M - yes
July 1997
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--solicitor struck off
none found
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No Year Alleged Violation
Context/
Function
Aggravating (A) / Mitigating (M) 
Circumstances?
Hearing/Tribunal Appeal
5 1998 
(solicitor) 
Gregory
attempt to suborn Crown 
witness/induce to perjure
during course of 
practice
A - none cited
M - yes
May 1998
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--suspended from practice 
for 2 years
December 1998
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--suspension order set 
aside;
--solicitor struck off;
--pay costs - fixed;
--Nov 2001 - application 
for re-admission denied
6 1997/2000 
(solicitor) 
Clough
use of dishonest means to 
further a client's case 
(personal injury case)
during course of 
practice
A - none cited
M - yes (including need for intent + 
no finding of 'dishonesty' - just unfair 
means)
Nov 1997
--guilty of unprofessional 
conduct;
--suspended for 12 
months; 
--ordered to attend legal 
education program;
(NB - practitioner 
appealed)
July 2000
--guilty of unprofessional 
conduct;
--appeal and cross-
appeal dismissed;
--Tribunal's judgment 
affirmed (i.e. suspension)
--pay costs
7 2000 
(barrister) 
Darveniza
supplying dangerous drug 
(prior conviction); then intent 
to decieve court re his 
appication/affidavit for 
barrister in NSW
court - application 
for barrister
A - yes (including personal conduct 
affecting professional standing)
M - none cited
not found
--direct application to 
Supreme Court
2000
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--barrister struck off
8 2000 
(solicitor) 
Delaney
3 charges of unprofessional 
conduct; no charges of 
deception or fraud alleged or 
found
during course of 
practice
A - yes (minor)
M - yes
2000
--guilty of 'unprofessional 
conduct';
--fine of $15,000;
--pay costs + taxes;
--pay compensation to 3 
complainants totaling 
$21,000
2000
--affirmed Tribunal's 
judgment;
--appeal by A-G 
dismissed
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No Year Alleged Violation
Context/
Function
Aggravating (A) / Mitigating (M) 
Circumstances?
Hearing/Tribunal Appeal
9 1999/2001 
(solicitor) 
Wright
8 charges - false or 
misleading affidavits; false or 
misleading or recklessly 
made statements and 
submissions to QLS re 
commercial transaction case
in court + during 
course of practice
A - yes
M - none cited
Dec 1999
--guilty of 'professional 
misconduct';
--solicitor struck off
--pay costs + taxes;
Feb 2001
--affirmed Tribunal's 
judgment;
--appeal by practitioner 
dismissed;
--pay costs of appeal
10 2001 
(barrister) 
Khan
failure to disclose info 
relevant to application for 
admission (ie lack of candour 
in application)
during course of 
practice
A - yes
M - none cited
not found
--direct application to 
Supreme Court
March 2001
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--barrister struck off
11 2001/2002 
(solicitor) 
Priddle
2 charges of unprofessional 
conduct - failure to keep 
accounting and record of trust 
moneys;  no charges of 
deception or fraud indicated; 
no findings of deceitful or 
dishonest conduct by court
during course of 
practice
A - none cited
M - yes
Oct 2001
--guilty of 'unprofessional 
conduct';
--solicitor suspended for 1 
year
--pay costs
Aug 2002
--affirmed Tribunal's 
judgment;
--appeal by QLS and A-G 
dismissed;
--costs to be assessed
12 2000/2001 
(barrister) 
Young
1 charge - giving false 
evidence on commission 
inquiry into electoral fraud
at commission 
hearing
A - yes
M - yes
not found
--direct application to 
Supreme Court
March 2001
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--barrister struck off;
--pay costs
13 2003 
(solicitor) 
Whitman
3 charges - 1 fraudulently 
misappropriate client funds; 
knowingly falsely represent 
employment of one solicitor
during course of 
practice
A - yes
M - yes
Dec 2002/Feb 2003
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--suspended for 9 months;
--pay costs 
October 2003
--affirmed Tribunal's 
judgment; 
--appeal and cross-
appeal dismissed
14 2002/2003 
(solicitor) 
Lowes
7-8 charges of 
misappropriation of client 
trust funds + undue delay in 
administration of estate; no 
charge  of dishonesty (but 
tribunal finding  of dishonesty 
on 1 charge)
during course of 
practice
A - none cited
M - yes
June/Aug 2002
--guilty of unprofessional 
conduct;
--fine of $15,000;
--orders for CPM course + 
audit by senior 
practitioner;
--pay costs 
October 2003
--affirmed Tribunal's 
judgment; 
--appeal via AG/QLS 
dismissed
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No Year Alleged Violation
Context/
Function
Aggravating (A) / Mitigating (M) 
Circumstances?
Hearing/Tribunal Appeal
15 2004 
(solicitor) 
Tunn
4 charges - breaches of 
request for info via Society, 
failure to properly supervise 
staff, serious neglect and 
undue delay in handling 
cases; no deception or fraud 
alleged
during course of 
practice
A - yes
M - yes (personal and medical)
June/July 2004
--2 charges guilty of 
unprofessional conduct;
--2 charges guilty of 
professional misconduct;
--solicitor struck off;
--orders to pay 
compensation to named 
complainants for total of 
$19,318.00;
--pay costs;
--no new undertakings by 
clients 
Nov 2004
--affirmed Tribunal's 
judgment; 
--appeal via solicitor
16 2005 
(solicitor) 
Williams
various breaches of Trust 
Accounts Act and Trust 
Accounts Regulation; no 
deception or fraud alleged - 
none found
during course of 
practice
A - yes
M - yes
June/July 2004
--guilty of unprofessional 
conduct;
--solicitor suspended for 
12 months (if default on 
any terms of order);
--penalty of $10,000 to 
Fund;
--complete PMC module 
on Trust Accounts;
--install/operate 
computerised Trust 
Account System;
--pay costs
Note - Solicitor appealed 
for 'manifestly excessive 
penalty' 
Nov 2004
--affirmed Tribunal's 
judgment except varied 
suspension period to 6 
months; 
17 2005 
(barrister) 
Williams
aggravated fraud; attempted 
aggravated fraud - personal 
actions affecting professional 
standing
during course of 
being barrister but 
not in course of 
practice; personal 
commercial 
transactions
A - yes
M - yes 
Oct 2005
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--pay costs 
none found
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No Year Alleged Violation
Context/
Function
Aggravating (A) / Mitigating (M) 
Circumstances?
Hearing/Tribunal Appeal
18 2005 
(solicitor) 
Baker
18 charges of dishonesty in 
charging fees and rendering 
account of fees charged in 
violation of retainer 
agreement
during course of 
practice
A - yes (# of charges)
M - none cited
Sept 2005
--guilty of 5 charges of 
professional misconduct;
--guilty of 3 charges of 
unprofessional conduct;
--solicitor struck off;
--pay costs;
NB - Tribunal granted stay 
of strike off pending 
appeal
Dec 2005
--Set aside Tribunal's 
order to stay 
recommendation as 
improper exercise of 
discretionary power;
--solicitor struck off; 
--solicitor's application for 
stay dismissed;
--no order as to costs
19 2006 
(barrister) 
Mullins
knowingly misled insurer in 
connection with claims 
negotiation at mediation; 
fraudulent deception
during course of 
practice - at 
mediation
A - yes
M - yes
Nov 2006
--guilty of professional 
misconduct;
--publicly reprimanded;
--pay penalty of $20,000;
--pay costs
none found
20 2006 
(barrister) 
Hackett
swore misleading affidavit 
used in District Court
during course of 
practice - at 
meeting of body 
corporate
A - yes
M - yes
Dec 2006
--guilty professional 
misconduct;
--pay pecuniary penalty of 
$5,000
--pay costs;
none found
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